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vPREFACE
Elections have long fascinated me. This interest was one of the driving forces behind
my decision in the early 1990s to study political science in Leiden. In those years, I
soon came to realise that if one wants to understand the choices of voters, some
knowledge of psychology might be helpful. So I followed a couple of introductory
courses in that field. When I had to choose a subject for my master’s thesis, I ulti-
mately decided to focus on what interested me most and apply some ideas from psy-
chology to the electoral context. When I had finished the thesis, my conclusion was
that the strategy adopted had been fruitful. Moreover, in as far as I did not exactly
know why people voted in a particular way, at least I had some ideas about how to
find out. I wrote down my ideas in a research proposal, on the basis of which I was
awarded the position of Ph.D. candidate in the department of Political Science at the
University of Leiden. It took a little longer than I anticipated, but the final result now
lies in front of you.
Of the many things that could additionally be said, there is one peculiarity that
seems nice to highlight. During my doctoraal (three-year program leading to a mas-
ter’s degree) in political science at the University of Leiden, there were two courses
for which I received the lowest passing grade. The first course was on research meth-
ods, and the second was on political psychology. Strikingly, both topics feature quite
prominently in this thesis. Perhaps this makes you wonder whether my dissertation
would have been much better, had it been on another subject. Or perhaps you won-
der how much better a dissertation would have been written about this subject, had
someone else been given the opportunity to do so. These are interesting questions,
although we might never know the answer.
This leads me to the people whose contribution I wish to acknowledge. First, I
want to express my gratitude to the department of Political Science at the University
of Twente, which generously provided me with the opportunity to finish the disser-
vi
tation in a stimulating and friendly environment. Second, I am grateful to the col-
leagues who commented on draft versions of chapters or related papers, which I pre-
sented at several conferences. Third, I would like to thank the person who was will-
ing to use his artistic talents, which are not easily underestimated, for designing the
cover of this thesis: Martin van Leeuwen. Finally, I would not have been able to write
this thesis if my private life would not have been such a happy one. Family and
friends contributed to this, but the single person largely responsible is the one who
accompanied me in life for all those years.
Enschede, October 2004
Martin Rosema
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PA R T  I
Introduction and Background

3Why do people vote as they do? That is the central question of this research. Why do
voters support one candidate or party rather than another? This has been one of the
classic questions of political science, which should be no surprise given the fact that
elections are the cornerstone of the democratic system. The essence of democracy is
that political power is acquired through a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.1
Consequently, without insight in why people vote as they do in elections, we know
little about the functioning of democracies. The validity of the interpretation of an
election outcome as a mandate, for example, depends on why people vote as they do.
If they vote for a party because they approve of its performance in the past, the out-
come cannot be interpreted in the same way as when they do so because they like its
promises for the future.2 To understand what meaning can be attributed to election
outcomes, and judge how democracies function, we need to understand what makes
voters decide in a particular way.
The question why people vote as they do is not new. Many answers have al-
ready been given and substantial insights have been gained (see Dalton and
Wattenberg 1993; Harrop and Miller 1987). Nevertheless, our understanding of vot-
ing behaviour is still limited. In a sense, today it appears even more limited than
some decades ago. For example, in the Netherlands in the 1950s the choice of a large
majority of voters could be explained on the basis of their religiosity and social class
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lijphart 1974; Andeweg 1982). Today, however, on the ba-
sis of the same information vote choices can be predicted much more poorly. Moreo-
ver, no other social characteristics seem to have taken the place of religiosity and so-
cial class (Andeweg 1982, 1995; Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1989a; Van Holsteyn and
Irwin 2003; Van der Kolk 2000). Alternative explanations of vote choice have since
been provided, for example on the basis of ideology and policy preferences (Van der
Eijk and Niemöller 1983; Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1989b; Middendorp 1991; Van
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Wijnen 2001). However, this has not yet resulted in satisfactory explanations. Moreo-
ver, since the mid-1980s the explanatory power of models based on ideology and
policy preferences seems also to have decreased (Thomassen et al. 2000; Van Wijnen
2001; Van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003).
The decrease in understanding described above is the result of changes in soci-
ety, not developments in scientific theory. One may argue that to know that today
religiosity and social class structure vote choice to a limited extent and to know that
in the 1950s they did to a large extent, both concern the same amount of understand-
ing. What the example illustrates, is that a so-called sociological approach to voting
behaviour is of limited value today. We must turn to other approaches. One possibil-
ity is to focus more strongly on what goes on in voters’ minds.
This shift is also important for another reason. The question how well a model
explains voting behaviour is often answered on the basis of the number of voters
whose choice can be predicted correctly on the basis of information other than their
voting – in statistical terms: the amount of variance explained of the dependent vari-
able (vote choice) on the basis of the independent variables (for example, religiosity
and social class). At least equally important, however, is to understand how inde-
pendent variables are related to vote choice (Asch 1952, ch. 18). For example, if
Catholic voters were all to vote for a Catholic party, the question remains why they
do so. Do they vote out of habit, or do they deliberately make up their mind? Do they
vote because people in their surrounding influence them, or because they agree with
the policy proposals of the party? Or do they vote because they reckon that they
share the same ideology? To really understand why people vote as they do, such
questions must be answered.
The questions just posed point to one specific way in which our understanding
of voting is limited, namely in terms of the underlying psychological processes. Al-
though much electoral research has been done, the psychology of voting has re-
mained poorly understood. Some scholars have explicitly stated that their studies
adopted a psychological perspective, most notably those of the so-called Michigan
school (Campbell et al. 1954, 1960). In the following chapter it will be argued, how-
ever, that it may be doubted whether these studies are as psychological as generally
thought, and whether they give insight in the psychological processes that underlie
voting.
THE RESEARCH QUESTION
Voting is often regarded as comprising two decisions: whether to vote or abstain,
and which party or candidate to vote for. The two decisions correspond with differ-
ent questions that voters ask themselves: “Shall I vote or not?” and “For whom shall I
vote?”. These questions may be related. If voters know whom they prefer, this may
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be an incentive to cast a vote. If voters have no idea for whom to vote, this may be a
reason to abstain. This implies that the two decisions are not always made independ-
ently of one another. Nevertheless, in voting research both decisions are often re-
garded as independent, or at least treated as if they are (see, for example, Dalton and
Wattenberg 1993; Miller and Shanks 1996). This research adopts the common ap-
proach and focuses on ‘for whom’ people vote. Hence, in this study the question is
why people vote as they do, given the fact that they vote.
If voting behaviour is defined in terms of ‘for whom’ people vote, the question
arises who this ‘whom’ is. In this research voting is defined in terms of parties. While
in principle the theory to be outlined can also be applied to other objects – for exam-
ple, candidates – this study speaks about vote choice in terms of parties for whom
people vote. The main reason to do so is that in most established democracies parties
play a key role. Elections may therefore be conceived of as competitions between
parties. Moreover, even if, in a formal and/or psychological sense, people vote for
candidates, their votes may still be analysed in terms of the parties that in a sense
receive them. This means that the research question may in practice be phrased as
why people vote for (a candidate of) a particular party.
A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH
The fact that the study of voting has its own name – psephology3 – illustrates that
one might regard the study of voting as a discipline on its own. The theories that
have been used to explain voting are usually not meant to be applied outside the
voting domain. This does not mean, however, that psephology operates in isolation
of other fields. Rather, the major theories of voting have a basis in three other disci-
plines: sociology, psychology, and economics (Harrop and Miller 1987). Likewise,
this study is strongly based in psychology.
The psychological explanation for voting fits the fourth and latest phase of the
development of the study of mind and behaviour (see LeDoux 1998, ch. 2). Until the
beginning of the twentieth century the study of mind and behaviour was based pri-
marily on introspection. During the first half of the twentieth century the dominant
approach became that of behaviourism, which proclaimed that concepts that con-
cern the mind, and which were gained access to by introspection (e.g. concepts like
perception, memory, and emotion), are not appropriate topics for scientific study. In
the behaviourist approach the psychological processes that mediate between ‘exter-
nal events’ and ‘behaviour’ were regarded as a ‘black box’. With the development of
computers a new metaphor for the human mind arose, namely that of an informa-
tion-processing system. This laid the base for a third approach, which opened up the
black box: cognitive science. An essential element, however, was still missing. Argu-
ably, the most important difference between computers and humans is that, unlike
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humans, computers are not directed by emotions. The incorporation of emotions in
information-processing marks the approach of the fourth phase. Unlike the behav-
iourist approach, the study of mental phenomena is regarded as necessary; and un-
like the purely cognitive approach, emotions are regarded as phenomena to be in-
cluded.
The core idea in the psychological approach adopted is that to understand why
people vote as they do, we must understand what goes on in their mind. When indi-
viduals act, like when they vote, specific thoughts or feelings have preceded and
these are regarded as the key to understanding the behaviour. This is not to say that
the underlying psychological processes are all there is to know. However, even for
the understanding of the impact of non-psychological phenomena, such as social set-
tings and political events, insight in the psychological processes is important. Such
phenomena have an impact on voting behaviour only if (and thus because) they in-
fluence how voters think and feel about political objects. This means that their im-
pact is mediated by psychological variables. Hence, the study of social settings and
political events may not only benefit from, but arguably requires, insight in the psy-
chological processes that underlie voting.4
Psychological variables may be regarded as consequences of non-psychological
variables and as causes of behaviour.5 However, psychological variables may also be
consequences of behaviour. Various scholars have emphasised that what individuals
do influences what they feel or think, rather than the other way round (Festinger
1957; Bem 1972). In this study those processes will not be focused on. The question
here is what psychological processes underlie voting behaviour, not what psycho-
logical processes result from it. However, when focusing on particular psychological
variables in order to explain voting, it is important to ask the question whether these
variables should not be regarded consequences, rather than causes, of the behaviour
studied. Furthermore, it is important to note that causal relationships may also exist
between psychological variables themselves.6 This implies that psychological vari-
ables may be related to behaviour indirectly, since their influence may be mediated
by other psychological variables. So to understand the psychological processes that
underlie voting, the way psychological variables are related to one another must also
be examined.
The question which psychological variables are to be focused on remains to be
answered. This will be done in the remainder of this study by applying some general
ideas from social psychology, and to some extent neuroscience, to the electoral con-
text. Theories not directed at voting behaviour may provide useful insights for its
study. In some instances the electoral context may require modifications of those
theories. Another difference with general psychological research is that in this study
the concepts will mostly be phrased in a way that only applies to voting. For exam-
ple, a key concept in this study is that of party evaluations. These may be seen as an
example of the social psychological concept of attitudes.
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THE DUTCH CASE
The psychological processes that underlie voting are presumably not fundamentally
different across voters, elections, countries, or time. All voters use similar brains and
therefore similar psychological processes will operate. Consequently, in a sense it is
not relevant in which context the theory to be developed is put to the test. Neverthe-
less, from the perspective of electoral research, the Netherlands is particularly inter-
esting.
As will be shown in more detail in the next chapter, the Netherlands has been
considered a country to which a sociological approach applies very well (Lipset and
Rokkan 1967: 15). In terms of so-called psychological models of voting the Dutch
case was found to be special too, because the models could not be applied well. With
respect to party identification, one of the central concepts in psychological models of
voting, the Netherlands has been found to be the oddest case of all (Miller and
Shanks 1996: 117; see Chapter 2). Among Dutch voters party identification and elec-
toral choice could not be distinguished meaningfully (Thomassen 1976b), and the
major psychological model was therefore considered not useful. Although solutions
to the Dutch ‘party identification problem’ have been proposed, as yet it has not been
solved. To substantiate the principal claim of this study that vote choice can be dis-
tinguished meaningfully from partisanship if it is conceptualised in terms of party
evaluations, a useful strategy may be to test the ideas in a context that seems least
likely to be suitable. Because the Dutch case has been known for its unsuitability to
explain voting behaviour on the basis of the existing psychological models and the
impossibility to distinguish between partisanship and vote choice, there is arguably
no better case for an empirical test than the Dutch one.
Dutch parliamentary elections may also be considered interesting in their own
right. Although Dutch politics has perhaps not been renowned for a high level of
excitement, recent elections brought some eye-catching changes. In 1994 the Chris-
tian Democrats (CDA) suffered a record loss of 20 seats (out of 54). This resulted in
the first government without any Christian party since the introduction of universal
suffrage at the beginning of the twentieth century.7 In 2002 the Labour Party (PvdA)
beat the record, losing 22 of their 45 seats. The most amazing electoral event was ar-
guably the fact that in the same year a new list of candidates headed by Pim Fortuyn,
who was assassinated nine days before the election, entered parliament with 26
seats. This made them the second-largest party. To understand these events, it is nec-
essary to gain insight in what went on in the minds of voters.
A final reason why the Dutch case is an appropriate one for this study, is that
data for analysis are available. The Netherlands has a research project called the
Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES), which contains data from surveys
held around each parliamentary election since 1971 (about the DPES, see Van der
Eijk and Niemöller 1994). On the basis of these data, the major models of voting have
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already been tested. Although the DPES data are not perfect for testing all ideas put
forward in this research, the surveys in 1986, 1994, 1998, and 2002 included questions
on the basis of which key ideas can be tested.
DESIGN OF THE BOOK
The aim of this research is to contribute to the understanding of voting at the theo-
retical level by focusing on the psychological processes that underlie voting. A
theory of voting will be developed and the corresponding models will be tested em-
pirically in the context of Dutch parliamentary elections.
This book is organised in four parts: background, theory, empirical analyses,
and conclusions. The psephological and psychological background of this research
will be discussed in the following two chapters. Chapter 2 points out how existing
theories of voting might be viewed from a psychological perspective, what their im-
plications are, and ‘where they go wrong’. Chapter 3 discusses attitude-behaviour
research, an important sub-field of social psychology, including applications to vot-
ing behaviour.
The aim of Part II is to synthesise insights from voting research and psycho-
logical research in order to develop a psychological theory of voting. Chapter 4 deals
with the relationship between party evaluations and voting behaviour, which are
specified in the sincere vote model. Chapter 5 discusses the choice mechanisms that
underlie voting in terms of six ways in which voters may decide how to vote. Chap-
ter 6 concerns the explanation of party evaluations.
In Part III the theory is put to the test in the context of four Dutch parliamentary
elections. Chapter 7 presents an empirical test of the sincere vote model. Chapter 8
examines why some voters cast a so-called non-sincere vote by focusing on alterna-
tive choice mechanisms. Chapter 9 contains analyses of why voters evaluated parties
as they did.
The concluding Chapter 10 in Part IV integrates the theoretical models, summa-
rises the findings of the empirical analyses, and discusses their implications.
9Three approaches to voting are distinguished: a sociological, psychological, and eco-
nomic approach (Harrop and Miller 1987, ch. 6). These are represented by the
Columbia school, the Michigan school, and the Downsian school, respectively. This
chapter elaborates upon the corresponding studies. This discussion is not an exten-
sive review of all theories of voting, but a highlighting of the major approaches (for
more thorough reviews, see Dalton and Wattenberg 1993; Harrop and Miller 1987).
Discussing the so-called Michigan studies is especially relevant, since these are re-
garded as the most important example of a psychological approach. Special attention
will also be given to theories of issue voting and to applications to the Netherlands.
The discussion in this chapter focuses on the psychology in the theories. Both
the explicit and the implicit assumptions and hypotheses about the psychology of
voting are elaborated upon. This should further clarify what the psychological per-
spective that is adopted in this research means. What is important in this respect, is
that some theories that are often regarded as psychological will be shown to be in a
sense non-psychological, while some other theories that are regarded as non-psycho-
logical will be shown to be in a sense psychological.
ON ELECTORAL RESEARCH
DEVELOPMENT  OF  MODERN  ELECTORAL  RESEARCH
Today, electoral research is based primarily on large-scale projects held when major
elections take place. In the United States large-scale surveys are held around the
presidential elections: the American National Election Studies. In many other coun-
tries there are similar projects, such as the British Election Studies and the Dutch
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Parliamentary Election Studies. These studies have one feature in common: they are
based on interviews with a large sample of voters.
Individual data have not always been the standard for election studies. Before
surveys were the basis of analysis, electoral behaviour was examined mainly on the
basis of census data or comparable sources of information. Not the individual, but
geographical entities were the unit of analysis. This changed with the work by the
commercial polling agencies, which in the 1930s collected individual data about elec-
toral behaviour on a large scale for the first time (Campbell et al. 1960: 14). Their
work laid the foundation for major voting studies in the United States. The first elec-
tion to be studied extensively in this way was the 1940 U.S. presidential election. Paul
Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet from Columbia University pub-
lished the results in 1944 in The People’s Choice. This study marks the beginning of
modern electoral research. At the theoretical level the unit of analysis shifted to the
individual, replacing geographical entities such as regions or neighbourhoods. At
the methodological level it marks the beginning of the use of interviewing and the
survey method.
The aim of The People’s Choice was to examine the psychological process of opin-
ion formation, but the authors ultimately concluded that vote choice could be ex-
plained well on the basis of social characteristics. This ‘sociological research’ left
many questions unanswered – in particular, how the voter’s mind was affected – and
from a psychological perspective it did not answer the question why people vote as
they do satisfactorily. This partly changed in 1954, when Bernard Berelson, Paul
Lazarsfeld and William McPhee published a second Columbia study, Voting. In this
study it was explained why social characteristics influenced vote choices. Two ‘proc-
esses’ or ‘mechanisms’ that linked social characteristics to vote choices were consid-
ered specifically important: social influence on voters by people who surround them,
and political interests shared by voters with similar social characteristics.
In the same year, Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren Miller from the
Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan published their first major
election study, The Voter Decides. The Michigan scholars argued that their research
shifted the attention from sociological to psychological variables. They focused on
voters’ stands on the issues, their feelings about the major parties, and their percep-
tions of the candidates. This approach was elaborated upon by Angus Campbell,
Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes in The American Voter, published
in 1960. The Michigan studies have since been considered the major representatives
of a ‘psychological approach’ to voting behaviour (Harrop and Miller 1987, ch. 6).
An economic approach is usually distinguished as a third approach. An Eco-
nomic Theory of Democracy, published in 1957 by Anthony Downs, is regarded its ma-
jor representative. Downs discussed how voters would behave if they applied the
principles of rationality, which he derived from economic theory, to voting. Various
scholars have tested Downs’ ideas empirically. Like the so-called sociological and
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psychological studies, these studies were based on survey data and had the indi-
vidual as unit of analysis.
THE  FORCE  FIELD  FRAMEWORK
Theories of voting are usually phrased in terms of one of two analytical frameworks:
the force field framework and the spatial framework. The force field framework is
related to the work of the psychologist Kurt Lewin. According to Lewin’s (1951) field
theory, behaviour results from a number of simultaneous psychological forces that
act upon a person. The net effect of these forces determines how individuals behave.
With respect to voting this implies that voters experience various forces that direct
them either towards voting for a particular party, or away from such voting. To-
gether such forces determine for whom they vote.
In The People’s Choice the Columbia scholars adopted the force field framework.
Their discussion of what they called ‘cross-pressures’ clearly shows this.
By “cross-pressures” we mean the conflicts and inconsistencies among the fac-
tors which influence vote decision. Some of these factors in the environment of
the voter may influence him toward the Republicans while others may operate
in favor of the Democrats. In other words, cross-pressures upon the voter drive
him in opposite directions. (...) There were a number of factors differentiating
Republican and Democratic voters. Each of these factors could be considered a
“pressure” upon final vote decision. We found the Protestant vote allied to the
Republicans and the Catholic vote more strongly Democratic. We found that
individuals on the higher SES levels tended to vote Republican and their
poorer neighbors to vote Democratic. In other words, a vote decision can be
considered the net effect of a variety of pressures. (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944: 53, 56)
The notions of forces and pressures are fairly similar. The words quoted also indicate
what the pressures stemmed from: social characteristics such as religious affiliation
and socio-economic status. Forces related to these characteristics ‘predisposed’ vot-
ers in a Democratic or Republican direction.
Although cross-pressures were predominantly viewed as resulting from social
characteristics, the Columbia scholars used the term also to discuss ‘attitudinal
forces’. Some voters
(...) were subject to strong attitudinal cross-pressures (resulting from their
“weak” predispositions); they liked Roosevelt for this and Willkie for that, or
they approved one part of a candidate’s program but disapproved another
part. (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944: 99)
So the notion of forces was in some instances related to voters’ psychological, rather
than social, characteristics.
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In The Voter Decides the Michigan scholars spoke about ‘motivational forces’ and
‘psychological forces’, indicating the use of the force field framework. Party identifi-
cation, issue orientation, and candidate orientation were regarded as three simulta-
neous forces acting upon individuals and influencing their vote choice. In The Ameri-
can Voter the Michigan scholars explicitly linked their theory to Lewin’s field theory
(Campbell et al. 1960: 33). Forces were conceptualised in terms of six so-called ‘parti-
san attitudes’, each of which could be regarded as a force towards either a Republi-
can or a Democratic vote.
Both the Columbia and Michigan scholars did not assume that voters experi-
enced the ‘forces’ they distinguished as such. The forces were not psychological enti-
ties, but analytical constructs. In Voting the Columbia scholars stated that situations
with cross-pressures
(...) may have no subjective reality for the voter himself at the moment; it is
merely that we as observers can foresee his future vulnerability by virtue of his
location within cross-currents of social influence. (Berelson et al. 1954/1966:
284)
In The Voter Decides the Michigan authors stated that their three-fold division of
orientations was also made for analytical purposes.
In defining the concept of candidate orientation, as in our definitions of party
identification and issue orientation, we are attempting to differentiate analyti-
cal constructs, and are not attempting to isolate psychologically pure “types.”
(Campbell et al. 1954/1971: 136-137)
This view can be extended to The American Voter. The ‘partisan attitudes’ were not
psychological entities either, but analytical constructs to examine the influence of
voters’ perceptions and feelings with respect to candidates, parties, and issues.
THE  SPATIAL  FRAMEWORK
Another framework that has been used in voting research is that of ‘spatial analysis’.
The central idea here is that parties and voters can both be positioned in some kind
of (political) space in which mutual distances represent differences and similarities:
the larger the distance between two objects, the larger their difference; the smaller
the distance, the larger their similarity. The dimensions of the space usually repre-
sent certain dimensions of political conflict. If politics is viewed as being structured
by only one dimension of conflict, we speak about a one-dimensional space. In a
similar way two dimensions of conflict correspond with a two-dimensional space,
three with a three-dimensional space, and so on. Voting models using this frame-
work are usually based on the assumption that voters choose the party closest to
them in the political space. This idea is known as ‘the smallest distance hypothesis’.
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In An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) Downs made use of the spatial frame-
work and defined it in terms of ideology. A simple conceptualisation would be to
view the political space as one-dimensional based on ideology in terms of a left-right
continuum. Parties and voters are then assumed to take a position on this dimension,
and voters are assumed to vote for the party that is closest to them. In addition to
ideology, other phenomena may be used to define the political space; for example, a
number of salient issues. The number of issues involved would then correspond to
the number of dimensions of the space. Issues and ideology can both be regarded as
dimensions of political conflict.1 The spatial framework may also be used to model
the impact of other phenomena, such as voters’ images of candidates’ personal capa-
bilities (Enelow and Hinich 1984, ch. 5; Endersby 1994).
Studies of voting that make use of the spatial framework are mostly silent about
the psychological processes that operate. Their aim is not to reveal what goes on in
voters’ minds, but to explain voters’ choices at the polls on the basis of their ideologi-
cal positions or policy preferences. Through which psychological processes the latter
are transformed into a vote choice, is not considered relevant.
The spatial framework can be used to explain voting behaviour, but it is not a
theory of voting. The question how the political space is to be defined is not an-
swered by merely adopting the spatial framework. Similarly, the question what
forces constitute a field is not answered by adopting the force field framework. Only
after the dimensions of the space, or the forces of the field, are defined, is an answer
given to the question why people vote as they do. The most relevant question when
discussing theories of voting is therefore not which of the two analytical frameworks
is used, but what the forces or distances correspond with or stem from. If one defines
forces in relation to social characteristics, then social characteristics are the explana-
tion provided for voting. If forces are defined in terms of attitudes, then attitudes are
the explanation. If one focuses on a one-dimensional ideological space, then ideology
is the explanation provided for voting. If dimensions are defined in terms of policy
preferences, then these constitute the explanation. What is also relevant, is which so-
cial characteristics are put forward, which attitudes, which ideological dimension,
and which policies. The remainder of this chapter will focus on these aspects and
additionally will elaborate further upon what is psychological, and what is not,
about the various studies.
A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE COLUMBIA STUDIES
SOCIAL  CHARACTERISTICS  AND  POLITICAL  PREDISPOSITION
The People’s Choice (1944) was based on repeated interviewing of the same people
during the campaign period. Seven interviews were held with a sample of voters
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from Erie County, Ohio, in the period from May until November 1940, when
Franklin D. Roosevelt eventually beat his Republican challenger Willkie to secure his
third term as U.S. President. The aim of the study by Lazarsfeld and his colleagues
was to discover the “processes underlying opinion formation and political behavior”
(Lazarsfeld et al. 1944: 10), which is reflected in the subtitle of the study: How the
Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. The study concentrated on voters’
exposure to the campaign in the media, and on changes in voting intentions and the
reasons underlying these. It made extensive use of open-ended questions about why
voters changed their vote choice and why they favoured a particular candidate.
The best known findings of the study, however, stem from a chapter that exam-
ined the impact of various social characteristics, among which socio-economic status,
religious affiliation, and residence. The general pattern was that voters with a high
socio-economic status favoured the Republicans, those low in socio-economic status
the Democrats; Protestants favoured the Republicans, Catholics the Democrats; rural
voters favoured the Republicans, urban voters the Democrats. On the basis of these
social characteristics a so-called index of political predisposition was constructed.
Voters with a high SES level, who were Protestant, and who lived in the rural area
had the strongest Republican predisposition, whereas urban Catholics with a low
SES level had the strongest Democratic predisposition. A clear empirical relationship
between political predisposition and voting was found: when voters’ predisposition
tended stronger towards the Republican or Democratic side, they voted for the corre-
sponding party in larger numbers. Whether they would vote for the Republican or
Democratic candidate could be predicted correctly on the basis of the index for 67
per cent of the voters.2 The main conclusion of the study consequently was that vot-
ers’ choices were largely determined by their social characteristics. The authors came
to their much-cited conclusion that “a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially. So-
cial characteristics determine political preference” (p. 27).
The People’s Choice showed that, and which, social characteristics were related to
vote choice. The second Columbia elaborated upon why they were. In Berelson,
Lazarsfeld and McPhee’s Voting (1954) the central idea was that people are influ-
enced by whom they have contact with, which in turn is determined by their social
characteristics. Three principles related to this process were identified: (1) there is a
social basis for political interest: voters belong to different groups that have different
interests, (2) voters ‘inherit’ vote preferences from their family, and (3) voters have
contact predominantly with other people from the same social groups (cf. pp. 74-75,
147). By these three principles the groups people belong to influence for whom they
vote.3 Hence, because they have similar political interests a political predisposition
based on social characteristics translates into vote preferences.4
Another part of Voting focused on issues, since these supplied “the content of
political debate [and were] the ‘stuff’ in terms of which a democratic campaign is
rationalized, in both senses” (p. 182). The authors also discussed effects of candidate
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images, but it was concluded that the trends in the 1948 campaign were not due to
shifts in candidate evaluations, but to an increase in the saliency of certain issues
(ch. 12). The main focus concerning images in the voters’ minds was therefore on the
issues. They were regarded as manifestations of underlying cleavages that have a
history that goes beyond single elections. In the 1948 election, for example, the major
issues (specifically those of the Taft-Hartley Law and of price controls) were related
to a (class) cleavage, resulting from Roosevelt’s New Deal in the 1930s. So previous
vote preferences were reactivated through issues related to the dominant cleavage of
class.
CLEAVAGES  IN  WESTERN  EUROPE
The idea that cleavages are important for voting may be even more true for Western
Europe (for a definition of cleavages, see Bartolini and Mair 1990, ch. 9). The ideas
that Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan set out in Party Systems and Voter
Alignments (1967) are particularly relevant in this respect. Lipset and Rokkan argued
that to understand alignments among voters we must focus on the alternatives vot-
ers can choose from. These alternatives are parties that offer ‘packages’ which are
historically given – parties were viewed as “alliances in conflicts over policies and
value commitments” (p. 5). Hence, in order to understand voter alignments we must
understand party formation. Lipset and Rokkan identified four lines of cleavage that
corresponded with conflicts between centre and periphery, between rural and urban
interests, between church and state, and between employers and workers. These
cleavages had been the basis for party formation. Moreover, the party systems estab-
lished on the basis of these cleavages had shown to be enduring. Lipset and Rokkan
argued that “the party systems of the 1960’s reflect, with few but significant excep-
tion, the cleavage structures of the 1920’s” (p. 50). This phenomenon is known as ‘the
freezing of party systems’ (cf. p. 3).
Lipset and Rokkan referred to the Netherlands as the most typical example of
‘institutionalised segmentation’, for which the Dutch use the term ‘verzuiling’
(‘pillarisation’) (cf. p. 15). The impact of social characteristics on vote choice was very
strong. Among voters who were Catholic or Calvinist (one of the two main Protes-
tant denominations) and who were classified as church attendees, at least 90 per cent
voted for the party of their ‘zuil’ (‘pillar’ or ‘segment’).5 Of those who attended
church less often the figures varied between 50 and 65 per cent. Voters with another
Protestant denomination, those who classified themselves as Reformed, fit the struc-
ture less well. Non-religious voters mostly supported Labour, Liberals, or Commu-
nists. As a result of this structure, in the Netherlands in 1956 vote choices could be
predicted correctly on the basis of religious affiliation in combination with church
attendance for 72 per cent of the voters.6
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What cleavages are important with respect to vote choice varies across coun-
tries. Whereas in the Netherlands the primary cleavage resulted from religion, in
Britain social class has been of paramount importance (Norris 1997, ch. 6). The corre-
sponding phenomenon is known as ‘class voting’. There are also other social charac-
teristics that have been used in explaining voting behaviour, some of which are not
related to cleavages. But arguably the most important ones are, and the discussion
above presumably clarifies sufficiently what kind of variables a so-called sociological
approach makes use of.
SOCIAL  CHARACTERISTICS  AND  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  PERSPECTIVE
A sociological perspective is characterised by its focus on social characteristics or
group belonging as determinants of voting behaviour. The sociological perspective
does not focus on what goes on in voters’ minds. The sociological perspective there-
fore differs fundamentally from the psychological perspective. In practice, however,
this difference frequently vaporises. For example, the Columbia studies also elabo-
rated upon psychological mechanisms that linked social characteristics to vote
choice. Moreover, studies of voting that are regarded as sociological make use of
concepts that may well be regarded as psychological. For example, religion and so-
cial class can be viewed as psychological concepts. They do not refer to an individu-
al’s position in the society that is to be assessed ‘objectively’, but they concern an in-
dividual’s (subjective) feelings or thoughts. They do not refer to group belonging,
but to a sense of group belonging. They concern voters’ ‘social identity’ (Norris 1997).
Identity is a psychological concept.7
According to Solomon Asch (1952: 556), studies like The People’s Choice “fall
short of the needs of psychological investigation in an essential way”.8 What is miss-
ing, is insight in the principles that relate conditions (social characteristics) to conse-
quences (voting behaviour), and hence the sociologist establishes no “meaningful
nexus between his variables” (p. 533). Only if the processes through which social
characteristics are transformed into vote choices are known, will understanding be
achieved. By uncovering those processes, the psychological domain is entered.
The discussion of the Columbia studies provided in this chapter shows that
they handled the ‘nexus’ between social characteristics and vote choice. Moreover, it
would be untrue to conclude that studies on voting from a sociological perspective
brought no understanding (and only confirmed the already known). The sociologi-
cal perspective has certainly resulted in insight in why people vote as they do. Much
of this insight, however, stems from interplay between a sociological and a psycho-
logical approach. A strict division between both perspectives can be made in theory,
but hardly in practice. Moreover, a sociological and a psychological perspective are
not that different. In several ways they are related and complementary to each other.
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In Voting, the Columbia scholars gave special attention to how social and psy-
chological characteristics relate to each other. They accepted the psychological point
of view, according to which what voters think and feel matters.
What parties do affects what the voters think they are and what the voters
think they are affects what they subsequently do. (...) “The parties” have their
main impact in the attitudes and the perceptions held by the voters. Political
ideas associated with the parties are more important (...) than the formal or-
ganizations themselves. Accordingly, the next step is to review what Republi-
cans and Democrats think about politics – the “pictures in their heads.”
(Berelson et al. 1954/1966: 216, 182)9
In their view this next step is especially challenging.
It is not hard to relate such preconditions as class position or religion or even
personal associations to such end products as turnout or party preference. But
it is hard to analyze and document the fine sequences of events that intervene
between them. How is a harder question to answer than what. (Berelson et al.
1954/1966: 253)
In Voting a contribution was made to answering the ‘how-question’. It discussed vari-
ous processes – some of which fairly psychological – that are affected by social struc-
tures.10 Moreover, the view presented indicates that to understand why certain psy-
chological processes occur, sociological insight may be helpful. Many important
issues are related to cleavages; understanding the role of issues requires an under-
standing of the historical trend of those cleavages. To understand the psychological,
the sociological has to be known. Even the much-cited conclusion that “a person
thinks, politically, as he is, socially” (emphasis added) (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944: 27) indi-
cates that social characteristics have an impact on voting because they influence
what goes on in voters’ minds. Sociological characteristics thus influence individuals’
behaviour through mediating psychological variables. Because in a purely sociologi-
cal approach the psychological process by which social characteristics influence vote
choice is ignored, we could name this ‘the psychological black-box of sociological
models of voting’. Figure 2.1 represents this idea.
FIGURE 2.1  The psychological black-box of sociological models of voting
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To open the black box, a psychological perspective has to be adopted. From a
psychological point of view the question is how social characteristics are trans-
formed into vote choices. In methodological terms: what psychological variables are
influenced by social characteristics that thereby indirectly have an impact upon vote
choice? This points to a possibility for a synthesis between the sociological and psy-
chological approach. If we have a view on what psychological characteristics are im-
portant, the relationship between social characteristics and those psychological char-
acteristics can be examined. Once a psychologist has indicated what the most
relevant psychological characteristics are, we can analyse how social characteristics
influence those characteristics, rather than focus solely on the ultimate vote choice.
In this way a sociological-psychological synthesis may result in further insight than
any of the two approaches can achieve on its own.11
A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE MICHIGAN STUDIES
PARTY  IDENTIFICATION ,  CANDIDATE  ORIENTATION ,  AND  ISSUE  ORIENTATION
The Michigan studies can be regarded as a reaction to the Columbia studies.
Campbell and his colleagues argued that there are three methods of dealing with the
question why people vote as they do: (1) studying external events, such as specific
speeches, newspaper articles, or television programs, (2) studying the social settings,
as done by the Columbia scholars, and (3) studying psychological variables that in-
tervene between external events and voting behaviour (Campbell et al. 1954/1971:
83-86). The sociological approach could not explain voting well, the Michigan schol-
ars argued, and the focus should be shifted from social to psychological characteris-
tics. Whereas the Columbia scholars had emphasised voters’ group belonging, the
Michigan scholars emphasised “the pictures in their heads” (Campbell et al. 1960:
39).
In The Voter Decides (1954) Campbell, Gurin and Miller focused on the 1952 U.S.
presidential election between the Republican candidate General Eisenhower and the
Democratic candidate Governor Stevenson. The study was based on two interviews
held with the same voters: one shortly before the election and another shortly after.
To explain voting behaviour the Michigan scholars focused on voters’ ‘motivating
factors’ or ‘motivational forces’, which were regarded as psychological in nature.
Three psychological factors were distinguished and viewed as the most important:
those concerning parties, issues, and candidates (pp. 85-86). Conformity to group
standards was named as a fourth factor influencing the direction of the vote, but this
aspect was not elaborated upon.
Party identification is a core concept in the Michigan studies. The concept had
been introduced in an article about foreign policy (Belknap and Campbell 1952), but
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was discussed more elaborately by Campbell and his colleagues in The Voter Decides
and The American Voter (1960). They argued that political parties, a specific category
of social groups, were one of the central objects in politics. The feelings individuals
have with respect to political parties as social groups were conceptualised as party
identification.
The sense of personal attachment which the individual feels toward the group
of his choice is referred to (...) as identification and, with respect to parties as
groups, as party identification. (Campbell et al. 1954/1971: 88-89)
This attachment was measured by asking individuals how they saw themselves in
partisan terms.
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Demo-
crat, an independent, or what?12
Those who said they thought of themselves as a Republican or Democrat, were
asked:
Would you call yourself a strong Republican (Democrat) or a not very strong
Republican (Democrat)?
Independents were asked:
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?
Voters were classified as strong Republicans, weak Republicans, independent Re-
publicans, Independents, independent Democrats, weak Democrats, or strong
Democrats. These categories were regarded as making up a single seven-point scale.
Party identification was strongly related to presidential preference of voters
and non-voters. As voters’ party identification tended more strongly towards the Re-
publican or Democratic side, a larger proportion voted for the candidate of the corre-
sponding party. Moreover, the strength of the relationship was considerably larger
than found by the Columbia scholars with respect to social characteristics. The corre-
lation between party identification and vote choice was, however, not perfect. The
discrepancy between party identification and vote choice was seen as an indicator
that party identification is not the same as vote choice (Campbell et al. 1954/1971: 97).
The second force that was supposed to act upon a voter, issue orientation, was
assessed on the basis of voters’ agreement or disagreement with the positions on
seven issues taken by the government of President Truman. A position in line with
the government stand was regarded as pro-Democratic, whereas disagreement was
regarded as pro-Republican (cf. p. 113, note 2). On each issue voters’ positions were
related to their vote choice: compared to other voters, those taking ‘Democratic
stands’ favoured Stevenson more often, and those taking opposite stands preferred
Eisenhower more often. With respect to two issues voters were asked whether they
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thought there were differences between the Democratic and Republican parties,
which was the basis for a measure called ‘sensitivity to party differences’. By com-
bining voters’ perception of party differences and voters’ own positions on four of
the issues an ‘issue partisanship’ score was constructed. A strong relationship was
found between issue partisanship and vote choice. Voters with strong Democratic or
Republican scores tended towards the corresponding candidate in large proportions;
voters with weak scores tended to the corresponding candidate but less strongly;
and voters with neutral scores favoured Eisenhower somewhat over Stevenson, al-
most exactly in the same proportion as the sample as a whole did.
The third force identified as determining voting behaviour, candidate orienta-
tion, was meant to include only the candidate appeal resulting from personal at-
tributes. The basis for operationalising candidate orientation was the set of spontane-
ous references to the candidates as persons made by voters during the interview. By
subtracting a Stevenson score (the number of positive remarks on Stevenson minus
the number of negative remarks on him) from an Eisenhower score (constructed in a
similar way) one measure was constructed for ‘candidate partisanship’. These scores
were transformed into a five-point scale with one neutral position and moderately
and strongly favourable positions for Eisenhower and Stevenson. The more positive
the score was for Eisenhower, the larger the proportion of voters who preferred to
vote for him.
On the basis of additional analyses it was concluded that although the three
psychological factors shared some common element, they were sufficiently inde-
pendent and qualitatively different to be distinguished (ch. 10). The Michigan schol-
ars also examined the effects of different combinations of the three motivational fac-
tors on vote choice and found that as more forces impelled voters towards the same
candidate, larger proportions supported that candidate. When forces pulled in dif-
ferent directions, the proportion favouring a specific candidate decreased. Voters
who were pulled by none of the forces favoured both candidates in about equal
numbers (ch. 11).
FUNNEL  OF  CAUSALITY  AND  PARTISAN  ATTITUDES
In 1960, Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes published The American Voter. In this
study the Michigan scholars repeated several of their earlier arguments, but they
also made some amendments and additions, both theoretically and methodologi-
cally. First, the idea presented in The Voter Decides that a vote choice is the result of
different psychological forces was elaborated upon. Second, the Michigan scholars
presented their view on how different kinds of variables can be put into a single
theoretical framework. Third, the concept of party identification was elaborated
upon and its position as explanation of vote choice was viewed differently than be-
fore.
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In The American Voter the Michigan scholars clarified that they adopted a psy-
chological perspective. Following Walter Lippmann’s (1922) notion of ‘pictures in the
head’, Campbell and his colleagues (1960: 39) argued, “the voter has a picture of the
world of politics in his head, and the nature of this picture is a key to understanding
what he does at the polls”. Voters’ cognitions with respect to politics matter with re-
spect to voting. The scholars indicated that cognition or perception is not all that
matters.
The elements of politics that are visible to the electorate are not simply seen;
they are evaluated as well. Evaluation is the stuff of political life, and the cogni-
tive image formed by the individual of the political world tends to be posi-
tively and negatively toned in its several parts. This mixture of cognition and
evaluation, of belief and attitude, of percept and affect is so complete that we
will speak of the individual’s cognitive and affective map of politics. (Campbell
et al. 1960: 42)
The idea that cognition, belief, or perception is associated with evaluation, atti-
tude, or affect is related to ideas set out by Lewin (1951) in relation to the framework
of field theory. Lewin spoke about valences, the attracting or repelling forces of ob-
jects. The notions of affect and attitudes are closely related to the notions of valences
and evaluations. The essence is that in memory the cognitive representation of ob-
jects have attached a certain amount of positive or negative affect. The affect is im-
portant, because it influences the behaviour with respect to the objects.
The forces that the Michigan scholars distinguished as determinants of an indi-
vidual’s vote choice can be seen as the result of such affect or evaluations. They
stated:
Our hypothesis is that the partisan choice the individual voter makes depends
in an immediate sense on the strength and direction of the elements compris-
ing a field of psychological forces, where these elements are interpreted as atti-
tudes toward the perceived objects of national politics. (...) A system of
attitudinal variables measuring the net partisan direction of the voter’s politi-
cal reactions (...) constitute a field of forces operating on the individual as he
deliberates over his vote decision. (Campbell et al. 1960: 9, 16)
Voters evaluate their images of issues, parties, and candidates. These result in psy-
chological forces pulling them either towards a vote for the Republican candidate, or
towards a vote for the Democratic candidate.
In The American Voter the psychological forces were conceptualised in terms of
six so-called partisan attitudes. Candidate orientation was represented by two fac-
tors: personal attributes of the Democratic candidate, and personal attributes of the
Republican candidate. Issue orientation was also represented by two factors: issues
of domestic policy and issues of foreign policy. Two additional attitudinal forces cor-
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responded with groups involved in politics and with the parties’ record in govern-
ment management. Each of the six dimensions of partisan attitudes consisted of two
elements: direction (Republican or Democratic) and intensity (from very weak to
very strong). On the basis of voters’ positions on these six dimensions in the 1952 and
the 1956 U.S. presidential elections Campbell and his colleagues ‘predicted’ correctly
for whom 85 per cent of the voters sampled would vote.
The Michigan scholars understood something needed to be said about how the
attitudinal influences related to other explanations, like those based on social charac-
teristics or past events. To handle this, they presented the theoretical notion of a ‘fun-
nel of causality’. According to this notion, “events are conceived to follow each other
in a converging sequence of causal chains, moving from the mouth to the stem of the
funnel.” (p. 24) One way to conceive the direction of the funnel was in terms of time.
The stem of the funnel would then represent the present and the mouth of the funnel
the (far) past.13 The notion of a funnel of causality was related to a specific aspect of
Lewin’s field theory. In field theory behaviour is seen as the resultant of forces acting
at that moment. A past event can have an impact on current behaviour only if it is in
some way represented in the present field, or has influenced forces acting upon a
person that are part of the present field (pp. 33-34).
In the Michigan model the partisan attitudes were regarded as making up that
‘present field’. Voting behaviour was seen most directly as a consequence of atti-
tudes towards candidates, policies, and group benefits. These attitudes are influ-
enced by voters’ party identification, which in turn is determined by social character-
istics, which are located in the mouth of the funnel.
CANDIDATE  EVALUATIONS  AS  DIRECT  DETERMINANTS  OF  VOTE  CHOICE
The ideas set out in The American Voter laid the foundation for later studies on voting.
An example is an article by Gregory Markus and Philip Converse (1979). What is in-
teresting about their model, is that it includes candidate evaluations as the most di-
rect determinant of vote choice. They assumed that voters’ overall evaluations of the
competing candidates mediated other influences on vote choice, such as party iden-
tification, issue stands, perceived candidate personalities, and previous voting.
Hence, voters were expected to simply vote for the candidate they evaluate most
positively. If evaluations of both candidates are fairly similar, party identification
was assumed to influence vote choice directly and be decisive. The idea that candi-
date evaluations are the determinant of vote choice, and that other phenomena influ-
ence vote choice only by affecting such evaluations, is also central in several other
models of voting (see, for example, Rahn et al. 1990; Markus 1982; Page and Jones
1979). The essential difference with the Michigan studies discussed above is that
overall judgements of the individual candidates were included as primary determi-
nants of vote choice.
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A related difference is that in Markus and Converse’s study candidate evalua-
tions were assessed directly. Candidate evaluations were operationalised on the basis
of so-called feeling thermometer scores, measures used in the American National
Election Studies (NES) to tap how favourable or unfavourable voters feel towards
each individual candidate. The NES-question is as follows.
I’d like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other peo-
ple who are in the news these days. I’ll read the name of the person and I’d like
you to rate that person using this feeling thermometer. You may use any
number from 0 to 100 for a rating. Ratings between 50 and 100 degrees mean
that you feel favorable or warm towards the person. Ratings between 0 and 50
degrees mean that you don’t feel too favorable toward the person. If we come
to a person whose name you don’t recognize, you don’t need to rate that per-
son. Just tell me and we’ll move on to the next one. If you do recognize a name,
but don’t feel particularly warm or cold towards the person, you would rate
that person at the 50-degree mark.
To answer the question respondents are shown a picture of a vertical thermometer
bulb that has nine values listed next to it, which are all labelled (see Alwin 1997: 335).
The labels are, from top to bottom: 100° “very warm or favorable feeling”, 85° “quite
warm or favorable feeling”, 70° “fairly warm or favorable feeling”, 60° “a bit more
warm or favorable feeling than cold feeling”, 50° “no feeling at all”, 40° “a bit more
cold or unfavorable feeling”, 30° “fairly cold or unfavorable feeling”, 15° “quite cold
or unfavorable feeling”, 0° “very cold or unfavorable feeling”.
THE  MICHIGAN  STUDIES  AND  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  PERSPECTIVE
The essence of the Michigan theory is that voters have ‘pictures in their heads’ and
that these pictures determine for whom they vote. The nexus between the pictures
and the vote consists of the notion of psychological forces, which operate because the
pictures are evaluated.
The elements of national politics – the presidential candidates, questions of
group interests, the issues of domestic and foreign policy, the performance of
the parties in the conduct of government – are not simply perceived by the in-
dividual; they are evaluated as well. Orientations to these objects, seen by the
voter as positive or negative, comprise a system of partisan attitudes that is of
primary importance for the voting act. (Campbell et al. 1960: 66)
Positive and negative evaluations of political objects resulted in forces towards the
Democratic or Republican side, which were captured in The Voter Decides in the no-
tion of three orientations and in The American Voter in the notion of six partisan atti-
tudes.
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From a psychological perspective, it is important to note two things about the
Michigan studies. First, with respect to issues and candidates the evaluations were
not assessed directly, but constructed on the basis of voters’ own policy preferences
and remarks about the candidates. Second, the three orientations and partisan atti-
tudes should not be regarded as an indication of how the voter’s mind is organised.
The distinction was made for analytical purposes only. This points to an important
distinction, namely between concepts that refer to psychological entities, which are
assumed to exist as such in the voter’s mind, and concepts that are mere analytical
constructs to analyse (the impact of) such psychological entities.
In the case of the Michigan studies the psychological phenomena analysed are
the voters’ images of parties, candidates, and issues. The motivational forces distin-
guished in The Voter Decides and the partisan attitudes distinguished in The American
Voter are the analytical constructs used to analyse these images. They are the pre-
sumed partisan effects of cognitions and affects with respect to certain classes of ob-
jects that are stored in voters’ memories. Hence, the Michigan studies are psychologi-
cal in the sense that their explanation of voting behaviour is based on the
information in voters’ minds. However, they are not psychological in the sense that
they describe mental processes that underlie voting, or that the concepts used are
psychological entities.
The party identification concept is different in this respect. Campbell and his
colleagues (1960: 122) stated that this concept was based on particular psychological
theories. Warren Miller and Merrill Shanks (1996) summarised this as follows.
Party identification is a concept derived from reference and small group theory
positing that one’s sense of self may include a feeling of personal identity with
a secondary group such as a political party. […] The tie between individual
and party is psychological – an extension of one’s ego to include feeling a part
of a group. (Miller and Shanks 1996: 120)
The idea that partisanship can be conceived of in terms of group belonging, analo-
gous with religious and other forms of social identity, is central in various treatments
of the concept (Miller and Shanks 1996; Green et al. 2002). Few scholars, however,
have elaborated upon the psychological theory in which the party identification con-
cept is presumably based. An exception is Steven Greene (1999), who linked the con-
cept explicitly to social identity theory, which is related to the reference group theory
the Michigan scholars referred to (see Forsyth 1990: 40-41). In this view political par-
ties are groups to which voters may belong, and for whom this belonging may be
more or less central to their self-concept.
If one views partisanship as an identification, this should be reflected in the
measures used to operationalise it (see Greene 2002). The traditional American ‘root
question’ appears to concern the self-concept and can be linked to the idea of identi-
fication. It is difficult to argue the same with respect to the follow-up question asked
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to Independents. This problem was recognised by Warren Miller (1991), who argued
that partisanship treated in terms of identification is operationalised best on the basis
of the root question only. The follow-up question asked to Republicans and Demo-
crats should be discarded too, Miller thought, because this measure is influenced too
strongly by short-term forces that do not concern identification. Moreover, he ar-
gued, what matters are the boundaries between identifiers and nonidentifiers and
these are assessed by the root question.
A related matter is that one may question whether the operationalisation of
party identification as a single dimension is appropriate (see Weisberg 1980; Greene
1999). Identification with the Democratic Party and identification with the Republi-
can Party may well be viewed as two distinct phenomena. The fact that both are re-
lated to each other, does not imply they are not two different phenomena. This
means that the single dimension has to be regarded as an analytical construct used to
analyse the impact of two psychologically distinct phenomena.
A final observation to be made is that the concept of partisan attitudes in The
American Voter differs from the concept of attitudes as used in social psychology.
Generally, attitudes are conceptualised as positions on a single dimension that
ranges from very positive to very negative; they refer to liking or disliking certain
things (cf. Tesser and Martin 1996; Eagly and Chaiken 1993, ch. 1). Partisan attitudes
are positions on a dimension that does not range from very positive to very negative,
but from strongly pro-Republican to strongly pro-Democratic. The evaluative di-
mension concerns to what extent cognitions (and affect) with respect to certain ob-
jects pull individuals towards one party and away from the other. It is not a matter of
liking single parties, but a matter of favouring one party over the other with respect
to something. It is not a matter of affect, but a matter of effect.
PARTY  IDENTIFICATION  IN  THE  NETHERLANDS
The concept of party identification has been applied not only in the United States,
but also in various other countries (Campbell and Valen 1961; Budge et al. 1976;
Holmberg 1994a). In other political contexts party identification ‘behaved’ differ-
ently than in the United States. On the basis of a study by Jacques Thomassen (1976b)
the Netherlands have been considered the oddest case (Miller and Shanks 1996:
117).14
The questions used to operationalise party identification in the United States
could not be translated directly into Dutch. In the Netherlands the concept has been
operationalised on the basis of the following questions.
Many people think of themselves as an adherent of a particular political party,
but there are also people who do not think of themselves as an adherent of a
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political party. Do you think of yourself as an adherent or not as an adherent of
a political party?
Those who said they did not think of themselves as an adherent were asked:
Is there a party to which you feel more attracted than to other parties?
If voters responded positively to any of these questions, they were asked which
party they were an adherent of, or to which party they felt more attracted.15
Thomassen (1976b) questioned whether the party identification concept could
be applied to the Netherlands. On the basis of an analysis of panel data from the
1970-1972 period he concluded that it probably could not.16 This conclusion was
based on three findings: (1) party identification was less stable than vote choice,17 (2)
the distinction between party identification and vote choice could be due to
unreliability of the measurement, and (3) party identification seemed not to be prior
to vote choice (p. 77). To explain why party identification did not function,
Thomassen pointed out that in the Netherlands political parties were closely allied
with social groups, and that voters probably identified with these groups rather than
with the related parties (Thomassen 1976b: 65-66, 78).
According to Samuel Barnes (1990), the Dutch findings were not the result of
this pillarised structure, but of its collapse. He argued that the instability of party
identification compared to vote choice had to do with a process of realignment that
was taking place. Barnes also pointed to the impact of minor parties, to which voters
of the major parties may turn relatively easily. Bradley Richardson (1991) argued that
the finding that vote choice was more stable than party identification might have to
do with negative feelings toward non-preferred parties. Richardson found that vot-
ers who were stable in their vote choice were more likely to be persons with “feelings
of out-party hostility” and hypothesised that voting was sometimes “driven mainly
by negative feelings toward other parties” (p. 765). Hence, he argued,
Future research should try to identify the sentiments of these negative parti-
sans more effectively via measurements that focus on feelings toward alterna-
tive parties as well as those that tap positive affect for a preferred party.
(Richardson 1991: 766)
Sören Holmberg (1994a: 100) argued that the strong correlation between the
vote and party identification did not mean voters had not developed lasting psycho-
logical attachments to the parties. What is problematic, is that as a concept party
identification is interesting for voting theory only if it is not too closely related to
vote choice (p. 95 ff.). If voters vote for the party they identify with and vice versa,
then party identification is not useful for explaining voting, because voting and
party identification cannot be distinguished meaningfully. Frode Berglund (2000)
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came to similar conclusions, but argued that because of its long-term effects the con-
cept remains meaningful for other purposes than explaining vote choice.
C. van der Eijk and B. Niemöller (1983, ch. 8) analysed the stability of party
identification and also found it to be (too) instable. Additionally they pointed to an-
other problem, namely that in the Netherlands voters frequently identified with
more than one party. This is incompatible with the concept of party identification,
they concluded (see also Niemöller and Van der Eijk 1984: 533-534). Considering the
conclusions drawn about party identification in the Netherlands, Niemöller and Van
der Eijk (1984: 534) argued that either the concept had to be operationalised differ-
ently, or that a theoretical concept had to be found that was measured by the ques-
tions that were intended to measure party identification. A strategy Niemöller and
Van der Eijk preferred, however, was to develop a “functional, theoretical, and op-
erational equivalent” that suited the Dutch multi-party system, such as ideological
identification (p. 534) (see also Niemöller and Van der Eijk 1990). In line with this
argument they focused on ideology in terms of left and right, building on the work
by Downs (1957).
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE: DOWNS AND SPATIAL MODELS
AN  ECONOMIC  THEORY  OF  DEMOCRACY
In An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), Downs outlined a theory that deals with
the behaviour of both parties and voters. Central in his theory is the notion of ration-
ality, which was taken from traditional economic theory. Downs was clear that the
model he presented was not a description of how parties and voters actually behave,
but how they would behave under a certain set of assumptions. This does not imply
that the theory is normative. The model explains what will happen under certain
conditions, not what should happen (p. 14).
Downs assumed that selection of government is the sole purpose of elections.
According to his theory, both parties and voters act rationally, which implies that
they seek to maximise benefits. Parties’ goals are to get as many votes as possible in
order to win elections (vote-maximisation axiom). For voters, benefits are defined in
terms of the utility they receive from government activity (utility income), which are
defined in terms of policy outcomes. The model outlines how rational parties and
voters behave, given their goals. The benefits themselves are taken as givens. The no-
tion of rationality applies to the means, not the ends.
Voters cast their votes for the party they believe will provide the highest utility
income. To maximise the utility they derive from the next government, voters com-
pare the utility incomes that the competing parties provide if they would be in office.
The difference between the hypothetical future benefits of the different parties (ex-
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pected utility incomes) is referred to as the expected party differential. Voters base their
judgement of the expected party differential on their judgement about the past. To
judge what parties will do in the next election period, voters evaluate what they have
done in the most recent. For the governing party the evaluation is based on what it
has done while it was in power. For an opposition party it is based on what voters
think it would have done if it had been in power. The corresponding equivalent of
the expected party differential is a current party differential. According to Downs,
making use of the current party differential is rational because the information on
which it is based concerns real facts (at least with respect to the governing party),
whereas the future party differential concerns only hypothetical situations (ch. 3).18
Voters decide for whom to vote on the basis of the policies the parties adopt.
The decision-making process starts with gathering information about the policy is-
sues and ends with a vote choice.19 Between gathering and analysing relevant factual
information and actually voting (or abstaining), Downs distinguished three steps.
[1] For each issue, appraising the consequences of every likely policy in light of
relevant goals. This is a value appraisal, not a strictly factual one.
[2] Coördinating the appraisals of each issue into a net evaluation of each party
running in the election. This is also a value judgment personally tailored to the
goals of the voter himself.
[3] Making the voting decision by comparing the net evaluations of each party
and weighting them for future contingencies. (Downs 1957: 209)
So when voters have the information they need, they evaluate each policy adopted
by a party, transform these single evaluations into an overall evaluation for each
party, and finally compare their overall evaluations of the competing parties to make
their vote choice. To judge the parties’ policies voters compare these to their own
view on what the ideal society looks like. Hence,
A man’s evaluation of each party depends ultimately upon (1) the information
he has about its policies and (2) the relation between those of its policies he
knows about and his conception of the good society. (Downs 1957: 46)
If governments consist of a single party, voters just have to evaluate the plat-
forms of the various parties. In a system with coalitions government, policies will not
match a single party’s platform. Then it is relevant which government coalitions the
parties are likely to join and what the coalition policies would be. Hence, in multi-
party systems with coalition governments voting rationally is more difficult. This
may lead voters to behave irrationally. Voters may merely support their favourite
party and treat elections “as expressions of preference instead of government selec-
tors” (pp. 152-153). About this form of irrationality Downs noted:
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When we call such behavior irrational, we do not mean that it is unintelligent
or not in the best interest of the voters. In fact, it may be the most rational thing
for them to do as individuals. The only sense in which it is irrational is from
the point of view of elections as direct government selectors. (Downs 1957: 154)
An additional rule for multi-party systems in Downs’ theory is that voters will not
vote for their favourite party if it has no chance of winning. Voters do not want to
‘waste their vote’ and choose between parties that have ‘a reasonable chance’.20 An
exception to this rule is made for future-oriented voters, who want to improve their
favourite party’s future chances. Voters may also support a party that has no chance
of winning in order to warn another party to change its policies (pp. 48-49).
A major problem of this model, Downs set out, is an assumption that in practice
will never be met.
This is how a voter would behave in a world of complete and costless informa-
tion. (...) In the real world, uncertainty and lack of information prevent even
the most intelligent and well-informed voter from behaving in precisely the
fashion we have described. (Downs 1957: 45-46)
To meet these limitations Downs modified the model in a number of ways. First, vot-
ers base the utility incomes only on those areas where differences between parties
are “great enough to impress” (p. 46). Second, the difference between the parties has
to be large enough, so that voters are not indifferent about which party wins the elec-
tion. Only when a so-called party differential threshold is passed, do voters not abstain
(p. 46). Third, if in consecutive elections careful deliberation has repeatedly resulted
in the same party choice, voters may vote for the same party out of habit. Such a vote
may be rational because it saves information costs (p. 85). Fourth, it may be rational
for voters to delegate steps in this decision-making process to others in order to re-
duce information costs. The most important modification, however, was the intro-
duction of the concept of ideology. Downs argued that for parties it is rational to
adopt ideologies and be consistent in these across time. For voters it may be rational
to use ideology as a short cut, because they cannot become fully informed about all
policies (ch. 7).
The notion of ideology laid the foundation for an analysis of party platforms in
terms of a single dimension, referred to as a ‘political space’. Downs used the anal-
ogy from previous research of competition in the context of shops in a street
(Hotelling 1929; Smithies 1941) (p. 115), and made use of a scale with values ranging
from 0 to 100 on which political preferences could be ordered meaningfully from left
to right. He assumed that parties take stands on many issues, which all can be plot-
ted on the left-right dimension. The parties’ net position would correspond with a
weighted average of all its issue positions. By positioning voters and parties on such
a single dimension the expected behaviour of parties was analysed (ch. 8). An under-
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lying assumption was that voters vote for the party that is closest to them in the po-
litical space (the smallest distance hypothesis).
Downs’ study is not an empirical study. Downs did not apply his theory to vot-
ing empirically. However, numerous empirical studies have been inspired by his
theory. A well-known way in which his work has been influential is by the founda-
tion it laid for so-called spatial models of voting (Davis et al. 1970; Enelow and
Hinich 1984; Van der Eijk and Niemöller 1983). Several studies centre around the
idea that voters base their choice on policy preferences as if they are consumers
(Himmelweit et al. 1981), while others focus on the impact of ideology (Heath et al.
1985, ch. 8; Middendorp 1991). Another way in which his views have been followed
can be seen in research that focuses on the information-processing of voters (Popkin
1991). An element of Downs’ theory that has received less attention is the idea that
voters may use different mechanisms to make a vote choice.
SPATIAL  MODELS  OF  IDEOLOGICAL  VOTING  IN  THE  NETHERLANDS
Building on Downs’ theory, Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983, ch. 7) employed the
left-right dimension to study voting in the Netherlands. Voters’ positions were
operationalised as self-ratings on a ten-point scale of left-right. On the same scale
voters assessed the positions of the political parties that were represented in parlia-
ment. In line with the smallest distance hypothesis voters were expected to vote for
the party that was closest to them on the scale. The distances were based on a voter’s
self-rating and that voter’s party ratings. Van der Eijk and Niemöller found that in the
1981 parliamentary election 60 per cent of all voters indeed had voted for a party that
was closest to them in terms of left-right (p. 278).21 In another study similar results
were obtained with respect to the 1989 election (Hermsen 1992, ch. 5). Perceived
agreement in terms of left-right has since repeatedly been put forward as the most
important variable for explaining vote choice in the Netherlands (Tillie 1995, ch. 6;
Oppenhuis 1995, ch. 6; Van Wijnen 2001, ch. 8).
The notion of an ideological space has also been used in other ways. Of particu-
lar interest is the ‘heartland model’ that Galen Irwin and Joop van Holsteyn (1989b,
1997; Van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003) developed.22 In this model the ideological space
was defined in terms of two dimensions rather than one.23 The dimensions were
operationalised on the basis of two issues: income inequality and abortion. Two
seven-point scales at which the extremes indicated opposite policy positions were
used to construct the space, which consequently consisted of 49 positions. The two
issues were thought to represent the major ideological differences in Dutch politics.
The dimension defined by income inequality corresponds largely with the meaning
of left-right. The dimension defined by abortion is related to religious and moral val-
ues. The political parties were not assigned a single point in the political space, but
areas, their ‘heartlands’. The area that corresponded to a leftist position with respect
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to income inequality (‘income differences should become smaller’) and a liberal
point of view on abortion (‘woman decides’) was defined as the Labour heartland. A
rightist position on income inequality (‘income differences should remain as they
are’) in combination with a liberal position on abortion was considered the Liberal
heartland. The area that corresponded with opposition to abortion (‘forbid abortion’)
was regarded as the Christian Democratic heartland, irrespective of the position on
income inequality.24 The area not defined as heartland of any of the three major par-
ties was referred to as ‘battlefield’. The ideological space consequently consisted of
four areas.25 Clear and strong relationships between voters’ positions in the space
and vote choice were found. Across the six parliamentary elections between 1977
and 1994 the three main parties (Labour Party, Liberal Party, and Christian Demo-
crats) received about half of the vote in their own heartlands (Irwin and Van
Holsteyn 1997: 106).26 In the battlefield the distribution of votes was more balanced,
although from 1981 until 1989 the Christian Democrats clearly received more votes
in this area than the other parties. In recent years, the explanatory power of the
heartland model has decreased considerably (Van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003).27
Although the spatial framework may be used to analyse the impact of ideology
on voting, it need not be. On the basis of other kinds of analyses ideology has also
been found in the Netherlands to be structured by two ideological dimensions. C. P.
Middendorp (1989; 1991) concluded that the left-right self-identification measure
that Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983) employed was a mixture of two ideological
orientations: a social-economic left-right orientation (which is fairly closely related to
socialism and liberalism) and a libertarian-authoritarian value orientation (related to
conservatism).28 According to Middendorp, whose analyses built on the idea that
electoral politics could be well understood in the Netherlands on the basis of a pro-
gressive-conservative dimension, a problem of the left-right self-image was that its
meaning was ambiguous (unlike measures based on concrete issues). Related to this
is J. W. van Deth’s (1986) objection that the use of concepts as left-right placement is
too trivial to explain vote choice. He argued that examining the impact of such per-
ceptions should be nothing but “a sideline in a much broader research program”
(p. 193) in which the more important questions are answered by going deeper into
the funnel of causality, so to speak.
DOWNS ’  THEORY  AND  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  PERSPECTIVE
Downs (1957) argued that his theory was not a psychological theory. The model only
explains how voters would behave if they were to act rationally within the frame-
work provided.
The model is not an attempt to describe reality accurately. (...) The statements
in our analysis are true of the model world, not the real world. (...) We are
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studying rational political behavior, not psychology or the psychology of po-
litical behavior. (Downs 1957: 9-10, 34)
So the model of voting Downs set out is not an accurate description of how voters
actually make up their mind, nor was it intended to be. As argued above, neither was
the theory meant to be normative. What then is the value of the model? According to
Downs, this value was in something else.
Our model could be described as a study of political rationality from an eco-
nomic point of view. By comparing the picture of rational behavior which
emerges from this study with what is known about actual political behavior,
the reader should be able to draw some interesting conclusions about the op-
eration of democratic politics. (Downs 1957: 14)
According to Downs, comparing the outcomes of real life to the outcomes of the
model is interesting even while the model does not describe accurately what hap-
pens in reality. The model thus provides a framework to analyse voting behaviour. It
can be tested whether voters in fact vote rationally, that is, to what extent they con-
form to the model. This is an empirical question. If voters do appear to act rationally,
we have a framework to interpret vote choice.29
To answer the question whether voters act rationally, two interpretations of
what ‘voting rationally’ means are possible. First, one may compare how voters actu-
ally voted to how they would have voted according to the model of a rational voter.
In this interpretation the process by which voters determine their vote choice is irrel-
evant. The only thing that matters in this view is the ultimate behaviour, not how it is
reached. In an alternative interpretation the process by which voters make up their
mind is taken into account. In that case voters are said to vote rationally only if they
follow the procedure set out by the model. In this interpretation the demands to vot-
ers are much higher: not only should the outcome correspond with a rational vote, so
should the process by which it is reached. In empirical studies the common use of
Downs’ theory is in line with the first interpretation: researchers compare what they
consider to be rational with how voters actually voted (see, for example, Van der Eijk
and Niemöller 1983). From a psychological perspective this is not satisfactory. To un-
derstand why people vote as they do, the processes that underlie those choices are
also of interest. For the same reason studies of voting that explain voting on the basis
of voters’ and parties’ positions in an ideological space are of limited value from a
psychological perspective: such studies are silent about the psychological processes
underlying vote choices.
Downs’ way of thinking is not only inspired by economics, but also shows a
great similarity with economic theories and models about consumer behaviour. This
is clear from the vocabulary that was used and the concepts that were focused on.
Hence, in terms of the concepts used Downs’ explanation for voting differs from
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those offered by the Columbia and Michigan scholars, who focused on group be-
longing, social and partisan identity, and attitudes. The use of different concepts,
however, does not imply that a different way of thinking is involved. In terms of the
three methods the Michigan scholars distinguished for the study of voting (studying
external events, studying social settings, and studying psychological variables),
Downs’ theory clearly fits the ‘psychological approach’. His theory does not focus on
external events or social settings, but on the psychological process that intervenes
between external events and vote choice. Downs’ theory concerns processes that
(may) occur in voters’ minds. In that sense his theory should be regarded as another
example of a psychological approach.
The fact that, according to Downs, his model does not describe the psychologi-
cal processes of voters, does not mean the model cannot be used as a framework to
analyse those processes. Adopting the line of argument Downs discussed with re-
spect to the normative implications of the model can show this. Downs indicated
that the model is not prescriptive of behaviour, but that it can be used for such pur-
poses. In a similar way the model itself is not descriptive, but it can be used as if it is.
Downs’ model can be interpreted as if it gives an explanation of the real world.
Downs’ theory draws attention to particular psychological processes that may
operate when voters face an election. Downs regarded voters as individuals who
make deliberate choices from a number of alternatives based on a calculation of costs
and benefits of possible election outcomes. The Michigan scholars, on the other
hand, did not specify any decision-making process. In their view vote choices are a
result of several psychological forces. No calculation need be made, the psychologi-
cal forces are automatically weighed and this results in a vote choice. Another differ-
ence between both approaches may be found in terms of affect: Downs’ approach
seems a rather cognitive one, whereas the Michigan approach involves values, evalu-
ation, and affect. Rational voters would not let their vote choice be (mis)directed by
non-rational influences such as emotional attachments. But the major difference is
arguably that whereas in the Michigan approach voting is viewed as expressive, in
Downs’ approach it is seen as instrumental: voters are assumed to behave goal-ori-
ented (cf. Harrop and Miller 1987: 130, 145).
Although the Michigan and Downsian approaches breathe very different at-
mospheres, they complement rather than contradict one another, just as the Colum-
bia and Michigan approaches do. The Michigan approach clarifies why social char-
acteristics have an impact on voting, namely through mediating psychological
concepts. Downs in a sense explains why certain psychological concepts, like those
focused on in the Michigan studies, have an impact on voting, namely through some
sort of decision-making process in which voters take into account possible election
outcomes. Downs’ theory does not violate the Columbia or Michigan findings, but
tells another part of the story.
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THEORIES OF ISSUE VOTING
THE  ISSUE-ORIENTED ,  RESPONSIBLE  VOTER
The Columbia scholars, Michigan scholars, and Downs seem to have agreed upon
the fact that for voting issues are of paramount importance. They differ, however, in
the way they viewed issues and handled them in their research. The Columbia schol-
ars emphasised the relationship between issues and the underlying cleavages and
corresponding social structure. The Michigan scholars emphasised that what matters
is voters’ perceptions of the candidates, of which their positions on domestic and for-
eign issues are an important aspect. Downs argued that voters seek to maximise util-
ity, which they derive from issue positions that governments take.
Although issues were not unimportant in the Columbia and Michigan studies,
the image of the voter that arose from these empirical studies was experienced as
being at odds with the democratic ideal of voters who base their vote choice on their
policy preferences.
They can be added up to a conception of voting not as a civic decision but as an
almost purely deterministic act. (...) The actions of persons are made to appear
to be only predictable and automatic responses to campaign stimuli. (Key
1966: 5)
In The Responsible Electorate (1966) V. O. Key contested the idea that voters’ choices at
the polls were predetermined socially or directed by blind party loyalty. He argued
that politicians falsely acted as if voters are manageable fools.
The perverse and unorthodox argument of this little book is that voters are not
fools. To be sure, many individual voters act in odd ways; yet in the large the
electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect,
given the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of the in-
formation available. (Key 1966: 7)
Key analysed the vote choices of different groups of voters and found that vote
choice strongly paralleled policy preferences.
Various other studies have examined the impact of issues and policy prefer-
ences. The idea that issues are crucial for voters when they decide for whom to vote
is referred to by the notions of ‘policy voting’ and ‘issue voting’. What kind of issues
are relevant and how their impact of vote choice has to be modelled, has been de-
bated. Three well-known models of issue voting that deal with this matter will be
discussed in some more detail.
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PROXIMITY  MODEL  OF  ISSUE  VOTING
The analogy of spatial competition that Downs applied to the election process has
become the basis of a specific class of voting models that have been used to examine
the impact of issues: spatial models of voting. Spatial models of voting assume that
voters are rational and make a choice on the basis of their self-interest. Self-interest is
not meant to be economic self-interest, but self-interest may concern a whole variety
of non-economic issues.
What spatial theory assumes is that the voter has a given stake or interest in
the outcome of the vote, which he recognizes, and which leads him to vote as
he does. The form of this self-interest is subjectively determined by the voter.
Spatial theory does not explain the source or form that this self-interest takes.
The theory merely assumes that the voter recognizes his own self-interest,
evaluates alternative policies or candidates on the basis of which will best
serve his self-interest, and casts his vote for the policy or candidate most
favorably evaluated. In short, the voter is rational. (Enelow and Hinich 1984: 3)
The notion of space enters the theory when the self-interest is conceptualised. James
Enelow and Melvin Hinich (1984) argued that the self-interest of the voter is related
to the policy outcomes that are associated with the future government. Who wins the
election determines which policies will be adopted, and these policies ‘serve’ or ‘vio-
late’ the interest of the voter. Enelow and Hinich argued that policy positions can be
conceptualised as ‘predictive dimensions’ that together make up the political space
in which electoral competition takes place (p. 38). The positions that parties and vot-
ers take in the space depend on their policy preferences. In line with the smallest
distance hypothesis voters are expected to prefer the party that is closest to them in
the space. This model has been referred to as the proximity model of issue voting.
In empirical analyses spatial models of voting have been applied in two differ-
ent ways, which can be referred to as a deductive method and an inductive method.
In the deductive method first voters’ and parties’ positions on the dimensions of the
political space are determined, for example in terms of their positions on a number
of issues. On the basis of these positions and the smallest distance hypothesis predic-
tions are made about voters’ party preferences or vote choice, which are then tested
empirically (see, for example, Van Cuilenburg et al. 1980; Middendorp et al. 1993).
In the inductive method the starting point is voters’ evaluations of the parties or
candidates. On the basis of statistical analyses of such evaluations a political space
can be constructed that best fits the data. The result is a space in which parties and
voters have a position, but which has no meaning (yet). What the spatial dimensions
stand for remains undefined. By analysing relationship between voters’ and parties’
positions in the space and stands on issues (or ideological positions), the dimensions
of the space can be interpreted (see, for example, Enelow and Hinich 1984, ch. 9).
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DIRECTIONAL  THEORY  OF  ISSUE  VOTING
George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine Macdonald (1989) formulated an alternative
theory of issue voting. In electoral research voters’ stands with respect to issues are
usually operationalised by showing them a line with a certain number of positions,
while both end-points of the scale are labelled with opposite policies. Voters are then
asked to indicate their own position on this scale. In a similar way their perceptions
of parties and candidates are assessed. The differences between two scale positions
are interpreted as a distance that indicates the degree of agreement on the issue, for
example between a voter and a party. Rabinowitz and Macdonald agreed with
Donald Stokes (1963) that operationalising issues this way only makes sense if the
scale can be conceived of as a set of ordered alternatives. According to Stokes, this
assumption is false.
Rabinowitz and Macdonald proposed to view voters’ positions on such scales
in a different way. They argued that the positions indicate two things about a certain
‘political symbol’: direction and intensity.30 In terms of direction the scale has three
positions, namely ‘favourable, ‘unfavourable’, and ‘neutral’. The intensity refers to
the strength of the feeling concerning the issue: the end-points represent strong feel-
ings, whereas a position close to the neutral mid-point indicates weak feelings.31
According to Rabinowitz and Macdonald, the impact of an issue on voters’ feel-
ings towards candidates is determined by both the voters’ and the candidates’ posi-
tions on the scale.32 The directional components determine whether the voter likes
the candidate more or less due to the issue. If both take a ‘favourable’ position or
both take an ‘unfavourable’ position, the voter will like the candidate better; if they
take opposite positions, the voter will like the candidate less. If either the voter or the
candidate takes a neutral position the effect is assumed to be zero. The intensity com-
ponents indicate the amount of feeling the issue evokes. The intensity of the candi-
date position indicates how much the candidate stirs feelings on the issue (p. 96) and
how central the issue is for judgements about the candidate (p. 98). The intensity of
the voter’s position indicates how much feeling the issue evokes in the person and
how central the issue is for judgements by the voter. More extreme positions indicate
that the issue evokes stronger feelings and has a larger impact on how voters evalu-
ate candidates.
The directional theory results in different expectations about the relationship
between voters’ positions on an issue scale and their feelings towards a party or can-
didate than the proximity model. For example, if a scale has values ranging from one
to seven and a party takes position two, then the proximity model predicts voters at
position two to like the party best. The directional theory predicts voters at position
one to like the party best, since the issue affects them most strongly (and they favour
the same side as the party).
Psychology in Voting Theory 37
To a certain extent one may conceive of Rabinowitz and Macdonald’s theory as
one concerning a methodological question, namely how to interpret issue scales.
From a psychological point of view another aspect of their theory is especially inter-
esting, namely that they put central the notion of feelings or emotions. According to
their theory, issues matter because they evoke emotional responses. These may vary
across individuals and how much a certain issue matters may vary across parties and
candidates.
THEORY  OF  ISSUE  OWNERSHIP
Another theory of issue voting was outlined by Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie (1979).
In this context the distinction that Stokes (1963: 373) made between ‘position issues’
and ‘valence issues’ is relevant. Position issues involve alternative actions of govern-
ment (e.g. the issue of abortion), while valence issues concern the strength of the link
between a party and a certain positively or negatively evaluated condition (e.g. the
issue of unemployment). Budge and Farlie argued that party competition cannot be
characterised best by parties who take opposite or different positions on certain (po-
sition) issues. With respect to many issues parties do not differ much in terms of di-
rection, but in the degree to which these issues are important to them. Parties focus
on a limited number of (valence) issues and more or less ignore the issues that other
parties are talking about. Consequently, each party has ‘its own issues’.
Because parties are regarded as the ‘owners’ of particular issues, the theory has
been referred to as the theory of issue ownership. Party competition then takes place
in terms of differences in the importance assigned to issues. What matters is the sali-
ency of issues and hence the theory has also been referred to as ‘saliency theory’. If
voters regard the same issues important as a party, they are more strongly inclined to
vote for it. The match between parties and voters in terms of the saliency of the va-
lence issues is regarded as the key to voters’ choices. This implies that the proximity
model and the directional theory miss the point, since these focus on disagreement
with respect to position issues.33
THEORIES  OF  ISSUE  VOTING  AND  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  PERSPECTIVE
Theories of issue voting may be considered psychological in the sense that issue po-
sitions and policy preferences concern the voters’ mind. But whether the concepts
used and analyses performed provide insight in how the mind works may be
doubted.
With respect to a certain issue a number of alternative actions of government
exist and voters’ like or dislike these alternatives to certain degrees. The alternative
that voters like best may be said to be their policy preference or issue position. This
implies that a single policy preference is in fact based on voters’ feelings with respect
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to more than one object, namely each alternative action of government. We may refer
to the degree to which voters like or dislike such underlying single policies as policy
evaluations. Hence, the scales that have been used in electoral research to
operationalise policy preferences or issue positions combine a number of psycho-
logical entities. If the end-points are labelled with policies X and Y, the scale may be
regarded as an analytical construct that combines a like-dislike rating of policy X and
a like-dislike rating of policy Y: the scale position indicates the degree to which
policy X is liked more, or less, than policy Y. The mid-point then indicates that poli-
cies X and Y are liked equally well. What is important, is that from a psychological
perspective issue scales should thus be viewed as analytical constructs, rather than
measurements of truly psychological concepts.
From a psychological perspective it is also important to note that to explain vot-
ing on the basis of issue positions or policy preferences, these must be stored as such
in voters’ memory (or at least the underlying policy evaluations must). Only if they
exist as such in the voters’ mind, can they influence their vote choice.
Another important point is that if empirical analyses show that a relationship
exists between voters’ policy preferences and their vote choice, this does not imply
that the issue in question as such had an impact. It is possible that the relationship is
found because the issue was empirically related to another issue that influenced the
vote. If, for example, voters’ choices are influenced by their opinions about euthana-
sia, their vote choice can be predicted on the basis of their opinions about abortion,
assuming opinions on both issues are related. Analyses could then show that policy
preferences with respect to abortion predict vote choice well, while not a single voter
thought about that issue when deciding for whom to vote. A related possibility is
that voters decide on the basis of group belonging or ideology, which may also be
related to particular issue stands. Yet another possibility is that voters’ policy prefer-
ences are caused by, rather than causes of, vote choice (see, for example, Thomassen
1976a: ch. 2-3, 6-7). Voters may use political parties as a point of reference and form
policy preferences on the basis of parties’ issue stands (Belknap and Campbell 1952).
Hence, strong relationships between policy preferences and vote choice need not in-
dicate that the former caused the latter.
Note, finally, that in most research on issue voting the analyses merely show the
empirical relationships between policy preferences and vote choice. The psychologi-
cal process by which both are related usually remains a sort of black box. What hap-
pens in voters’ minds is an important question that remains to be answered to under-
stand why and how issues play their role.
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THE PSEPHOLOGICAL PARADIGM
The models of voting discussed may be regarded as complementary, rather than con-
tradictory. Each tells a part of the story. The models are also related in the sense that
they share a set of ideas. These may jointly be referred to as the orthodoxy of voting
theory.
Helena Catt (1996, ch. 2) argued that there is ‘voting behaviour orthodoxy’ and
identified four orthodoxies.34 First, voting theories assume that in elections voters de-
cide “which party they like best” (p. 23). It is assumed that all voters decide in the
same fashion, and that voters of a particular party like it for the same reason. Second,
votes are regarded as a form of support for the party or candidate voted for. Third,
models of voting assume that voters make ‘rational decisions’. Catt mentioned four
elements of rationality: “the traditional ‘economic’ self-interest; a consistency of
views; decisions based on ‘objective facts’ rather than emotions; and seeing the world
in the same way as the analyst” (p. 30). Fourth, election studies typically ignore sys-
tem biases, which result from the party system, the electoral system, or the local con-
text. These four aspects of the orthodoxy have constraining effects. Catt listed three
types of votes that cannot be accounted for as a result of the orthodoxy: protest votes,
tactical votes, and votes resulting from negative motivations.
This section elaborates further upon the similarities between models of voting
from a psychological perspective. The discussion shows that most models share a set
of underlying ideas about how the minds of voters work. They are discussed in
terms of ten assumptions that underlie most studies of voting. The assumptions are
discussed as separate points, but are all related to one another. Together they make
up what may be called a psephological paradigm. How we can go beyond this para-
digm is indicated by discussing research in which certain orthodoxies were not taken
for granted.
THE  ASSUMPTION  OF  VOTING  AS  A  TWO-DECISION  PROCESS
A first assumption that underlies most studies of voting is that voters make two deci-
sions: they decide whether to vote or to abstain, and they decide for whom to vote.
For voters both choices may be related. To know for whom to vote may be an incen-
tive to cast a vote, and not to know for whom to vote may be a reason to abstain.
Therefore, one may argue that voting studies should abandon the idea that two sepa-
rate decisions are involved. In an alternative view the option to abstain and the op-
tions to vote for particular parties or candidates constitute a single choice set.
Some theories deal simultaneously with both decisions in the sense that they
use the same concepts to explain the decision whether to vote and the decision for
whom to vote (for example, Downs 1957; Davis et al. 1970). However, using the same
framework to study both decisions does not imply that the choice is conceived of as
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one out of a single set of alternatives. Both aspects remain dealt with separately and
are conceived of as two choices. Hence, these studies in fact fit the orthodoxy.
A model in which both aspects are treated as a single choice, is one that states
that if voters like one party better than the other, they will vote for that party; if they
like both parties equally well (or poorly), they will abstain. Such a model explains
voting in terms of voting versus non-voting and party choice simultaneously. In this
example non-voting is not evaluated by voters as such, but is a result of equal evalu-
ations of the competing parties. Another possibility is to include voters’ attitude to-
wards abstention as such. The options of voting for each of the competing parties, as
well as the option of non-voting, can be viewed as alternatives to which voters may
be attracted to different degrees. Voters may then be hypothesised to choose the op-
tion they feel attracted to most strongly.
THE  ASSUMPTION  OF  A  SINGLE  OBJECT  OF  VOTING
Most voting models have as an underlying assumption that in a particular system all
voters either vote for parties or vote for candidates. Hence, the ‘for whom to vote’ is
conceptualised as a choice for one specific object: parties or candidates.35
It may sound plausible that in parliamentary elections voters choose parties,
but in many countries, such as Britain and the Netherlands, voters do not have this
possibility. Voters can only pick a single candidate from the ballot paper and thus
cannot cast a ‘party vote’. So formally these voters do not vote for parties, but for
candidates. From a psychological perspective one could counter-argue that what
matters is not this formal procedure, but the subjective experience of voters.
If we adopt this perspective, another possibility arises. In a single election some
voters may feel they voted for a party, whereas others feel they voted for a candidate.
Another possibility is that some voters experience their vote as one for a govern-
ment. In two-party systems in particular, like Britain, voters may feel that they cast a
vote for a Conservative or Labour government, rather than for the Conservative or
Labour party. In multi-party systems with coalition governments, such as the Nether-
lands, this is presumably less easy, although considerations about the future govern-
ment may play a role. In elections that focus on candidates researchers may similarly
falsely assume that candidates are the objects of voting. Voters may feel they voted
for a party, rather than for a candidate. In U.S. presidential elections there is another
possible flaw in the assumption that voters vote for a presidential candidate. The
voters also elect a vice-president and thus vote for a ticket that comprises two candi-
dates. Consequently, voters may regard their vote as one for such a ticket, rather than
for a single candidate. Yet another possibility is that some voters regard their vote as
being cast for more than one object; for example, for a party and for a candidate.
One research strategy is to leave this matter aside, and for analytical purposes
define voting in terms of a single object: even if voters feel they cast their votes for
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candidates, these may still be analysed in terms of the parties who (in a sense) re-
ceived them. But from a psychological point of view this is not satisfactorily. To aban-
don this orthodoxy, electoral researchers need to identify for whom voters cast their
vote in their own experience.
THE  ASSUMPTION  OF  PARTIES  AS  SINGLE ,  UNITARY  ACTORS
Another assumption that underlies most voting research is that political parties can
be conceived of as single, unitary actors; and that voters view them that way. The
possibility that within a party different persons or groups may have different policy
preferences, for example, is usually not taken into account. Often, however, people
speak about parties as if they are not unitary actors. For example, the idea that there
exists a left wing of the Labour Party may be seen as an indication that parties are not
unitary actors; or one may think about candidates of a party who are known for tak-
ing different stands on particular issues.36
Another way in which this assumption manifests itself is that the same political
parties operate at different levels: in local, regional, national, and supranational elec-
tions often the same parties participate. Usually, it is assumed that at these various
levels the participating parties are the same. However, it may well be that some vot-
ers see differences between parties at different levels and consequently have differ-
ent attitudes towards the same party at those levels.37
THE  ASSUMPTION  OF  CAUSAL  HOMOGENEITY  IN  VOTE  CHOICE
Most models share the assumption that all voters make up their mind in a similar
fashion and hence that all voters fit one single causal model. Variation among voters
is allowed in terms of the attributes of the variables included, but for each voter the
same set of variables is assumed to be relevant. If the model allows voters to put dif-
ferent weights on different variables, all voters are usually nevertheless assumed to
put equal weight on each variable. This orthodoxy can be referred to as the assump-
tion of ‘causal homogeneity’ (see, for example, Green and Shapiro 1994: 17).
In some studies the homogeneity assumption has been loosened. Studies on is-
sue voting that include the notion of (issue) saliency are an example. When voters
decide for whom to vote, they are assumed to put different weights on the various
issues. Some voters, for example, may base their choice primarily on economic issues
such as inflation and unemployment, while others base their choice primarily on
moral issues as abortion and euthanasia. To include issue saliency in the analysis,
voters may simply be asked how important various issues are to them (see, for exam-
ple, McGraw et al. 1990).
Another way in which the assumption of causal homogeneity has been loos-
ened is by performing analyses separately for different groups of voters. For exam-
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ple, Paul Sniderman and his colleagues (1990; 1991, ch. 9) examined whether in U.S.
presidential elections voters made up their mind differently depending on their level
of education. They found that, at least in the 1980 election between Reagan and
Mondale, incumbent approval was important especially for the less educated, and
that perceived competence was especially important for the more educated (p. 171).
Another example is a study by C. J. Pattie and R. J. Johnston (2001). They found that
in Britain voters’ education had no impact on the influence of retrospective economic
evaluations on vote choice, but they observed differences with respect to ideology
and policy preferences. With respect to the Netherlands Pieter van Wijnen (2001,
ch. 7) found that perceived ideological differences in terms of left-right had a
stronger impact on vote choice among highly-educated voters.
According to Douglas Rivers (1988), the two methods discussed above do not
solve the problem that arises if voters decide in different ways. The notion of saliency
does not solve the problem, because people are “bad reporters of their own decision
processes” (p. 738). Distinguishing between groups does not solve it, because within
those groups homogeneity is still assumed; an additional problem is which groups
to distinguish. Rivers showed that an alternative method to cope with the problem
can be employed if instead of vote choice the dependent variable analysed is a pref-
erence rank-ordering of candidates. This allows each voter to put a different weight
on each variable. After the set of variables to be used as independent variables has
been determined, empirical analyses can determine for each voter how much weight
was put on each variable. Rivers’ analysis showed that in the 1980 U.S. presidential
election the impact of two variables, party identification and ideology (liberal versus
conservative), indeed varied across voters.
Another type of research that seems to have few problems with the idea of
causal heterogeneity, is the more qualitatively oriented research based on voters’
own motivations of their vote choice (see, for example, Van Holsteyn 1994). When
voters themselves are asked why they voted as they did, they provide researchers
with many different reasons. Various motives can be distinguished; for example,
group interests, ideology, policy preferences, and candidate preferences. This indi-
cates that different voters may vote for the same party for different reasons.
THE  ASSUMPTION  OF  A  SINCERE  VOTE
Models of voting by and large have as an underlying assumption that voters make
their choice by simply picking the most positively evaluated party or candidate. In
so-called economic models this more or less corresponds with the notion of utility
(or party utility, cf. Tillie 1995), and in social-psychological models with the notion of
attitudes. Because a vote for the best-liked party or candidate has been referred to as
a sincere vote (see Catt 1989), this may be referred to as the assumption of a sincere
vote.
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The problem of this assumption can be clarified on the basis of the notion of
strategic or tactical voting. Voters may have reasons to give their vote to another
party or candidate than the one they like best. A well-known example is related to
the first-past-the-post electoral system, as in Britain. Voters may vote for another
party or candidate than the one they liked best, because their original preference has
no chance of winning the constituency seat. Research has shown that this indeed has
happened (Catt 1989). This shows that the assumption that all voters vote for the
party or candidate they like best is false; a theory of voting should explicitly allow
for the possibility that voters do not.
THE  ASSUMPTION  OF  MEMORY-BASED  CANDIDATE  AND  PARTY  EVALUATIONS
The assumption of a sincere vote implies that although voting models are usually
tested by examining how well they predict vote choice, in fact they explain why vot-
ers like or dislike parties or candidates. The explanations provided for those evalua-
tions generally build on the idea that voters have certain images of parties and candi-
dates, and their appraisal of these images determines how much they like or dislike
them. This means that candidate and party evaluations are assumed to be memory-
based.
With respect to candidate evaluations there is evidence that this assumption is
(at least partly) false. According to Milton Lodge and his colleagues (1989, 1995;
McGraw et al. 1990; Lodge and Stroh 1993), when voters process information about
candidates, they immediately adjust an overall judgement of the candidate. They
‘update a running tally’ that indicates how much they like or dislike the candidate.
This idea is known as the on-line model, because it implies that candidate evalua-
tions are made ‘on-line’, when information about the candidate is processed. A key
difference with the traditional view is that voters may forget the information they
have processed, while the effect on candidate or party evaluations remains. For ex-
ample, voters may hear about a policy proposal of a certain party and therefore like
the party better. Later these voters do not remember the proposal, but nevertheless
still like the party better than if they had not heard about the proposal. This implies
that the overall evaluation of the party need not be in balance with the information
voters have stored in memory about that party. Lodge and his colleagues found that
candidate evaluations indeed operated like running tallies: they were affected by in-
formation that individuals could not recall. This suggests that candidate and party
evaluations are not memory-based and implies that we should regard voters as
information-processing, rather than information-possessing beings.
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THE  ASSUMPTION  OF  COGNITIVE  AND  SEMANTIC  MEMORY
The idea that the images of parties and candidates that voters have stored in their
memory are the key to understanding their party and candidate evaluations is in it-
self biased in another way, namely in terms of the kind of information in memory
that is taken into account. In psychology it is common to distinguish between differ-
ent kinds of memory (Squire 1987; Schacter 1996; LeDoux 1998). Distinctions that are
important in this context, are those between cognitive and affective or emotional
memory, and between semantic and episodic memory. Electoral research takes into
account only ‘cognitive’ and ‘semantic’ memory; ‘affective’ and ‘episodic’ memory
are neglected.
The distinction between semantic and episodic memory corresponds with that
between ‘facts about’ and ‘experiences with’. Semantic memory concerns the image
of a party or candidate in terms of traits and characteristics or other facts, whereas
the episodic memory concerns memories of one’s past experiences with those parties
and candidates. This means that semantic memory includes, for example, beliefs
about the ideological positions that parties take, or about the traits that candidates
possess. Episodic memory includes recollections of speeches by a candidate heard,
or certain actions by a party or government witnessed.38
Voters not only have an image about what parties are like and what they stand
for, but they may also remember things the parties have done in the past. What mat-
ters is not only the image, but also the memories one has of a party. If voters remember
things that parties have done which they like, they may be expected to be more likely
to like them and vote for them. Such experiences may be independent of the image
as stored in semantic memory. Therefore, not only the semantic memory but also the
episodic memory is relevant when studying voters’ minds.
Another way in which the study of voters’ memory is biased concerns the dis-
tinction between cognitive and affective memory. Electoral researchers usually study
memory in terms of voters’ cognitions or beliefs, not their emotional responses to
parties or candidates.
An exception to the neglect of both kinds of memory is a study by Robert
Abelson and colleagues (1982). They explained voters’ evaluations of presidential
candidates on the basis of their recall of past emotional experiences with those candi-
dates. Studies by George Marcus and his colleagues (Marcus 1988; Marcus and
MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000) have provided further evidence for the impact of
emotional phenomena in addition to candidate characteristics, policy preferences,
and party identification.
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THE  ASSUMPTION  OF  HOMOGENEITY  IN  BASES  OF  EVALUATION  (ACROSS  PARTIES)
Another orthodoxy in voting theory is that what matters with respect to how voters
feel about parties or candidates is the same across all parties or candidates. The same
set of characteristics that make up the image one has of a party or candidate is as-
sumed to be relevant for how voters evaluate each party or candidate. For example,
the proximity model of issue voting assumes that voters evaluate all parties or candi-
dates on the basis of the same set of issues. Each issue is assumed to be equally im-
portant for each party or candidate.
To some extent Rabinowitz and Macdonald’s (1989) directional theory of issue
voting is different, since their model allowed for differences in the importance for
each issue across parties. In a sense the heartland model of Irwin and Van Holsteyn
(1989b) also does not fit this assumption. Their model suggests that in the Nether-
lands Labour and the Liberals are evaluated on the basis of two ideological dimen-
sions (those related to the issues of abortion and income inequality), whereas the
Christian Democrats are evaluated on the basis of only one (related to abortion).
The idea that different parties may be evaluated on the basis of different criteria
not only applies to the kinds of issues, but also to the kinds of characteristics. It is
possible that one party is liked or disliked because of its policy positions, while an-
other is because of the personal competence of its leader or because of the way it
performed in the government. In voting theories such differences have often not
been taken into account.
THE  ASSUMPTION  OF  CONSTRUCTABLE  EVALUATIONS
Most models of voting not only share the idea that evaluations of a particular set of
characteristics determine how much voters like parties or candidates, they also share
the idea that those evaluations can be constructed (by researchers).
With respect to some characteristics the evaluation is assumed to be similar
across all voters. For example, if a candidate is perceived as honest, all voters are
assumed to evaluate this characteristic positively. Moreover, they are assumed to like
this characteristic equally well. In most cases, however, voters are not assumed to
evaluate a characteristic similarly; some voters like a certain characteristic, whereas
others dislike it. This is the case, for example, with respect to parties’ and candidates’
issue positions. The question then arises how voters evaluate that characteristic and
why they do so. Many models of voting answer these two questions simultaneously
by pointing out that the evaluation of a party or candidate characteristic can be de-
termined by the match between that party or candidate characteristic on the one
hand, and a certain corresponding voter characteristic on the other hand. For exam-
ple, the proximity model of issue voting assumes that voters like an issue position of
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a party to the extent that it matches their own position. ‘Evaluations’ are constructed
on the basis of the match between party characteristics and voter characteristics.
A more appropriate method is to assess the evaluation of the party or candidate
characteristics more directly. If a certain party is of the opinion that abortion should
be forbidden, rather than ask voters about their own opinions about abortion and
assume that this position results in a specific evaluation of the party’s stand, one
could ask voters directly how they feel about the party’s issue position.
THE  ASSUMPTION  OF  RESEARCHER  FOREKNOWLEDGE
Another assumption that appears to underlie voting research is that researchers
know beforehand which party and candidate characteristics are important. Typi-
cally, to explain their vote choice, voters are asked to indicate their positions on a
selected number of issues. Hence, the researcher knows beforehand which issues are
important. We may refer to his as the assumption of researcher foreknowledge.
An exception is the research by Stanley Kelley and Thad Mirer (1974; Kelley
1983). To explain why voters preferred a particular candidate, they made use of vot-
ers’ answers to open-ended questions about what they liked and what they disliked
about the candidates. The research based on these questions is much more open in
terms of the kind of characteristics that are taken into consideration to explain vote
choice.
THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  PROCESS  AS  A  BLACK  BOX
The last orthodoxy concerns not what models of voting say about how voters decide
about for whom to vote, but what they do not say. In particular, models of voting are
silent about psychological processes that operate. The models are analytical tools to
analyse the impact of certain phenomena on voting, but which psychological proc-
esses take place that make that those phenomena are related in a certain way to vote
choice is not elaborated upon. Even the most important representatives of a so-called
psychological approach, the Michigan scholars, clearly stated that their theory does
not describe the psychological processes that actually take place in voters’ minds.
What is missing in particular, is a view on what decision-making mechanisms
operate. How do voters know for which party to vote? Do voters really compute
evaluations of each party or candidate characteristic on the basis of the match with
their own characteristics, integrate these in overall evaluations, and then choose the
party they like best? Are there other ways in which evaluations of parties or candi-
dates can be formed? Are there other choice mechanisms at work? And if so, which
are these choice mechanisms? These are important questions about which most
models of voting are silent. To understand well why people vote as they do, the black
box must be opened and the psychological processes must be revealed.
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Attitudes have long been regarded as one of the main concepts of social psychology.
Gordon Allport’s (1935: 798) much-cited words that “the concept of attitudes is prob-
ably the most distinctive and indispensable concept in contemporary American so-
cial psychology” still seems to be true, probably even world-wide (Fishbein and
Ajzen 1975: 1; McGuire 1985: 235; Petty et al. 1997: 610). Two main reasons why atti-
tudes are important are that they influence perception and direct behaviour (Fazio
1986, 1990). Because of this, when studying voting behaviour from a psychological
perspective, the attitude concept may be considered important. Insights from social
psychology about the impact of attitudes on behaviour may be useful for the study
of voting.
As in this research the psychological perspective on attitudes is adopted, it is
useful to first take a close look at the conceptualisation of attitudes in psychology. An
additional reason to do so, is that various measurements used in electoral research
can be related to discussions of attitudes in social psychology. By discussing the lat-
ter, the underlying conceptual differences between various measurements from elec-
toral research may be illuminated.
THE CONCEPT OF AN ATTITUDE
CONCEPTUAL  DEFINITIONS  OF  ATTITUDES
The question how to define an attitude is not easy to answer. Despite many decades
of research on attitudes – or perhaps because of it – there has not been a single
agreed-upon conceptual definition (McGuire 1985: 239-240). The introduction of the
concept is generally credited to William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki (Allport
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1935: 802). Thomas and Znaniecki’s (1918/1958: 22-23) conception of attitudes was
not very psychological. In The Polish Peasant they argued that attitudes were prima-
rily ‘towards something’, not ‘a state of somebody’. Hence, in their view attitudes
were not a psychic state or a psychological process. Later definitions differ from Tho-
mas and Znaniecki’s original conception. Attitudes became regarded as ‘a state of
somebody’. More specifically, attitudes became to be viewed as individuals’ readi-
ness to respond in a certain way. In the words of Droba (1933), “a mental disposition
of the human individual to act for or against a definite object” (cited in Allport 1935:
804). A similar view is reflected in Allport’s (1935: 810) definition of an attitude as “a
mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a direc-
tive or dynamic influence upon the individual’s response to all objects and situations
with which it is related”. Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen (1975: 6, 10) adopted a
fairly similar view in their definition of an attitude as “a learned predisposition to
respond in a consistently favorable or unfavorable manner with respect to a given
object”.
Milton Rosenberg and Carl Hovland (1960) made an influential contribution by
elaborating upon the kind of responses that attitudes evoke. They argued that atti-
tudes cannot be observed and measured directly; only the responses they evoke can.
These responses, Rosenberg and Hovland argued, fall in three categories: affective,
cognitive, and behavioural.1 At the beginning of the 1960s, they concluded that for
most researchers “evaluation of the affective component has been central” and that
“the bulk of attitude research (…) has involved some index of ‘affect’ (or ‘evaluative
response’) as the prime measure of attitude” (p. 5). Fishbein and Ajzen (1975: 11)
came to similar conclusions: “there is widespread agreement that affect is the most
essential part of the attitude concept”. In the 1990s Richard Petty and John Cacioppo
(1996: 7) concluded that there was “widespread agreement among social psycholo-
gists that the term attitude should be used to refer to a general and enduring positive
or negative feeling about some person, object, or issue”. The use of the word ‘feeling’
indicates that attitudes were viewed as affective phenomena.2
In the view of various authors ‘evaluation’ and ‘affect’ are synonymous, or at
least they treated them as such (see Rosenberg and Hovland 1960: 5; Fishbein and
Ajzen 1975: 11). An evaluation is viewed as an affective phenomenon. In the 1980s
and 1990s the notion of evaluation is arguably the most central element of how atti-
tudes are conceived. For example, Petty and Cacioppo (1986: 25) defined an attitude
as “a general favorable, unfavorable, or neutral evaluation of a person, object, or is-
sue”; and Russell Fazio (1990: 81) defined an attitude as “an association in memory
between a given object and one’s evaluation of that object”. Alice Eagly and Shelly
Chaiken’s (1993: 1) definition of an attitude, which is widely used today, speaks
about “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity
with some degree of favor or disfavor”.3 Evaluation in terms of favour versus disfa-
vour has become the central element in the definition of an attitude.4 In later defini-
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tions the notion of affect is not explicitly included, but this does not reflect a change
in the conceptualisation. It is a consequence of the fact that today the term affect is
mostly reserved for other concepts than attitudes, namely moods (such as happi-
ness) and emotions (such as fear) (Ajzen 2001: 29). Hence, attitudes are still regarded
as an affective phenomenon.
OPERATIONAL  DEFINITIONS  OF  ATTITUDES  IN  VOTING  RESEARCH
Despite disagreement about the conceptual definition of attitudes, William McGuire
(1985: 239) observed considerable agreement on the operational definition of atti-
tudes as “responses that locate ‘objects of thought’ on ‘dimensions of judgment’.”
Despite this agreement, there has been a variety of ways in which the ‘dimensions of
judgement’ have been operationalised. This holds also with respect to voting re-
search. Individuals’ attitudes towards parties and candidates, which are the most im-
portant ‘objects of thought’, have been assessed in a variety of ways. There appears
to be a similarity between these measurements in electoral research and different
definitions of attitudes in social psychology. Various operations in voting research
reflect different views on attitudes.
The measurement of party evaluations in British voting research, for example,
strongly corresponds with one particular view on attitudes. In the British Election
Studies party evaluations have been measured by questions like, “How do you feel
about the Conservative Party?” The answer categories included ‘strongly in favour’,
‘in favour’, ‘neither in favour, nor against’, ‘against’, ‘strongly against’, and ‘don’t
know’ (Heath et al. 1993). The categories ‘in favour’ and ‘against’ reflect a general
evaluative positive-negative dimension, which corresponds largely with the view on
attitudes as evaluations of objects.
According to other definitions, attitudes are affective phenomena. This view is
reflected in the way candidate evaluations have been measured in American elec-
toral research. In the American National Election Studies candidate evaluations have
been measured on the basis of a so-called feeling thermometer (see Chapter 2). The
question wording and the labels that are used in relation to the thermometer define
the evaluation in affective terms. The labels include wordings like ‘very warm or
favorable feeling’ and negative equivalents as ‘fairly cold or unfavorable feeling’. The
words ‘warm’ and ‘cold’ indicate that an affective evaluation is involved.
In another view on attitudes these are defined as tendencies to respond. Elec-
toral research has usually not included questions about voters’ general readiness to
respond favourably or unfavourably towards the competing parties or candidates.
However, in Dutch and European electoral research voters have been asked how
likely they thought it was that they would ever vote for a certain party (Tillie 1995;
Oppenhuis 1995; Van der Eijk, Franklin, et al. 1996). This so-called future vote prob-
ability measure can be regarded as a very specific evaluation of parties, namely one
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in terms of behavioural tendency. This reflects the conception of attitudes as readi-
ness to respond with a certain degree of favour or disfavour. However, the response
is limited to the notion of voting, which is an important difference with the attitude
concept.
Attitudes can also be assessed indirectly, as proposed by Fishbein and Ajzen
(1975), by combining measures concerning beliefs about attitude objects and evalua-
tions of those beliefs. Some electoral research has adopted an approach related to this
strategy. Voters have often been asked to scale themselves and the competing politi-
cal parties along certain dimensions, for example in terms of left-right or in terms of
their stand on certain issues. By comparing the party position with voters’ own posi-
tions, scores can be computed that indicate an ‘expected party evaluation’ (see, for
example, Markus and Converse 1979; Van der Eijk and Niemöller 1983). Voters’ per-
ceptions of parties’ positions correspond with what attitude research refers to as be-
liefs about the attitude object.5 Evaluations about those beliefs are constructed by
comparing the perceived party position with voters’ own positions.
From the perspective of this research, in which attitudes are conceived of as af-
fective evaluations of objects, the operationalisation in the American National Elec-
tion Studies on the basis of a so-called feeling thermometer is preferable. This
operationalisation includes the notion of evaluation as well as the notion of affect.
The Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies contain an equivalent of this question,
which does not include the notion of a feeling thermometer, but which does concern
an affective evaluation of parties.
ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR
THE  ATTITUDE-BEHAVIOUR  RELATIONSHIP
Attitudes concern the degree to which an individual likes or dislikes a certain object.
R. B. Zajonc (1980, 1984) convincingly argued that like-dislike ratings are basic and
do not even need cognitive deliberation (but see Lazarus 1982, 1984). Affective reac-
tions, as Zajonc referred to them, are often the first reactions to stimuli and they oc-
cur automatically.
One cannot be introduced to a person without experiencing some immediate
feeling of attraction or repulsion and without gauging such feelings on the part
of the other. We evaluate each other constantly, we evaluate each others’
behavior, and we evaluate the motives and the consequences of their behavior.
(Zajonc 1980: 153)
Affective reactions also appear immediately and automatically when something is
retrieved from memory.
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When we try to recall, recognize, or retrieve an episode, a person, a piece of
music, a story, a name, in fact, anything at all, the affective quality of the origi-
nal input is the first element to emerge. (Zajonc 1980: 154)
The idea that in feeling and thinking affective evaluations are central is supported by
research on response latencies, which indicates that individuals can produce like-
dislike ratings very quickly. This implies that attitudes can be retrieved from
memory directly and easily, which indicates their centrality. Moreover, this research
indicates that attitudes are activated automatically. Whenever individuals think
about a certain object, the evaluation associated with it is also activated (Fazio et al.
1986; Fazio 1986, 2001; Bargh et al. 1992; Bargh 1997). The centrality of evaluations
was also stressed by Charles Osgood, George Suci and Percy Tannenbaum (1957),
who analysed the dimensionality of the meaning that individuals attribute to con-
cepts. They found that “a pervasive evaluative factor in human judgment regularly
appears first and accounts for approximately half to three-quarters of the extractable
variance” (p. 72).
A main reason that attitudes are important is to be found in their presumed re-
lationship with behaviour. As Fazio (2001: 130) put it, “by forming attitudes, indi-
viduals structure their social world into classes of objects that merit either approach
or avoidance behaviour”. Several scholars have stressed the relationship between
evaluations of objects and behaviour with respect to those objects – often this has
been done in terms of a mediating motivation system and the approach-avoidance
dichotomy (see Bargh 1997). Behaviour can be explained on the basis of attitudes to-
wards the objects related to it. The general finding is that if the attitude towards an
object is more positive, behaviour ‘in favour of the object’ is more likely. This has
been reported in numerous studies and several overviews and meta-analyses (Ajzen
and Fishbein 1977; Farley et al. 1981; Sheppard et al. 1988; Ajzen 1991, 2001; Kim and
Hunter 1993; Van den Putte 1993; Kraus 1995; Sutton 1998).
If attitudes are viewed as explanatory variables, this seems to imply that atti-
tude-behaviour models describe the psychological process that underlies behaviour.
Fazio (2001: 129) argued that if people need to make decisions with respect to par-
ticular objects, the automatic activation of attitudes already formed obviates the need
to evaluate the alternatives on the spot and thus facilitates the decision making. Con-
sequently, “possessing an attitude is functional in the sense that it increases the ease,
speed, and quality of decision making” (Fazio et al. 1992: 389).6 Zajonc (1980: 155)
argued that in many decisions affective evaluations play a larger role than most are
willing to admit. Information about alternatives, then, serves more as a justification
afterwards (to both oneself and others) than for making the decision as such. This
means that behaviour is performed not only in line with certain attitudes, but also
because of those attitudes.
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Another view on the relation between attitudes and behaviour can be seen in
the words of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975: 10), who argued that “since a person’s com-
plete history is not available to the investigator, he often turns to variables that reflect
residues of past experience. Attitudes are generally assumed to constitute such
residues”. The use of attitudes to explain behaviour may then be regarded not as a
reflection of the underlying psychological process, but as a substitute for the analysis
of the impact of all past experiences. This implies that there is no direct causal link
between attitudes and behaviour as such. Consequently, the explanatory power of
attitude-behaviour models is more limited than the strength of the attitude-behav-
iour relationship might suggest.
There is also another reason why the explanatory power of attitude-behaviour
models may be limited. Various scholars have questioned the supposed impact of
attitudes on behaviour, arguing that the causal direction may well be reversed (see,
for example, Festinger 1957; Bem 1972). Sometimes people do not behave in a par-
ticular way because they hold certain attitudes, but they hold certain attitudes be-
cause they behave in a particular way. In other words, people sometimes bring their
attitudes in line with their behaviour.7 This does not mean, however, that attitudes
cannot be used to explain behaviour. Attitudes are caused by behaviour only in par-
ticular circumstances. The general pattern remains that in which attitudes influence
behaviour, rather than the other way round (see Eagly and Chaiken 1993, ch. 4 and
11). In as far as individuals’ attitudes are the result of their behaviour, the question
arises what other factors then caused the behaviour. This points to the need to also
focus on such other factors, such as the influence of other people.
THEORY  OF  REASONED  ACTION
Much research on the relationship between attitudes and behaviour has been done
within the framework of specific attitude-behavioural models. Martin Fishbein and
Icek Ajzen’s (1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) Theory of Reasoned Action has gener-
ally been regarded as the most important model (Tesser and Shaffer 1990: 489-491;
Olson and Zanna 1993: 131-133; Petty et al. 1997: 635-636).8
The Theory of Reasoned Action was outlined by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) as
follows.
Our theory views a person’s intention to perform (or not to perform) a behavior
as the immediate determinant of the action. (...) A person’s intention is a func-
tion of two basic determinants, one personal in nature and the other reflecting
social influence. The personal factor is the individual’s positive or negative
evaluation of performing the behavior; this factor is termed attitude toward the
behavior. It simply refers to the person’s judgment that performing the behavior
is good or bad, that he is in favor of or against performing the behavior. (...)
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The second determinant of intention is the person’s perception of the social
pressures put on him to perform or not perform the behavior in question. Since
it deals with perceived prescriptions, this factor is termed subjective norm. (...)
According to the theory, attitudes are a function of beliefs. (...) The beliefs that
underlie a person’s attitude toward the behavior are termed behavioral beliefs.
(...) Subjective norms are also a function of beliefs, but beliefs of a different
kind, namely the person’s beliefs that specific individuals or groups think he
should or should not perform the behavior. These beliefs underlying a person’s
subjective norm are termed normative beliefs. (…) Within our theory, a behavior
is explained once its determinants have been traced to the underlying beliefs.
(Ajzen and Fishbein 1980: 5-7, 90)9
Some concepts of the theory need further explanation. Behavioural beliefs are
beliefs that the behaviour leads to certain outcomes, including the likelihood of their
occurrence. Combined with evaluations of the outcomes they determine the attitude
towards the behaviour. Normative beliefs determine the subjective norm in combina-
tion with the motivation to comply with specific referents. The extent to which the
attitude towards the behaviour and the subjective norm determine the intention de-
pends on the relative importance of attitudinal and normative considerations, which
depends on the behaviour under consideration and which may vary from person to
person (see Trafimow and Finlay 1996). According to Ajzen and Fishbein (1980: 59),
the relative importance cannot be measured directly, and should be derived from
multiple regression analysis. Other factors that are related to the behaviour, but are
not considered part of the theory, are termed external variables.
A number of additional remarks have to be made. First, the theory is accompa-
nied by a principle of correspondence.10 The measurement of the attitudinal and behav-
ioural entities should correspond with regard to four different elements: “the action,
the target at which the action is directed, the context in which the action is performed,
and the time at which it is performed” (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977: 889). This means
that, for example, to explain why someone voted for the Republican candidate in the
U.S. presidential election in 2000 (specific behaviour), one should look at the attitude
towards voting (action) for the Republican candidate (target) in the U.S. presidential
election (context) in 2000 (time). The intention and subjective norm have to be de-
fined in the same terms. This implies that the kind of attitude that should be meas-
ured is the attitude towards the behaviour, not the attitude towards the object of that
behaviour. According to the Theory of Reasoned Action, it is not a candidate or party
that is evaluated, but the act of voting for that candidate or party in a certain election.
The degree to which individuals like or dislike the candidates or parties concern ex-
ternal variables.11
A second remark concerns the alternatives involved. At least one alternative to
the behaviour under investigation is present, namely not performing it. Often the
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number of options exceeds these two. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980: 79) emphasised that
in such cases beliefs with respect to each behavioural alternative have to be identi-
fied.
Third, since intentions can change over time, they argued that it is important to
measure the intention as closely as possible to the behavioural observation in order
to obtain an accurate prediction (p. 47).
Fourth, they also stressed that the attitude concerns a person’s own perform-
ance of the behaviour, not its performance in general (p. 56). This principle could be
regarded as a fifth element to be added to the principle of correspondence: also the
actor who performs the behaviour has to correspond between the attitudinal and be-
havioural entities.
Although the Theory of Reasoned Action has been applied and discussed pre-
dominantly in the sub-field of attitude research, Eagly and Chaiken (1993: 175) indi-
cated that especially when applied to choices between alternatives the model is simi-
lar to so-called subjective expected utility models of decision-making. The essence of
these models is that
each alternative course of action or choice option should be evaluated by
weighting its global expected satisfaction-dissatisfaction with the probabilities
that the component consequences will occur and be experienced. (Hastie 2001:
658)
This is exactly what the Theory of Reasoned Action assumes. In essence it states that
individuals base their decision to perform certain behaviour on their assessment of
the consequences of performing the behaviour. Hence, one could classify it as a
model of ‘rational choice’.
MODE  MODEL  AND  COMPOSITE  MODEL
In the Theory of Reasoned Action attitudes concern evaluations of the performance
of specific behaviour (involving an object). According to the theory, such attitudes
result from evaluations of the anticipated consequences of the behaviour. Russell
Fazio (1986, 1990; Fazio and Towles-Schwen 1999) emphasised that behaviour is of-
ten not the result of such conscious deliberations about the consequences of behav-
iour. Instead, many kinds of behaviour are more or less automatically evoked by
positive attitudes towards the objects of the behaviour. According to Fazio, deliber-
ate reasoning takes place only if individuals are motivated and have the opportunity
to do so. Hence, his model he referred to as the MODE model – MODE is an acronym
for Motivation and Opportunity as DEterminants.
Alice Eagly and Shelly Chaiken (1993: 206) emphasised that Fazio’s and
Fishbein and Ajzen’s models are not mutually exclusive. In some instances the psy-
chological process may correspond more closely to Fazio’s model, whereas in other
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instances to Fishbein and Ajzen’s. This idea matches nicely with dual-process models
of persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Chaiken 1980), according to which indi-
viduals sometimes elaborately process relevant information, whereas in other in-
stances they rely on certain cues or shortcuts (Eagly and Chaiken 1993: 206; Fazio
and Towles-Schwen 1999). Eagly and Chaiken furthermore argued that both models
may focus on different phases in the psychological process underlying behaviour.
Fazio’s model concerns how behaviour is initiated, whereas the Theory of Reasoned
Action presumably focuses on the most proximal determinants of behaviour.
Eagly and Chaiken (1993, ch. 4) consequently included both kinds of attitudes
in their model of the attitude-behaviour relationship, as well as some other concepts.
According to their Composite Model, behaviour may originate in five phenomena:
(1) a habit of performing the behaviour, (2) a positive attitude towards the object of
the behaviour, (3) utilitarian outcomes, (4) normative outcomes (resulting from so-
cial norms or personal norms), and (5) self-identity outcomes (“affirmations or
repudiations of the self-concept that are anticipated to follow from engaging in the
behavior”, p. 210). According to the Composite Model, these five concepts, which
may influence one another, can lead to specific behaviour after being translated into
a positive attitude towards the behaviour, which in turn may be translated into an
intention to perform the behaviour. When this intention is executed, the behaviour
results.12
The Composite Model indicates that performing certain behaviour may be a
mere reflection of a positive attitude towards the object of the behaviour, but it also
identifies other mechanisms that may underlie the performance of behaviour. With
respect to voting this means that individuals may vote for a certain party simply be-
cause they like that party well, but also because they habitually vote for that party,
because they identify with voting for that party, because they think they are sup-
posed to do so (or feel obliged to, that is, experience a social or personal norm), or
because they think that voting for that party will bring them a certain utility, that is,
because they evaluate positively the consequences of voting for that party.
ATTITUDES AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR
THE  KIND  OF  ATTITUDES  THAT  EXPLAIN  VOTING
In social psychology attitude-behaviour research has been done on various subjects,
including electoral behaviour. With respect to voting the relation between attitudes
and behaviour appears to be fairly strong. In a meta-analysis in comparison to eight
other domains, voting was found to show the strongest attitude-behaviour relation-
ships (Kraus 1995: 66-67). Voting has been regarded as behaviour to which attitude-
56 THE  SINCERE  VOTE
behaviour models apply well.13 Moreover, attitude-behaviour research on voting has
resulted in some important additional insights.
A first set of insights concerns the kind of attitudes that explain voting best. Ac-
cording to the principle of correspondence, attitudes towards objects (parties or can-
didates) predict behaviour less accurately than attitudes towards behaviour (voting
for those parties or candidates). With respect to voting this indeed was found to be
the case (Fishbein, Ajzen and Hinkle 1980; Fishbein, Bowman, et al. 1980; Fishbein et
al. 1985). This means that both kinds of attitudes can be distinguished meaningfully.
The size of the differences, however, was limited.14 Hence, even Ajzen and Fishbein,
who generally do not proclaim the use of attitudes towards objects, argued that “un-
der most circumstances, however, the act of signing a petition or voting for a given
candidate involves little more than expressing an evaluation of the target in ques-
tion” (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977: 891). This merits a focus on attitudes towards candi-
dates and attitudes towards parties, rather than attitudes towards voting for them.
However, in some cases, or for some voters, voting involves more than just express-
ing which party or candidate they like best.
Most attitude research seems to assume that vote choices are expressions of vot-
ers’ feelings towards the competing candidates or parties, for it focuses on those atti-
tudes. The question then arises which attitudes are more important. Electoral re-
searchers would presumably argue that this depends on the context: in some
political systems elections centre around candidates, in others around parties. Atti-
tude-behaviour research supports this view: in some elections attitudes towards can-
didates predicted voting behaviour better, in other elections attitudes towards par-
ties did. For example, in the 1976 U.S. presidential election between Ford and Carter
attitudes towards candidates showed a stronger relationship with vote choice than
attitudes towards parties (Fishbein, Ajzen and Hinkle 1980). Similar findings were
obtained with respect to the 1968 presidential election between Johnson and
Goldwater and with respect to a senatorial and congressional election that year
(Fishbein and Ajzen 1981). In the 1988 Singapore general election attitudes towards
the People’s Action Party showed a weaker relationship with voting intentions that
attitudes towards the typical candidate of this party (Singh et al. 1995).15 Other stud-
ies found attitudes towards parties to be more important. In the 1974 British parlia-
mentary election in the four constituencies examined attitudes towards the Con-
servative Party, the Labour Party, and the Liberal Party showed stronger
relationships with vote choice than attitudes towards their candidates (Fishbein,
Bowman, et al. 1980).
The importance of attitudes has been found to also differ in another way. Some-
times attitudes towards particular candidates or parties had a stronger impact on
vote choice than attitudes towards other candidates or parties. For example, in the
1984 U.S. presidential election attitudes towards Reagan predicted voting better than
attitudes towards Mondale (Fazio and Williams 1986). The notion of retrospective
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voting presumably provides the theoretical explanation. If voting is retrospective in
nature, attitudes towards incumbent candidates or parties should predict vote choice
better than those towards challengers. In the 1974 British parliamentary election, on
the other hand, no differences were found between the explanatory power of atti-
tudes towards the incumbent Conservative Party and attitudes towards the Labour
Party (Fishbein, Bowman, et al. 1980).
THE  IMPACT  OF  SOCIAL  NORMS ,  INTENTIONS ,  AND  PAST  BEHAVIOUR
Attitude-behaviour research has resulted in insight about the role of phenomena that
may influence behaviour in addition to attitudes. One insight concerns the role of
intentions. According to various attitude-behaviour models, behaviour results from
an intention to perform it. Hence, attitudes are related to behaviour only indirectly,
namely via intentions. Empirical findings suggests that the relationship between atti-
tudes and voting behaviour is indeed mediated: voting intentions correlated with
voting behaviour more strongly than attitudes (Fishbein, Bowman, et al. 1980;
Fishbein and Ajzen 1981; Fishbein, Ajzen and Hinkle 1980; Fishbein and Coombs
1974; Fishbein et al. 1985), and in multiple regression analyses intentions showed
stronger relationships with behaviour than expectancy-value measures of attitudes
(Echebarria Echabe et al. 1988; Echebarria Echabe and Valencia Garate 1994). The
support for this part of attitude-behaviour models indicates that it is possible to dis-
tinguish between the degree to which voters like parties or candidates, and whether
or not they intend to vote for them.
With respect to the impact of social norms not much support has been found.
Various analyses indicated that in the domain of voting social norms show weaker
relationships than, and add little to the predictive power of, attitudes (Ajzen 1985;
Fishbein and Ajzen 1981; Fishbein, Ajzen and Hinkle 1980; Fishbein, Bowman et al.
1980; Fishbein et al. 1985; Montgomery 1989; Singh et al. 1995; Gerganov et al. 1995;
Echebarria Echabe et al. 1988; Echebarria Echabe and Valencia Garate 1994). Moreo-
ver, the effects found may be methodological artefacts due to invalid or unreliable
attitude measurements and false consensus effects (Marks and Miller 1987; see also
reviews of attitude-behaviour research listed above). Nevertheless, reversed findings
sometimes occurred: in a senatorial election subjective norms were found to be more
important than attitudes (Fishbein and Ajzen 1981).16
Another variable that has been suggested for inclusion in attitude-behaviour
models concerns past or previous behaviour (Bentler and Speckart 1979, 1981). Vari-
ous studies have found that including previous voting behaviour in a model in addi-
tion to attitudes, increases the accuracy with which voting intentions as well as vot-
ing behaviour can be predicted (Echebarria Echabe et al. 1988; Echebarria Echabe
and Valencia Garate 1994; Fishbein and Ajzen 1981; Sample and Warland 1973;
Granberg and Holmberg 1990). Two remarks have to be made, however. First, prob-
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lems related to the validity and reliability of the measurements of other concepts
may have caused empirical correlations between past voting and current voting.17
Second, empirical relationships between past voting and current voting have to be
interpreted theoretically. Do voters vote for a certain party because they did so be-
fore? If not, what theoretical explanation can be given? One possibility is that voters
develop a voting habit, upon which they base their vote choice in any upcoming
election. Having performed behaviour in the past and a habit are not the same, how-
ever. So although including past behaviour may enhance the prediction of voting,
some questions need to be answered before it is included in an attitude-behaviour
model aimed at explaining voting behaviour.18
METHODOLOGICAL  ISSUES :  MEASUREMENT  AND  RESEARCH  DESIGN
Another topic that has received attention concerns the possible explanations of dif-
ferences in the strength of the attitude-behaviour relationship, as well as the attitude-
intention relationship. One explanation is the method by which attitudes are meas-
ured. Three different methods have been employed frequently: single evaluative
measures, semantic differential measures, and expectancy-value measures. Martin
Fishbein and Fred Coombs (1974) assessed attitudes towards candidates in two
ways: by expectancy-value measures and by semantic differential measures. Al-
though both measures strongly correlated, the expectancy-value measures showed
stronger correlations with voting behaviour and voting intention than the semantic
differential measures. Kulwant Singh and colleagues (1995) also assessed attitudes
towards candidates and towards parties by expectancy-value measures based on
possible characteristics of the parties and candidates (a cognitive measure). Addi-
tionally, they used a measure based on affective or emotional responses to candi-
dates and parties. The affective measures predicted voting intentions better than the
cognitive measures, and the authors concluded that the affective measures mediated
the effects of the cognitive measures (p. 45). These findings indicate that the method
by which attitudes are measured may have an effect on the strength of the relation-
ship found between attitudes and vote choice.
Another methodological issue concerns the research design. The relationship
between attitudes and intentions, and attitudes and behaviour, can be analysed
‘across subjects’ and ‘within subjects’. In an across-subjects analysis attitudes are
compared across voters; voters are compared to each other. Voters are expected to be
more likely to vote for a certain party than other voters when their attitude towards
the party is more positive than the attitude of other voters. In a within-subjects
analysis attitudes are compared within voters; parties are compared to each other.
Voters are expected to be more likely to vote for a certain party than another party
when their attitude towards this party is more positive than their attitude towards
the other party. Within-subjects analyses have been found to show stronger attitude-
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intention and attitude-behaviour relationships than across-subjects analyses
(Davidson and Morrison 1983; Ahlering 1987).
In a sense both analyses correspond with different questions. An across-subjects
analysis addresses the question why some people vote for a certain party, but others
do not. A within-subjects analysis addresses the question why some people vote for a
certain party, but not for another. The latter question is of primary interest for voting
research. Therefore, a so-called within subjects analysis is preferable.
Although the corresponding hypothesis, which states that voters vote for the
party they like best, may seem straightforward, most analyses of voting in attitude-
behaviour research have adopted an across-subjects design. One reason for this may
be that attitude-behaviour models are often applied to explain the single act of per-
forming or not performing certain behaviour. If a single act is involved rather than a
choice among alternatives, then comparisons among different attitudes (towards
each of the alternatives) are not applicable. Another reason may be found in the use
of multiple regression analyses, which were suggested by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975;
Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) as a means to apply their model. If such an analysis is used
to examine the relationship between attitudes and intentions or behaviour, and if the
attitude measures are used as independent variables, almost automatically an across-
subjects design is adopted.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF VOTING
The attitude-behaviour research discussed leads to a number of conclusions. The sin-
gle most important conclusion is that attitudes towards parties and candidates go a
long way in explaining the vote. How people vote appears to be determined strongly
by the degree to which they like or dislike the competing parties or candidates. Usu-
ally, voters simply vote for the party or candidate they like best. Such attitudes
should thus be central in models of voting.
Second, attitude-behaviour research has shown that certain kinds of attitudes
explain voting behaviour better than other kinds. This means that electoral research-
ers need to specify in what circumstances particular attitudes can be expected to be
more important. The sort of election involved (presidential or parliamentary) and
the position of the incumbent (eligible for re-election or not) are factors that might be
expected relevant.
A third set of related conclusions concerns the research design and statistical
method used to analyse the impact of attitudes. When behaviour concerns a choice
among a set of alternatives, like voting, it is important to focus not on the attitudes
independently, but on their mutual relationships. What is relevant is how attitudes
of an individual relate to each other. The basic hypothesis is that voters vote for the
party (or candidate) towards which they hold the most favourable attitude. This
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means that multiple regression analyses in which attitudes are the independent vari-
ables are not appropriate. In multiple-choice contexts, a possible solution is to create
a preference measure on the basis of the configuration of the attitudes. The prefer-
ence is that alternative towards which the attitude is most positive. The strength of
this so-called preference can be determined on the basis of comparisons between the
attitudes involved.
A fourth conclusion is that attitudes towards parties and candidates can be dis-
tinguished meaningfully from voting intentions: voters do not always intend to vote
for the party or candidate they like best. A related finding is that attitudes towards
voting behaviour have been found to show somewhat stronger relationships with
voting (intentions) than attitudes towards the objects of that behaviour (parties or
candidates). This implies that although voting usually does not involve much more
than the expression of a favourable attitude towards a party or candidate, sometimes
it does involve more. There are situations where voters do not like the idea of voting
for a certain party as much as they like the party itself. Consequently, it may be use-
ful to distinguish between whether voters prefer parties and whether they prefer to
vote for them.
A fifth conclusion concerns the role of intentions, which mediate the influence
of attitudes on behaviour. Although voting intentions usually strongly correlated
with voting behaviour, these relationships were not perfect. Voters sometimes sup-
ported another party or candidate than the one they initially intended to vote for. So
once voters have decided for whom to vote, they may still change their mind. For
electoral researchers this may be a reason to examine when voters form voting inten-
tions and under what circumstances they change them.
A final conclusion is that voting, like other behaviour, may result from different
psychological processes. Voters may rely on their attitudes towards the competing
parties or candidates and simply vote for the one they like best. Voters may also
elaborate upon the consequences of their behaviour, for example in terms of the out-
come of the election. This reasoning may make voters decide to vote strategically
and support another party than the one they like best. Other ways in which voters
may make a choice is by relying on a habit or following the advice of someone else.
This may lead them to vote for a party they did not like best, but it need not. This
implies that if voters support the party towards which their attitude is most positive,
we do not know what choice mechanism resulted in that vote. It seems that by focus-
ing on prediction instead of explanation, attitude-behaviour research has given this
issue too little attention. Many studies show strong attitude-behaviour relations, but
they do not always shed light on the causal mechanisms involved.
In the next part these insights from psychological research will be used in com-
bination with the previously discussed insights from the study of voting. The aim of
the following chapters is to increase our understanding of voting behaviour at the
theoretical level on the basis of ‘a psychological-psephological synthesis’.
PA R T  I I
A Psychological-Psephological
Synthesis
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The question why people vote as they do will be answered in this chapter by present-
ing the sincere vote model. This name refers to the notion of a sincere vote, which
indicates that a vote is cast for the party an individual likes best. A sincere vote is
usually contrasted with a so-called strategic or tactical vote, which is a vote cast for a
party other than one’s favourite (see Catt 1989; Blais and Nadeau 1996). (For a more
elaborate discussion of the concept of a sincere vote, which originates in social choice
theory, refer to Appendix A.)
The sincere vote model is based on five observations, which were discussed in
the preceding chapter: (1) behaviour is guided by attitudes, (2) attitudes towards
performing certain behaviour must be distinguished from attitudes towards the ob-
ject of that behaviour, (3) what matters in a choice situation is how attitudes form a
preference, (4) attitudes and preferences determine behaviour through mediating in-
tentions, and (5) across time attitudes, preferences, and intentions may change.
Attitudes indicate how much an individual likes or dislikes a certain object.
They are important because they influence behaviour. Why people vote as they do
can thus be understood on the basis of their attitudes towards the objects of their
voting. Because this research is based on the assumption that, in general, elections
may be conceived of as primarily a competition between parties, voters’ attitudes to-
wards parties are considered of paramount importance. In line with the idea that
evaluation is a central aspect of an attitude we do not speak about ‘attitudes’, how-
ever, but about ‘evaluations’. When discussing evaluations of parties we may incor-
porate the object involved and consequently speak about ‘party evaluations’ (and
likewise about ‘candidate evaluations’). The use of the term ‘evaluation’ instead of
‘attitude’ might help to limit possible confusion, as in political science ‘attitudes’ are
conceived of differently than in social psychology, and in social psychology attitudes
have sometimes been defined more broadly than the use here (see Chapter 3).1
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If behaviour involves a choice among a set of alternatives, then the attitudes to-
wards each alternative matter in relation to one another. In such a case an individual
is expected to behave favourably towards the object towards which the attitude is
more positive than that toward any other object. Hence, an individual will choose
the object the individual evaluates most positively. In this context the concept of a
preference may be useful. With respect to political parties we may refer to such pref-
erences as party preferences. They indicate which party among a set of alternative
parties a voter likes best. Voters are expected to vote for their party preference.
Although strong relationships have been found between attitudes and behav-
iour, those relationships were not perfect. One of the reasons for such discrepancies
has to do with the distinction between attitudes towards objects and attitudes to-
wards behaviour. According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1977,
1980), what matters is not the attitude towards the object of the behaviour, but the atti-
tude towards the behaviour. Individuals decide whether they will perform certain be-
haviour or not on the basis of an evaluation of that behaviour (in combination with
evaluations of alternative behaviour). Fishbein and Ajzen’s view implies that a dis-
tinction should be made between an attitude towards a political party (an object) and
an attitude towards voting for that party (behaviour). This kind of distinction can
also be made at the level of preferences by distinguishing between a party preference
and a vote preference. The former indicates which party an individual evaluates
most positively, while the latter indicates which party an individual prefers to vote
for. Because this need not involve the same party, voters may form the intention to
vote for another party than their party preference. For that reason, in electoral re-
search it is important to distinguish between voters’ party preferences on the one
hand, and their intention to vote for a particular party on the other.
Fishbein and Ajzen’s argument that we should focus on attitudes towards be-
haviour follows from their so-called principle of correspondence (Ajzen and
Fishbein 1977). According to this principle, any specificity of the behaviour to be ex-
plained should be reflected in the attitude that is focused on. Not only should atti-
tudes towards behaviour be focused on, but the ‘specifications’ of that behaviour
should be incorporated in the attitude concept. For example, if one is interested in
explaining why voters voted for a certain party in a specific election, then the attitude
towards voting for that party in that specific election should be focused on. The same
argument applies to voting intentions. What matters is voters’ intention to vote for a
particular party in a specific election. Analogous with this idea voting intentions are
conceived of in this research as election-specific phenomena. Party evaluations and
party preferences, on the other hand, are phenomena that exist independently of any
specific election. These correspond with the notion of attitudes towards objects,
which are not related to a particular behavioural situation.
A final ‘observation’ is that distinguishing between vote preferences and voting
intentions does not appear useful.2 When making a choice between both concepts for
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the inclusion in a model of voting, there are good reasons to opt for voting inten-
tions. The model presented then links up with attitude-behaviour models, in which
intentions are central, as well as with the common distinction in psychology and
neuroscience between an evaluative or emotional system and a motivational system
(see Bargh 1997: 6; LeDoux 2002: 237).
All this means that it is important to distinguish between four concepts: party
evaluations, party preferences, voting intentions, and voting behaviour (see Fig-
ure 4.1). These concepts are the building blocks of the sincere vote model.
OUTLINE OF THE SINCERE VOTE MODEL
The sincere vote model is directed at explaining why in a specific election individu-
als vote for (a candidate of) a particular party. According to the model, the single
most important concept to explain voting behaviour is that of party evaluations.
Which party people vote for depends on how much they like or dislike the indi-
vidual competing parties. The core idea of the sincere vote model is that voters sim-
ply vote for the party they like best. This expectation is certainly not spectacular. But
as we shall see later, making it explicit and testing its validity may lead to some im-
portant insights.
To specify how party evaluations determine voting behaviour the model in-
cludes two additional concepts: party preferences and voting intentions. Party evalu-
ations indicate how much voters like an individual party. What matters, however, is
not how much a party is liked as such, but whether or not it is liked more than the
other parties.3 So party evaluations have to be focused on in terms of how by their
configuration they form party preferences. Voters are said to prefer a party if they
like it more than any other party. The party preference thus consists of the party (or
parties) that a voter evaluates most positively. This means that by comparing indi-
viduals’ party evaluations their party preference can be determined.4
When voters are faced with an election, they form a voting intention in accord-
ance with their party preference.5 Voting intentions concern the plan to vote for (a
FIGURE 4.1  Concepts to be distinguished in studies of voting
party evaluation: degree to which a voter likes or dislikes an individual party
party preference: party (or parties) that a voter likes best
voting intention: party for whom a voter intends to vote in a specific election
voting behaviour: party for whom a voter actually votes in a specific election
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candidate of) a particular party in a specific upcoming election. At what moment
voters decide for whom to vote, and thus form a voting intention, may vary across
them. Some may decide long in advance, whereas others may not know for whom to
vote until election day. At some point of time, however, voters will form a voting
intention and, according to the model, they do in line with their party preference.
The model presumes that when voters stand in the polling booth, the only thing that
they do is transforming an existing voting intention into voting behaviour. At that
moment voters do not have to weigh all kinds of information about the parties or
their candidates. Instead, they only have to recall which party they intended to vote
for and vote accordingly.6
The sincere vote model is presented graphically in Figure 4.2. The solid arrows
indicate the relationships between party evaluations, party preference, voting inten-
tion, and voting behaviour. The starting point to explain voting behaviour are party
evaluations. They jointly constitute a party preference. The party preference is trans-
formed into a voting intention, which in turn is transformed into voting behaviour.
Taken together, this means that voters will vote for the party they evaluate most posi-
tively. This can be referred to as the ‘sincere vote hypothesis’.
Variables that are not specified in the model (exogenous variables) are pre-
sumed to influence voting behaviour primarily through their impact on party evalu-
ations. In some cases, however, such variables may influence voting intentions or
voting behaviour directly. These influences of exogenous variables are indicated in
Figure 4.2 by dashed arrows. Obviously, the question arises what (exogenous) vari-
ables influence party evaluations, that is, why voters evaluate parties with certain
degrees of favour or disfavour. This question will be treated in Chapter 6. In the sin-
cere vote model party evaluations are merely taken as a given.
CONCEPTS OF THE MODEL AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS
Some additional comments with respect to the concepts of the model and the rela-
tionships between them are in order. First, with respect to party preferences a dis-
tinction can be made between single and multiple party preferences. If voters evalu-
ate one party more positively than all others, we speak of a single party preference.
Voters may also evaluate more than one party most positively; in that case we speak
of a multiple party preference. In the case of a single party preference the model re-
sults in a unique prediction concerning the voting intention (and voting behaviour).
If a voter has a multiple party preference, it does not; the model does not indicate
which of the parties of the party preference voters with a multiple party preference
are expected (to intend) to vote for. A possible solution is the introduction of an addi-
tional decision rule for voters with multiple party preferences. This will be discussed
in Chapter 5.
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FIGURE 4.2  The sincere vote model
exogenous variables 
party evaluations 
party preference 
voting intention 
voting behaviour 
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Second, with respect to party preferences a distinction can further be made be-
tween direction and strength. In the sincere vote model the only thing that matters is
which party voters prefer. This aspect may be referred to as the direction of the pref-
erence. Voters are expected to form an intention in favour of the party they like most,
irrespective of how much they like it more than other parties. However, if we assume
that in addition to party preferences other factors may influence voting intentions (as
suggested by the arrow in Figure 4.2 from exogenous variables to voting intentions),
then the intensity of the preference may matter. If voters like the party they prefer
much more than all other parties, then the chance that they form a voting intention
in favour of another party due to such additional influences is presumably smaller
than in a situation where voters like the preferred party only slightly more than
other parties. It may therefore be considered useful to not only ask the question
which party is evaluated most positively, but also how much more positively it is
evaluated than other parties. This study refers to this aspect as the strength of the
preference. With respect to individual parties the question is therefore not only
whether it is preferred or not, but also how strongly. With respect to preferred par-
ties the strength of the preference is defined as the degree to which the party is
evaluated more positively than any other party. With respect to non-preferred par-
ties the strength of the preference is defined as the degree to which the party is
evaluated less positively than the preferred party.7
Third, party evaluations, party preferences, and voting intentions may change
across time. This implies that voting intentions, once established, are not fixed. Dur-
ing the campaign voters may reconsider their voting intention and change it.8 Conse-
quently, if intentions are measured some time before the election, discrepancies may
occur in the voting intention–voting behaviour relationship. The model suggests that
changes in voting intentions can be expected if voters’ party preferences change.
Changes in party preferences can in turn result from one of three scenario’s (or a
combination thereof): (1) the evaluation of a preferred party has become more nega-
tive, (2) the evaluation of a non-preferred party has become more positive, or (3) a
new party has entered the choice set and is evaluated more positively than the other
parties. Note that changes in party preferences are more likely if voters’ party prefer-
ence is relatively weak: less change in evaluations is then needed to change the party
preference.
In principle, there may also be other reasons for discrepancies between inten-
tions and behaviour (other than changes in those intentions). Attitude-behaviour re-
search has shown that discrepancies between intentions and behaviour may occur if
behaviour is not fully under volitional control, for example because certain skills or
cooperation of others are required. In the context of voting, however, these kinds of
phenomena play virtually no role. It is not likely that voters will be prevented from
voting for the party they wish to vote for. Because the explanations from attitude re-
search for discrepancies between intentions and behaviour do not seem applicable to
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the electoral context, discrepancies between voting intentions and voting behaviour
may be conceived of as primarily a consequence of changes in voting intentions.9
A final matter concerns the notion of a sincere vote. Voting behaviour is called
sincere if the vote is cast for a party that the voter evaluates most positively, that is, if
party preference and voting behaviour are in line with each other (see Appendix A).
A sincere vote is usually contrasted with a strategic vote, which may be defined as a
vote for a party that a voter does not evaluate most positively. According to the view
presented in this research, however, not any vote for another party than the party
preference can be regarded as a strategic vote. The notion of ‘strategic’ implies that
the vote is cast with a specific purpose, which has to do with the outcome of the elec-
tion. Yet voters may have other reasons than strategic considerations to vote for a
non-preferred party (see Chapter 5). For example, in party-centred elections voters
may base their vote choice on their candidate preference rather than their party pref-
erence; or voters may base their choice on the advice of someone else. This means
that a vote that is not sincere, need not be strategic. In the following the opposite of a
sincere vote is therefore referred to as a ‘non-sincere vote’ – the terminology does
deliberately not speak of ‘insincere’ in order to emphasise that the notions sincere
and non-sincere are merely analytical constructs. A non-sincere vote can be defined
as a vote for a party that is not evaluated most positively. This means that any vote is
either a sincere or a non-sincere vote. In a similar way a sincere and non-sincere vot-
ing intention can be distinguished.
USE OF THE MODEL
The sincere vote model may be used to study voting in at least three ways. First, the
model can be used to explain voting behaviour on the basis of the concepts included,
in particular party evaluations. This may be considered the basic application of the
model. Second, the model may be used to analyse electoral change at the individual
level. According to the model, if voters switch party between two elections, this can
be explained on the basis of changes in their evaluations of the competing parties. In
a similar way, changes in voting intentions can also be traced back to changes in
party evaluations.10 Third, the model provides a framework for the analysis of factors
that are related to discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions.
Discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions may be used to
study the impact of various phenomena. First, because such discrepancies are ex-
actly what strategic voting is about, the model provides precisely the kind of frame-
work that is needed to analyse strategic voting.11 Discrepancies between party pref-
erences and voting intentions may also result from an impact of candidate
preferences. One of the debates among electoral researchers concerns the degree to
which voters’ evaluations of candidates influence their vote choice in addition to
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party evaluations (Van Wijnen 2000; Aarts 2001; King 2002). By examining how can-
didate preferences are related to discrepancies between party preferences and voting
intentions, this can be analysed.
In as far as there are no discrepancies between party preferences, voting inten-
tions, and voting behaviour, the sincere vote model in a sense shifts the task of elec-
toral researchers from explaining voting behaviour to explaining party evaluations.
Such a shift in focus may be considered an important consequence of the use of the
model. In this respect the argument that Richard Brody and Benjamin Page (1973)
presented regarding presidential elections is relevant. In that context the idea corre-
sponding with the sincere vote model is that voters vote for the candidate they evalu-
ate most positively. Brody and Page tested this ‘decision rule’ and found that in the
1968 U.S. presidential election of all voters with a single candidate preference 95 per
cent voted for the corresponding candidate. They argued:
In a very real sense, these findings serve to shift the analytical task from an
explanation of the vote to an explanation of attitudes toward the candidates.
Such a shift is particularly useful in the confusing context of multi-candidate
elections. It also makes possible the study of evaluations of candidates before
nomination and throughout the election year, with the assurance that these
evaluations can be linked to potential voting decisions. Moreover, candidate
evaluations, which can vary over a wide range of magnitude, permit much
more precise analysis than do dichotomous voting choices. (Brody and Page
1973: 16-17)
In the context of party-centred elections the same advantages apply: to study party
evaluations rather than vote choice is useful in multi-party elections, makes possible
analyses independent of an election, and permits more precise analyses than when a
categorical vote choice variable would be focused on.
Another reason that focusing on party evaluations may be useful is that it may
clarify why and how certain factors (exogenous variables) influence vote choice. An
example may clarify this. If a relationship exists between voters’ positions concern-
ing the issue of abortion and vote choice, insight in how and why abortion has an
influence on vote choice can be reached by incorporating party evaluations in the
analysis. It may be that positions on the issue affect the evaluation of each party
equally, but the issue might also be relevant with respect to the evaluation of one
party only. So by examining how voters’ positions with respect to abortion affect
their party evaluations, one can clarify how the issue has an impact on their vote. If
this strategy would be adopted to analyse the impact of the various phenomena that
have traditionally been used to explain vote choice, our insight in why and how
these phenomena influence vote choice may be significantly increased.
A fourth way in which the sincere vote model can be used, one could argue, is
as a basis for an analysis of the vote at the aggregate level. One might conceive of the
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notion of a sincere vote as an individual level equivalent of the normal vote, a con-
cept introduced by Philip Converse (1966). The normal vote is a hypothetical distri-
bution of the vote at the aggregate level, one devoid of short-term influences (like
those stemming from particular candidates or salient issues).12 On the basis of the
sincere vote model changes in the distribution of the vote at the aggregate level may
be analysed in terms of changes in party evaluations at the individual level (in com-
bination with changes in the discrepancies between party preferences and voting be-
haviour).13 As this research is solely about explaining vote choice at the individual
level, the possibility of using the model for analyses at the aggregate level will not be
elaborated upon.
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According to the sincere vote model, voters’ choices at the polls can be explained on
the basis of their evaluations of the competing parties. However, there is more to vot-
ing than merely comparing party evaluations. The aim of this chapter is to shed light
on what more there is by focusing on the different choice mechanisms voters may
use. This may be considered important for one reason in particular: it clarifies why
voters may choose to support another party than one evaluated most positively, that
is, why voters may decide to vote non-sincerely. Furthermore, the alternative choice
mechanisms discussed may be of use for voters with multiple party preferences.
The view presented in this chapter is based on two assumptions. First, it is as-
sumed that people’s information-processing ability and willingness is limited. When
individuals make a judgement they rely on a limited amount of information and use
simple judgement rules, or short cuts (cf. Kahneman et al. 1982).1 Hence, voters do
not weigh all the pros and cons involved in their choice, but rely on simple decision
rules, or heuristics (cf. Herstein 1980; Sniderman et al. 1991; Lau and Redlawsk 2001).
The second assumption is that there are a number of heuristics that voters may make
use of. Usually, models of voting assume that voters all make up their mind in the
same way (the assumption of causal homogeneity); for example, by just voting for
the party they like best (the assumption of a sincere vote). An alternative view would
be that voters may follow a range of possible causal pathways and may decide in
different ways (the assumption of causal heterogeneity; cf. Sniderman et al. 1991,
esp. ch. 2; see also Pattie and Johnston 2001). According to the resulting perspective,
there is not one single answer to the question why people vote as they do. Voters
make up their mind by using heuristics, and different voters use a different heuristic.
The first task of electoral researchers is to identity those heuristics. This view fits well
the ‘plea for mechanisms’ by Jon Elster (1999, ch. 1). Rather than adopt the traditional
view on causation and explain behaviour in terms of its single causes or in terms of
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universal laws, he argued, social scientists should strive for understanding mecha-
nisms as they operate in life.
Various authors have emphasised that voters make use of short cuts or heuris-
tics (for example, Downs 1957; Popkin 1991; Sniderman et al. 1991). Richard Lau and
David Redlawsk (2001) identified five: a candidate’s appearance, a candidate’s party
affiliation, a candidate’s ideology, a candidate’s position in the polls, and the en-
dorsement of a candidate by certain groups or persons. They referred to these as
‘cognitive heuristics’ and described them as “heuristics that citizens employ to make
sense of politics” (p. 953) and “to make sense of a political campaign and decide how
to vote” (p. 954). In this chapter the focus is slightly different, since we are only inter-
ested in ‘how voters decide for whom to vote’. Moreover, in this study the focus is on
parties instead of candidates.
In studies of voting as well as in attitude-behaviour research elements of causal
heterogeneity can be recognised. On the basis of research in both domains, alterna-
tive choice mechanisms can be identified that voters may employ when they decide
for whom to vote. Six heuristics will be distinguished and discussed: (1) election out-
come preference heuristic, (2) incumbent approval heuristic, (3) party preference
heuristic, (4) candidate preference heuristic, (5) voting habit heuristic, and (6) en-
dorsement heuristic. These heuristics have to be regarded as ideal types. They clarify
how voters may make up their mind and which mechanisms may be involved in vot-
ing.2 (Illustrations of the use of these heuristics are provided in Appendix B.)
ELECTION OUTCOME PREFERENCE HEURISTIC
The essence of human behaviour, according to many authors, is that it is goal-ori-
ented. Behaviour is instrumental: it is regarded as a means to reach certain ends (see,
for example, James 1890ab; Lewin 1951; Maslow 1954). This also applies to voting.
Downs (1957), for example, argued that in principle voters seek to maximise utility,
which they derive from future government policies.3 The core of this view is that in
making their choice voters decide about the future. Voters may then be hypothesised
to think about this future and base their choice on their evaluations of possible elec-
tion outcomes. We may refer to such possible outcomes as ‘prospects’ and to the
evaluations of these outcomes as ‘prospect evaluations’. The corresponding choice
mechanism may be referred to as the election outcome preference heuristic.
There is a paradox with the idea of voting as a prospective and instrumental act,
since a single vote has virtually no chance of making any difference (Meehl 1977;
Green and Shapiro 1994, ch. 4). A single vote has no instrumental value, one might
argue, because it has no consequences. This, however, does not mean that the idea of
voting as an instrumental act has to be abandoned. Voters may reason as if their vote
has instrumental value (see Quattrone and Tversky 1988: 732-734). If they do, voters
Vote Choice Heuristics 75
may focus on consequences at the aggregate level. One could say that for voters not
the consequences of the vote matter, but the consequences of the election. Whether an indi-
vidual vote might make a difference or not, is irrelevant. What is relevant, is the kind
of reasoning involved when voters decide for whom to vote. If this involves prospec-
tive considerations related to the election outcome, then calling voting prospective
and instrumental is appropriate.
The notion of prospective voting is related to attitude-behaviour models that
focus on consequences of the behaviour. According to the Theory of Reasoned Ac-
tion behaviour is determined by individuals’ intention to perform the behaviour,
which in turn is determined by their attitude towards performing the behaviour
(Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). What is relevant here in particu-
lar, is what the theory says about why attitudes are as they are. They result from two
components: the beliefs that the behaviour leads to certain outcomes and the evalua-
tions of those outcomes. With respect to voting this means that voters are expected to
take into consideration what the consequences are (or may be) of voting for a par-
ticular party. The theory therefore fits well the notion of prospective voting. The
Composite Model also includes the idea that individuals take into account antici-
pated consequences of performing behaviour (Eagly and Chaiken 1993).
Research in neuroscience about decision-making also provides support, al-
though indirect, for the idea that voting can be considered a prospective act. Accord-
ing to Antonio Damasio (1994, ch. 8), individuals base their decisions on the emo-
tional response evoked by imagined future scenarios.4 With respect to voting, which
Damasio referred to explicitly (p. 167), this means that when voters are faced with an
election, they envision alternative scenario’s that correspond with possible election
outcomes. Voters evaluate these scenarios and associate them with alternative choice
options. Voters may be presumed to choose the option that is associated with the
best-liked scenario. For example, in the United States in a gubernatorial election vot-
ers imagine that the Republican candidate becomes governor and this image evokes
a certain emotional response. They also imagine that the Democratic candidate be-
comes governor, which evokes another emotional response. Which scenario evokes
the most positive emotional response, determines whether people vote Republican
or Democratic. Clearly, in this view voting is prospective: the degree to which voters
like or dislike the prospects associated with the behaviour (at the aggregate level)
determines which alternative option they choose.
If voters take into account future scenarios or possible consequences of the elec-
tion, the question arises how election outcomes have to be defined. In the example
above, the outcome is either that the Republican or the Democratic candidate be-
comes governor. In parliamentary and presidential elections the outcomes may be
defined in several other ways. These are discussed below in terms of a number of
sub-types of the election outcome preference heuristic. They are distinguished on the
basis of the kind of prospect on which voters base their decision.
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GOVERNMENT  PREFERENCE  HEURISTIC
Downs (1957) and Key (1966) both emphasised that the sole function of elections is
the selection of government: some parties or candidates get governmental power,
whereas others do not. This implies that the consequence of an election can be con-
ceived of in terms of the government that is selected, and voters can be expected to
vote in a way associated with establishing the government they prefer.
In parliamentary elections the corresponding heuristic can be applied most eas-
ily in a two-party system. In Britain, for example, voters may base their choice on
their evaluation of two future scenario’s: the prospect that the Conservative Party
forms the government and the prospect that the Labour Party forms the government
(due to the British electoral system a single party usually wins a majority of seats and
forms the government; for simplicity’s sake, we ignore the role of other parties). If
voters like the prospect of a Conservative government better than the prospect of a
Labour government, they simply vote Conservatives; if they prefer the prospect of a
Labour government, they vote Labour. We may refer to this decision rule as the gov-
ernment preference heuristic.
If governments constitute of coalitions of parties, as in the Netherlands, the use
of this heuristic is less easy. Elections determine how many seats each party gets in
parliament, but what kind of government is formed depends on the negotiations fol-
lowing the election. This, however, does not mean that voters cannot use the govern-
ment preference heuristic. Voters may prefer a particular government coalition and
they may be of the opinion that to bring about that coalition they best vote for one
particular party. For example, in the 1998 Dutch parliamentary election many voters
of D66 said they voted for the party in order to help establish the second so-called
purple coalition.5 Another possibility is that voters prefer a particular party to take
part in the government, irrespective of which coalition this would concern, and
therefore vote for that party. Yet another possibility is that voters hope that a particu-
lar coalition will not be formed and vote for a particular party for that reason. So in
multi-party systems with coalition governments voters may base their choice on con-
siderations about the future government and use the government preference heuris-
tic.
GOVERNMENT  LEADER  PREFERENCE  HEURISTIC
In presidential elections it seems straightforward to define the outcome of the elec-
tion in terms of the candidate who becomes president. In U.S. presidential elections,
for example, the outcome is either that the Republican candidate becomes president
or that the Democratic candidate does. If voters like the idea that one candidate be-
comes president better than the idea that the other does, they simply vote for that
Vote Choice Heuristics 77
one candidate. The corresponding decision rule may be referred to as the govern-
ment leader preference heuristic.6
In parliamentary elections voters may also take into account who will become
government leader. Voters may cast their vote as if who becomes prime minister is
the central question in the election (Bartle and Crewe 2002). We could then speak
about ‘quasi-presidential voting’.7 An example of an election in which this appears to
have played an important role is the 2001 Italian parliamentary election. The ques-
tion who would become prime minister was so central, in particular whether or not it
would be Silvio Berlusconi, that the election was perceived by many as “a referen-
dum for or against Berlusconi” (Allum 2001: 27). Note that this means that voters
presumably used the government leader preference heuristic in a positive as well as
a negative sense.
In Dutch parliamentary elections prime minister preferences may also have
played a role. In 1986, for example, the Christian Democrats used the campaign slo-
gan “Let Lubbers finish his job” (at that time Ruud Lubbers was prime minister of
his first cabinet with the Liberals). Selection of the prime minister was also central in
1977, when the main slogan of Labour was “Choose the prime minister” (Brants et al.
1982: 31). Labour’s ten seats gain nevertheless did not bring Joop den Uyl the desired
position, which illustrates that who becomes prime minister may depend more on
the cabinet formation process after the election, than on the result of the election it-
self. Nevertheless, voters may base their choice on their prime minister preference.
PARTY  SIZE  PREFERENCE  HEURISTIC
A distinction can be made between direct and indirect consequences of an election.
Direct consequences are those that depend solely on how the electorate cast their
votes, like who gets elected as president and the number of parliamentary seats a
party gets. Such consequences of an election may in turn lead to indirect conse-
quences. Examples are what coalition government is formed, and who becomes
prime minister, in a multi-party system. This depends not only on how the electorate
cast their votes, but also on negotiations between parties after the election.
In multi-party systems voters may base their choice on indirect consequences of
the election, like discussed above, but they may also focus on the direct conse-
quences. More specifically, voters may focus on the outcome of the election in terms
of the number of seats a party gets, as whether a party becomes largest in parliament
or not, or as whether a party passes the electoral threshold. If voters hope that a par-
ticular party becomes largest, or if they fear that a particular party might not pass the
electoral threshold, this may lead them to vote for that party. For example, in the
1988 Swedish election about a fourth of the Green Party voters supported this party
(although they did not prefer them), in order to prevent the party from disappearing
from parliament by not passing the four per cent threshold (Holmberg 1994b: 316).
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With respect to parties that are large enough not to be in danger of not passing the
threshold, but not large enough to make a chance of becoming largest, other pros-
pects related to party size may play a role. Moreover, even the prospect that one’s
favourite party will perform well or poorly in the election may motivate voters to
cast a vote in favour of this party. Because all these considerations are related to the
size of parties, we may refer to the corresponding choice mechanism(s) as the party
size preference heuristic.
POLICY  PREFERENCE  HEURISTIC
According to Downs (1957), voters base their choice on one particular indirect out-
come of the election: the policies of the future government. Various models regard
voters’ policy preferences the key to their choice. They assume that voters base their
choice on their own stands on various issues in relation to the perceived stands of the
parties. Policy voting as an example of the use of the election outcome preference
heuristic only applies if voters view policies as election outcomes and take these as
such into consideration when they make their choice. In that case we could regard it
as a choice mechanism and speak about the policy preference heuristic.
If only one issue plays a role, the election is much like a referendum and we
could speak about ‘quasi-referendum voting’. Voters may also take into account a
whole range of issues and base their choice on the degree to which they agree with
parties more in general (in their perception). So-called ‘vote selectors’ on the world
wide web (like the American ‘Vote Smart’ or the Dutch ‘StemWijzer’) facilitate voters
to make use of this heuristic. Typically, such programs contain a wide variety of
statements about policies. By comparing the opinions of voters with those of the par-
ticipating parties, scores are computed that indicate which party voters agree with
FIGURE 5.1  Sub-types of the election outcome preference heuristic
government preference heuristic: vote for the party you want to
   go into government
government leader preference heuristic: vote for the party you want to
   deliver the president or prime minister
party size preference heuristic: vote for the party you want to
   increase in size
policy preference heuristic: vote for the party that wants
   the policies you want
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most. If voters base their choice on such ‘advice’, and they use it in order to get the
desired policies in the future, then they may be conceived of as having used the
policy preference heuristic.8 Voters who base their choice on perceived ideological
agreement, and regard this as a key to future policies (as in Downs’ theory), fit this
mode of voting too. In all these cases it is essential, however, that voters conceive
these policies in terms of possible consequences of the election and thereby of their
vote.
The policy preference heuristic completes the sub-types of the election outcome
preference heuristic (see Figure 5.1).9 We will now turn to other heuristics voters may
employ.
INCUMBENT APPROVAL HEURISTIC
The function of elections is to hold the past government accountable and to provide
the future government with a mandate (Powell 2000). The use of the election out-
come preference heuristic reflects the mandate aspect. Voters may, however, focus on
the accountability. In that case voters’ feelings about the performance of the incum-
bent government are the key to their choice. The corresponding decision rule is sim-
ple: if individuals are satisfied with the performance of incumbents, they vote for
them; if they are dissatisfied, they support the opposition.10 The key to voters’
choices, then, is their evaluations of the incumbent government. Because this means
that voters base their choice on their approval (or disapproval) of the performance of
the incumbent, this choice mechanism may be referred to as the incumbent approval
heuristic.11 As this implies that voters are backward-looking and judge retrospec-
tively, we may refer to this mode of voting as retrospective voting.
In its simplest form the incumbent approval heuristic can only be applied if
there are two parties or candidates, of which one held office. Only then do approval
and disapproval automatically result in the choice for one particular party or candi-
date. If incumbent parties or candidates do not participate in the election, it is diffi-
cult to hold them accountable and use this heuristic. Although, one can imagine that
in U.S. presidential elections, for example, disapproval of a Republican president
would result in a vote for the Democratic candidate, even if the Republican candi-
date would not be the incumbent. For example, in the 1952 U.S. presidential election
Eisenhower beat Stevenson mainly because voters were dissatisfied with the Demo-
cratic administration of President Truman (cf. Key 1966: 66-67, 74-75). Multi-party
systems and coalition governments complicate this kind of decision-making. Which
coalition party should be credited if one is satisfied with the government? Which op-
position party should be supported if one is dissatisfied? The fact that applying this
heuristic is less simple in such circumstances, however, does not mean that it cannot
be used. Voters may credit one party in particular for their satisfaction with the gov-
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ernment performance. Or voters may limit their choice set on the basis of this heuris-
tic, and then choose among the remaining parties on the basis of another heuristic
(cf. Tversky 1972).
The idea of retrospective voting has been central in various studies of voting
(Key 1966; Fiorina 1981). According to Key (1966: 9, 58), voters rely on their experi-
ences during the latest government period. The notions of reward and punishment
provide the link to vote choice: if voters are satisfied with incumbents, they reward
them with a vote; if they are dissatisfied, they punish them with a vote for the opposi-
tion.12 Morris Fiorina’s (1981) theory of retrospective voting emphasises the impor-
tance of retrospective evaluations concerning the incumbent. Various other models
included incumbent approval explicitly as a central concept (for example, Sniderman
et al. 1990; 1991, ch. 9).
In attitude-behaviour models the idea of the incumbent approval heuristic
comes close to a model in which only one attitude is incorporated, namely that to-
wards the incumbent.13 As individuals’ attitude towards the incumbent is more posi-
tive, they are more likely to give the incumbent their vote. Such a model corresponds
with a so-called across-subjects design (Davidson and Morrison 1983). Empirical
support for attitude-behaviour models in the domain of voting has frequently been
based on such a design (see, for example, Fishbein and Coombs 1974; Fishbein and
Ajzen 1981; Echebarria Echabe et al. 1988; see also Fazio and Williams 1986).14
Protest voting may be considered an example of retrospective voting: in pro-
testing against something voters express their disapproval. Protest may at the same
time be prospective and instrumental, however, namely if its aim is to influence the
future. According to Rudy Andeweg (1982, ch. 5), in the 1967 Dutch parliamentary
election protesting was an important factor. There would have been virtually no elec-
toral change without the 16 per cent of the voters who confirmed that they had voted
“to protest against something” (p. 187). The question remains, however, what exactly
those voters (and other voters who say they vote for a particular party out of protest)
were protesting against.15
Three additional remarks need to be made. First, the notions of reward and
punishment have been applied in relation to the overall approval or disapproval of
the performance of the incumbent. Another possibility is that voters approve, or dis-
approve, so strongly of one particular act, that this alone provides them with a reason
to vote, or not to vote, for the incumbent. Second, the notions of reward and punish-
ment may be applied with respect to other objects than incumbent governments or
presidents. For example, voters may vote for an opposition party because they are
particularly satisfied with one of its acts, or with its overall performance, as an oppo-
sition party.16 In this research, however, the notion of retrospective voting will be re-
served for the use of the incumbent approval heuristic, and consequently is only spo-
ken about when evaluative judgements with respect to the incumbent government
(leader) are involved. Third, if voters strongly approve of a specific act of a particular
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party, they may credit them for this by voting for them in more than one election. For
example, in the 1990s in the Netherlands some Labour voters motivated their choice
by referring to the introduction of social benefits for the elderly (AOW) by Willem
Drees, their former leader, a couple of decades earlier.17 In a similar way disapproval
may be a reason not to vote for a particular party for a longer time period. Conse-
quently, the time frame of approval (and reward and punishment) may exceed that
of a single election period.
PARTY PREFERENCE HEURISTIC
Voters may leave considerations about the performance of the incumbent govern-
ment or possible outcomes of the election aside, and choose on the basis of their
evaluations of the competing parties. According to the corresponding heuristic, vot-
ers simply vote for the party they like best. Because in this research that party is re-
ferred to as the party preference, the corresponding heuristic may be referred to as
the party preference heuristic.18
Although a vote in line with one’s party preference has been referred to as a
sincere vote, there is a difference between voting sincerely and voting on the basis of
the party preference heuristic. The party preference heuristic implies that individu-
als vote for a particular party because they like it best. The notion of sincere voting is
used irrespective of the choice mechanism. If, for example, voters vote for a certain
party because they preferred the leader of this party to become prime minister, their
voting would be classified as sincere if they liked the party of this politician best.
However, they did not employ the party preference heuristic; the choice mechanism
would then be the election outcome preference heuristic. Hence, whereas a vote
based on the party preference heuristic is by definition sincere, a sincere vote need
not be based on the party preference heuristic.19
In attitude-behaviour models individuals are usually hypothesised to choose
the alternative towards which their attitude is most positive. The corresponding
analysis corresponds with that of a so-called within-subjects design (Davidson and
Morrison 1983). In the case of an election that centres around parties this means that
voters are expected to vote for the party towards which their attitude is most favour-
able.
In candidate-centred elections voters may also rely on their party preference.
This idea matches well with Lau and Redlawsk’s (2001) emphasis on party affiliation
as a possible heuristic. This means that voters who rely on their party identification,
the concept central in electoral research in the United States, fit this mode of voting.
Voters who support the Republican or Democratic candidate because the candidate
represents the party they identify with, can be said to have made use of the party
preference heuristic.
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CANDIDATE PREFERENCE HEURISTIC
In some elections the focus is on candidates. The candidates may represent certain
parties, but the focus is on the candidates themselves. In that case voters may be hy-
pothesised to rely on their evaluations of those candidates. According to the corre-
sponding candidate preference heuristic, voters simply vote for the candidate they
like best.
In American electoral research, in particular that on presidential elections, this
heuristic has been central. Brody and Page (1973), for example, defined a decision
rule that corresponds exactly with this heuristic. The same idea was adopted, albeit
sometimes rather implicitly, in research by the Michigan scholars (Campbell et al.
1954, 1960), in spatial models of voting (Davis et al. 1970; Enelow and Hinich 1984),
and in various other voting models. For example, in the model outlined by Markus
and Converse (1979) vote choice is determined directly by candidate evaluations (see
also Page and Jones 1979; Rahn et al. 1990).
In elections that centre around parties, candidates may also play a role. The rel-
evant candidates may be both local candidates and party leaders. Presumably the
latter are particularly important. Candidate evaluations may influence vote choices
in two ways: directly and indirectly (King 2002). The latter possibility implies that
voters’ evaluations of the candidates have an impact on their evaluations of the par-
ties, and when voters use the party preference heuristic candidate evaluations indi-
rectly have an impact on their vote. In that case candidate evaluations do not enter
the choice mechanism. Another possibility is that voters base their choice on the
evaluations of the candidates, rather than the evaluations of the parties (see Crewe
and King 1994). In that case they use the candidate preference heuristic.
VOTING HABIT HEURISTIC
Rather than elaborate upon for whom to vote at every election, voters may develop a
habit of voting for (candidates of) one particular party.20 When faced with an elec-
tion, these voters transform their voting habit into still another vote. We may refer to
this choice mechanism as the voting habit heuristic.
Downs (1957) acknowledged that voters may rely on a habit when facing an
election.
Finally, some rational men habitually vote for the same party in every election.
In several preceding elections, they carefully informed themselves about all the
competing parties, and all the issues of the moment; yet they always came to
the same decision about how to vote. Therefore they have resolved to repeat
this decision automatically without becoming well-informed, unless some ca-
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tastrophe makes them realize it no longer expresses their best interests.
(Downs 1957: 85)21
Although the Michigan scholars (Campbell et al. 1954, 1960) did not focus on habit
explicitly, the central concept of their studies – party identification – may be linked to
it. They more or less assumed that voters habitually vote for the candidates of one
particular party, namely the party they identified with, unless short-term influences
made them decide to deflect. This idea laid the foundation for the concept of a nor-
mal vote, which indicated a long-term preference for either the Democrats or the Re-
publicans (Converse 1966).22 The idea that the notion of party identification can be
linked to the voting habit heuristic is only valid, however, if one conceives of party
identification as a direct determinant of vote choice.23 So the choice of voters who
rely on their party identification, which above was said to point to the use of the
party preference heuristic, may also have an element of a voting habit.
Habit is among the concepts that have been suggested as additions to attitude-
behaviour models. Habits predict behaviour in addition to intentions and predict in-
tentions in addition to attitudes (Eagly and Chaiken 1993: 178-182). The route from
habit to behaviour via intentions is relevant here, because votes are not cast without
the formation of an intention. As determinant of voting intentions habits may add to
our understanding. They point to a psychological mechanism that differs from form-
ing an intention on the basis of attitudes.
Empirical evidence about the impact of habits on vote choice has been provided
in several ways. First, research based on attitude-behaviour models showed that pre-
vious voting influenced vote choice in addition to attitudes and social norms
(Echebarria Echabe et al. 1988; Echebarria Echabe and Valencia Garate 1994). Second,
in research that asked voters directly whether they voted for a particular party out of
habit, voters sometimes confirmed that they had done so. In a survey following the
1992 British general election, for example, about a quarter of the voters said that they
had voted for a party out of habit (Heath et al. 1993). Finally, in research that asked
voters why they voted for a particular party in an open-ended question, many spon-
taneously mentioned the word ‘habit’, or used phrases that indicate the impact of a
habit, such as ‘out of tradition’ or ‘always voted that way’. Since the 1970s, in Dutch
parliamentary elections typically about ten per cent of the voters provided such mo-
tives (Van Holsteyn 2000: 112).
ENDORSEMENT HEURISTIC
Voters may base their choice on the endorsement of a particular party or candidate
by someone else – specific individuals, groups, or organisations. If voters base their
choice on such an endorsement, we may refer to the choice mechanism as the en-
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dorsement heuristic. Recall that Lau and Redlawsk (2001), too, identified endorse-
ment as one of the heuristics that voters may use.
Many models of voting are based on the assumption that voters make up their
mind by themselves. This is not to say that other people are not important. In the
early Columbia studies, for example, it was argued that the social environment is
important for understanding why people vote as they do (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944;
Berelson et al. 1954). It was not assumed, however, that the ultimate judgement
might have been left to someone else to whom voters then would conform. Downs
(1957), on the other hand, discussed this possibility. After he had identified a number
of steps which would lead to a vote choice, Downs argued: “Every one of these steps
except the last can be delegated to someone other than the voter himself” (p. 209).
This included the step of making a choice from the competing parties or candidates.
The last step, which a voter could not delegate according to Downs, was actually vot-
ing or abstaining. The possibility of a proxy vote, however, enables voters to delegate
even this last step.
Attitude-behaviour models have acknowledged that individuals may base their
decision to perform certain behaviour on the opinions of others. Individuals’ behav-
iour and intentions are expected to be influenced by the perceived opinions of rel-
evant others (cf. Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Eagly and Chaiken 1993, ch. 4). In attitude-
behaviour models, however, this influence has been conceptualised in terms of social
pressure or social norms, which the notion of endorsement does not imply. Empirical
applications of attitude-behaviour models to voting have shown that social norms
FIGURE 5.2  Six heuristics to decide how to vote
election outcome preference heuristic: vote such, that what you want to happen
   becomes more likely
incumbent approval heuristic: if you approve of the latest government,
   vote for them;
if you disapprove, vote for the opposition
party preference heuristic: vote for the party that you like best
candidate preference heuristic: vote for the candidate that you like best
voting habit heuristic: vote for the party you always vote for
   (or did last time)
endorsement heuristic: vote for the party or candidate
   others say you should
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have predictive value, but their impact is relatively weak in comparison with atti-
tudes (see, for example, Ajzen 1985, 1991). Hence, applications of attitude-behaviour
models to voting have not provided convincing evidence that endorsements play an
important role.
THE HEURISTIC MODEL OF VOTING
The various heuristics have been described more or less as mutually exclusive, as if
voters decide on the basis of only one of them (see Figure 5.2).24 However, voters may
combine heuristics. First, it is possible that voters base their decision on two (or
more) heuristics that point towards the same party. For example, voters may vote for
a particular party both because they like the party best and because they hope that
their leader becomes prime minister. Another possibility is that one heuristic is used
to limit the choice set, and another to choose between the remaining options (cf.
Tversky 1972). For example, voters may limit their choice set to a few parties on the
basis of the party preference heuristic (perhaps those that constitute a multiple party
preference), and then choose between these parties on the basis of the candidate
preference heuristic.
Another thing to note is that the different kinds of evaluations on the basis of
which voters may decide for whom to vote, are related to each other. More specific,
as the prospects associated with an election usually involve particular parties, candi-
dates, or governments, voters’ evaluations of those prospects will depend on their
evaluations of the parties, candidates, or governments involved. For example, voters’
evaluation of the prospect that a particular candidate will become prime minister
will depend on their evaluation of that candidate. Voting intentions may then be
based on both kinds of evaluations: voters may vote for the party of a particular can-
didate because they prefer that candidate to become prime minister, or merely be-
cause they like that candidate.
How prospect evaluations, government evaluation (incumbent approval), party
evaluations, candidate evaluations, voting habit, and perceived endorsement are re-
lated to one another, and how they can be fit into a single model of voting, is illus-
trated in Figure 5.3. The model presented, which is referred to as the heuristic model
of voting, states that a voting intention may originate in any of the six phenomena
distinguished. This fits the principle of causal heterogeneity. How the six phenom-
ena may lead to a particular voting intention has been discussed above in terms of
the six heuristics. Additionally, the model states that government evaluation, party
evaluations, and candidate evaluations may also influence voting intentions indi-
rectly, namely through their impact on prospect evaluations.25
The relationship between government evaluation and prospect evaluations will
not come as a surprise to those familiar with electoral research. Various studies
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FIGURE 5.3  The heuristic model of voting
stressed that retrospective and prospective judgements are closely related: if voters
are satisfied about the incumbent, they presumably prefer the same candidate or
party to take office after the election. The relationship between party evaluations and
prospect evaluations is also straightforward. If voters evaluate a particular party
more positively than other parties, they may be expected, for example, to prefer that
party to win seats or participate in the new government. Similarly, if voters like a
particular candidate best, they may be expected to prefer that candidate to become
president or prime minister. Hence, candidate evaluations influence prospect evalua-
tions. Government evaluations, party evaluations, and candidate evaluations may
thus influence voting intentions indirectly (through their impact on prospect evalua-
tions and the use of the election outcome preference heuristic) as well as directly
(through the use of the incumbent approval heuristic, party preference heuristic, or
candidate preference heuristic).
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Prospect evaluations come in a variety of kinds. One could argue that this
should preferably be specified in the model. A reason not to do so, however, is that
across elections different prospects may play a role. Arguably, the best strategy is to
operationalise the prospect evaluations with in mind the election that the model is
applied to. For example, in presidential elections measures are needed that indicate
voters’ evaluations of the prospects that specific candidates will become president. In
some elections the prospect of a particular vice president may also play a role. In
parliamentary elections measures are needed to find out how voters feel about the
possibility that specific government coalitions will be formed, that specific parties
will become largest, and that specific persons will become prime minister. If parlia-
mentary elections are held under a system with an electoral threshold, and if some
parties are conceived of being in danger of not passing the threshold (and if voters
are expected to take this into consideration), corresponding measures are needed. In
short, to apply the model to a specific election, the prospect evaluations need to be
further specified.
There are various other factors that have often been used to explain voting; for
example, social characteristics, policy preferences, and ideological positions. Accord-
ing to the model, these factors do not influence voting intentions directly. Therefore,
they are not included in the model and are referred to as exogenous variables. This
means that any influence of such phenomena on voting intentions is assumed to be
mediated by the concepts in the model. An important implication of this is that to
reach full insight in voting, such other factors should not be studied in relation to
voting intentions (or behaviour), but in relation to the concepts that mediate their
impact.
Finally, the heuristic model of voting is related to the sincere vote model in
three ways. First, the heuristic model indicates that party evaluations may influence
voting intentions directly (through the use of the party preference heuristic) as well
as indirectly (through their impact on prospect evaluations and the use of the elec-
tion outcome preference heuristic). Second, the heuristic model indicates what deci-
sion rules voters with multiple party preferences may employ in order to choose be-
tween the parties they evaluate equally positively. Third, the heuristic model
indicates what more there is to voting than simply expressing one’s party preference.
Discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions may result if pros-
pect evaluations, government evaluation, candidate evaluations, voting habits, or
perceived endorsements direct voters towards another party than the one they
evaluated most positively. The heuristic model of voting may thus be used to explain
non-sincere voting.
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If voting behaviour is influenced strongly by voters’ evaluations of the competing
parties, as the models presented in the preceding two chapters suggest, the question
is why voters like or dislike parties.
This chapter discusses three models that may be used to explain party evalua-
tions. First, it will be shown that to explain party evaluations we may use theories
that focus on explaining vote choice. The strategy of applying concepts used in such
theories is referred to as a traditional approach. The model that integrates the corre-
sponding concepts into a general framework is referred to as the orthodox model of
party evaluations; this model links up with the voting research orthodoxy discussed
in Chapter 2. Second, the on-line model of party evaluations will be discussed. This
model builds on the idea that party evaluations have to be conceived of as ‘running
tallies’ that are updated whenever individuals process information about a party.
Next, it will be shown that the on-line model has some anomalies as well, which are
related to the functioning of memory and emotions. Third, therefore, a model will be
presented that synthesises ideas from the orthodox model and the on-line model,
and which incorporates the idea that emotions play a role. This model is referred to
as the emotion-integration model of party evaluations.
The three models describe different psychological processes that may underlie
the formation and change of party evaluations. Understanding those processes is
necessary to have insight in why people evaluate parties as they do, but not suffi-
cient. Additional questions need to be answered to reach fuller insight. For example,
if voters’ evaluations of parties are based on their images of those parties, as the or-
thodox model suggests, then the question arises what elements comprise those im-
ages. Are parties seen as representing particular interests (e.g., the labour force),
adopting a particular ideology (e.g., socialism), or holding specific policy prefer-
ences (e.g., oppose abortion)? Or are parties viewed primarily as having done a good
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job in the latest government, or as having good plans for the future government?
Such questions need also to be answered to understand why voters evaluate parties
in a certain way. However, these questions do not point to different psychological
processes. Moreover, what distinguishes these questions from those concerning the
psychological processes, is that they can only be answered within the context of a
particular political system and with respect to specific parties. In this chapter such
questions will therefore not be answered. The discussion will be limited to the un-
derlying psychological processes, which operate irrespective of the kind of system or
the particular party one is interested in.
THE ORTHODOX MODEL
A  TRADITIONAL  APPROACH  TO  EXPLAIN  PARTY  EVALUATIONS
One thing that many voting studies have in common, is that voting behaviour is re-
garded as the sole dependent variable and one set of independent variables is used
to explain voting.1 We may refer to such models as traditional models of voting. Fig-
ure 6.1 shows an example. In this model two voter characteristics are regarded as the
determinants of voting behaviour: religious identity and social class identity.
According to the perspective adopted in this research, party evaluations medi-
ate the influence of concepts as religion and social class on voting behaviour. Such
social characteristics have an impact on voting, because they influence how voters
evaluate the competing parties. Those evaluations in turn determine for whom peo-
FIGURE 6.1  A traditional model of voting (an example)
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ple vote. The corresponding model, of which an example is shown in Figure 6.2, is
referred to as a traditional model of party evaluations and voting. For simplicity’s
sake, the figure includes only two parties (parties X and Y). According to this model,
voters’ religious identity and social class identity have an impact on the evaluation of
party X as well as on the evaluation of party Y. Voters’ evaluations of both parties
jointly determine their voting behaviour.
To understand the impact of religion, two relationships need to be examined:
that between voters’ religious identity and their evaluation of party X, and that be-
tween voters’ religious identity and their evaluation of party Y. The first question to
be answered is whether or not those evaluations are affected by voters’ religious
identity. Four possible scenarios result: (1) religion has an effect on the evaluations of
both parties; (2) religion has an effect on the evaluations of party X, but not on the
evaluation of party Y; (3) religion has an effect on the evaluation of party Y, but not
on the evaluation of party X; and (4) religion has no effect on the evaluations of either
party. If one of the first three scenarios applies, the direction and size of the effect(s)
need to be examined. In a similar way the impact of social class can be analysed. This
would result in substantial insight in the impact of religion and social class in the
vote choice process, which goes further than the mere observation that voters with a
specific social background vote for particular parties more (or less) often.
This kind of analysis may be performed with respect to many concepts that
have been used to explain voting behaviour, such as social identity, policy prefer-
ences, ideological positions, government satisfaction, and party leader evaluations.
These are not discussed elaborately here.2
FIGURE 6.2  A traditional model of party evaluations and voting (an example)
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THE  ORTHODOX  MODEL  OF  PARTY  EVALUATIONS
A related way to explain party evaluations is to construct a model on the basis of the
psephological paradigm, the orthodoxy that characterises voting research. Such a
model is referred to as the orthodox model of voting. Although the model is directed
at explaining voting behaviour, it may also be used to explain party evaluations, be-
cause the model explicitly includes those evaluations.
Figure 6.3 outlines the orthodox model of voting. The phenomenon to be ex-
plained is an individual’s voting behaviour. In line with the assumption that voters
support the party they like best (the assumption of a sincere vote), voting behaviour
is determined by overall evaluations of the parties. This shifts the question to why vot-
ers evaluate parties as they do. According to the model, this depends on both per-
ceived characteristics of the parties and characteristics of the voter. Party characteristics are
not just perceived by voters, they are evaluated as well. Hence, what matters are vot-
ers’ evaluations of (perceived) party characteristics. If a party favours legalisation of
abortion, for example, voters who favour legalisation will evaluate this characteristic
positively and those who oppose it negatively. How voters evaluate parties thus de-
pends on the characteristics of what is evaluated (parties), as well as on the charac-
teristics of those who evaluate (voters).
If we were to focus solely on party evaluations, the orthodox model of voting
would result in a specific model of party evaluations. This model, which is referred
to as the orthodox model of party evaluations, is presented in Figure 6.4. According
to this model, the overall evaluation of a party is determined by the evaluations of
the perceived characteristics of that party. For simplicity’s sake, the figure includes
only two (characteristics A and B). How each characteristic is evaluated depends on
FIGURE 6.3  The orthodox model of voting
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the characteristics themselves, as well as on the characteristics of the voter. It is the
interaction between both that determines the evaluation.
The orthodox model provides a framework for the analysis of party evalua-
tions, but cannot be applied directly. The main reason for this is that the model does
not indicate which characteristics are important. Only by specifying which character-
istics are to be taken into account, can the model be applied to analyse voting behav-
iour or party evaluations. Note that the model neither specifies how the single evalu-
ations are integrated into one overall party evaluation. A rule has to be formulated
before the model can be applied.3 Although this rule as well as the characteristics
included may, in principle, vary across parties and voters, in most voting research
homogeneity in bases of evaluation is assumed.4
KELLEY  AND  MIRER :  THE  SIMPLE  ACT  OF  VOTING
The studies of voting discussed in Chapter 2 differ in terms of which aspect of the
model they focus on, what kind of characteristics are included, and how evaluations
are presumably reached and integrated. However, they do not challenge the idea
that the processes described take place.
A model of voting that fits the orthodox model perhaps even better was pre-
sented by Stanley Kelley and Thad Mirer (1974).5 In “The simple act of voting” they
argued that the Michigan scholars had perhaps “identified the ingredients that go
into voting decisions, but not the recipe for mixing the ingredients” (p. 573). In the
Michigan model the weights assigned to the various forces could be identified only
by means of regression analyses in which vote choices were entered; vote choices
FIGURE 6.4  The orthodox model of party evaluations
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could thus be predicted only ‘after the fact’. Kelley and Mirer formulated a simple
rule according to which voters were expected to cast their votes and which could be
applied without knowing their vote choice (‘before the fact’).
The voter canvasses his likes and dislikes of the leading candidates and major
parties involved in an election. Weighing each like and dislike equally, he votes
for the candidate toward whom he has the greatest net number of favorable
attitudes, if there is such a candidate. If no candidate has such an advantage,
the voter votes consistently with his party affiliation, if he has one. If his atti-
tudes do not incline him toward one candidate more than toward another, and
if he does not identify with one of the major parties, the voter reaches a null
decision. (Kelley and Mirer 1974: 574)
Kelley and Mirer tested this decision rule in the context of U.S. presidential
elections on the basis of voters’ answers to a number of open-ended questions about
their so-called likes and dislikes with respect to the competing parties and candi-
dates. The questions asked were the following.
I’d like to ask you what you think are the good and bad points about the two
parties. Is there anything in particular that you (like, don’t like) about the
(Democratic, Republican) Party? What is that?
Now I’d like to ask you about the good and bad points of the (two, three) can-
didates for president. Is there anything in particular about (name of candidate)
that might you make want to vote (for him, against him)? What is that? (Kelley
and Mirer 1974: 573, note 4)
Across the five elections between 1952 and 1968 on average they classified correctly
86 per cent of the votes. The decision rule permitted prediction in more cases and
had higher accuracy than party identification.
Some aspects of these questions are particularly interesting. First, voters are free
to mention any type of characteristic they like. Second, which characteristics voters
mention may vary across voters. Third, the questions concern both parties and can-
didates. And fourth, the questions about the parties refer in no way explicitly to the
act of voting and thus seem to concern characteristics underlying party evaluations.
However, the questions concerning candidates explicitly include the notion of voting
for them. Hence, answers to these questions may include considerations that do not
underlie candidate or party preferences, but which do play a role with respect to
vote preferences.
Kelley and Mirer’s model matches well with various aspects of the orthodox
model. The notions of ‘likes’ and ‘dislikes’ correspond with the notions of evalua-
tions of single characteristics of the orthodox model. By integrating these sub-evalua-
tions voters reach an overall evaluation of each candidate and by comparing these a
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vote choice is reached. What characteristics are important is not defined in the
model, since every characteristic can be listed as a like or dislike. Why characteristics
are evaluated positively or negatively is also not explained in the model; the direc-
tion of the evaluation is taken for granted. In that respect the orthodox model pro-
vides a fuller explanation than Kelley and Mirer’s.
According to Kelley and Mirer’s model, evaluations of the candidates are con-
structed on the basis of likes and dislikes that are retrieved from memory. According
to an alternative view, candidate evaluations can be retrieved from memory directly,
more or less irrespective of any consideration underlying such evaluations. The cor-
responding decision rule was formulated by Brody and Page (1973: 13) as follows: “if
a voter favors one candidate even slightly more than the others, he will vote for that
candidate”. According to this model, only one summary judgement with respect to
each candidate has to be retrieved from memory in order to make a vote choice. Ap-
parently, voting is an even simpler act than Kelley and Mirer hypothesised.
THE ON-LINE MODEL
THE  ON-LINE  MODEL  OF  CANDIDATE  EVALUATIONS
According to the orthodox model, the key to understanding why voters evaluate
parties as they do is the representation of parties in voters’ memory. Milton Lodge
and his colleagues (1989, 1990, 1995; McGraw et al. 1990; Lodge and Stroh 1993) put
forward an alternative view. Central in this view is the distinction between memory-
based judgement and on-line judgement (Hastie and Park 1986; Lichtenstein and
Srull 1987). When individuals make a judgement, sometimes they search their
memory for information that is relevant to that judgement and make the judgement
on the basis of that information. Such judgements are referred to as ‘memory-based’.
In other cases the judgement can be retrieved from memory directly. This is possible
only if the judgement has been made before, while information relevant for the
judgement was being processed, and was then stored in memory. Such judgements
are referred to as ‘on-line’.
According to Lodge and his colleagues, the process underlying candidate
evaluations is that of on-line judgements. They formulated a model in line with these
ideas. The model has been referred to as an impression-driven model of candidate
evaluations, but also as the on-line model (of candidate evaluations). According to
the model, whenever voters process information with respect to a candidate, they
update an overall evaluation of the candidate, a so-called running tally. If, with re-
spect to a particular candidate, voters hear or read things they like, they may adjust
the running tally positively; whereas if voters hear or read things they dislike, they
may adjust it negatively.6 The key argument is that the information on the basis of
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which evaluations of candidates are adjusted may well be forgotten, while the im-
pact on the evaluation lasts. Consequently, there need not be a match between the
information stored with respect to a candidate in voters’ memory and the way they
evaluate that candidate. Memory and evaluation need not be in line with each other.
This is a fundamental difference with the orthodox model. With respect to voting the
on-line model implies that the only thing voters do when deciding for whom to vote,
is, like Brody and Page (1973) suggested, comparing their candidate evaluations;
they only have to “retrieve the on-line tally” (Lodge et al. 1989: 416). An implication
of the on-line model is that the reasons voters themselves provide to motivate why
they like or dislike candidates, or why they voted for them, should be seen as
rationalisations (Rahn et al. 1994).
To test the model, Lodge and his colleagues (1989, 1995; McGraw et al. 1990)
conducted a number of experiments.7 Individuals were typically asked to evaluate a
brochure of a candidate who ran for Congress; they did not know this was a ficti-
tious person. The brochure contained information about the candidate’s party affilia-
tion, some biographical information, and information about the candidate’s policy
positions. Individuals were asked while reading the brochure to rate how much they
liked or disliked the various policy positions (Lodge et al. 1989), or how strongly
they agreed or disagreed with them (McGraw et al. 1990); single bipolar scales were
used for this. After they had read the brochure and performed a distraction task – the
aim of this was to let information about the candidate fade from short-term memory
– individuals were asked to evaluate the candidate in terms of an overall evaluation
and in terms of various traits related to the candidate’s competence and integrity.
Next, individuals’ recall about the candidate was assessed: they were asked to indi-
cate which policy positions were in the brochure.
The actual test of the on-line model consisted of a comparison of two methods
to predict individuals’ candidate evaluations. If candidate evaluations were
memory-based, they should be predicted best on the basis of the information that
individuals could recall. On the other hand, if evaluations were made on-line, they
should be predicted best on the basis of all information that individuals had proc-
essed, including the information they could no longer recall. The results of the subse-
quent analyses indicated, as hypothesised, that candidate evaluations could be pre-
dicted better on the basis of all information voters had processed than on the basis of
recalled information. Even if information could not be recalled, it apparently had an
impact on how individuals evaluated the candidate. Moreover, when individuals
had been instructed in the experiment in such a way that they formed a general im-
pression of the candidate, the impact of the recalled information in addition to the
processed information was virtually absent. Hence, the experiments provided clear
support for the on-line model.8 Lodge and his colleagues assumed that in real life
voters form overall impressions of candidates, and that the on-line model explains
better what psychological process underlies their liking or disliking of candidates.9
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With respect to parties we may formulate an alternative model of voting by
combining the on-line model with the idea that voters vote for the party they evalu-
ate most positively (the assumption of a sincere vote). The resulting model can be
referred to as the on-line evaluation model of voting (see Figure 6.5). According to
this model, voting behaviour is based on overall evaluations of the competing par-
ties. As in the orthodox model, voters are expected to vote for the party they evaluate
most positively. The basis of this evaluation, however, differs. According to the on-
line model, overall evaluations of parties are based on evaluations of the information
processed with respect to the parties. How the information is evaluated depends on
characteristics of the voter. In this sense there is no difference between the orthodox
model and the on-line model. The difference concerns what is being evaluated: per-
ceptions stored in memory, or information that has been processed but which need
not be stored in memory. Note that the question that arises on the basis of on-line
model, but which is obviously not answered by adopting the model, is what infor-
mation voters process about particular parties. This question can only be answered
in the context of a particular political system with respect to specific parties.
The on-line evaluation model of voting links up with dominant models of atti-
tude change in social psychology (about these models, refer to Olson and Zanna
1993; Petty et al. 1997; Petty and Wegener 1999; Chen and Chaiken 1999). In such
models changes in evaluations are mostly regarded as the result of information-
processing. The models emphasise that evaluations may change on the basis of infor-
mation-processing in two ways: either by conscious deliberation, or through a more
superficial, partly unconscious, process. For example, in Richard Petty and John
Cacioppo’s (1986) elaboration likelihood model (ELM) a so-called central route and a
peripheral route are distinguished. In the central route individuals process informa-
FIGURE 6.5  The on-line evaluation model of voting
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tion about the attitude object consciously and if the information results in new posi-
tive or negative thoughts about the object, the attitude will be adjusted accordingly.
The likelihood of this kind of elaboration depends on the individual’s motivation
and ability to process the information. The model also describes a peripheral route,
on the basis of which attitudes may change without much cognitive processing. The
latter changes, which may be due to cues like message length or credibility of the
message source, are assumed to be relatively temporarily and more susceptible to
counter-persuasion (Petty and Wegener 1999: 43). The heuristic-systematic model
that was outlined by Shelly Chaiken (1980) describes two fairly similar routes.
Clearly, these models of attitude change provide a different view on why individuals
like or dislike parties than the orthodox model. They shift the focus from information
stored in long-term memory to information processed in short-term memory. Moreo-
ver, they indicate that evaluations need not be based solely on conscious, systematic
reasoning.
ANOMALIES  IN  THE  ON-LINE  MODEL
The empirical findings seem to support the on-line model. However, one could ar-
gue that those studies concerned candidates, not parties, and that it remains to be
seen whether party evaluations are based on similar processes. Another objection
that has been made is that the evidence provided concerns experimental settings,
which may differ from the real world (Redlawsk 2001). More important is that the
on-line model and its tests do not take into account two important ways in which
memory may still play a role. First, voters may use information to form general im-
ages of the parties or candidates and base their evaluations on those general images.
Second, information that has been stored in memory may be retrieved and could
then influence the evaluation in a similar way as when it would have been processed
after visual or auditory perception. Both points will be explained.
The conclusion that candidate evaluations are not memory-based was founded
primarily on the fact that such evaluations could be predicted more accurately on the
basis of the information processed than on the basis of the information recalled. This
does not imply, however, that evaluations are independent of information stored in
memory. It may be that when voters process information about a party or candidate,
they do not store this information as such in memory, but use it to form a general
image of the party or candidate. For example, when information about a candidate’s
issue stands is processed, voters may conclude that the candidate is a conservative.
Voters may forget which issue stands the candidate took, while they remember that
the candidate is a conservative. When asked to evaluate the candidate, they may base
the evaluation on the image of the candidate that they have stored in memory, which
says that the candidate is a conservative. The evaluation would then be memory-
based, although the initial information could be forgotten and the recalled stands of
Three Models to Explain Party Evaluations 99
the candidate need not be in line with the evaluation. Such processes underlie the
working of memory (Schacter 1996). Individuals do not remember all information
they process as such, but use it to create or update general images of persons, objects,
situations, and so on. Hence, a first assumption that underlies the tests of the on-line
model and that may well be false is that the image of a candidate consists (only) of
information as it was processed.
There is another way in which memory may still play a role. If, for example,
voters process information from a television broadcast about a party, this informa-
tion will trigger other information that voters had already stored in their memory.
The information that is then retrieved from memory influences the perception and
interpretation of the information from the television broadcast. What information
voters process thus depends not only on what information they come across in terms
of sensory perception, but also on what information they retrieve from memory
when processing such information. Moreover, even without processing sensory per-
ception voters may re-process information from memory: they may think about par-
ties without being engaged in a conversation or paying attention to media.
The fact that in information-processing information is activated from memory
is important not only because it influences perception, but also because it may influ-
ence the adjustment of party or candidate evaluations. The information that is re-
trieved from memory is processed again and this may establish an adjustment of
evaluations in the same way as information that is perceived through the senses.
These ideas match with Antonio Damasio’s (2000) discussion about how the brain
works. On the basis of neurological research he came to the conclusion that the
thought of a phenomenon and the actual encounter of that same phenomenon evoke
emotional responses in a similar way. There is not a fundamental difference between
the emotional response of seeing a snake and imagining seeing a snake (although the
intensity may differ). A similar observation was already made by William James
(1890b). He emphasised that objects of emotions can be those actually present as well
as those only thought of.
With emotions, the mere memory or imagination of the object may suffice to
liberate the excitement. One may get angrier in thinking over one’s insult than
at the moment of receiving it; and we melt more over a mother who is dead
than we ever did when she was living. In the rest of the chapter I shall use the
word object of emotion indifferently to mean one which is physically present or
one which is merely thought of. (James 1890b/1950: 442-443)
Hence, information recalled from memory may affect party evaluations in a similar
way as information that reaches voters through their senses. The way such informa-
tion is processed and responded to is not different.
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THE EMOTION-INTEGRATION MODEL
THE  IMPACT  OF  EMOTIONS  ON  CANDIDATE  EVALUATIONS
Another critique of traditional voting models is that they do not take into account
the role of emotions. Most studies of voting focus on memory in terms of cognitive
and semantic judgements. However, several studies have shown that emotions have
impact as well (Abelson et al. 1982; Christ 1985; Conover and Feldman 1986; Marcus
1988; Ragsdale 1991; Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Goren 1997; Glaser and Salovey
1998; Lavine et al. 1999; Marcus et al. 2000). For example, Pamela Johnston Conover
and Stanley Feldman (1986) examined whether emotional reactions to the economy
had an impact on judgements about the performance of the U.S. president. They
found that how voters evaluated President Reagan’s general performance was deter-
mined only to a limited extent by cognitive judgements about the economy. Consid-
erably stronger effects were found with respect to whether the national economy or
the personal economic situation had made voters feel happy, proud, or hopeful.
The question is whether such emotions influence voters’ attitudes towards par-
ties and candidates. Various studies have shown that they do. Liking and disliking
candidates and parties appear not to be the mere result of cognitive processes. In-
stead, emotional responses play an important role. A seminal study that showed this,
is that by Robert Abelson and his colleagues (1982). They made use of voters’ reports
about whether competing U.S. presidential candidates had evoked certain emotional
responses. The following questions were asked.
Now I want to ask you about (candidate). Think about your feelings when I
mention (candidate). Now, has (candidate) – because of the kind of person he
is or because of something he has done – ever made you feel: Angry? …
Happy? … Hopeful? … (and so on) (Abelson et al. 1982: 620-621)
The emotions included were: fear, anger, disgust, uneasiness, hope, pride, and sym-
pathy. For each emotion the answers were coded as ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
Abelson and his colleagues showed that the emotional responses represented
two factors that were to a considerable extent independent of each other: one factor
corresponded with positive emotions (hope, pride, and sympathy) and the other
with negative emotions (fear, anger, disgust, and uneasiness).10 Indices for positive
and negative emotions were constructed by counting the number of different emo-
tions that candidates had evoked.11 The authors examined the relationship between
both indices and candidate evaluations, which were operationalised as feeling ther-
mometer scores that ranged between 0 and 100. Both indices strongly correlated
with candidate evaluations. On average across the six candidates examined (Carter,
Kennedy, Connally, Reagan, Bush, and Baker) each positive emotion increased the
evaluation by 9 points, whereas each negative emotion decreased it by 7 points.12
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Even more interesting is that the emotion scores contributed substantially to the
prediction of evaluation scores in addition to perceived positive and negative traits –
respondents had been asked to rate candidates in those terms also. Apparently, what
mattered with respect to whether voters liked or disliked the candidates was not
solely their image of the candidates in terms of candidate characteristics, but also the
extent to which the candidates had evoked emotions. This finding has been repli-
cated with respect to parties, in other countries, and by the use of different measure-
ments (Ottati et al. 1992; Innes and Ahrens 1994; Eagly et al. 1994).13 These studies
showed that the degree to which emotions play a role may vary considerably across
candidates and parties, and some evaluations appeared to be based solely on cogni-
tive judgements. A study that focused on emotions with respect to three Australian
political leaders, showed that in one case (Bob Hawke) the negative emotions repre-
sented two factors: one for feeling angry and disgusted, and another for feeling
afraid and uneasy (Innes and Ahrens 1994). The overall evaluations correlated more
strongly with the factor that represented anger and disgust, but none of the emotion
measures added to the predictive power of trait measures. These findings do not,
however, violate the conclusion that emotions at least may play a role with respect to
how much voters like or dislike candidates and parties.
The independence of positive and negative emotions that Abelson and his col-
leagues (1982) found came somewhat as a surprise for two reasons. First, with re-
spect to traits, research had shown that positive and negative judgements correlated
negatively. Second, emotions had previously been conceptualised in terms of a single
bipolar valence dimension. It was expected that the experience of positive and nega-
tive emotions would be correlated negatively to each other. To understand why they
were not, insight in how emotions operate is helpful.14 In this respect the studies by
George Marcus and his colleagues (Marcus 1988; Marcus and MacKuen 1993;
Marcus et al. 2000) have provided useful insight (see also Cacioppo et al. 1997). They
emphasised that emotions do not stem from a single ‘emotion system’, but from two
independent systems that operate in the brain. One system scans for success (and
failure) in engaged actions. The output of this system is emotions like enthusiasm
and excitement. Another system continuously scans the environment for threat. The
output of this system is emotions like anxiety and fear. The first system has been re-
ferred to as the disposition system, the latter as the surveillance system.15 Marcus and
his colleagues emphasised that as different emotions originate in different systems,
we need not expect them to be correlated.
George Marcus (1988) studied the 1984 U.S. presidential election on the basis of
the same emotions and similar question wordings as Abelson and his colleagues
(1982) had used. He found that positive and negative emotions both played a role,
but in different ways. The impact of issues was related more strongly to negative
emotions stemming from the surveillance system. Overall candidate evaluations,
however, correlated more strongly with positive emotions stemming from the dispo-
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sition system. The effects could not be accounted for by party identification, policy
preferences, and perceived candidate characteristics. In a later study that focused on
the 1988 U.S. presidential election George Marcus and Michael MacKuen (1993) con-
ceptualised the emotional responses not as positive and negative emotions, but as
enthusiasm and anxiety. To operationalise these, the following question was asked.
When we talk to people about the major Presidential candidates, they use dif-
ferent words to describe how they feel about them. For both Vice President
Bush and Governor Dukakis, I’d like to read you some pairs of words. For each
pair, let’s use one (1) for the lowest possible rating and 100 as the highest possi-
ble rating. Let’s start with Vice President Bush. Would you say you feel “unen-
thusiastic” or “enthusiastic” about him? One (1) would be the most unenthusi-
astic rating and 100 would be the most enthusiastic rating. (Marcus and
MacKuen 1993: 674-675)
Voters rated the candidates using four pairs of words: enthusiastic–unenthusiastic,
interested–indifferent, anxious–safe, and upset–comfortable. The scores of the first
two pairs were transformed into a single score for enthusiasm, and the other two into
one for anxiety. The hypothesis that both dimensions have different effects was sup-
ported by the empirical findings. The main effect of anxiety was that it discouraged
reliance on habitual cues and stimulated attention and learning. Enthusiasm stimu-
lated interest in the campaign and influenced candidate evaluations as such (and
thereby the direction of the vote).16
On the basis of these findings George Marcus, Russell Neuman and Michael
MacKuen (2000) developed a theory about how emotions direct (political) behav-
iour, which they referred to as affective intelligence. According to their theory, peo-
ple rely heavily on habits and routine actions. The successes and failures of the ex-
ecution of the corresponding behaviour are monitored continuously by the
disposition system. If it detects success, feelings of enthusiasm or satisfaction result,
whereas failures result in depression or frustration. Simultaneously, the surveillance
system operates, scanning the environment for novelty and threat. If it detects novel
circumstances, the system draws attention to them and consequently individuals no
longer rely on their habitual behaviour. Instead, they involve in more deliberate rea-
soning processes. Hence, emotions such as anxiety, uneasiness, and fear lead voters
to pay closer attention and learn more about the situation. As long as such responses
are not evoked, calmness and relaxation are the typical outcomes of the system. This
theory implies that there is a double role for emotions: they influence candidate
evaluations as such (through enthusiasm), and they have an impact on the influence
of cognitive judgements (through anxiety).17 This view implies that reason and emo-
tion are not each other’s opposites: they operate in tandem against habitual behav-
iour. This is drawn attention to by the name of the theory: affective intelligence.
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There are two important questions that are usually not answered in this kind of
research, namely what voters are emotional about and why they are emotional in a
particular way. If we know that some voters like a candidate because they were en-
thusiastic about him, whereas others dislike the candidate because he made them an-
gry, then we know something, but not enough. Without insight in what made voters
enthusiastic or angry, and why it did, our understanding remains limited. To under-
stand the impact of emotions, those questions will also have to be answered.
THE  EMOTION- INTEGRATION  MODEL  OF  PARTY  EVALUATIONS
Two major shortcomings in traditional theories of voting have been identified. They
neglect the role of emotions, and they do not take into account the possibility that
party and candidate evaluations are influenced by information that is no longer
stored in voters’ memory. The on-line model, on the other hand, neglects the role that
information stored in long-term memory plays. Moreover, this model is as silent
about the role of emotions as most traditional theories of voting. To explain why vot-
ers evaluate parties as they do and illuminate the psychological processes involved,
these limitations have to be overcome. This may be done by formulating a model that
synthesises the various ideas presented.
The resulting model builds on the idea that it is possible to distinguish between
long-term memory and short-term memory (or working memory), as well as be-
tween episodic memory and semantic memory (see Appendix C, which discusses
the conceptualisation of memory). Furthermore, it builds on the idea that a distinc-
tion can be made between temporal emotional states (emotion episodes) and endur-
ing emotional states (sentiments) (see Appendix D, which discusses the conceptual-
isation of emotions). Party evaluations are an example of enduring states.
According to the model, party evaluations are formed as well as changed on the
basis of temporary emotional responses that result from information-processing in
working memory. Information may reach working memory in two ways: through
sensory perception (for example, by reading a newspaper or speaking with friends)
and through retrieval of information that has been stored in long-term memory (see
Figure 6.6).
Working memory and long-term memory are related to each other reciprocally;
information flows in both directions. First, information processed in working
memory may be stored in long-term memory. This may happen both in terms of the
encounter itself (episodic memory) as well as in more general terms, dissociated
from that particular moment (semantic memory). Information with respect to parties
may be stored as such in long-term memory, but may also be used to create or up-
date the images of parties. Second, information stored may travel back from long-
term memory to working memory. Whenever information is processed in working
memory, information from long-term memory is more or less automatically re-
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FIGURE 6.6  The emotion-integration model of party evaluations
trieved. Information retrieved from memory is used to comprehend and interpret in-
formation from media messages and personal communication.
When individuals process information, they automatically evaluate the infor-
mation (cf. Zajonc 1980, 1984). This may be referred to by the notion of emotional
response. Often the response will be rather weak. In that case we may speak about
liking or disliking the information. If the response is strong, this may lead to so-
called emotion episodes (cf. Russell 2003). For example, if voters hear about a policy
proposal made by a particular party, they may occasionally respond with emotions
as sadness, disgust, anger, happiness, enthusiasm, and so on. What kind of emotion
media reports, personal 
conversations, et cetera 
information about party 
in long-term memory 
information about party 
in working memory 
storage and retrieval sensory-perception 
emotional response 
party evaluation 
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individuals experience, as well as the intensity of the response, depends on the cog-
nitive processes involved (Ortony et al. 1988). In as far as such temporary emotional
responses are attributed to political parties, they may lead to an adjustment of the
evaluation of that party and thus have a lasting impact. These are the processes that
James Russell (2003) referred to by the notions of attributed affect and perception of
affective quality; Nico Frijda (1994) referred to the latter as sentiments (see Ap-
pendix D).18
The model indicates that the information that leads to an emotional response
may be information perceived, but also information retrieved from memory. The lat-
ter is also automatically evaluated. The resulting emotional response may establish
an adjustment of the party evaluations in the same way as information that reaches
individuals through the senses. For example, if voters think about something a par-
ticular party has proposed, they may (again) experience a certain emotion.
The emotional response, whatever the origin of the information it is based on,
may become represented in working memory. This means that individuals become
conscious of their emotional response: they know whether they liked or disliked the
information they processed and they know whether it made them disgusted, angry,
enthusiastic, and so on (LeDoux and Phelps 2000: 167-168).19 The knowledge of those
feelings may as such be stored in long-term memory. These are the memories that
Abelson and his colleagues (1982) focused on.20
Information that has been stored in long-term memory need not be kept. It may
lose its accessibility and ultimately be forgotten. This applies in particular to infor-
mation in episodic memory: after a few weeks such information is usually no longer
available (Robinson and Clore 2002b). This does not mean, however, that the effect
the information had on the evaluations of the parties involved is lost as well. After
all, party evaluations are stored in memory independently of the other (cognitive)
information about the party stored in long-term memory. Consequently, party evalu-
ations may be affected by information that voters have once processed but no longer
remember. This view is shared with Lodge and his colleagues (1989).21
The model is referred to as the emotion-integration model of party evaluations,
because party evaluations are regarded as a result of emotions experienced with re-
spect to parties; these emotions are integrated by individuals into general evalua-
tions of the parties. The model in a sense integrates the idea from the orthodox
model that there is a relationship between the image of a party as stored in long-term
memory and the evaluation of that party, and the idea from the on-line model that
evaluations are based on information processed in working memory. It adds to this
the idea that voters’ emotional responses play a key role, because these are what
party evaluations are based on. Note that the model does not indicate what kind of
information about parties voters respond to emotionally, neither which type of emo-
tional response they show. These are the kind of additional questions that can only
be answered in a specific context.
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EMPIRICAL TEST OF
THE SINCERE VOTE MODEL
According to the sincere vote model, voting behaviour results from voters’ evalua-
tions of the competing parties through a sort of causal chain. The chain starts with
voters’ overall positive or negative feelings towards the various parties, which are
referred to as party evaluations. Party evaluations form party preferences. The party
preference is the party (or parties) a voter evaluates most positively. When voters are
faced with an election, they form a voting intention in accordance with their party
preference. Voting intentions can be formed any moment before voters actually cast
their vote. The voting intention of voters with a multiple party preference may con-
sist of any of the parties their party preference consists of. The final step is from vot-
ing intention to voting behaviour. According to the model, in the polling booth vot-
ers retrieve their voting intention from memory and vote accordingly.
In this chapter the sincere vote model will be tested empirically by applying it
to the Dutch parliamentary elections in 1986, 1994, 1998, and 2002 on the basis of
data from the respective Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES).1 These years
were selected for the simple reason that party evaluation measures were incorpo-
rated in the surveys. The main part of the DPES consisted of two face-to-face inter-
views with a large sample of voters. A first wave of interviews was held in the weeks
preceding the election, while a second wave of interviews was held shortly after the
election. Questions concerning party evaluations and voting intentions were asked
in the pre-election interview; questions regarding respondents’ actual voting behav-
iour were asked in the post-election interview.2
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OPERATIONALISATION OF THE CONCEPTS
MEASUREMENT  OF  PARTY  EVALUATIONS
Party evaluations have been measured in electoral research by various procedures.
The method used in the DPES corresponds with the feeling thermometer that has
been used to measure candidate evaluations in the American National Election Stud-
ies, which was discussed in Chapter 2. The question was worded as follows.3
There are many political parties in our country. I would like to know from you
how sympathetic you find these parties. You can give each party a score be-
tween 0 and 100. The more sympathetic you find a party, the higher the score
you give. A score of 50 means that you find a party neither sympathetic nor
unsympathetic. If you don’t know a party, please feel free to say so. First we
take the Labour Party. Which score would you give the Labour Party?
Respondents were shown a card with a horizontal line with at equal distance eleven
numbers, which ranged from 0 to 100 (all multiples of ten). Both end-points and the
mid-point were labelled. The score of 0 was labelled “very unsympathetic”, the score
of 50 was labelled “neither sympathetic, nor unsympathetic”, and the score of 100
was labelled “very sympathetic”.4
To indicate their feelings, respondents could mention any value between 0 and
100, so the measure can be regarded as a 101-point scale. However, in practice the
measurement operated more as an eleven-point scale. In 1998, for example, only one
and a half per cent of the answers did not fit an eleven-point format. In this research
such answers have been transformed in line with the eleven-point format by round-
ing off the figures to the nearest multiple of ten. This procedure has some disadvan-
tages (the number of multiple party preferences may be overestimated), but safe-
guards against some more severe problems and possible critiques.5 Therefore, the
following analyses are all based on evaluation scores that have been rounded off. It is
worth noting that in as far as this procedure affects the results, it only weakens the
support found for the principal claims of this study that voting can be accurately
predicted on the basis of party evaluations and that partisanship can at the same
time be distinguished from voting.
In each study respondents were asked to evaluate all parties that were repre-
sented in the Second Chamber of Dutch parliament at that time. In 2002 two new
parties that were doing well in the opinion polls (List Pim Fortuyn and Liveable
Netherlands) were also included.6 Table 7.1 lists the parties and shows how many
voters apparently knew each party, since they awarded it an evaluation score.7 In
2002 the figures are relatively high for all parties. Presumably, the campaign in
which Pim Fortuyn played such a dominant role, made voters pay closer attention to
the election than they had done in previous years. Note also that the number of vot-
Empirical Test of the Sincere Vote Model 111
ers who knew the various parties varied. The Labour Party, Liberal Party, and Chris-
tian Democrats were well-known in each year: between 95 and 99 per cent of the vot-
ers could indicate how much they liked them. In the elections in which they partici-
pated, the Centre Democrats, List Pim Fortuyn, and Liveable Netherlands were also
well-known: between 92 and 98 per cent of the voters awarded them a score.8 In 1986
D66 was slightly less well-known (88 per cent), but since 1994 this party was about as
well-known as the major parties. GreenLeft and the Socialist Party were only slightly
less well-known. Large majorities of voters were also familiar with the three small
left-wing predecessors of GreenLeft in 1986 (PPR, CPN, and EVP) and with the Eld-
erly Alliance in 1994 (between 74 and 87 per cent). Finally, the orthodox Protestant
parties (SGP, GPV, RPF, and ChristianUnion) were not as well-known as most others,
but a majority knew them too.
Table 7.2 to Table 7.5 show how voters evaluated the various parties. For each
party the number of voters is shown who awarded each evaluation score, as well as
the number of voters who did not know the party. Additionally, the mean evalua-
tion score awarded to each party, as well as the standard deviation, is presented.
TABLE 7.1  Percentage of voters who knew (how much they liked) the parties
1986 1994 1998 2002
Labour Party PvdA 97 97 97 99
Liberal Party VVD 95 95 96 99
Christian Democrats CDA 97 97 96 99
Democrats 66 D66 88 93 95 98
Political Party Radicals PPR 79 - - -
Communist Party CPN 87 - - -
Evangelist Party EVP 77 - - -
GreenLeft GL - 88 93 98
Socialist Party SP - - 80 94
Political Reformed Party SGP 74 72 71 86
Reformed Political League GPV 73 71 75 -
Reformed Political Federation RPF 67 63 66 -
ChristianUnion CU - - - 87
Centre Party/Centre Democrats CP/CD 92 95 93 -
Elderly Alliance AOV - - 74 -
List Pim Fortuyn LPF - - - 98
Liveable Netherlands LN - - - 93
(N) (1630) (1812) (2101) (1908)
Notes: Abbreviations listed for GreenLeft (GL), ChristianUnion (CU), and Liveable Netherlands (LN)
are not as common as the others, but will be used in this study for practical purposes. In this research
the Centre Party (CP) and Centre Democrats (CD) will sometimes be referred to jointly as Centre
Democrats.
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TABLE 7.2  Evaluation scores awarded to parties in 1986 (%)  (N = 1630)
PvdA VVD CDA D66 PPR CPN EVP SGP GPV RPF CP
100 9 2 5 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
90 11 5 9 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0
80 15 8 13 7 4 3 1 2 2 1 0
70 8 8 13 13 6 3 2 3 3 2 0
60 10 13 12 18 10 6 6 5 5 3 1
50 14 15 13 22 12 11 11 11 10 9 2
40 7 13 8 10 10 7 8 8 7 6 2
30 7 10 7 6 9 8 6 6 7 6 2
20 5 8 6 4 8 9 8 10 9 8 3
10 6 7 6 3 10 16 16 13 13 14 9
0 4 6 4 2 8 23 17 14 14 16 72
don’t know 3 5 3 12 21 13 23 26 27 33 8
––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
mean score 59 46 56 53 39 27 27 30 30 26 5
(std) (29) (26) (27) (20) (25) (25) (24) (25) (25) (25) (14)
TABLE 7.3  Evaluation scores awarded to parties in 1994 (%)  (N = 1812)
PvdA VVD CDA D66 GL SGP GPV RPF CD
100 3 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 0
90 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 0
80 14 8 11 13 8 2 2 2 0
70 15 12 12 18 10 2 3 2 1
60 15 16 14 18 13 5 5 4 0
50 21 18 21 19 15 12 11 9 2
40 9 13 11 7 10 9 8 6 2
30 7 9 7 5 9 11 11 10 3
20 3 6 7 3 6 9 10 9 4
10 2 4 4 2 6 12 12 11 7
0 2 3 3 2 6 10 9 8 75
don’t know 3 5 3 7 12 28 29 37 5
––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
mean score 57 51 52 58 48 32 32 31 6
(std) (22) (23) (23) (21) (25) (23) (23) (23) (15)
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TABLE 7.4  Evaluation scores awarded to parties in 1998 (%)  (N = 2101)
PvdA VVD CDA D66 GL SP SGP GPV RPF CD AOV
100 4 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1
90 8 3 4 3 5 2 1 1 1 0 1
80 18 9 9 8 13 7 2 3 3 0 4
70 21 14 15 15 17 7 3 4 3 1 7
60 18 15 18 19 14 8 4 5 4 1 9
50 17 18 23 22 15 15 14 15 13 3 21
40 6 15 12 11 10 10 9 10 8 2 7
30 3 9 6 7 8 9 12 11 10 2 7
20 2 5 4 5 5 8 11 11 11 5 6
10 1 4 2 3 3 7 10 10 8 9 7
0 1 2 1 1 2 5 6 5 5 70 4
don’t know 3 4 4 5 7 20 29 25 34 7 26
––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
mean score 64 52 55 54 55 44 34 36 36 6 44
(std) (19) (22) (20) (20) (23) (25) (22) (22) (23) (15) (23)
TABLE 7.5  Evaluation scores awarded to parties in 2002 (%)  (N = 1908)
PvdA VVD CDA D66 GL SP SGP CU LPF LN
100 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0
90 5 3 5 3 5 4 1 3 3 1
80 11 10 13 9 13 9 2 4 7 3
70 17 16 19 15 17 13 4 7 7 6
60 18 18 19 18 16 13 6 9 7 9
50 18 16 17 19 14 13 13 15 9 14
40 12 16 12 14 11 11 10 12 9 12
30 7 9 7 8 10 10 14 12 9 13
20 4 6 3 6 6 10 13 10 9 12
10 3 3 3 4 4 8 16 11 16 15
0 1 1 1 2 1 3 7 4 19 7
don’t know 1 1 1 2 2 6 14 13 2 7
––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
mean score 56 53 57 51 55 48 33 41 35 36
(std) (21) (20) (20) (21) (22) (24) (23) (24) (29) (23)
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In 1986 the average score awarded to the Labour Party was highest (mean score of
59). The Centre Party, on the other hand, was evaluated very negatively (mean score
of 5). The mean score awarded to other parties varied between 26 and 56. In 1994
D66 and the Labour Party were evaluated most positively (mean scores of 58 and
57), and the Centre Democrats again very negatively (mean score of 6). The average
scores awarded to the Christian Democrats, Liberal Party, and GreenLeft were fairly
similar (mean scores of about 50). The orthodox Protestant parties were evaluated
more negatively (mean scores of about 30). The major change in 1998 concerned the
mean evaluation of the Labour Party, which increased to 64 – the highest average of
any party in all four years. The Socialist Party and Elderly Alliance were evaluated
less positively than the Christian Democrats, Liberal Party, D66, and GreenLeft, but
more positively than the orthodox Protestant parties. Four years later, in 2002, the
most striking change is arguably that of the Labour Party, whose average score de-
creased to 56. The Christian Democrats, Liberal Party, D66, and GreenLeft were
again evaluated fairly similarly. The two new parties – List Pim Fortuyn and Live-
able Netherlands – were on average evaluated fairly negatively (scores of about 35).
Whereas the average evaluation score varied considerably across the parties,
the variation in these scores was remarkably similar. Some differences can be ob-
served, however. First, in 1986 the scores awarded to the Labour Party varied more
strongly than those of other parties, whereas scores awarded to Democrats 66 var-
ied less. The figures of the Centre Party and Centre Democrats showed least devia-
tion. Large majorities awarded them the same, negative evaluation score (0). From
1994 until 2002 the variation in scores of the various other parties was about the
same, although slightly lower than in 1986, with one exception. In 2002 the evalua-
tions awarded to List Pim Fortuyn varied more strongly than those of any other
party.
Although the average evaluation scores and their variation tell something about
how the parties were evaluated, the frequency distributions provide more useful in-
formation. We may expect that a party has a reasonable chance to be preferred only if
it is awarded a fairly high evaluation score. If we focus on the three highest evalua-
tion scores (80, 90, and 100), the following observations can be made (see Table 7.6).
In 1986 the Labour Party was awarded such positive scores most often, namely by 35
per cent of all voters. In no other year was any party liked that much that often. The
same year the Christian Democrats received such scores from 27 per cent of the vot-
ers. The corresponding figures for the other parties were considerably lower. In 1994
fewer voters awarded a score of at least 80 to the Labour Party and the Christian
Democrats, and more did so with respect to D66. Consequently, the figures of these
three parties no longer differed very much. The Liberal Party and GreenLeft were
both evaluated that positively somewhat less frequently, while the figure of the or-
thodox Protestant parties was still low at 5 per cent.
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In 1998 the Labour Party was awarded scores of 80 and above by more voters
again (29 per cent), and the party was by far liked well most often. The party that
came closest was GreenLeft; this party was awarded such scores more often than be-
fore. The corresponding figure for the Christian Democrats, Liberal Party, D66, and
the Socialist Party were lower and varied between 10 and 15 per cent. For D66 this
implied a large decrease. For the three orthodox Protestant parties the figure rose
slightly to 7 per cent. In 2002 Labour’s position became much weaker again, since the
number of voters who awarded them scores of at least 80 decreased to 18 per cent.
The Christian Democrats and GreenLeft were awarded such high scores about
equally often as the Labour Party (each about 20 per cent). The corresponding fig-
ures of the Liberal Party, D66, Socialist Party, and List Pim Fortuyn were lower and
varied between 12 and 14 per cent. The orthodox Protestant parties were liked that
well by more voters than in any previous year, namely by 10 per cent.9 Finally, 4 per
cent of the voters awarded these scores to Liveable Netherlands.
It is clear that average evaluation scores do not tell us much about how often
parties were liked well. For example, in 2002 List Pim Fortuyn and Liveable Nether-
lands were on average evaluated about equally positively (or better: negatively –
both had a mean evaluation score of about 35). However, if we focus on the number
of voters who awarded them very positive evaluation scores, there are large differ-
ences: List Pim Fortuyn was liked well by 12 per cent of the voters, Liveable Nether-
lands by only 4 per cent. Average scores, which are often focused on, are of limited
use.
TABLE 7.6  Percentage of voters who awarded parties evaluation scores of 80 or more
1986 1994 1998 2002
Labour Party 35 22 29 18
Liberal Party 15 14 14 13
Christian Democrats 27 17 15 19
D66 10 20 12 12
GreenLeft 10 14 19 20
Socialist Party - - 10 14
Orthodox Protestant 5 5 7 10
Centre Democrats 1 1 0 -
Elderly Alliance - - 5 -
List Pim Fortuyn - - - 12
Liveable Netherlands - - - 4
(N) (1630) (1812) (2101) (1908)
Note: The 1986 figure of GreenLeft concerns the small left-wing parties jointly (PPR, CPN, EVP).
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MEASUREMENT  OF  PARTY  PREFERENCES
How voters evaluated an individual party still says nothing about whether they pre-
ferred that party or not. That depends on the evaluation of the party in comparison to
the evaluations of other parties. What matters is whether a party was evaluated most
positively. Only if voters awarded a party a higher evaluation score than any other
party, can this party be said to be preferred. Recall that voters may award their high-
est evaluation score to more than one party. In that case they have a multiple party
preference.
The highest evaluation score that voters awarded to a party varied considerably
across voters (Table 7.7). Some voters awarded at least one party the highest possible
evaluation score, namely a score of 100. A majority of the voters did not evaluate any
party this positively, and awarded the party they liked best scores between 70 and 90.
Few voters did not like any party and evaluated a party at best neutrally (a score of
50), or disliked each party and awarded all of them even lower scores. This pattern is
similar across the years, with two notable exceptions. First, in 1986 20 per cent of the
voters awarded a score of 100, while in the other three years only about 10 per cent
did. Second, in 1994 almost 10 per cent of the voters did not like any party – about
twice as many as in the other years.
Table 7.7 furthermore shows that only 2 per cent or less of the voters did not
evaluate any party. Consequently, in each year a party preference measure could be
created on the basis of the party evaluation scores for at least 98 per cent of the vot-
ers. This means that the sincere vote model can be investigated for virtually all vot-
ers.10
Whether a particular party was preferred or not, and how strongly so, can be
examined by determining the difference between the evaluation score awarded to
that party and the highest evaluation score awarded to any other party. The values
indicate how strongly the party was preferred, or how strongly it was not preferred.
To facilitate the discussion these scores have been transformed into seven categories:
strongly preferred (scores of 30 or higher), moderately preferred (score of 20),
weakly preferred (score of 10), multiple preference (score of 0), weakly not preferred
(score of –10), moderately not preferred (score of –20), and strongly not preferred
(scores of –30 and lower). An additional category includes voters who did not know
(how much they liked) a party. How strongly voters preferred each party is shown in
Table 7.8 to Table 7.11.
The measures regarding the individual parties can be combined to determine
the direction as well as the strength of voters’ party preference. The directional com-
ponent is the party that voters preferred, while the strength component indicates
how strongly that party was preferred. With respect to the directional component a
distinction can be made between voters with a single and those with a multiple party
preference. The basis for this distinction is the number of parties that voters evalu-
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ated most positively.11 In each election, a majority of the voters evaluated one party
more positively than any other (Table 7.12). The number of voters with a single party
preference decreased, however, from 80 per cent in 1986 to about 65 per cent in 1998
and 2002. Table 7.12 furthermore shows that other voters mostly preferred two par-
ties, but some liked three or even more parties equally well.12
Which party voters with a single party preference preferred is shown in Ta-
ble 7.13. In 1986 the Labour Party was preferred most often, namely by 33 per cent of
the voters. The number of voters who evaluated the Christian Democrats more posi-
tively than any other party equalled 24 per cent. The Liberal Party and D66 were
liked best by 11 and 5 per cent, respectively. Even fewer voters preferred the ortho-
dox Protestant parties or the Centre Democrats. If these figures are compared to
those concerning party evaluations, an observation is that the relatively small parties
(D66, the small left-wing parties, and the orthodox Protestant parties) were preferred
less often than one might have expected on the basis of the evaluation scores. Voters
who liked these parties well were likely to like another party still better. This illus-
trates the importance of focusing on party evaluations in terms of party preferences.
In 1994 the Labour Party and Christian Democrats were preferred less often
than in 1986, whereas in particular D66 and GreenLeft were preferred more often.
Four years later the number of voters who liked the Christian Democrats best had
decreased to only 9 per cent. The number of voters who preferred D66 also decreased
strongly. The two parties that in 1998 were included in the survey for the first time,
the Socialist Party and the Elderly Alliance, were preferred by 4 and 3 per cent, re-
spectively. In 2002 the two most striking changes are the decrease in the number of
voters who preferred the Labour Party (from 19 to 11 per cent), and the emergence of
TABLE 7.7  Highest evaluation score awarded to any party (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
100 20 9 11 10
90 27 21 19 24
80 29 31 35 34
70 13 20 20 21
60 6 9 8 8
50 3 6 4 2
0-40 1 3 1 1
none evaluated 2 2 2 1
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1630) (1812) (2101) (1908)
mean score 83 77 79 80
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List Pim Fortuyn (preferred by 7 per cent). Other changes were that fewer voters pre-
ferred the Liberal Party, and that the Christian Democrats, Socialist Party, and ortho-
dox Protestant parties were preferred somewhat more often than before.
All these changes largely reflect those that were observed with respect to the
way voters evaluated the various individual parties, but the shifts are not identical.
For example, in 1998 considerably more voters awarded GreenLeft evaluation scores
of 80 or higher than in 1994 (14 versus 19 per cent), but the number of voters who
preferred them did not increase (9 versus 8 per cent). This illustrates that changes in
the number of voters who prefer a party depend also on changes in evaluations of
other parties.
TABLE 7.8  Preferences for parties in 1986 (%)  (N=1630)
PvdA VVD CDA D66 PPR CPN EVP SGP GPV RPF CP
strongly preferred 13 2 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
moderately preferred 9 3 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
weakly preferred 10 6 8 3 2 1 0 0 1 0 0
multiple preference 9 7 11 7 4 3 2 3 3 2 1
weakly not preferred 10 9 9 12 7 4 3 4 4 3 0
moderately not preferred 8 12 10 16 8 6 5 6 5 3 1
strongly not preferred 38 57 43 48 79 73 66 60 61 57 89
don’t know party 3 5 3 12 21 13 23 26 27 33 8
––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
TABLE 7.9 Preferences for parties in 1994 (%)  (N=1812)
PvdA VVD CDA D66 GL SGP GPV RPF CD
strongly preferred 4 3 3 1 1 0 0 0 1
moderately preferred 4 4 3 4 3 0 0 0 0
weakly preferred 9 7 8 7 5 0 0 1 0
multiple preference 14 11 12 17 10 3 3 3 1
weakly not preferred 17 13 12 18 12 5 5 3 1
moderately not preferred 17 14 14 17 12 7 7 5 1
strongly not preferred 34 44 44 29 45 57 56 50 89
don’t know party 3 5 3 7 12 28 29 37 5
––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Categories in Tables 7.8 to 7.10 are based on the difference between the evaluation score
awarded to a party and the highest score awarded to any other party. Resulting scores have been
transformed into seven categories that indicate the strength of the preference for a party (see discus-
sion in text).
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Which combinations of parties were preferred by voters who liked two or more
parties equally positively, is shown in Table 7.14. All multiple party preferences that
occurred among at least 1.0 per cent of the voters in at least one of the years are
listed. The preferences are grouped into three categories on the basis of the question
whether the preference consisted of left-wing parties, right-wing parties, or a mix-
ture of both.13 In each election, a wide variety of different multiple preferences ex-
isted; these were spread across all three categories. Furthermore, no particular multi-
ple party preference was held very often (the highest figure was 3.3 per cent) and
across the years different combinations were preferred most often. In 1986 the three
most common combinations were those of the Christian Democrats and Liberals, La-
bour and Christian Democrats, and combinations of Labour with one or more small
left-wing parties. In 1994 multiple party preferences of D66 with either GreenLeft or
TABLE 7.10  Preferences for parties in 1998 (%)  (N=2101)
PvdA VVD CDA D66 GL SP SGP GPV RPF CD AOV
strongly preferred 3 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
moderately preferred 5 3 3 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
weakly preferred 11 6 5 3 5 3 1 1 1 0 2
multiple preference 21 13 14 11 15 8 2 3 3 1 5
weakly not preferred 21 12 15 17 17 8 4 5 3 1 8
moderately not preferred 15 13 17 20 16 10 7 9 7 2 10
strongly not preferred 22 47 42 42 37 51 57 57 51 89 47
don’t know party 3 4 4 5 7 20 29 25 34 7 26
––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
TABLE 7.11  Preferences for parties in 2002 (%)  (N=1908)
PvdA VVD CDA D66 GL SP SGP CU LPF LN
strongly preferred 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
moderately preferred 3 2 3 1 2 1 0 1 2 0
weakly preferred 7 5 8 4 6 4 1 2 4 1
multiple preference 12 11 14 10 14 10 2 4 8 5
weakly not preferred 19 17 17 17 20 13 5 9 7 8
moderately not preferred 17 17 17 20 16 14 8 10 8 9
strongly not preferred 40 46 39 46 40 51 69 59 67 70
don’t know party 1 1 1 2 2 6 14 13 2 7
––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Labour were most common. In 1998 the combinations of Labour with the Christian
Democrats or GreenLeft occurred most frequently. Finally, in 2002 the combination
of parties that was preferred most often was that of GreenLeft and Socialist Party.
The final question is how strongly voters preferred the party they evaluated
most positively. The strength of the party preference has been determined by sub-
tracting the evaluation score awarded to the second-best liked party from the score
awarded to the best-liked party.14 For voters with a multiple party preference the
TABLE 7.12  Number of parties in party preferences (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
1 80 71 64 64
2 15 20 22 23
3 4 5 9 8
4 or more 2 4 6 4
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1593) (1783) (2064) (1894)
mean number 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.6
Note: Party preferences that include only one party are referred to as single party preferences; those
that include two or more parties are referred to as multiple party preferences.
TABLE 7.13  Distribution of single party preferences (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
Labour Party 33 17 19 11
Liberal Party 11 14 12 8
Christian Democrats 24 15 9 13
D66 5 12 5 5
GreenLeft 4 9 8 9
Socialist Party - - 4 6
Orthodox Protestant 2 2 3 5
Centre Democrats 1 2 1 -
Elderly Alliance - - 3 -
List Pim Fortuyn - - - 7
Liveable Netherlands - - - 1
––– ––– ––– –––
total 80 71 64 64
(N) (1593) (1783) (2064) (1894)
Note: The 1986 figure of GreenLeft concerns the small left-wing parties jointly (PPR, CPN, EVP).
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score by definition equals 0, which indicates that the second-best liked party was
liked as much as the best-liked party. For voters with a single party preference the
score may vary between 10 (weak preference) and 100 (extremely strong prefer-
ence). The scores have been transformed into a four-point scale by combining val-
ues of 30 and up. The resulting categories are referred to as strong, moderate, weak,
and multiple party preferences.
TABLE 7.14  Distribution of multiple party preferences (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
left-wing SP & GL - - 2.1 2.5
combinations: PvdA & GL 2.2 2.0 2.7 1.9
PvdA, D66 & GL 0.4 1.0 0.7 0.9
PvdA & D66 1.6 3.0 1.8 1.3
D66 & GL 0.4 3.3 0.9 1.0
other combinations 0.9 - 2.5 2.3
––– ––– ––– –––
subtotal 5.5 9.3 10.8 10.0
right-wing CDA & Orthodox Protestant 1.2 0.7 0.8 1.6
combinations: CDA & VVD 3.3 2.2 2.1 1.8
CDA & LPF - - - 1.1
VVD & LPF - - - 1.8
Orthodox Protestant 1.4 1.2 1.2 0.8
other combinations 0.4 0.9 1.7 3.0
––– ––– ––– –––
subtotal 6.3 5.0 5.8 10.1
mixed PvdA & CDA 2.1 2.1 2.8 1.3
combinations: PvdA & VVD 0.3 0.6 1.9 0.7
CDA & GL 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.0
CDA & D66 1.4 1.6 0.1 0.5
VVD & D66 0.7 2.4 0.8 0.5
other combinations 3.8 7.6 13.1 11.9
––– ––– ––– –––
subtotal 8.7 14.8 19.3 15.7
––– ––– ––– –––
total 20.5 29.1 35.9 35.9
(N) (1593) (1783) (2064) (1894)
Note: All combinations mentioned by at least 1 per cent in at least one year are listed; other combi-
nations are listed together as ‘other combinations’. The figures of GreenLeft in 1986 concern combi-
nations with one or more of their predecessors (PPR, CPN, EVP).
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In 1986 voters were distributed fairly equally across the four categories (Ta-
ble 7.15). In 1994 strong and moderate party preferences were less common, and
weak and multiple party preferences were more common. Four years later, strong
party preferences had again become less common and multiple party preferences
again more common. The figures of 2002 were fairly similar to those of 1998. Conse-
quently, in the two latter years approximately 10 per cent of the voters had a strong
party preference, 15 per cent a moderate party preference, 40 per cent a weak party
preference, and 35 per cent a multiple party preference. Hence, whereas in 1986 the
number of voters with multiple and weak party preferences equalled the number
with moderate and strong party preferences, in 2002 the former outnumbered the
latter by a ratio of 4 to 1. Due to these changes, the average difference between the
score awarded to the best-liked party and that awarded to the second-best liked
party dropped from 18 points in 1986 to 9 points in 2002. This means that the
strength of voters’ party preferences decreased substantially.
MEASUREMENTS  OF  VOTING  INTENTIONS  AND  VOTING  BEHAVIOUR
The pre-election interview of the DPES included questions concerning respondents’
voting intentions. First, they were asked whether they intended to vote in the
upcoming parliamentary election or not. In 1998 the question read as follows.
As you may know, elections for the Second Chamber will be held in May of
this year. Do you intend to vote or not, or don’t you know yet?
If they said they intended to vote, they were asked which party they intended to vote
for.
Which party do you intend to vote for on May 6?15
The answer to the second question is used in this research as a measure for voting
intention.16
Voters can be classified into four categories regarding their voting intentions:
(1) voters who intended to vote and knew for which party, (2) voters who intended to
vote, but did not know for which party, (3) voters who did not know whether they
would vote or not, and (4) voters who intended not to vote. Table 7.16 shows the dis-
tribution of the voters across the four categories. The figures indicate that when they
were interviewed in the weeks before the election, of all respondents between 63 and
79 per cent intended to vote and knew for which party.
We may expect that the strength of the party preference played a role, and that
voters with strong party preferences were more likely to know for whom to vote.
The figures in Table 7.17 show this was indeed the case. On the whole, voters with
strong party preferences were more likely to have formed a voting intention than
those with moderate party preferences, who in turn were more likely to have formed
Empirical Test of the Sincere Vote Model 123
TABLE 7.15  Strength of party preferences (%)
strength score 1986 1994 1998 2002
≥ 30 strong party preference 26 14 9 7
20 moderate party preference 22 18 17 14
10 weak party preference 32 39 39 43
0 multiple party preference 20 29 36 36
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1593) (1783) (2064) (1894)
mean score 18.3 13.5 10.8 9.2
Note: The strength score indicates the difference between the evaluation score awarded to the best-
liked party and the evaluation score awarded to the second-best liked party.
TABLE 7.16  Distribution of voting intention categories (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
intended to vote and knew for whom 79 63 68 76
intended to vote and did not know for whom 12 24 18 20
did not know whether to vote 4 8 7 2
intended to abstain 5 5 7 2
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1473) (1812) (2101) (1908)
Note: The 1986 data file contains 157 voters for whom the vote intention variable did not contain
valid data. These voters are not included in this table.
TABLE 7.17  Party preference strength and voting intention categories: percentage of voters
who knew for whom to vote
1986 1994 1998 2002
strong party preference 90 72 76 92
moderate party preference 85 75 79 84
weak party preference 75 65 73 78
multiple party preference 68 49 59 67
all voters 79 63 68 76
Reading example: In 1986 of all voters with a strong party preference 90 per cent intended to vote and
knew for whom when they were interviewed before the election.
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an intention than those with weak party preferences. Voters with a multiple party
preference were least likely to know for whom to vote when they were interviewed.
The findings show that the differences across the years found in Table 7.16 cannot be
attributed to differences in the strength of the party preferences, since the figures in
Table 7.17 also vary across the years.
The frequency distribution of voting intentions is shown in Table 7.18. In 1986 a
voting intention for the Labour Party occurred most often: 43 per cent of the voters
said they intended to vote for them. In 1994 the Labour Party, Christian Democrats,
and Liberal Party were each mentioned by about 22 per cent of the voters. In 1998 the
Labour Party was referred to most often again (28 per cent), whereas in 2002 voters
intended to vote most often for the Christian Democrats (26 per cent).
How voters actually voted, that is, their voting behaviour, was determined by
asking voters in the post-election interview. Literally, in 1998 they were asked:
Did you vote in the parliamentary election on May 6?
If voters indicated that they had voted, they were asked next:
Which party did you vote for?
These self-report measures are certainly not ideal, since voters may be mistaken in
reporting particular voting behaviour. However, because in the Netherlands there
are no records of actual voting behaviour, research has to rely on the voting behav-
iour as reported by voters themselves.17
TABLE 7.18  Distribution of voting intentions (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
Labour Party 43 23 28 18
Liberal Party 17 22 23 14
Christian Democrats 27 21 21 26
D66 5 17 7 5
GreenLeft 4 8 9 11
Socialist Party - 1 5 6
Orthodox Protestant 4 4 6 7
Centre Democrats 0 2 0 -
Elderly Alliance - 2 1 -
List Pim Fortuyn - - - 11
Liveable Netherlands - - - 1
others 0 0 1 1
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1166) (1134) (1416) (1444)
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In 1986 of all voters who participated in the post-election interview 93 per cent
reported having voted, whereas 7 per cent said they did not vote. In 1994 and 1998
fairly similar numbers said they had voted: 92 and 91 per cent, respectively. In 2002
remarkably many voters said they had voted, namely 97 per cent.18 Among those
who voted virtually all (99 per cent) reported a party that they said they had voted
for.19 The distribution of these votes across the parties is shown in Table 7.19.
One may be tempted to compare the figures of the voting intentions and voting
behaviour and conclude that both figures match each other fairly well, even though
some differences can be observed. For example, in 1986 the Labour Party was voted
for less often than voting intention figures would suggest, and the Christian Demo-
crats were voted for more often than those figures suggested. What is more impor-
tant, however, is how at the individual level voting intentions and voting behaviour
are related to each other, as well as how these concepts were related to party evalua-
tions and party preferences.20
TABLE 7.19  Distribution of voting behaviour (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
Labour Party 35 25 29 17
Liberal Party 17 22 22 14
Christian Democrats 32 20 18 28
D66 7 18 12 6
GreenLeft 4 6 9 10
Socialist Party - 1 4 8
Orthodox Protestant 3 3 5 6
Centre Democrats 0 1 0 -
Elderly Alliance - 4 0 -
List Pim Fortuyn - - - 11
Liveable Netherlands - - - 1
others 1 1 1 0
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1255) (1393) (1630) (1514)
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A TEST OF THE SINCERE VOTE MODEL
RELATIONSHIPS  BETWEEN  PARTY  PREFERENCES ,  VOTING  INTENTIONS ,  AND  VOTING
BEHAVIOUR
The sincere vote model makes predictions about two relationships: voters are ex-
pected to form a voting intention that favours the party that they evaluate most posi-
tively, and they are expected to vote according to their voting intention. Conse-
quently, voters are expected to vote for the party they evaluate most positively. The
model will now be tested. Because the explanatory power of the model differs be-
tween voters with single and multiple party preferences, these will be treated sepa-
rately.21
For voters with single party preferences, Table 7.20 indicates to what extent vot-
ers intended to vote for the party they evaluated most positively. In 1986 and 1994
about 92 per cent intended to vote for their party preference, and 8 per cent intended
to vote for another party. In 1998 and 2002 fewer voters intended to vote for the party
preference, namely 85 per cent. For voters with multiple party preferences the fig-
ures are fairly similar, although the differences across the years are less marked (Ta-
ble 7.21). In each election, about 90 per cent intended to vote for one of the parties
they evaluated most positively.
By combining the figures of voters with single and multiple party preferences,
it becomes clear to what extent voting intentions could be predicted accurately on
the basis of the model (Table 7.22). The voters for whom it could, are those who had a
single party preference and intended to vote for that party. In each election, this con-
cerned a majority of the voters. However, the size of this group of voters decreased
from 78 per cent in 1986 to 58 per cent in 2002. Most other voters also had a sincere
voting intention, but the model could not predict for whom they intended to vote
because they had a multiple party preference. The size of this group increased from
15 per cent in 1986 to 28 per cent in 2002. Only a small minority of voters intended to
vote for a party they did not like best. The size of this group increased from 7 per
cent in 1986 to 14 per cent in 2002. Nevertheless, the findings provide strong support
for the hypothesis that voters form voting intentions in accordance with their party
preferences.
According to the sincere vote model, voting intentions are transformed into cor-
responding voting behaviour. Table 7.23 shows to what extent voters with single
party preferences voted for the party they intended to vote for when they were inter-
viewed before the election.22 As expected, in each election a large majority (between
86 and 90 per cent) did. Only between 10 and 14 per cent of the voters ultimately
voted for another party. Voters with multiple party preferences were somewhat less
likely to stick to their voting intention, but large majorities voted as they intended as
well (Table 7.24). The differences between voters with single and multiple party pref-
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erences can be understood within the framework of the model. Voters with a single
party preference have only one option, whereas voters with a multiple party prefer-
ence have at least two equally good options. Whatever party these voters intend to
vote for, there is always another party that they can turn to while still voting sin-
cerely.23
How well voting behaviour could be predicted on the basis of the voting inten-
tions that voters had formed, becomes clear if the figures of voters with single and
multiple party preferences are combined (Table 7.25). In each election, about 85 per
cent of the voters cast their vote for the party they intended to vote for when inter-
TABLE 7.20  Relationship between party preferences and voting intentions – voters with single
party preferences (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
intended to vote for party preference 93 92 85 85
intended to vote for another party 7 8 15 15
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (941) (847) (976) (979)
TABLE 7.21  Relationship between party preferences and voting intentions – voters with multi-
ple party preferences (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
intended to vote for party preference 91 93 90 88
intended to vote for another party 9 7 10 12
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (186) (244) (420) (447)
TABLE 7.22  Percentage of voters with sincere and non-sincere voting intentions
1986 1994 1998 2002
sincere voting intention (single preference) 78 71 59 58
sincere voting intention (multiple preference) 15 21 27 28
non-sincere voting intention 7 8 13 14
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1127) (1091) (1396) (1426)
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viewed, while about 15 per cent ultimately voted for another party. The findings pro-
vide strong support for the hypothesis that on election day voters vote on the basis of
a previously formed voting intention.24
Some voters did not know yet for whom they would vote when they were inter-
viewed before the election. We may refer to them as undecided voters. For these vot-
ers the party preference–voting intention and voting intention–voting behaviour re-
lationship cannot be examined. On the basis of the sincere vote model another
expectation can be formulated for undecided voters. We may hypothesise that some
time between the moment of interview and the moment they stood in the polling
TABLE 7.23  Relationship between voting intentions and voting behaviour – voters with single
party preferences (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
voted as intended 90 86 89 87
voted for another party 10 14 11 13
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (766) (737) (843) (802)
TABLE 7.24  Relationship between voting intentions and voting behaviour – voters with multi-
ple party preferences (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
voted as intended 73 80 82 80
voted for another party 27 20 18 20
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (165) (202) (365) (365)
TABLE 7.25  Percentage of voters who voted as initially intended and who did not
1986 1994 1998 2002
voted as initially intended 87 85 87 85
voted for another party 13 15 13 15
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (931) (939) (1208) (1167)
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booth, these voters formed a voting intention on the basis of their party preferences
and ultimately voted accordingly. Hence, we expect that undecided voters voted in
line with their party preferences.
In each election, approximately 25 per cent of those who voted belonged to the
undecided voters category; they formed a voting intention only after the pre-election
interview.25 Table 7.26 and Table 7.27 show the relationship between party prefer-
ences and voting behaviour for these voters. Unsurprisingly, voters with a multiple
party preference were more likely to vote for a preferred party than voters with a
single party preference.26 More striking is the fact that the number of undecided vot-
TABLE 7.26  Relationship between party preferences and voting behaviour – undecided voters
with single party preferences (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
voted for party preference 79 59 49 41
voted for another party 21 41 52 59
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (197) (232) (200) (164)
TABLE 7.27  Relationship between party preferences and voting behaviour – undecided voters
with multiple party preferences (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
voted for party preference 87 84 73 66
voted for another party 13 16 27 34
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (87) (158) (187) (168)
TABLE 7.28  Percentage of undecided voters who voted sincerely and non-sincerely
1986 1994 1998 2002
voted sincerely (single preference) 55 35 25 20
voted sincerely (multiple preference) 27 34 35 33
voted non-sincerely 19 31 40 46
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (284) (390) (387) (332)
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ers who behaved as expected was rather low compared to the figures concerning ‘de-
cided voters’. Furthermore, across the years the number of voters who voted for a
preferred party decreased. Consequently, the number of undecided voters whose
voting behaviour could be predicted accurately on the basis of the sincere vote
model decreased from 55 per cent in 1986 to only 20 per cent in 2002 (Table 7.28). A
development in the opposite direction can be observed with respect to voters who
voted non-sincerely: among undecided voters the size of this group increased from
19 per cent in 1986 to 46 per cent in 2002. Hence, although most undecided voters
ultimately voted for a party they preferred when interviewed before the election,
TABLE 7.29  Relationship between party preferences and voting behaviour – voters with single
party preferences (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
voted party preference 85 79 74 72
voted for another party 15 21 26 28
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (950) (936) (1041) (969)
TABLE 7.30  Relationship between party preferences and voting behaviour – voters with multi-
ple party preferences (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
voted party preference 86 86 82 78
voted for another party 14 14 18 22
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (242) (346) (555) (536)
TABLE 7.31  Percentage of voters who voted sincerely and non-sincerely
1986 1994 1998 2002
voted sincerely (single preference) 68 58 48 46
voted sincerely (multiple preference) 17 24 29 28
voted non-sincerely 15 19 23 26
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1192) (1282) (1596) (1505)
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their majority has become rather narrow. Apparently, undecided voters met the ex-
pectations based on the sincere vote model less often than voters who formed their
voting intention longer in advance. So either undecided voters ultimately decided on
the basis of considerations other than how much they liked the competing parties, or
they changed their party evaluations relatively often (and then voted sincerely).
How strong is the support for the sincere vote model when it comes to explain-
ing voting behaviour directly on the basis of party preferences for the electorate as a
whole?27 Table 7.29 shows the relationship between party preferences and voting be-
haviour for all voters with a single party preference. In each election, a large majority
voted for the party they evaluated most positively. However, this number decreased
substantially. While in 1986 85 per cent voted for the party they preferred, in 2002
this figure had decreased to 72 per cent. Voters with multiple party preferences also
became less likely to vote for a preferred party, since the number who did decreased
from 86 to 78 per cent (Table 7.30). Voters with a multiple party preference were gen-
erally somewhat more likely to vote in line with their party preference than voters
with a single party preference.
By combining the figures of voters with single and multiple party preferences,
it becomes clear to what extent the electorate as a whole voted as expected, and to
what extent this could be accurately predicted on the basis of the sincere vote model.
While in 1986 the voting behaviour of 68 per cent of the voters could be accurately
predicted, this figure decreased to 46 per cent in 2002 (Table 7.31). The other voters
either voted sincerely but had a multiple party preference, due to which their choice
could not be predicted, or they voted non-sincerely. Most striking is the increase in
the number of voters who voted non-sincerely: from 15 per cent in 1986 to 26 per cent
in 2002. Hence, although overall the support for the sincere vote hypothesis is strong,
across the years the strength of it declined.
PATTERNS  OF  RELATIONSHIPS
Building on the previous analyses, voters can be classified regarding four character-
istics: (1) the type of party preference (single or multiple party preference) (2) the
relationship between party preference and voting intention (match or discrepancy),
(3) the relationship between voting intention and voting behaviour (match or dis-
crepancy), and (4) the relationship between party preference and voting behaviour
(match or discrepancy). By combining these characteristics in total 15 different ‘pat-
terns’ can be distinguished.28
Table 7.32 shows the patterns of combinations as well as the number of voters
who fit each pattern. In the table parties are represented by a letter. The letter A refers
to the party of the party preference. If a party preference consists of two (or more)
parties, one of these parties is indicated by the letter A, and the other(s) by A
2
. So ‘A’
indicates a single party preference, while ‘A A
2
’ indicates a multiple party preference.
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The letter in the voting intention column indicates whether or not the voting inten-
tion consisted of a party from the party preference. The letter A indicates that the
party preference also was the voting intention, whereas the letter B indicates that the
voting intention involved another party. If no letter is listed, then the voter did not
express a voting intention in the pre-election interview. In a similar way the letter in
the voting behaviour column indicates whether the party that was voted for matched
the party preference and whether it matched the voting intention. If letters are the
same across a row this indicates a match concerning the parties involved, whereas
different letters indicate a discrepancy.
The fifteen different patterns have been numbered in order to facilitate discus-
sion. The first pattern concerns voters who had a single party preference (A), who
TABLE 7.32  Patterns of party preference–voting intention–voting behaviour relationships (%)
party voting voting
preference intention behaviour
1986 1994 1998 2002
1. A A A 54.3 45.8 41.1 40.4
2. A A
2
A A 9.0 11.2 17.0 17.3
3. A - A 13.1 11.2 6.4 4.7
4. A A
2
- A 6.5 10.4 9.1 7.5
––– ––– ––– –––
subtotal 82.9 78.5 73.6 69.9
5. A B B 2.9 2.7 5.5 5.6
6. A A
2
B B 0.8 0.9 1.6 2.0
7. A A
2
A A
2
1.7 1.5 2.2 2.5
8. A A B 4.5 4.7 4.0 4.7
9. A A
2
A B 1.1 0.7 1.2 1.7
10. A B A 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.1
11. A A
2
B A 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3
12. A B C 0.5 0.4 0.9 1.1
13. A A
2
B C 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4
14. A - B 3.7 7.7 6.5 6.9
15. A A
2
- B 0.9 2.2 3.3 3.9
––– ––– ––– –––
subtotal 17.1 21.5 26.4 30.1
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (1192) (1282) (1596) (1505)
Reading example: In 1986 the pattern of the ‘party preference-voting intention-voting behaviour rela-
tionship’ was ‘A/A/A’ for 54.3 per cent of all 1192 voters. This means that they had a party prefer-ence
for one party (A), a voting intention for this same party (A), and they voted for this same party (A).
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had a voting intention for this party, and who also voted for this party. In 1986 this
pattern applied to 54 per cent of the voters; the number decreased to 40 per cent in
2002. The second pattern is similar to the first, except that these voters had a multiple
party preference (A A
2
) instead of a single party preference. The third and fourth pat-
tern concern voters who did not express a voting intention, and who voted for their
party preference. These are the four patterns that show no discrepancies. In 1986 this
applied to 83 per cent of the voters, in 1994 to 79 per cent, in 1998 to 74 per cent, and
in 2002 to 70 per cent.
Voters who fit patterns five to fifteen in some way violated the expectations.
Patterns five and six consist of voters whose voting intentions were not in line with
their party preferences. Pattern seven represents voters with a multiple party prefer-
ence who did not vote in line with their voting intention. Patterns eight and nine con-
cern voters who intended to vote for their party preference, but who voted for an-
other party than they initially intended. The next four patterns all concern voters
who had a discrepancy both between party preferences and voting intentions and
between voting intentions and voting behaviour. Finally, patterns fourteen and fif-
teen concern voters who did not express a voting intention and whose voting behav-
iour was not in line with their party preferences. In 1986 in total 17 per cent of the
voters fit one of the eleven patterns that involve some kind of discrepancy. In subse-
quent years this number increased to 30 per cent.
The decline of the number of voters who showed no discrepancy appears to
stem primarily from an increase in non-sincere voting, and not from less stable vot-
ing intentions. Two changes are particularly noteworthy. First, in 1994 undecided
voters had become more likely to vote for a party they did not evaluate most posi-
tively. The size of this group increased from 5 per cent in 1986 to 10 per cent in 1994
(patterns fourteen and fifteen combined).29 Second, in 1998 voters who decided ear-
lier had become more likely to intend to vote for a party they did not like best. The
number of voters with a non-sincere voting intention increased from 5 per cent in
1994 to 9 per cent in 1998 (patterns five and six, and ten to thirteen). Furthermore,
between 1998 and 2002 in virtually each category that involves a discrepancy the
number of voters increased slightly. Combined with the fairly stable number of vot-
ers who changed their voting intention, these developments accounted for the fact
that the number of voters who met the expectations decreased from 83 to 70 per cent.
The fact that large numbers of voters met the expectations based on the sincere
vote model, does not imply that the voting behaviour of the same number of voters
could be predicted accurately. For voters who evaluated two or more parties most
positively the model does not result in a unique prediction concerning their voting
intention and voting behaviour. According to the model, voters with a so-called mul-
tiple party preference will intend to vote for one of the parties of their party prefer-
ence, but the model does not indicate for which of them. Consequently, the number
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of voters for whom the model predicted voting behaviour accurately and completely
(patterns one and three), varied between 68 per cent in 1986 and 46 per cent in 2002.
THE  IMPACT  OF  PARTY  PREFERENCE  STRENGTH
The findings suggest that across the years voters became less likely to base their vot-
ing intentions solely on their evaluations of the competing parties. One possible ex-
planation for this development is that the strength of voters’ party preferences
changed. If party preferences become weaker, the chance that the influence of other
factors leads to an intention to vote for another party may be expected to increase.
Furthermore, if party preferences become weaker, the chance that voters change
their intention (to vote for those parties) may also be expected to increase.
In line with this argument, we may formulate three hypotheses. First, we may
hypothesise that voters with strong party preferences are less inclined to form non-
sincere voting intentions than voters with weak party preferences. Additionally, we
may hypothesise that voters with strong party preferences are more inclined to stick
to their intention than other voters. If both hypotheses are supported by empirical
evidence, we may further hypothesise that once the strength of party preferences is
taken into account, the number of voters with non-sincere voting intentions and the
number voters who voted differently than they initially intended was stable across
the years. This would mean that the changes in the number of voters who showed no
discrepancies between party preferences, voting intentions, and voting behaviour
could be attributed to changes in the strength of party preferences.
Additional analyses support the first two hypotheses. Voters with strong party
preferences were less likely to form non-sincere voting intentions than voters with
moderate party preferences, who in turn were less likely to form non-sincere voting
intentions than voters with weak party preferences (Table 7.33). Voters with multiple
party preferences took an intermediate position. Regarding the relationship between
voting intentions and voting behaviour, the findings show that voters with strong
party preferences were most likely to stick to their voting intention, followed in turn
by those with moderate, weak, and multiple party preferences (Table 7.34). So party
preference strength plays the hypothesised role.
The third hypothesis, however, is not supported by the findings. The figures in
Table 7.33 indicate that across all four categories non-sincere voting intentions be-
came somewhat more likely across the years. The fact that within the various catego-
ries the increase is not as large as among the electorate as a whole, indicates that the
development resulted in part from changes in the strength of party preferences. But
the fact that within each category the figures increase, indicates that the develop-
ment was also due to a weaker relationship between party preferences and voting
intentions as such. So the increase in the number of voters with a non-sincere voting
intention was not merely the result of changes in the strength of party preferences.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The analysis presented in this chapter has resulted in strong support for the sincere
vote model. Party preferences have been found to predict voting intentions, which in
turn were transformed into corresponding voting behaviour. Consequently, a large
majority of voters met the expectations derived from the sincere vote model. How-
ever, this proportion decreased from 83 per cent in 1986 to 70 per cent in 2002. Fur-
thermore, it must be noted that up to 26 per cent of the voters met the expectations,
but evaluated at least two parties equally positively. On the basis of the sincere vote
model we cannot explain why these voters preferred to vote for one of these parties
in particular.
TABLE 7.33  Party preference strength and non-sincere voting intentions (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
strong party preference 2 4 3 5
moderate party preference 5 4 11 7
weak party preference 14 12 19 20
multiple party preference 9 7 10 12
unweighted mean across categories 8 7 11 11
all voters (weighted mean) 7 8 13 14
Reading example: In 1986 of all voters with a strong party preference 2 per cent had a non-sincere vot-
ing intention. The mean across the four categories, unweighted for the number of voters fitting each
category, was 8 per cent. The weighted mean, which indicates the number of all voters who had a
non-sincere voting intention, equalled 7 per cent.
TABLE 7.34  Party preference strength and changes in voting intentions (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
strong party preference 7 7 5 6
moderate party preference 10 18 10 12
weak party preference 14 14 13 15
multiple party preference 27 20 18 20
unweighted mean across categories 15 15 12 13
all voters (weighted mean) 13 15 13 15
Reading example: In 1986 of all voters with a strong party preference 7 per cent had changed their in-
tention about for whom to vote. The mean across the four categories, unweighted for the number of
voters fitting each category, was 15 per cent. The weighted mean, which indicates the number of all
voters who changed their intention, equalled 13 per cent.
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The lack of fit results in part from the simple fact that voters sometimes change
their mind about for whom to vote. Discrepancies in the voting intention–voting be-
haviour relationship are found if a time difference distinguishes both. One might ar-
gue that this is more a methodological problem (resulting from the typical design of
election surveys with a pre-election interview held weeks before the actual election),
than a theoretical problem. However, the question remains why these voters
changed their voting intention. Furthermore, the analysis indicated that another fac-
tor was also important: various voters intended to voted for another party than the
one they liked best at that moment; across the years this applied to more voters,
which could only partly be accounted for by changes in the strength of party prefer-
ences.
If the correlations between party preferences and voting intentions and be-
tween voting intentions and voting behaviour were (almost) perfect, then this would
have implied that to explain voting behaviour we ‘only’ have to explain party evalu-
ations. The findings suggest that this is only part of the story, although an important
part. Explaining party evaluations is necessary, because they are strongly related to
voting intentions and thereby indirectly determine for whom people vote. Chapter 9
will therefore focus on this aspect. However, the findings indicate that at least three
other questions need to be answered. One question is how voters choose between the
parties of a multiple party preference. A second question is why certain voters prefer
to vote for another party than one they evaluate most positively. A third question is
why certain voters cast their vote differently than they initially intended.
To answer these questions additional analyses are needed. With respect to the
first two questions some will be presented in the next chapter. The third question is
in fact one concerning electoral change at the individual level: why do voters change
their mind about for whom to vote? The sincere vote model suggests that if voting
intentions change, either the party evaluations underlying those intentions have
changed, or the impact of additional phenomena has changed. Although this ques-
tion is important, in this research it will not be answered. The data upon which this
research is based are not suited well to analyse changes in voting intentions. The con-
cepts involved have not been measured at more than one point in time, which is nec-
essary to perform the required analyses.30 Therefore, phenomena that may explain
why some voters choose to support another party than the one they like best will
next be focused on. This is the major question that follows from the findings pre-
sented in this chapter. Additionally, voters with multiple party preferences will be
focused on.
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THE NON-SINCERE VOTE
The test of the sincere vote model has revealed that voters do not always meet the
expectations. For some voters a discrepancy was observed between party prefer-
ences and voting intentions. A second discrepancy concerned a difference between
voters’ voting intentions and their actual voting behaviour. This chapter focuses on
the first discrepancy: the central question is why voters prefer to vote for another
party than one they evaluate most positively. A second question that is focused on in
this chapter, is how voters choose between parties of multiple party preferences; the
sincere vote model does not indicate which party voters are expected to vote for, if
they evaluate more than one party most positively.
Analogous with the notions of a sincere and non-sincere vote, we may distin-
guish between a sincere and non-sincere voting intention. A sincere voting intention
can be defined as the intention to vote in a specific election for a party that is evalu-
ated most positively, whereas a non-sincere voting intention corresponds with the
intention to vote for a party that is not evaluated most positively. Although the sin-
cere vote model acknowledges that voting intentions may differ from party prefer-
ences, the model does not indicate on the basis of what factors such discrepancies
may occur. In this context the vote choice heuristics discussed in Chapter 5 may be
particularly useful. They show that party evaluations are not the only phenomenon
that voters may base their vote choice on. Voters may also decide on the basis of can-
didate evaluations, incumbent approval, prospect evaluations, voting habits, and
endorsements. Except for the endorsement heuristic, the heuristics discussed can be
analysed on the basis of measures available in the surveys upon which this research
is based.1 (For an analysis of the impact of another factor that may be deemed rel-
evant, party size, see Appendix E.)
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THE IMPACT OF ELECTION OUTCOME PREFERENCES
Voters may base their choice on election outcome preferences. This means that their
choice is based on so-called prospect evaluations. Prospects may take various forms,
but those that concern who forms the government are arguably the most important
ones; recall that the selection of government has been regarded as the sole function
of elections (Downs 1957; Key 1966).
In countries with coalition governments, like the Netherlands, it is not straight-
forward what kind of prospects voters can base their vote choice on. The election
result does not determine what government will be formed. Nevertheless, voters
may base their choice on their preferences regarding the partisan composition of the
future government. For example, voters may prefer the new government to consist
of a particular set of parties and may be of the opinion that in order to establishing it
they best vote for one particular party. Voters may also prefer the government to in-
clude at least one party in particular (perhaps ‘just’ their favourite party) and be in-
different about what other parties participate. Voters’ preferences regarding the fu-
ture government may also be negative: their desire may be that a particular party (or
set of parties) does not take part in the new government.
In the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) voters’ preferences regard-
ing the future government have been assessed by asking them in the pre-election in-
terview what government coalition they preferred to be formed after the election. In
1998 the question read as follows.
After the elections for the Second Chamber, a new cabinet must be formed. In
the Netherlands, a cabinet is mostly formed by different parties. According to
you which parties should be part of the next cabinet?
If voters mentioned only one party, they were additionally asked:
Are there perhaps parties which according to you should be part of this cabinet
as well?
In the other years the DPES included similar questions, but one difference has
to be mentioned. In 1986 and 1994 voters were only allowed to mention the four ma-
jor parties, which were listed on a card shown (Labour Party, Liberal Party, Christian
Democrats, and D66). Voters were asked to mention at least two of these parties. The
problem of this procedure is that if voters preferred a coalition that included one or
more of the minor parties, this was not noticed. Another problem of the question for-
mat is that voters were more or less forced to mention at least two parties. If voters’
government preferences were of the kind ‘any government that includes party X’,
the survey did not detect this. Neither were voters’ government preferences detected
if they were of the negative kind – ‘a government without party X’.
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Nevertheless, the answers to the questions may be used to examine whether
government preferences provide an explanation for discrepancies between party
preferences and voting intentions. If they do, a relationship exists between the kind
of coalition preference and the extent to which voting intentions are sincere or non-
sincere: voters who prefer a coalition that does not include their party preference
have a non-sincere voting intention more often. Furthermore, in that case voters with
TABLE 8.1  Percentage of voters who preferred specific coalitions
1986 1994 1998 2002
(centre-) left PvdA, D66 & GreenLeft - - 5 3
coalitions: PvdA & D66 19 18 2 1
PvdA & CDA 20 11 7 4
PvdA, CDA & GreenLeft - - 4 10
PvdA, CDA & D66 4 12 5 3
other (centre-) left coalitions - - 6 10
––– ––– ––– –––
subtotal 43 41 28 32
(centre-) right CDA & VVD 28 12 3 9
coalitions: CDA, VVD & LPF - - - 13
CDA, VVD & D66 4 5 1 3
VVD & D66 1 10 0 0
other (centre-) right coalitions - - 2 8
––– ––– ––– –––
subtotal 34 27 6 33
other PvdA, VVD & D66 2 10 22 3
coalitions: PvdA & VVD 5 5 4 2
PvdA, CDA & VVD 2 3 13 6
CDA & D66 3 6 0 0
other coalitions 1 2 16 21
––– ––– ––– –––
subtotal 12 25 56 32
only one party mentioned 1 0 3 0
don’t know 11 7 8 2
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1630) (1812) (2101) (1908)
Note: A coalition is listed as such if it was mentioned by at least 5 per cent in at least one year; voters
for whom data were not available are included in the don’t know category.
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non-sincere voting intentions intend to vote for parties that they want to participate
in the new government relatively often.2
Table 8.1 shows what combinations of parties voters mentioned when they
were asked what parties should be part of the next cabinet. The table lists these coali-
tions separately if they were mentioned by at least 5 per cent of the voters in at least
one of the years. The coalitions are grouped into three categories: (centre-) left coali-
tions, (centre-) right coalitions, and other coalitions.3 The table also indicates that the
number of voters who did not know what government coalition they preferred was
already low in 1986 (11 per cent) and decreased to a mere 2 per cent in 2002.4 Hence,
in each year a large majority of the voters could say what kind of coalition they pre-
ferred. The number of voters who provided the name of only one party was also low:
the proportion never exceeded 3 per cent (a logical consequence of the question for-
mat). Consequently, a large majority indicated that they preferred a particular coali-
tion of two or more parties to form the new cabinet.
In none of the years much agreement existed concerning what parties should be
part of the cabinet. Voters’ preferences were spread across the various categories, and
within each category across various combinations. In 1986 most voters preferred ei-
ther a (centre-) left coalition or a (centre-) right coalition. Three combinations of par-
ties were mentioned relatively often: Labour Party and Christian Democrats, Labour
Party and D66, and above all the two parties of the incumbent government: Christian
Democrats and Liberal Party (28 per cent). In 1994 the most frequently mentioned
combination was that of the Labour Party and D66 (18 per cent); additionally, five
other combinations of two or three parties were referred to by about 10 per cent each.
In 1998 one combination was clearly mentioned most often, namely that of the in-
cumbent government of that time: Labour Party, Liberal Party, and D66 (22 per cent).
TABLE 8.2  Percentage of voters who preferred specific parties in the coalition
1986 1994 1998 2002
Labour Party 53 60 82 53
Liberal Party 44 46 60 57
Christian Democrats 62 50 44 71
D66 34 62 46 24
GreenLeft - - 24 35
Socialist Party - - 5 8
Orthodox Protestant - - 3 5
Centre Democrats - - 0 -
Elderly Alliance - - 2 -
List Pim Fortuyn - - - 24
Liveable Netherlands - - - 4
(N) (1630) (1812) (2101) (1908)
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In this year remarkably few voters preferred a (centre-) right coalition. In 2002 there
was less agreement concerning the composition of the new cabinet. The coalition that
was preferred most often was that of the Christian Democrats, Liberal Party, and List
Pim Fortuyn, although only 13 per cent referred to this combination.
After the change in question format in 1998, many voters mentioned other com-
binations than those listed; in 2002 they mentioned more than 150 different combina-
tions. Because voters mentioned such a wide variety of combinations, one may re-
gard the presentation of coalition preferences as problematic. Another way to look at
coalition preferences, which overcomes that problem, is in terms of the frequency
that each party was mentioned. Table 8.2 provides these data. In 1986 the Christian
Democrats were preferred in government most often (62 per cent). The number of
voters who mentioned the three other major parties varied between 34 per cent (D66)
and 53 per cent (Labour Party). The most striking difference between 1986 and 1994
is that many more voters preferred a coalition that included D66: the number of vot-
ers who mentioned this party increased to 62 per cent. In 1998 the most striking fig-
ure is that of the Labour Party: 82 per cent of the voters preferred a coalition that
included this party. In 2002 the figure of the Labour Party was considerably lower (53
per cent). This time the Christian Democrats were preferred most often (71 per cent).
We may expect that voters’ coalition preferences are related to their party pref-
erences. Additionally, we may expect that especially those voters who preferred
small parties have included other parties than their party preference in their coali-
tion preference. After all, the chance of such parties to participate in a government
may be considered smaller than the chance of larger parties. Table 8.3 shows that this
TABLE 8.3  Percentage of voters who preferred their party preference in the coalition
party preference: 1986 1994 1998 2002
Labour Party 95 92 96 87
Liberal Party 92 92 93 92
Christian Democrats 96 91 82 95
D66 68 90 81 56
GreenLeft - - 60 72
Socialist Party - - 32 29
Orthodox Protestant - - 32 34
Centre Democrats - - 30 -
Elderly Alliance - - 10 -
List Pim Fortuyn - - - 74
Liveable Netherlands - - - 19
Notes: Party preferences include both single and multiple party preferences. The numbers of voters
upon whom the proportions are based include voters who did not express a coalition preference.
Reading example: In 1986 of all voters who preferred the Labour Party, 95 per cent preferred a coali-
tion that included this party.
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was indeed the case.5 Voters who preferred the Labour Party, Liberal Party, or Chris-
tian Democrats were very likely to mention this party when asked which parties
should form the new cabinet: across the years this proportion varied between 82 and
96 per cent. In 1994 and 1998 voters who preferred D66 showed similar figures, but
in 1986 and 2002 fewer included them in the coalition preference. Voters who pre-
ferred various small parties (Socialist Party, orthodox Protestant parties, Centre
Democrats, Elderly Alliance, and Liveable Netherlands) were fairly unlikely to men-
tion these parties when asked about their coalition preference: the proportion never
exceeded 35 per cent. Figures of GreenLeft (since 1998) and List Pim Fortuyn (in
2002) take an intermediate position: a majority of the voters who preferred these par-
ties included them in their coalition preference, but the proportion was not as large
as that for the Labour Party, Liberal Party, and Christian Democrats.
These findings imply that a majority of voters preferred the party (or parties) of
their party preference in the new coalition. Table 8.4, which shows the relationship
between party preferences and coalition preferences, supports this. Across the years
between 64 and 70 per cent of the voters mentioned their party preference when they
were asked which parties should form the new cabinet. Some voters held a multiple
party preference and mentioned at least one of these parties, but not all. The propor-
tion of voters to whom this applied increased from 10 per cent in 1986 tot 21 per cent
in 2002. Such an increase is not surprising, given the fact that in those years the pro-
portion of voters with a multiple party preference increased from 20 to 36 per cent. A
small minority of the voters (between 10 and 15 per cent) mentioned only parties that
did not belong to their party preference. In 1986 and 1994 this could be the result of
the question format. In 1998 and 2002, however, this methodological issue played no
role and similar proportions of voters preferred a coalition that did not include the
party they evaluated most positively.
The voters that are of particular interest here are those who included other par-
ties in their coalition preference than the ones they evaluated most positively. If coali-
tion preferences account for discrepancies between party preferences and voting in-
tentions, these voters are expected to show such discrepancies relatively often.
Table 8.5 shows the proportions of voters who had a non-sincere voting intention in
relation to the kind of coalition preference they had expressed.6 As expected, voters
who did not include their party preference in their coalition preference were rela-
tively likely to have a non-sincere voting intention: across the years this proportion
varied between 26 and 51 per cent. Voters who included their party preference in
their coalition preference, on the other hand, were less likely to have a non-sincere
voting intention. Consequently, across the years voters who preferred a coalition that
did not include their party preference were about six times as likely to have a non-
sincere voting intention as others. Hence, non-sincere voting intentions can be ex-
plained – at least partly – on the basis of voters’ coalition preferences.
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TABLE 8.4  Relationship between party preferences and coalition preferences (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
party preference preferred in coalition 70 64 64 65
party preference partly preferred in coalition 10 15 17 21
party preference not preferred in coalition 10 15 12 12
no coalition preference expressed 10 6 7 2
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1593) (1783) (2064) (1894)
Note: Comparisons across years should be made with care, because in 1998 the question format
changed (see discussion in text).
TABLE 8.5  Coalition preferences and the party preference–voting intention relationship
(percentage of non-sincere voting intentions)
coalition preference: 1986 1994 1998 2002
party preference preferred in coalition 4 5 8 9
party preference partly preferred in coalition 4 5 12 11
party preference not preferred in coalition 42 26 46 51
all voters 7 8 13 14
Note: The numbers of observations upon which the figures are based are as follows. In 1986: 924, 97,
104, and 1127; in 1994: 764, 131, 169, and 1091; in 1998: 978, 220, 163, and 1396; and in 2002: 983, 257,
171, and 1426.
Reading example: In 1986 of all voters who preferred the party (or parties) of their party preference to
participate in the new government coalition, 4 per cent had a non-sincere voting intention.
TABLE 8.6  Relationship between coalition preferences, party preferences, and voting inten-
tions (%)
voting intention in line with: 1986 1994 1998 2002
party preference and coalition preference 86 76 76 77
party preference only 7 16 10 9
coalition preference only 6 6 11 12
neither 1 2 2 2
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1127) (1091) (1396) (1426)
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The data have not shown whether voters with non-sincere voting intentions in-
deed intended to vote for parties that they wanted to participate in the new cabinet.
Table 8.6 therefore shows the relationship between coalition preferences, party pref-
erences, and voting intentions. The figures indicate to what extent in each year vot-
ing intentions were in line with both coalition preferences and party preferences,
with only one of these phenomena, or with neither. In each year most voters in-
tended to vote for a party they liked best and wanted to participate in the new coali-
tion as well (between 76 and 86 per cent). Voters with non-sincere voting intentions
mostly had a voting intention that was in line with their coalition preference. Voters
who intended to vote for a party that was included in their coalition preference
(third group) largely outnumbered voters who intended to vote for another party
(fourth group). The size of the group of voters that is of special interest here – those
who had a voting intention that was not in line with their party preference, but
which was in line with their coalition preference – varied across the years between 6
and 12 per cent. This suggests that for various voters coalition preferences may have
been the reason that they had a non-sincere voting intention.
The overall conclusion is that discrepancies between party preferences and vot-
ing intentions can be explained to a considerable extent on the basis of voters’ prefer-
ences regarding the partisan composition of the new government. Non-sincere vot-
ing intentions were much more likely among voters whose coalition preference did
not include their party preference. Moreover, voters with non-sincere voting inten-
tions often turned to parties they wanted to participate in the new government. What
has to be mentioned, however, is that voting intentions nevertheless cannot be ex-
plained well on the basis of coalition preferences, simply because virtually without
exception coalition preferences included more than one party. Hence, if voters wish
to vote for one of the parties they want to form a coalition, the question remains why
they prefer to vote for one of these parties in particular.
THE IMPACT OF INCUMBENT APPROVAL
Another heuristic voters may use to decide for whom to vote, is the incumbent ap-
proval heuristic. If voters are satisfied with incumbents, they may reward them with
a vote; if voters are dissatisfied, they may punish them by supporting the opposition.
Although in multi-party systems with coalition governments the use of this heuristic
is less straightforward, it may still be used.
If incumbent approval has a direct impact on vote choice, this may explain non-
sincere voting intentions. This would imply that at least some voters either preferred
a government party, but did not intend to vote for them because they were dissatis-
fied with the government, or they preferred an opposition party, but intended to vote
for a party of the government they were satisfied with. Whether this indeed hap-
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pened, can be examined on the basis of the following question that has been asked in
the DPES.
With the help of this card, could you indicate how satisfied you are in general
with what the government has done during the past four years?
Respondents were given a card that listed five possible answers: very satisfied, satis-
fied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, dissatisfied, and very dissatisfied.7
The various governments that voters were asked to evaluate in terms of satisfac-
tion are listed in Table 8.7. From 1982 until 1989 the Christian Democrats of Prime
Minister Ruud Lubbers formed a coalition with the Liberal Party. In 1989 Lubbers’
third government was installed, but this time the Christian Democrats formed a coa-
lition with the Labour Party. From 1994 until 2002 the two so-called ‘purple’ coali-
tions of the Labour Party, Liberal Party, and D66 were in office.
To what extent voters were satisfied with what these governments had done is
shown in Table 8.8. In each year, virtually all voters could say whether or not they
were satisfied: only 2 per cent said they did not know.8 Few voters said they were
very satisfied or very dissatisfied: in 1986 only 9 per cent of the voters said they were,
and in the other years even fewer did. Furthermore, the findings show that in each
year a large number of voters had no strong feelings: between 30 and 50 per cent said
TABLE 8.7  Parties that participated in government coalitions (1982–2002)
period government prime minister’s party second party third party
1982–1986 Lubbers-I Christian Democrats Liberal Party -
1986–1989 Lubbers-II Christian Democrats Liberal Party -
1989–1994 Lubbers-III Christian Democrats Labour Party -
1994–1998 Kok-I Labour Party Liberal Party D66
1998–2002 Kok-II Labour Party Liberal Party D66
TABLE 8.8  Percentage of voters who were satisfied or dissatisfied with the government
1986 1994 1998 2002
very satisfied 3 0 1 1
satisfied 37 18 43 33
neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied 30 49 41 43
dissatisfied 22 27 11 19
very dissatisfied 6 4 1 3
don’t know 2 2 2 1
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1630) (1812) (2101) (1908)
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they were neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied. The proportion that was satisfied and
the proportion that was dissatisfied also varied across the years. For the incumbent
government the figures were most positive in 1998: whereas 44 per cent said they
were satisfied, only 12 per cent said they were dissatisfied. In 1986 and 2002 satisfied
voters also outnumbered dissatisfied voters, but not as strongly as in 1998. The only
year in which dissatisfaction was more common than satisfaction, was 1994: whereas
18 per cent of the voters was satisfied, 31 per cent was dissatisfied.
Government satisfaction was closely related to party preferences. Table 8.9
shows how often various groups of voters preferred a government party.9 In each
year, voters who were satisfied with the government preferred a government party
considerably more often than voters who were dissatisfied. This pattern was clearest
in 1986: of the satisfied voters about 70 per cent preferred a government party, while
only 6 per cent of the dissatisfied voters did. In 1994 and 1998 the number of voters
who preferred a government party, even though they were dissatisfied with what the
TABLE 8.9  Relationship between government satisfaction and party preferences (I)
(percentage of voters who preferred a government party)
government satisfaction: 1986 1994 1998 2002
(very) satisfied 69 51 51 40
neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied 27 36 37 25
(very) dissatisfied 6 20 23 11
all voters 38 34 41 27
(N) (1593) (1783) (2064) (1894)
Note: Proportions do not include voters who preferred both a government and an opposition party.
Reading example: In 1986 of all voters who were satisfied with what the government had done 69 per
cent preferred a government party.
TABLE 8.10  Relationship between government satisfaction and party preferences (II)
(percentage of voters who preferred an opposition party)
government satisfaction: 1986 1994 1998 2002
(very) satisfied 21 31 24 35
neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied 59 45 39 53
(very) dissatisfied 90 62 56 76
all voters 52 48 35 52
(N) (1593) (1783) (2064) (1894)
Note: Proportions do not include voters who preferred both a government and an opposition party.
Reading example: In 1986 of all voters who were satisfied with what the government had done 21 per
cent preferred an opposition party.
The Non-Sincere Vote 147
government had done, was about 20 per cent; in 2002 the corresponding figure was
11 per cent.10
The reverse occurred also. Table 8.10 shows how many voters preferred opposi-
tion parties in relation to their satisfaction with the government. Some voters who
were satisfied nevertheless preferred an opposition party. Across the years this
amounted to between 20 and 35 per cent of the satisfied voters. As expected, a party
preference for an opposition party was especially likely among dissatisfied voters. In
1986 the proportion of dissatisfied voters who preferred an opposition party was as
high as 90 per cent. In the other years this varied between approximately 55 and 75
per cent.
How can these findings be related to explanations for non-sincere voting inten-
tions? There are two groups of voters for whom incumbent approval matched their
party preferences: voters who were satisfied with the government and preferred a
government party, and voters who were dissatisfied with the government and pre-
ferred an opposition party. For these voters incumbent approval provided no reason
to vote for another party than their party preference, quite the contrary. If voters
were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, incumbent approval could also not be the rea-
son. For two other groups of voters, however, the use of the incumbent approval
heuristic would result in a non-sincere voting intention. These are the voters who
were satisfied with the government, but nevertheless preferred an opposition party,
and voters who were dissatisfied with the government, but nevertheless preferred a
government party. If incumbent approval influences vote choice independently of
party preferences, these voters are expected to have non-sincere voting intentions
relatively often.
By combining voters’ government satisfaction (satisfied or dissatisfied) and
their party preference (government party or opposition party), four categories are
distinguished. In the analysis the two categories that involve a ‘match’ between gov-
ernment satisfaction and party preferences are combined, and so are the two catego-
ries that involve a ‘mismatch’ (Table 8.11).11 Voters who were neither satisfied nor
dissatisfied, as well as voters with a multiple party preference that included both a
government party and an opposition party, jointly form a fifth category that is la-
belled ‘other voters’. The findings support the idea that incumbent approval plays a
role. Among satisfied voters who preferred an opposition party and dissatisfied vot-
ers who preferred a government party, the proportion of non-sincere voting inten-
tions was remarkably large; it varied between 14 and 23 per cent. These voters were
about twice as likely to have a non-sincere voting intention as others. However, these
voters were still much more likely to vote in line with the party preference heuristic
than in line with the incumbent approval heuristic: the proportions of non-sincere
voting intentions are all far below 50 per cent.
The final matter to be discussed is the relationship between government satis-
faction, party preferences, and voting intentions. Table 8.12 shows to what extent
148 THE  SINCERE  VOTE
voting intentions were in line with government satisfaction and party preferences. A
first observation is that since 1994 only a minority of the voters had a voting inten-
tion that was in line with both the party preference and government satisfaction.
This is largely due to the fact that many voters were neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied
with what the government had done. They had no reason to reward the government,
but none to punish them either. Hence, these voters just could not decide on the basis
of the incumbent approval heuristic. The category that is of special interest, is that of
voters whose voting intention was in line with government satisfaction only. Across
TABLE 8.11  Government satisfaction and the party preference–voting intention relationship
(percentage of non-sincere voting intentions)
government party
sat-isfaction: preference:
1986 1994 1998 2002
(1) satisfied government party
4 7 12 14
(2) dissatisfied opposition party
(3) satisfied opposition party
19 14 23 20
(4) dissatisfied government party20
(5) other voters 9 7 12 13
all voters 7 8 13 14
Note: The numbers of observations upon which the figures are based are as follows. In 1986: 656, 108,
363 and 1127; in 1994: 347, 131, 613 and 1091; in 1998: 471, 197, 728 and 1396; and in 2002: 475, 203,
748 and 1426.
Reading example: In 1986 of all voters who were satisfied about what the government had done and
who preferred a government party, or who were dissatisfied and preferred an opposition party, 4 per
cent had a non-sincere voting intention.
TABLE 8.12  Relationship between government satisfaction, party preferences, and voting in-
tentions (%)
voting intention in line with: 1986 1994 1998 2002
party preference and government satisfaction 59 33 36 35
party preference only 33 59 51 51
government satisfaction only 4 3 5 5
neither 4 5 8 9
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1127) (1091) (1396) (1426)
Note: Voters who were neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied are included in the second and fourth cate-
gory.
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the years between 3 and 5 per cent of the voters fit this category. This means that for a
minority of the voters who had a non-sincere voting intention, expressing their ap-
proval (or disapproval) of what the incumbent government had done may have been
the underlying reason. This does not mean that the voting intention of these voters
can be explained fully on the basis of their satisfaction with the government. The
question why they prefer to vote for a particular government or opposition party still
remains to be answered.
THE IMPACT OF CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS
In the Netherlands the candidates that are of paramount importance are those who
head the lists: the party leaders. Party leader evaluations may influence voting inten-
tions directly as well as indirectly. The latter possibility, namely an effect of party
leader evaluations on voting intentions through an impact on party evaluations, will
be examined in Chapter 9. What is of interest here, is whether party leader evalua-
tions affect voting intentions directly. If they do, party leader evaluations may have
both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ effects. On the negative side, voters may be repelled
from their party preference by a negative evaluation of that party’s leader. On the
positive side, voters may be attracted towards another party than their party prefer-
ence by a positive evaluation of that other party’s leader. Voters may even base their
choice solely on their feelings towards the party leaders and ignore their party pref-
erence. In that case they would make use of the candidate preference heuristic.
Feelings towards party leaders may have an impact in the Netherlands. G. A.
Irwin (1983), for example, showed that in the 1981 election if voters were closest to a
party in terms of left-right but evaluated the leader of another party most positively
(in terms of trust in the politician as a future prime minister), they were likely to vote
for the party of this politician. Hans Anker (1992, ch. 5) showed that in the 1986 and
1989 elections voters voted more often for parties if they liked their leaders better
and less often if they liked them worse, and that they did so in proportions that were
beyond those that were expected on the basis of long-term influences on the vote.
Pieter van Wijnen (2000) found that vote choice could be predicted substantially bet-
ter when party leader evaluations were included in a model, even if factors such as
left-right ideology, issue positions, government satisfaction, social class, and religios-
ity had already been taken into account. Based on such findings, the question arises
whether voters’ feelings towards party leaders may account for discrepancies in the
party preference–voting intention relationship.
In the DPES respondents were asked to award various party leaders a score be-
tween 0 and 100. The higher the score, the more positive their feeling towards that
person. In 1998 the question, which was asked immediately after respondents had
evaluated the various parties, read as follows.
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I would also like to know how sympathetic you find the following politicians.
If you don’t know a politician, please feel free to say so.
First Wim Kok. Which score would you give him?
Table 8.13 lists the party leaders that voters were asked to evaluate in the vari-
ous years. Each study included the leaders of the Labour Party (Joop den Uyl, Wim
Kok, and Ad Melkert), Liberal Party (Ed Nijpels, Frits Bolkestein, and Hans Dijkstal),
Christian Democrats (Ruud Lubbers, Elco Brinkman, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, and Jan
Peter Balkenende) and D66 (Hans van Mierlo, Els Borst, and Thom de Graaf). Since
1994 leaders of the other parties have been included also, except that in 1998 only one
of the orthodox Protestant leaders was included.
Previous research has shown that most Dutch voters knew the leaders of the
major parties, while they were somewhat less familiar with leaders of smaller parties
(Irwin 1983: 186-188; Irwin 1998: 142-144; see also Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1999: 138-
140). Similar findings are obtained here (see Appendix F for details). In general the
leaders of the Labour Party, Liberal Party, and Christian Democrats were well-
known. Most of the years fewer than 5 per cent of the voters did not know them. The
only two exceptions are that 11 per cent of the voters did not know Frits Bolkestein of
the Liberal Party in 1994, and 21 per cent did not know Jaap de Hoop Scheffer of the
Christian Democrats in 1998. The leaders of D66, Hans Janmaat of the Centre Demo-
crats, as well as Pim Fortuyn were also well-known. Until 2002 the leaders of
GreenLeft were not that well-known. In 1986 27 per cent did not know Ina Brouwer
and 48 per cent did not know Mohammed Rabbae, while four years later 20 per cent
was not familiar with Paul Rosenmöller. However, in 2002 virtually all voters knew
him. Jan Marijnissen, too, was better known in 2002 than in 1998 (11 versus 43 per
cent did not know him). In 2002 Fred Teeven from Liveable Netherlands was un-
known to 33 per cent. Finally, in each election a majority of the voters did not know
the leaders of the orthodox Protestant parties (between 52 and 89 per cent).12
What evaluation scores voters awarded the various party leaders is not dis-
cussed here (details are provided in Appendix F). Suffice it to say that across the par-
ties, as well as across the years, considerable differences existed.
Party leader evaluations were strongly correlated to party evaluations (Ta-
ble 8.14). Voters who evaluated a certain party more positively than other voters,
evaluated the party’s leader more positively as well. The strength of the correlations,
however, varied. The two strongest relationships were those between voters’ evalua-
tions of Pim Fortuyn and his List Pim Fortuyn (r = 0.87) and between the evaluations
of Joop den Uyl and the Labour Party (r = 0.80). The weakest relationships were those
between the evaluations of Hans Dijkstal and the Liberal Party (r = 0.48) and between
the evaluations of Els Borst and D66 (r = 0.52). However, even in these cases a fairly
strong relationship existed between voters’ feelings towards the party leaders and
voters’ feelings towards their parties.
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Correlations between party leader evaluations and party evaluations were not
perfect. This implies that party leader evaluations might have influenced voting in-
tentions in addition to party evaluations. First, if voters did not like the leader of
their favourite party, they might have intended to vote for another party. Table 8.15
TABLE 8.13  Names and parties of the leaders who were evaluated
1986 1994 1998 2002
PvdA Den Uyl Kok Kok Melkert
VVD Nijpels Bolkestein Bolkestein Dijkstal
CDA Lubbers Brinkman De Hoop Scheffer Balkenende
D66 Van Mierlo Van Mierlo Borst De Graaf
GL - Brouwer/Rabbae Rosenmöller Rosenmöller
SP - - Marijnissen Marijnissen
SGP - Van der Vlies - Van der Vlies
GPV - Schutte Schutte -
RPF - Van Dijke - -
CU - - - Veling
CD - Janmaat Janmaat -
LPF - - - Fortuyn
LN - - - Teeven
TABLE 8.14  Relationship between party leader evaluations and party evaluations
(Pearson’s correlation coefficient)
1986 1994 1998 2002
Labour Party 0.80 0.68 0.63 0.64
Liberal Party 0.72 0.68 0.72 0.48
Christian Democrats 0.72 0.69 0.65 0.69
D66 0.64 0.70 0.52 0.72
GreenLeft - 0.67 0.68 0.74
Socialist Party - - 0.72 0.74
SGP - 0.65 - 0.75
GPV - 0.75 0.72 -
RPF - 0.77 - -
ChristianUnion - - - 0.71
Centre Democrats - 0.77 0.73 -
List Pim Fortuyn - - - 0.87
Liveable Netherlands - - - 0.67
Reading example: In 1986 the correlation between voters’ evaluations of the Labour Party and their
evaluations of the leader of the Labour Party (Den Uyl, see Table 8.13) was 0.80.
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TABLE 8.15  Evaluation scores awarded to leaders of preferred parties (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
100 15 7 10 8
90 19 15 19 20
80 23 23 26 30
70 13 21 18 21
60 9 12 9 10
50 7 9 6 5
0-40 4 10 4 5
leader not evaluated 10 4 10 2
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1593) (1783) (2064) (1894)
mean score 77 70 76 76
Note: For voters with multiple party preferences evaluation scores are those awarded to the best-
liked leader of the preferred parties.
FIGURE 8.1  Evaluation of the leader of the preferred party and the chance of a non-sincere
voting intention
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therefore shows what evaluation scores voters awarded to the leader of the party
they preferred (if voters had a multiple party preference, the evaluation score
awarded to the party leader they liked best is taken).13 Obviously, voters could only
evaluate party leaders if they had been included in the survey and if voters knew
them. Both conditions were not always met; across the years between 2 and 10 per
cent of the voters did not evaluate the leader of their party preference.14 The table
furthermore shows that considerable differences existed across voters. Some liked
the leaders of their party preference very well, since they awarded them scores as
high as 90 or even 100 (between 22 and 34 per cent). Other voters, however, did not
seem to like the leaders of their favourite party much and awarded them scores of 60
or lower (between 19 and 31 per cent).
To determine to what extent evaluations of the leader of the preferred party had
an impact on discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions, logistic
regression analyses have been performed. The dependent variable is a so-called
dummy variable that indicates whether or not voters had a non-sincere voting inten-
tion, while the evaluation score awarded to the leader of the preferred party is the
independent variable. The results are presented in Figure 8.1.15 The figure shows for
each year the chance of a non-sincere voting intention in relation to the evaluation of
the leader of the party that voters preferred.16 Three observations are important.
First, in each election the chance of a non-sincere voting intention decreased as vot-
ers liked the leader of their party preference better. So party leader evaluations had
the hypothesised effect. Second, the effect was fairly similar across the years; the
slopes of the four curves are similar.17 Third, at each evaluation score the chance of a
non-sincere voting intention was lowest in 1986, somewhat higher in 1994, again
higher in 1998, and highest in 2002.
Discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions can also result if
voters feel attracted to leaders of parties they do not prefer. Therefore, the impact of
evaluations of the other party leaders is also analysed. Table 8.16 shows what evalua-
tion scores voters awarded to the leaders of the parties they did not prefer. Some vot-
ers liked at least one of the leaders of the non-preferred parties much, since they
awarded them scores of 90 or 100 (between 10 and 15 per cent did so). Another 20 to
30 per cent of the voters awarded one or more leaders of non-preferred parties a
score of 80, while still another 20 to 30 per cent awarded a score of 70. The remaining
voters did not like any of the other party leaders much (between 25 and 50 per cent).
To what extent evaluations of leaders of non-preferred parties had an impact on
non-sincere voting intentions is shown on the basis of logistic regression analyses in
Figure 8.2.18 In each year party leader evaluations had the expected effect: if the
evaluation of the leader of non-preferred parties increased, so did the chance of a
non-sincere voting intention. Besides this, two observations are relevant. First, the
slope of the four curves clearly differs. The slope of the 1986 curve is not very steep,
which indicates that evaluations of leaders of non-preferred parties did not have
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TABLE 8.16  Evaluation scores awarded to leaders of non-preferred parties (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
100 3 2 4 2
90 11 8 11 11
80 19 22 27 31
70 18 27 27 29
60 20 18 14 15
50 15 11 9 6
0-40 13 11 7 4
none of the leaders evaluated 2 1 2 0
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1593) (1783) (2064) (1894)
mean score 64 65 70 72
Note: Evaluation scores are those awarded to the best-liked leader of the non-preferred parties.
FIGURE 8.2  Evaluation of the best-liked leader of non preferred parties and the chance of a
non-sincere voting intention
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much impact. The slope of the 1994 and 1998 curves are considerably steeper,
and the slope of the 2002 curve was still steeper, which suggests that this year voters’
feelings towards the leaders of non-preferred parties had the largest impact. Second,
the slopes in Figure 8.2 are steeper than those in Figure 8.1. This indicates that evalu-
ations of the leaders of non-preferred parties had a stronger impact than evaluations
of the leader of the preferred party. Apparently, the effect of being attracted to a
party whose leader voters liked was stronger than the effect of being repelled from a
party whose leader voters did not like.
So far, evaluations of leaders of preferred parties and evaluations of leaders of
non-preferred parties have been focused on in isolation. We may expect, however,
that what matters predominantly is how these evaluations relate to each other. If vot-
ers like the leader of their party preference better than any other leader, they may be
expected to prefer to vote for their party preference (and consequently have a sincere
voting intention). If voters like the leader of another party better, this may lead to a
non-sincere voting intention. What matters is the difference between the evaluation
score awarded to the leader of the preferred party and the highest score awarded to
the leaders of the non-preferred parties.
Table 8.17 shows the differences between the evaluation scores awarded to
leaders of preferred and non-preferred parties. The figures in the top four rows com-
bined indicate how many voters liked the leader of the party they preferred better
than the leaders of any other party. In 1986 a majority of the voters evaluated the
leader of the preferred party most positively: for 64 per cent of the voters the differ-
ence between both scores was positive. In the other years this applied to about 50 per
cent. In each year, some voters evaluated at least one leader of the non-preferred par-
ties exactly as positively as the leader of their favourite party (between 17 and 29 per
cent). Finally, between 20 and 27 per cent of the voters liked at least one other party
leader better than the leader of the party they preferred. These voters in particular
may be expected to have had a non-sincere voting intention relatively often, espe-
cially if the difference between the evaluation scores was large.
The results of logistic regression analyses based on these difference-scores are
shown in Figure 8.3.19 A number of observations can be made. First, the curves show
the expected pattern. The more voters liked the leader of the preferred party, com-
pared to the leaders of other parties, the smaller the chance that they intended to
vote for another party. For example, if voters liked the leader of their party prefer-
ence considerably better than any other party leader (difference of 30 points on the
101-point evaluation scale), in 2002 the chance of a non-sincere voting intention was
only 7 per cent. If voters liked at least one of the other party leaders equally well, the
chance of a non-sincere voting intention was 15 per cent. And if voters liked another
leader even better – say, awarded another leader a score of 20 points more –, then the
chance of a non-sincere voting intention increased to 25 per cent. Note that even if
voters liked another party leader considerably better, they were still more likely to
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TABLE 8.17  Differences in evaluations of leaders of preferred and non-preferred parties (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
40 and above 19 7 7 3
30 12 6 6 5
20 15 14 15 13
10 18 22 26 28
0 17 23 25 29
- 10 9 14 11 12
- 20 5 7 5 5
- 30 and below 6 6 5 5
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1413) (1698) (1847) (1847)
mean score 14 6 7 4
Note: Positive values mean that the leader of the preferred party was evaluated more positively than
all leaders of non-preferred parties; a score of zero means that at least one leader of non-preferred
parties was evaluated similarly; negative scores indicate that at least one leader of non-preferred
parties was evaluated more positively than the leader of the preferred party.
FIGURE 8.3  Difference between evaluations of the leaders of preferred and non-preferred par-
ties and the chance of a non-sincere voting intention
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vote for their party preference (the chance of a non-sincere voting intention remains
below 50 per cent). This shows that party leader evaluations were considerably less
important than party evaluations.
The slopes of the curves are about equally steep in all years, except 1986. Hence,
if party leader evaluations are not focused on in isolation, but in terms of the party
leader preferences they constitute, their impact appears to be fairly equal across the
years. Note that the deviating result in 1986 may be a methodological artefact, result-
ing from fact that the survey only included the leaders of the four major parties. So
the analyses provide no convincing evidence for the hypothesis that the impact of
party leader preferences increased in the most recent elections.20
A final matter to be examined is to what extent voters with non-sincere voting
intentions intended to vote for the party of the leader they preferred. Table 8.18
shows the relationship between party leader preferences, party preferences, and vot-
ing intentions.21 The third and fourth row are particularly relevant: those figures in-
dicate that only a minority of the non-sincere voting intentions were in line with
party leader preferences. Across the years between 3 and 6 per cent of the voters be-
longed to the category that is of special interest here. Their voting intention was not
in line with the party preference, but it was in line with the party leader preference.
Hence, approximately 5 per cent of the voters show the pattern that is expected if
they prefer to vote for another party than their party preference because of their
party leader preference.
THE IMPACT OF VOTING HABITS
Some people habitually vote for the same party in each election. The question is
whether voting habits may account for discrepancies in the party preference–voting
intention relationship. This would be the case, if voters who habitually vote for a par-
TABLE 8.18  Relationship between party leader preferences, party preferences, and voting in-
tentions (%)
voting intention in line with: 1986 1994 1998 2002
party preference and party leader preference 67 63 58 63
party preference only 25 29 29 22
leader preference only 4 3 5 6
neither 4 5 9 9
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1131) (1095) (1403) (1430)
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ticular party evaluate another party more positively, but nevertheless stick to their
old choice when it comes to casting their vote.
The DPES has included a number of questions that may be used to explore the
impact of voting habits. For example, in the post-election interview voters who re-
ported a vote were asked whether they had always voted for that party or whether
before they had voted for another party. The disadvantage of this question is that
voters who had always voted for the same party can only be identified if in this elec-
tion they again voted for that party. Voters who always voted for the same party but
voted for another party in this election, cannot be identified. That is problematic, be-
cause we are interested in whether a party preference for another party ends a voting
habit or not; that cannot be examined if voters who ended a voting habit cannot be
identified. Therefore, in this research another pair of questions is made use of. In the
interviews (the post-election interview in 1986, the pre-election interview in later
years), voters were asked about their voting behaviour at the previous parliamentary
election. In 1998 the corresponding questions read as follows.
The previous elections for the Second Chamber were held in 1994. Did you
vote in these elections, or not?
For which party did you vote then?
This question has one major disadvantage. It is a well-known fact – in psychol-
ogy in general, as well as in electoral research – that voters’ memories can be flawed.
Voters are frequently mistaken when it comes to how they voted in a previous elec-
tion. Moreover, these mistakes are biased in a particular way: voters tend to think
that they voted for the same party as the one they currently prefer (to vote for). Due
to such false recall, effects of habits or previous voting may be overestimated in
analyses based on these questions. The results should therefore be interpreted with
care. Furthermore, previous voting behaviour is certainly not the same as a voting
habit. However, if voters stuck to a voting habit even though they liked another
party somewhat better, we expect to see a particular relationship with respect to pre-
vious voting. More specifically, we expect that voting intentions were in line with
previous vote choices beyond the level expected on the basis of party preferences. A
second reason to focus on this pair of questions is that voters may base their vote
choice in part on their previous vote. Even if voters do not have the habit of always
voting for the same party, they may have a kind of standing vote decision. If voters
are faced with an election, they may recall for whom they voted last time and stick to
that choice unless they feel there is a specific reason not to. This mechanism is similar
to that of the voting habit heuristic, except that a habit implies a more automatic
process (or absence of elaboration).
Table 8.19 shows what proportions of voters responded with an answer con-
cerning their vote in the previous parliamentary election. In each election, a large
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TABLE 8.19  Percentage of voters who recalled their previous vote choice
1986 1994 1998 2002
previous vote choice recalled 70 79 78 85
did not vote in previous election 10 17 19 8
previous vote choice not recalled 19 4 3 7
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1630) (1812) (2101) (1908)
Notes: The vote choice concerns the previous parliamentary election. The third category includes vot-
ers for whom the measure was not available (see discussion in text)
TABLE 8.20  Relationship between previous vote choice and party preferences (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
previous vote included in party preference 57 60 55 57
previous vote not included in party preference 14 19 24 28
did not vote in previous parliamentary election 29 20 21 14
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1593) (1783) (2064) (1894)
Note: The third category includes voters for whom the previous vote choice measure was not avail-
able.
majority said they had voted and provided the name of a party. Other voters said
they did not vote in the previous election; sometimes they were not yet entitled to
vote. Finally, a minority of voters said they did not know whether they had voted, or
did not know for whom they had voted (usually about 5 per cent). Because in 1986
the question was still part of the post-election interview (in which some voters did
not participate), in that year previous vote choice measures were available for fewer
voters.
Voters’ previous vote choice was related fairly strongly to their party prefer-
ences (Table 8.20). In each election, between 55 and 60 per cent of the voters preferred
the party that they said they had voted for in the previous parliamentary election.22
These figures suggest a stable relationship between previous vote choice and party
preferences. However, the figures are influenced by differences in the proportions
that said they did not vote in the previous election and those for whom data were not
available. If we focus on the proportion of voters who preferred another party than
the one they voted for in the previous parliamentary election, a clear increase can be
observed: from 14 per cent in 1986 to 28 per cent in 2002.23 In other words, across the
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years an increasing number of voters had a party preference that deviated from their
previous vote choice.
If previous vote choice influences voting intentions independently from party
evaluations, a relationship should be present between previous vote choice and the
frequency that non-sincere voting intentions occurred. Voters who preferred another
party than their previous vote choice should have a non-sincere voting intention
more often; voters who preferred the party of their previous vote choice are expected
to seldom have a non-sincere voting intention. Table 8.21 shows that this was the
case. Of the voters who included the party of their previous vote in the party prefer-
ence, very few had a non-sincere voting intention (between 1 and 5 per cent),
whereas voters who preferred another party relatively often had a non-sincere voting
intention (between 31 and 43 per cent). Voters who did not vote in the previous elec-
TABLE 8.21  Previous vote choice and the party preference–voting intention relationship
(percentage of non-sincere voting intentions)
1986 1994 1998 2002
previous vote included in party preference 1 2 3 5
previous vote not included in party preference 40 31 43 36
did not vote in previous parliamentary election 8 11 13 16
all voters 7 8 13 14
Notes: The third category includes voters for whom previous the vote choice measure was not avail-
able. The numbers of observations upon which the figures are based are as follows. In 1986: 733, 123,
271, and 1127; in 1994: 787, 173, 131, and 1091; in 1998: 912, 328, 156, and 1396; and in 2002: 897, 384,
145, and 1426.
Reading example: In 1986 of all voters who included the party of their previous vote in their current
party preference, 1 per cent had a non-sincere voting intention.
TABLE 8.22  Relationship between previous vote choice, party preferences, and voting inten-
tions (%)
voting intention in line with: 1986 1994 1998 2002
party preference and previous vote choice 62 68 60 54
party preference only 30 24 27 31
previous vote choice only 3 4 8 7
neither 4 4 6 8
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1127) (1091) (1396) (1426)
Note: Voters who previously did not vote are included in the second and fourth category.
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tion (and those for whom no measures were available) took an intermediate position,
which did not deviate much from the overall figures.
These findings suggest that when voters decide for whom to vote, their choice
is based in part on how they voted previously. However, the impact of voting habits
may have been overestimated due to false recall. In the analysis above this is prob-
lematic, because it means that the causal direction is not from previous vote choice to
current party preferences or voting intentions, but the other way round: voters cur-
rent party preferences and voting intentions influences the recall of their previous
vote choice. What remains relevant, however, is that the findings are consistent with
what is expected if voting habits and previous vote choice play the hypothesised
role.
How previous vote choice, party preferences, and voting intentions were re-
lated is shown in Table 8.22. A majority of the voters had a voting intention that was
in line with both their party preference and their previous vote choice. Other voters
intended to vote for their party preference, which was another party than the one
they previously voted for. What is most relevant here, is that some voters with a non-
sincere voting intention intended to vote for the same party as they had voted for in
the previous election (between 3 and 8 per cent show this pattern). This means that
voters who stuck to their voting habit, even though they liked another party better,
may account for some of the non-sincere voting intentions.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES
Non-sincere voting intentions of many voters can be understood on the basis of other
heuristics than the party preference heuristic. If voters intended to vote for a party
they did not evaluate most positively, often they preferred this party to participate in
the future coalition, were satisfied about the performance of the government in
which that party participated, liked the leader of the party best, or had already voted
for the party in the previous election. What remains to be examined, is to what extent
specific non-sincere voting intentions can be understood on the basis of only one
heuristic or more heuristics. If for some voters an explanation can only be given on
the basis of one particular heuristic, this would underline the importance of that heu-
ristic. Furthermore, the question arises how well non-sincere voting intentions can be
explained if the various concepts are combined in one model, and how much each
heuristic then contributes. It is also worth examining whether the strength of party
preferences then still plays the hypothesised role.
To what extent non-sincere voting intentions can be explained on the basis of
different heuristics, is shown in Table 8.23. The figures of the four years are com-
bined, because the number of observations in each year was fairly limited. A number
of conclusions can be drawn. First, in 20 per cent of the cases one particular heuristic
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TABLE 8.23  Which concepts non-sincere voting intentions were in line with (%)
coalition incumbent leader previous
1986 1994 1998 2002
all
preference approval preference vote years
+ + + + 15 8 9 4 8
+ + + - 9 9 4 9 7
+ + - + 11 6 17 11 12
+ - + + 12 11 11 11 11
- + + + - - - 1 0
+ + - - 12 1 8 9 8
+ - + - 13 10 7 12 10
+ - - + 5 18 15 16 14
- + + - - 1 - 1 1
- + - + - 1 3 1 2
- - + + - - 1 0 0
+ - - - 9 15 12 14 13
- + - - 4 11 1 2 3
- - + - 1 - 1 2 1
- - - + 4 - 4 2 3
- - - - 6 7 9 4 6
––– ––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100 100
(N) (82) (87) (186) (204) (559)
Reading example: In 1986 of all non-sincere voting intentions 15 per cent was in line with voters’ coa-
lition preference, incumbent approval, party leader preference, and previous vote; 9 per cent of the
non-sincere voting intentions was in line with voters’ coalition preference, incumbent approval, and
leader preference, but not with their previous vote.
could be singled out as the only explanation, which more often than not involved the
coalition preference. About 75 per cent of the non-sincere voting intentions could be
understood on the basis of at least two heuristics. In other words, in most instances
more than one heuristic could have done the trick, and it remains unclear what ex-
actly made those voters prefer to vote for a particular party. Only 6 per cent of the
non-sincere voting intentions could not be understood on the basis of any heuristic.
Combined with the fact that across the years on average only about 11 per cent of the
voters had a non-sincere voting intention, this means that the proportion of the vot-
ers whose voting intention could not be understood at all was only 1 per cent.24
The relative importance of each heuristic, as well as the degree to which they
collectively explain non-sincere voting intentions, has been examined further by per-
forming logistic regression analyses. In these analyses the dependent variable indi-
cates whether voters had a sincere or non-sincere voting intention, while the inde-
pendent variables indicate whether or not voters included the party preference in
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their coalition preference, whether their government satisfaction and party prefer-
ence showed a ‘match’ or a ‘mismatch’, how much they evaluated leaders of the pre-
ferred party better or worse than leaders of non-preferred parties, and whether in the
previous parliamentary election they voted for the preferred party or for another
party. Additionally, two control variables are included. The first (evaluation of the
preferred party) is of minor importance for the interpretation of the results. The sec-
ond control variable indicates to what extent the strength of the party preference ex-
plaining non-sincere voting intentions.25
Table 8.24 presents the results of the analyses. The proportion of voters whose
voting intention could be classified correctly (as either sincere or non-sincere) on the
basis of the models varied between 89 and 95 per cent. These figures may seem very
large, but one should take into account that large numbers of voters had sincere vot-
ing intentions (between 86 and 93 per cent). Consequently, these figures are not very
suitable to judge the explanatory power of the models.26 A more appropriate meas-
ure is the amount of explained variance (as indicated by Nagelkerke R2). This varied
between 0.38 and 0.48, which means that the four phenomena collectively go a fairly
long way in explaining a non-sincere voting intention. Across the years there were
some differences, but in general the models performed about equally well.
At least as interesting is to what degree each phenomenon contributed to the
explanation. In each year coalition preferences influenced non-sincere voting inten-
tions significantly: if voters’ coalition preference did not include their party prefer-
ence, the chance of a non-sincere voting intention was considerably larger (indicated
by the positive sign of the b-values). The size of the effects (indicated by the size of
the b-values) varied across the years. The impact was largest in 1986 and 2002, and
considerably smaller in the other years. Nevertheless, in 1994 and 1998 coalition pref-
erences also played a role. The degree to which non-sincere voting intentions could
be explained on the basis of coalition preferences (indicated by the R statistic), re-
flected the differences in size of the effects and was somewhat larger in 1986 and
2002 than in the two other years.27
Government satisfaction had no impact on non-sincere voting intentions. The
effect was not significant: once the impact of the other concepts is taken into account,
non-sincere voting intentions could not be explained better by including measures of
incumbent approval.28
Party leader evaluations influenced non-sincere voting intentions in three of the
four years. In 1986 no significant effect was found, but this may be a methodological
artefact (only four party leaders were included). Since 1994, party leader evaluations
have had an impact. As expected, if voters liked the leader of their favourite party
better compared to other leaders, the chance of a non-sincere voting intention de-
creased (as indicated by the negative b-values).29 Across the years there are some dif-
ferences in the size of the effect and consequently in the extent to which party leader
preferences contributed to the explanation of non-sincere voting intentions, but these
164 THE  SINCERE  VOTE
TABLE 8.24  A multivariate model of non-sincere voting intentions
(results of logistic regression analysis)
1986 1994 1998 2002
EFFECT  COALITION  PREFERENCES
party preference not included b 2.38 1.34 1.16 2.12
(S.E.) (0.34) (0.28) (0.22) (0.21)
R 0.28 0.19 0.15 0.29
EFFECT  GOVERNMENT  SATISFACTION
 ‘match’ with party preference b - 0.55 - 0.37 - 0.24 0.20
(S.E.) (0.33) (0.31) (0.22) (0.21)
 ‘mismatch’ with party preference b - 0.08 0.38 - 0.20 0.20
(S.E.) (0.43) (0.37) (0.27) (0.26)
R 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EFFECT  PARTY  LEADER  EVALUATIONS
party leader preference score* b - 0.007 - 0.031 - 0.025 - 0.038
(S.E.) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
R 0.00 - 0.16 - 0.12 - 0.19
EFFECT  PREVIOUS  VOTE  CHOICE
previous vote for party preference b - 1.82 - 1.30 - 1.64 - 1.54
(S.E.) (0.40) (0.39) (0.32) (0.30)
previous vote for another party b 1.73 1.23 1.38 0.94
(S.E.) (0.33) (0.36) (0.28) (0.27)
R 0.36 0.33 0.37 0.33
CONTROL  VARIABLES
party evaluation score b - 0.018 - 0.023 0.006 - 0.019
(S.E.) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
R - 0.03 - 0.09 - 0.00 - 0.06
party preference strength score* b - 0.032 - 0.049 - 0.024 - 0.031
(S.E.) (0.016) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013)
R - 0.06 - 0.09 - 0.03 - 0.06
constant - 0.44 - 0.05 - 2.06 - 0.02
(N) (1127) (1091) (1396) (1426)
correct predictions (%) 95.2 93.4 88.7 89.7
explained variance (Nagelkerke R2) 0.48 0.38 0.42 0.42
* equals the difference in evaluations of (leaders of) preferred and non-preferred parties
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TABLE 8.25  A multivariate model of non-sincere voting behaviour
(results of logistic regression analysis)
1986 1994 1998 2002
EFFECT  COALITION  PREFERENCES
party preference not included b 0.29 1.12 1.34 1.41
(S.E.) (0.21) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17)
R 0.00 0.17 0.18 0.19
EFFECT  GOVERNMENT  SATISFACTION
 ‘match’ with party preference b - 0.40 0.02 - 0.46 - 0.06
(S.E.) (0.20) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16)
 ‘mismatch’ with party preference b 0.10 0.45 - 0.06 - 0.15
(S.E.) (0.29) (0.23) (0.21) (0.20)
R 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00
EFFECT  PARTY  LEADER  EVALUATIONS
party leader preference score* b - 0.018 - 0.020 - 0.021 - 0.029
(S.E.) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
R - 0.13 - 0.11 - 0.11 - 0.17
EFFECT  PREVIOUS  VOTE  CHOICE
previous vote for party preference b - 1.06 - 0.86 - 1.25 - 1.38
(S.E.) (0.25) (0.22) (0.20) (0.19)
previous vote for another party b 1.09 0.88 1.07 0.30
(S.E.) (0.27) (0.23) (0.19) (0.19)
R 0.31 0.26 0.33 0.28
CONTROL  VARIABLES
party evaluation score b 0.008 - 0.004 - 0.004 - 0.017
(S.E.) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
R 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.06
party preference strength score* b - 0.023 - 0.032 - 0.032 - 0.007
(S.E.) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
R - 0.06 - 0.08 - 0.07 0.00
constant - 1.38 - 0.66 - 0.27 0.81
(N) (1192) (1282) (1596) (1505)
correct predictions (%) 86.4 84.0 83.3 80.5
explained variance (Nagelkerke R2) 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.20
* equals the difference in evaluations of (leaders of) preferred and non-preferred parties
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differences are limited. On average, the impact of party leader evaluations was
somewhat weaker than that of coalition preferences (especially in 1986 and 2002).
Previous vote choice also had an effect. In each election, voters who had voted
for their current party preference in the previous election were considerably less
likely than other voters to have a non-sincere voting intention; voters who before had
voted for another party were more likely to have a non-sincere voting intention. This
effect was strongest in 1986 and weakest in 1994 and 2002 (the mean of the two b-
values decreased from 1.8 tot 1.2), suggesting voters relied on their previous vote
choice less often in those two elections. Nevertheless, previous vote choice contrib-
uted to the explanation of non-sincere voting intentions about equally in all four
years. Furthermore, the analyses suggest that previous vote choice did so more
strongly than any other phenomenon. With respect to this latter finding, however, a
warning of caution is necessary: due to false recall the impact of previous vote choice
may be overestimated. But even if the results are in part a methodological artefact,
the findings remain consistent with the idea that voters are creatures of habit, and
that voting intentions can be explained – at least in part – on the basis of previous
vote choice.30
A final observation is that the strength of party preferences played the hypoth-
esised role. As the strength of voters’ party preference increased, the chance on a
non-sincere voting intention decreased. Hence, the relationship between party pref-
erence strength and the chance on a non-sincere voting intention observed in the pre-
vious chapter, cannot be accounted for – at least not fully – by the fact that voters
with relatively weak party preferences more often preferred a coalition with other
parties, more often preferred the leader of another party, or more often had the habit
to vote for another party. Party preference strength as such had an additional effect
on the chance on a non-sincere voting intention. At the same time, the fact that the
impact of party preference strength was rather weak, indicates that its strong rela-
tionship with non-sincere voting intentions found in the previous chapter can be
partly accounted for by the fact that voters with weak party preferences are more
likely to be in a position in which the use of another heuristic than the party prefer-
ence heuristic results in the choice for a non-preferred party.
So far we have focused on voting intentions, not voting behaviour. The question
arises to what extent the same phenomena can explain actual non-sincere voting. Be-
cause voting intentions are ultimately transformed into voting behaviour, we may
expect the same phenomena to influence whether voters actually voted sincerely or
non-sincerely. However, the analyses in Chapter 5 showed that the amount of non-
sincere voting was considerably greater than the amount of non-sincere voting inten-
tions. This can be understood if one realises that voting intentions may change for
various reasons. First, the underlying party evaluations may change, which may lead
to shifts in party preferences, which in turn may lead to shifts in voting intentions.
Second, changes may take place with respect to the other phenomena – election out-
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come preferences, incumbent approval, and party leader evaluations – which may in
turn affect voting intentions. Because data about all such changes are not available,
this will not be analysed here. A third reason why voting intentions may change,
concerns the relative weight of the various phenomena. It is possible that the impor-
tance of the phenomena that underlie voting intentions changed. For example, per-
haps prospective considerations influenced voting intentions more strongly in the
latest phase of the campaign than weeks in advance. Or maybe party leader evalua-
tions became more important shortly before the election. If such changes occur, this
may lead to shifts in voting intentions and discrepancies will occur between voting
intentions some weeks before the election and actual voting behaviour. Moreover,
changes may then be observed in the impact of the various phenomena in relation to
non-sincere voting behaviour.
To examine whether the relative weight of different phenomena changed, simi-
lar logistic regression analyses have been performed with actual voting behaviour as
the dependent variable (instead of voting intentions). The results are shown in Ta-
ble 8.25. If the results are compared with those in Table 8.24, a number of observa-
tions can be made. First, the explanatory power of the models that focus on voting
behaviour is lower than that of the models that focus on voting intentions. On aver-
age, the proportion of correct predictions decreased from 92 to 84 per cent, and the
explained variance as indicated by Nagelkerke R2 decreased from 0.43 to 0.25. This is
no surprise, because the models do not take into account two important causes of
discrepancies between party evaluations and voting behaviour (changes in party
evaluations and changes in other factors that influence voting intentions). Second,
for each phenomenon on average the size of the effect (as indicated by the b-values)
is somewhat smaller in the models that focus on voting behaviour. Overall there
were no major differences in the relative importance of the various phenomena. That
is confirmed by R statistics. Previous vote choice had the strongest impact, coalition
preferences and party leader evaluations had a weaker impact, and government sat-
isfaction had virtually no impact.
There is one election, however, in which the impact of the various phenomena
on actual voting behaviour differed from their impact on voting intentions: the 1986
election. In that year voting intentions were influenced strongly by coalition prefer-
ences, and not by party leader preferences. Actual voting behaviour, however, was
not influenced by coalition preferences, but by party leader preferences. These find-
ings are consistent with the then unexpected results of the 1986 election (see
Andeweg 1988). Opinion polls indicated that the Labour Party would become larger
than the Christian Democrats, but the outcome of the election was reversed. This was
apparently the result of changes in the voting intentions shortly before the election.
The analyses presented here suggest that those changes stemmed from the fact that
voters were ultimately motivated less by which coalition they preferred, and more
by which leader they preferred. The decreased impact of coalition preferences pre-
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sumably affected the electoral support for Labour negatively, while the increased im-
pact of party leader preferences affected the electoral support for the Christian
Democrats positively. This illustrates that changes in the weight that voters put on
strategic considerations and candidate preferences may account for discrepancies
between initial voting intentions and actual voting behaviour.
MULTIPLE PARTY PREFERENCES: HEURISTICS AS TIE-BREAKER
The findings presented suggest that voters sometimes choose to vote non-sincerely
because of their government preference, candidate preference, or voting habit. These
phenomena may also influence voting intentions in another way: voters with multi-
ple party preferences may use them as tie-breaker. This means that voters with a
multiple party preference use the party preference heuristic to eliminate the parties
they do not evaluate most positively, and then choose between the remaining parties
on the basis of one of the other heuristics.
The possibility that voters chose from the parties of their multiple party prefer-
ence by using their government preference, candidate preference, or voting habit as
a tie-breaker, can be examined by answering two questions. The first question is
whether it was possible for voters, in principle, to use the corresponding heuristics to
break the tie. This was only the case if voters included only one of the preferred par-
ties in their coalition preference, if they liked the leader of one of the preferred par-
ties better than those of the other parties, and if they voted before for one of the pre-
ferred parties. Furthermore, although incumbent approval was not found to explain
non-sincere voting, we may still examine whether voters used the corresponding
heuristic to break ties.
Additional analyses indicate that the government preference heuristic and the
incumbent approval heuristic could only be used as a tie-breaker by a minority of
voters (Table 8.26).31 Government preferences could often not provide a solution, be-
cause voters preferred a government coalition that included two or more of the pre-
ferred parties.32 Incumbent approval was mostly neither of much use, either because
voters were not satisfied or dissatisfied with the government, or, if they were
(dis)satisfied, because they preferred two or more government or opposition parties.
The candidate preference heuristic and the voting habit heuristic, on the other hand,
both provided a majority of voters the opportunity to break the tie. In each election,
about 60 per cent of the voters had a candidate preference that included the leader of
only one of the parties they preferred, while about 75 per cent of the voters had
voted for one of those parties in the previous parliamentary election.
The next question is whether in the cases where the heuristics could have been
used to break a tie, voters formed a voting intention as expected on the basis of that
heuristic. With respect to two heuristics the corresponding figures are as high as 80
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per cent: the government preference heuristic and the voting habit heuristic (Ta-
ble 8.27). If these heuristics could be used to break a tie, large majorities intended to
vote as expected on the basis of that heuristic. This supports the view that voters are
creatures of habit, but at the same time take into account strategic considerations.
Although the support for the idea that the incumbent approval heuristic and the can-
didate preference heuristic are used to break ties is less strong, a majority of voters
who could use this heuristic intended to vote as expected on that basis. This suggests
that some voters may have used these heuristics to break ties.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown that three of the heuristics discussed in Chapter 5 may pro-
vide an explanation of why some voters preferred to vote for parties they did not
evaluate most positively. First, sometimes voters preferred a particular government
to be formed after the election that did not include the party they liked best. This
happened relatively often if voters preferred small parties; these are often not re-
garded as potential government parties. Such voters may be expected to award their
vote to a party they liked somewhat worse, in the hope that this party will be in-
TABLE 8.26  Percentage of voters for whom each heuristic could break the tie
1986 1994 1998 2002
government preference heuristic 40 38 28 38
incumbent approval heuristic 21 23 30 22
candidate preference heuristic 61 58 60 55
voting habit heuristic 72 75 74 76
Reading example: In 1986 of all voters (with a multiple party preference), the government preference
heuristic could additionally be used to break the tie by 40 per cent of the voters.
TABLE 8.27  Percentage of voters who broke tie as expected on the basis of each heuristic
1986 1994 1998 2002
government preference heuristic 84 78 81 84
incumbent approval heuristic 80 61 57 63
candidate preference heuristic 56 56 55 69
voting habit heuristic 84 82 81 73
Reading example: In 1986 of all voters (with a multiple party preference) who could use the govern-
ment preference heuristic to break the tie, 84 per cent intended to vote for the corresponding party
(and thus broke the tie as expected on the basis of this heuristic).
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cluded in the future government. The findings suggest that this indeed happened. 
Across the four elections analysed, about 10 to 15 per cent preferred a government 
coalition that did not include their party preference. Moreover, these voters preferred 
to vote non-sincerely relatively often. Coalition preferences played a role in 
each election, but most strongly in those of 1986 and 2002. 
Another reason why voters may provide electoral support to non-preferred 
parties, is to be found in their evaluations of the party leaders. Voters may either not 
really like the leader of the party they like best, or they may like the leader of another 
party particularly well. This may be a reason not to support the best-liked party, as 
well as a reason to support another party. The findings indicate that usually 20 to 25 
per cent of the voters preferred the leader of a party other than the one they liked 
best, and those voters were indeed more likely to prefer to vote non-sincerely. The 
size of the overall impact of party leader preferences was fairly stable across the various 
elections, and usually somewhat smaller than that of coalition preferences. 
 
The findings presented are consistent with the hypothesis that voters sometimes 
stick to a habitual vote choice, even though there is another party that they in 
fact like more. In the polling booth people turn out to be creatures of habit. It must be 
noted, however, that methodological problems may have influenced the findings, 
which therefore should be interpreted with much care. 
Incumbent approval did not provide an explanation for non-sincere voting 
once other phenomena had been taken into account. In as far as satisfaction with the 
incumbent government affected voters’ choices, this effect seems to have been 
mediated by voters’ party evaluations, candidate evaluations, and preferences regarding 
the composition of the future government. Mechanisms of reward and punishment 
did not surpass the impact of those phenomena and thus did not influence voting 
intentions directly. 
As hypothesised on the basis of the sincere vote model, the chance that one of 
the phenomena identified resulted in a non-sincere vote also depended on the 
strength of voters’ party preference: the stronger their preference for a particular 
party, the smaller the chance on a non-sincere vote 
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C H A P T E R  9
EXPLAINING PARTY EVALUATIONS:
A TRADITIONAL APPROACH
In each of the elections analysed, voters mostly voted in line with their party evalua-
tions. If party evaluations determine voting behaviour so strongly, the question
arises why voters evaluate parties with certain degrees of favour or disfavour.
This matter was discussed in Chapter 6. But the ideas presented about how in-
formation-processing, representation in memory, and emotional response determine
party evaluations, unfortunately cannot be tested on the basis of the surveys upon
which this research is based. There are a number of reasons. First, the survey method
is more or less by definition just not well suited to analyse information-processing.
Individuals usually forget information they process as such, but only use it to update
specific aspects of their memory. Therefore, reconstructing what information voters
processed on the basis of a survey is virtually impossible. Second, how parties are
represented in memory has usually not been assessed properly. Typically, only a lim-
ited number of closed-ended questions have been asked about how voters perceived
parties’ stands in terms of a few issues and a left-right continuum. No questions have
been included about voters’ images of parties in various possible other terms – for
example, which interests parties represented (labour force, entrepreneurs, farmers),
which other organisations they were associated with (church, trade unions, environ-
mental movement), what ideological terms other than left and right applied to them
(socialist, liberal, conservative, Christian), or what other terms characterised the par-
ties (social, clear, arrogant). Moreover, no questions are available that reveal voters’
memories of things parties have said or done (so-called episodic information). Third,
the surveys have not included questions about voters’ emotional responses to par-
ties. Whether parties (or their candidates) made voters feel angry, anxious, enthusias-
tic, or whatever other emotions parties evoked, remains unknown.
This does not mean that party evaluations cannot be explained at all. The least
that can be done, is to attempt to explain party evaluations on the basis of concepts
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that have traditionally been used to explain voting behaviour and which have been
included in election surveys. This traditional approach will be adopted in this chap-
ter. Using the data from the Dutch Parliamentary Elections Studies (DPES), party
evaluations will be analysed in relation to voters’ social characteristics, policy prefer-
ences, ideological positions, government satisfaction, and party leader evaluations.
The analyses concern the same four elections as those central in the previous chap-
ters (1986, 1994, 1998, and 2002). The parties that will be focused on are the Labour
Party, Liberal Party, Christian Democrats, D66, GreenLeft, Socialist Party, orthodox
Protestant parties, and List Pim Fortuyn.1
Self-evidently, such analyses cannot provide full insight in the psychological
processes that underlie the formation and change of party evaluations. What psycho-
logical mechanisms operate that make that voters with a particular ideological posi-
tion like certain parties better or worse, for example, is a question that cannot be an-
swered by merely examining these relationships. The same argument applies as that
put forward in Chapter 1 with respect to sociological explanations of voting behav-
iour: the mere observation that voters with a particular social identity like certain
parties much, leaves the question open why they do. One possibility is that the rela-
tionship is spurious: for example, voters may ‘inherit’ their social identity as well as
their party evaluations from their parents. The following analyses therefore do not
provide definite answers regarding the psychological mechanisms involved. They
have to be considered as illustrations of how party evaluations may be explained if
one focuses on concepts that have traditionally been used to explain voting behav-
iour.2
The strategy adopted may be considered interesting for one reason in particu-
lar. Performing separate analyses for each party provides a basis to judge the validity
of a key element of the psephological paradigm: the assumption of homogeneity in
bases of evaluation. Models of voting are usually based on the assumption that vot-
ers like or dislike different parties for the same reasons. If this is the case, then we
should find that the various phenomena have a similar impact on voters’ evalua-
tions, irrespective of which party is focused on.3
THE IMPACT OF RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL CLASS IDENTITY
In earlier decades, vote choice in the Netherlands could be explained successfully on
the basis of a so-called sociological approach (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lijphart 1974;
Andeweg 1982). If one knew voters’ religious denomination, frequency of church at-
tendance, and social class self-image, their choice at the polls could be predicted
fairly accurately. Across the years, however, the impact of religion and social class
has decreased substantially (Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1989a; Van Holsteyn and Irwin
2003; Van der Kolk 2000). Nevertheless, in response to the 1994 election Rudy
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Andeweg (1995: 125) concluded that with the present speed of developments it
would still take three decades before their impact had disappeared.
Although religion and social class have usually been regarded as sociological
concepts, they may well be used in a psychological study of voting. After all, what
both concepts are about is voters’ social identity; identity is a psychological concept.
The central idea appears to be that for whom people vote, depends on which groups
they identify with. This more or less implies that party evaluations can also be ex-
plained in those terms. If voters define their identity in terms of belonging to a par-
ticular social class, they will presumably like parties better if these represent the in-
terest of that social class. If voters define their identity in terms of a religious
community, they will presumably like parties better if these are associated with that
religious community. Additionally, we may expect that if such an identity is more
central in a person’s self-image, so will be the effect on how voters evaluate the asso-
ciated parties.
Voters’ religious identity can be operationalised on the basis of questions about
church membership and attendance of religious services. In the DPES the questions
read as follows.4
Do you consider yourself a member of a particular church or religious commu-
nity, and if so, which one?
How often do you attend religious services?
While the first question indicates what religious community voters identify with, the
second question can be used as a proxy measure for the strength of this identifica-
tion. Voters who attend religious services more often, presumably identify more
strongly with that religious community than voters who attend such services less of-
ten.
Social class identity has been operationalised on the basis of another question.
One sometimes speaks of the existence of various social classes and groups. If
you were to assign yourself to a particular social class, which one would that
be?
Respondents were shown a card with five possible answers: upper class, upper mid-
dle class, ordinary middle class, upper working class, and ordinary working class.
The format of this question differs from that concerning voters’ religious identity.
The social class question only asks voters which social class they belong to; whether
they think of themselves as belonging to a particular social class, is not asked. Note
that while religious identity is operationalised in terms of direction and intensity,
there is no equivalent regarding the intensity of social class identity.
There were no major differences across the four years studied in the number of
voters who considered themselves a member of a particular church or religious com-
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TABLE 9.1  Percentage of voters who considered themselves member of a particular church
1986 1994 1998 2002
Roman Catholic 31 25 28 25
Dutch Reformed 14 14 11 12
Calvinist 6 6 7 9
other Christian - - 5 -
other 4 4 2 5
none 44 50 47 49
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1630) (1812) (2101) (1908)
Note: The category ‘none’ includes few voters who said they did not know or gave no answer.
TABLE 9.2  Percentage of Christian church members who attended religious services with a
particular frequency
1986 1994 1998 2002
at least once a week 16 12 13 11
at least once a month 9 10 11 10
several times a year 13 11 15 14
(almost) never 13 12 12 11
not a member of a Christian church 49 55 50 54
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1630) (1812) (2101) (1908)
Note: The category ‘(almost) never’ includes few voters who said they did not know/gave no answer.
TABLE 9.3  Percentage of voters who assigned themselves to a particular social class
1986 1994 1998 2002
upper class 2 2 1 4
upper middle class 14 14 16 22
ordinary middle class 44 53 56 55
upper working class 11 6 7 5
ordinary working class 26 21 18 12
don’t know 4 4 2 3
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1630) (1812) (2101) (1908)
Note: The category ‘don’t know’ includes few voters for whom data are missing.
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munity (Table 9.1). In general, about half of the voters considered themselves not a
member of a church, and the other half considered themselves Roman Catholic,
Dutch Reformed, or Calvinist. The frequency with which they attended religious
services did not change much either (Table 9.2).5 In terms of social class, on the other
hand, the composition changed substantially (Table 9.3). The size of the upper mid-
dle class increased from 14 to 22 per cent, and the size of the middle class from 44 to
about 55 per cent. Consequently, the number of voters who thought of themselves as
working class declined strongly. In 1986 still 37 per cent thought of themselves as
upper working class or ordinary working class, but in subsequent years this figure
decreased to only 17 per cent.
To determine the impact of voters’ religious and social class identity on party
evaluations, for each party and each year multiple regression analyses have been
performed. The evaluation score awarded to a particular party is the dependent vari-
able, and religious identity and social class identity are the independent variables.6
Religious and social class identity have been operationalised in the form of four so-
called dummy variables, which indicate whether voters had a particular identity
(coded 1 if voters had such an identity, coded 0 if not). If voters considered them-
selves member of a Christian church and attended religious services at least once a
week, they are classified as having a strong Christian identity. If they considered
themselves member of a Christian church and attended religious services less often,
they are classified as having a weak Christian identity. If voters assigned themselves
to the ordinary working class or the upper working class, they are classified as hav-
ing a working class identity. If voters assigned themselves to the upper middle class
or the upper class, they are classified as having an upper middle class identity.7 This
means that evaluation scores awarded by secular middle class voters are in a sense
used as a baseline. Thus, the so-called constant in the regression analyses indicates
the evaluation expected for those voters, while the b values indicate the effect to be
expected if voters had a particular other religious or social class identity.8
Two additional remarks need to be made. First, for the sake of convenience the
evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties, and in 1986 also those of the predeces-
sors of GreenLeft, are analysed jointly.9 Second, in analyses that involve the orthodox
Protestant parties, religious identity has been conceptualised in terms of a Protestant
(instead of a Christian) identity. Hence, in those analyses voters are classified not on
the basis of whether or not they considered themselves member of a Christian
church, but whether they considered themselves member of a Protestant church.
The evaluation scores that voters awarded to the various parties clearly differed
across the different groups (Table 9.4). Voters who had a weak Christian identity
awarded the Christian Democrats scores that were about 15 points higher (in terms
of the 0-100 evaluation scale) than those awarded by secular voters. For the orthodox
Protestant parties the effect of a weak Protestant identity was about 10 points. A
strong Christian identity had an even stronger impact on evaluations of the Christian
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TABLE 9.4  The impact of religious and social class identity on party evaluations
(b values in multiple regression analysis, constant, adjusted R2)
Labour Party Liberal Party
1986 1994 1998 2002 1986 1994 1998 2002
weak Christian identity - 9.7 n.s. - 1.8 - 4.5 6.6 6.8 3.1 3.8
strong Christian identity - 22.0 n.s. - 7.0 - 9.4 4.5 n.s. - 4.5 - 3.5
working class identity 14.0 2.7 3.2 4.8 - 11.0 - 7.5 - 6.4 - 4.9
upper middle class identity - 7.0 - 3.0 n.s. n.s. 10.1 3.5 2.6 3.1
constant 61.5 57.6 65.7 57.8 45.7 50.0 52.6 51.9
explained variance 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.03
Christian Democrats D66
1986 1994 1998 2002 1986 1994 1998 2002
weak Christian identity 16.9 14.7 12.2 13.2 n.s. - 2.1 - 4.4 - 4.5
strong Christian identity 27.1 24.9 18.8 19.8 - 9.4 - 11.0 - 15.2 - 21.3
working class identity - 8.0 - 5.9 - 2.3 n.s. n.s. - 4.1 - 2.8 n.s.
upper middle class identity n.s. - 3.2 - 2.6 n.s. 6.2 3.1 4.0 4.2
constant 48.8 46.1 49.2 50.9 54.8 60.8 57.1 54.5
explained variance 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.11
GreenLeft Socialist Party
1986 1994 1998 2002 1998 2002
weak Christian identity - 8.5 - 9.7 - 6.7 - 4.5 - 7.1 - 6.9
strong Christian identity - 9.7 - 16.0 - 9.4 - 9.3 - 12.3 - 10.6
working class identity n.s. - 2.9 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
upper middle class identity n.s. n.s. n.s. 4.6 n.s. 3.9
constant 47.8 53.5 58.5 56.3 48.0 50.6
explained variance 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Orthodox Protestant List Pim Fortuyn
1986 1994 1998 2002 2002
weak Christian identity 8.1 10.7 8.0 11.5 n.s.
strong Christian identity 35.2 36.5 33.7 36.7 n.s.
working class identity - 3.3 n.s. n.s. n.s. - 4.1
upper middle class identity n.s. n.s. - 4.4 n.s. n.s.
constant 29.9 30.6 38.0 37.9 35.4
explained variance 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.00
Notes: The constant indicates the evaluation score expected for secular middle class voters.
n.s. indicates an effect is not significant. With respect to the orthodox Protestant parties the effects of
a religious identity concern a Protestant identity instead of a Christian identity.
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Democrats (approximately 20 to 25 points), while a strong Protestant identity had a
still stronger impact on evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties (about 35
points). While the effects were equally strong across the years with respect to the or-
thodox Protestant parties, the impact on evaluations of the Christian Democrats
weakened somewhat between 1986 and 1998. So voters’ feelings towards this party
became less strongly influenced by their Christian identity.
Evaluations of the other parties were also affected by voters’ religious identity,
but usually not as strongly as those of the Christian parties. In 1986 the most notable
effect concerned the Labour Party. Voters with a weak Christian identity on average
awarded Labour an evaluation score that was 10 points lower than the score
awarded by secular voters. Among voters with a strong Christian identity the effect
was about 20 points. In 1994 these negative effects are not found. Christian voters
awarded Labour scores similar to those of secular voters. In later elections there were
again some effects, but these were fairly weak. The most noteworthy exception is
D66. Voters with a strong Christian identity evaluated this party relatively nega-
tively. Moreover, the size of this effect increased from about 10 points in 1986 to
about 20 points in 2002. Finally, voters with a (weak or strong) Christian identity
evaluated GreenLeft and Socialist Party somewhat more negatively than secular vot-
ers did (usually about 10 points).
The effects of social class were much weaker. Moreover, the impact of social
class decreased across the years and ultimately this characteristic played virtually no
role. The strongest effect found concerns that of a working class identity in relation
to evaluations of the Labour Party. In 1986 working class voters awarded Labour
scores that were on average about 15 points higher than those awarded by middle
class voters. A negative effect of an upper middle class identity was also present, but
this effect was only half as large. Since 1994, social class no longer had an impact on
evaluations of Labour. The most noteworthy other effect concerned a mirror image
of Labour. In 1986 working class voters awarded the Liberal Party relatively low
scores, and upper middle class voters awarded them relatively high scores. The size
of both effects was about 10 points. These effects have since weakened, and in 2002
neither exceeded 5 points.
The degree to which party evaluations could be explained on the basis of the
model that included both religious and social class identity varied considerably
across parties, and within some parties also across years. In each year, evaluations of
the Christian Democrats and the orthodox Protestant parties could be explained rela-
tively well by the model (explained variance varied between 14 and 20 per cent). In
1986 evaluations of the Labour Party could be explained relatively well too, but since
1994 this was no longer the case. Evaluations of the Liberal Party could also be ex-
plained to some extent in 1986, but less so in later years. One party shows the re-
versed pattern. While evaluations of D66 could initially be explained poorly, in later
years the model performed better. With respect to GreenLeft (and their predeces-
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sors), Socialist Party, and List Pim Fortuyn, the model did not contribute to the expla-
nation of how voters evaluated them in any year.
The differences in the explanatory power of the model appear to result pre-
dominantly from differences in the effect of religion.10 The fairly strong explanatory
power of the model with respect to evaluations of the Christian Democrats and or-
thodox Protestant parties stemmed, unsurprisingly, from the effect of voters’ Chris-
tian or Protestant identity. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model with re-
spect to evaluations of the Labour Party appears to be the result not only of an effect
of voters’ social class identity, but also of an even stronger negative effect of voters’
religious identity. A related finding is that the decrease in the explanatory power
with respect to Labour resulted from two simultaneous developments. First,
whereas in 1986 Labour was evaluated relatively positively by working class voters
and relatively negatively by upper middle class voters, in 1994 these effects were not
present. Second, whereas in 1986 voters with a Christian identity felt more nega-
tively about Labour than other voters, in 1994 this effect was not present either. Fi-
nally, note that the unanticipated increase of the explanatory power of the model
with respect to evaluations of D66 stemmed from increasingly negative feelings
among voters with a strong Christian identity.
THE IMPACT OF POLICY PREFERENCES
The decline of the explanatory power of models of voting based on religion and so-
cial class has resulted in a search for other explanations. Among the alternatives pro-
posed are the notions of policy voting and issue voting (Van Cuilenburg et al. 1980;
Middendorp et al. 1993; Van Wijnen 2001). According to these notions, voters regard
political parties as packages of policy preferences or issue stands. When faced with
an election, voters are expected to choose the party whose package comes closest to
their own policy preferences. The corresponding model assumes that the agreement
or disagreement between voters and parties in terms of a number of salient issues
determines how voters evaluate the various parties, which in turn determines their
vote choice.
In the DPES voters have been questioned about several issues. With respect to
each issue respondents were shown a card with a seven-point scale at which both
end-points were labelled. Voters were then asked to indicate how they perceived the
positions of various political parties and what their own position was. With respect
to the issue of euthanasia, for example, the following question was asked.
When a doctor ends a life of a person at the latter’s request, this is called eutha-
nasia. Some people think that euthanasia should be forbidden by law. Others
feel that a doctor should always be allowed to end a life, if the patient makes
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that request. Of course, there are people whose opinion lie somewhere in be-
tween. Suppose that the people (and parties) who think that euthanasia should
be forbidden are at the beginning of this line (at number 1) and the people (and
parties) who feel that a doctor should always be allowed to end a life upon a
patient’s request are at the end of the line (at number 7). I will ask you first to
place some parties on the line. If you have no idea at all which position a party
has, then please feel free to say so. Where would you place the CDA on this
line? And where the PvdA? … And where would you place yourself?
In a similar fashion voters were asked about policies concerning income inequality,
building nuclear plants, pace of the European integration, government action against
crime, integration of ethnic minorities, and admission of asylum seekers (see Ta-
ble 9.5).11 To facilitate the discussion, the polar positions are labelled in this research
– admittedly, somewhat arbitrarily – left-wing and right-wing.12
Most voters appeared to be able to express their personal opinion on the vari-
ous issues. At most 7 per cent of the voters said they did not know what their posi-
tion was.13 To examine the impact of policy preferences on party evaluations, for each
party and each year multiple regression analyses have again been performed. The
dependent variables are the evaluation scores awarded to the various parties, and
the independent variables are voters’ policy preferences.14 To facilitate the interpreta-
tion, the scales have been recoded such that the mid-point corresponds with a score
of zero and the end-points correspond with scores of plus and minus one (the left-
wing position was coded plus one, the right-wing position minus one). Conse-
quently, the constant in the regression analysis indicates the evaluation score ex-
pected for voters who positioned themselves at the mid-point of each scale, and the
b-values indicate the effect to be expected for voters who positioned themselves at
one of the end-points of the scale. Positive values indicate that voters who took a left-
wing position evaluated the party more positively than voters who took a right-wing
position, while negative values indicate the reversed. Because voters’ opinions re-
garding the integration of ethnic minorities and the admission of asylum seekers
were fairly strongly correlated, only one of these issues has been included in the
analyses (in 1994 that of ethnic minorities, in 1998 and 2002 that of asylum seekers).15
Policy preferences clearly had an impact on how voters evaluated the various
parties (Table 9.6). Some policy preferences mattered more strongly than others.
What is arguably even more interesting, is that the impact of particular policy prefer-
ences varied across parties. Opinions about euthanasia, for example, had a fairly
strong impact on evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties. Voters who posi-
tioned themselves at an end-point of the scale awarded these parties an evaluation
score that differed, on average, 15 points from the score awarded by neutral voters.
Unsurprisingly, voters who felt euthanasia should be allowed liked these parties
worse, and those who felt euthanasia should be forbidden liked them better. A simi-
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issue
euthanasia
income
nequality
nuclear
plants
European
integration
ethnic
minorities
asylum
seekers
crime
‘left-wing position’
A doctor should always be
allowed to end the life of a
patient when the latter
requests so
The differences in income in
our country should be
decreased
No nuclear plants should be
built at all in the Nether-
lands
The European unification
should go further
Foreigners and ethnic
minorities should be able to
live in the Netherlands
while preserving all customs
of their own culture
The Netherlands should
allow more asylum seekers
to enter
Government acts too tough
on crime
‘right-wing position’
It should be forbidden that
a doctor ends the life of a
patient at the latter’s
request
The differences in income in
our country should be
increased
Additional nuclear plants
should be built in the
Netherlands
The European unification
has gone too far
Foreigners and ethnic
minorities in the Nether-
lands should fully adjust
themselves to the Dutch
culture
The Netherlands should
send back as many asylum
seekers as possible
Government should act
tougher on crime
when
included
1986–2002
1986–2002
1986–2002
1998–2002
1994–2002
1998–2002
1994, 2002
TABLE 9.5  Policies about which voters indicated their positions
lar effect, but of a smaller size, can be observed regarding the Christian Democrats.
With respect to the other parties the effect was either small and reversed, or absent.
The only exception concerns the evaluations of D66 in 2002, which showed a re-
versed effect of 10 points.
Voters’ preferences regarding income inequality mattered most strongly with
respect to the Liberal Party. Voters who thought income inequality should be de-
creased awarded this party evaluation scores that were about 10 to 15 points lower
than those awarded by neutral voters, while voters who thought income inequality
should be increased awarded them scores that were equally much higher. With re-
spect to the Christian Democrats in 1986 a similar effect was found, but in later years
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income inequality did not matter much for how voters evaluated them. With respect
to the Labour Party, GreenLeft, and Socialist Party reversed effects can be observed.
The size usually varied between a modest 5 and 10 points, except for an effect of 16
points regarding evaluations of the Labour Party in 1986.
With respect to the issue of building nuclear plants some effects were found,
but these were smaller in size than those concerning euthanasia and income inequal-
ity. The largest effects found (9 points) concerned the Labour Party and Liberal Party
in 1986. Voters who opposed building new nuclear plants evaluated the former
somewhat more positively and the latter somewhat more negatively. Across the four
elections the average effect reached 5 points for only two parties: Liberal Party and
GreenLeft. The issue of European integration, which was only included in the sur-
veys of 1998 and 2002, played an even smaller role: no effect exceeded 5 points.
In 1994, when the crime issue was included for the first time, its impact on party
evaluations was weak: none of the effects exceeded 5 points. In 2002 the impact was
somewhat stronger. Voters who thought government should act tougher on crime
evaluated the Christian Democrats and List Pim Fortuyn somewhat more positively,
and the Labour Party, D66, GreenLeft, and Socialist Party somewhat more negatively
(effects varied between 5 and 10 points). With respect to the issue of asylum seekers,
the effects are in the same direction, but of a considerable greater magnitude. One
effect stands out in particular. Voters who took a right-wing position, which states
that as many asylum seekers as possible should be send back, awarded List Pim
Fortuyn scores that were 22 points higher than those awarded by neutral voters. This
is the largest effect found with respect to any party, in any year. With respect to the
Liberal Party there was an effect in the same direction, but of a limited magnitude.
With respect to GreenLeft the effect was fairly strong too (about 12 points), but re-
versed. For the Labour Party, D66, and Socialist Party the effects were in the same
direction as those concerning GreenLeft, but they were smaller in size. Evaluations of
the Christian Democrats and orthodox Protestant parties were unaffected.
How well party evaluations could be explained on the basis of the various ef-
fects jointly varied across parties, and within parties across years. In 1986 evaluations
of the Labour Party and the Liberal Party could be explained fairly well on the basis
of voters’ policy preferences (the explained variance was 20 per cent), while evalua-
tions of the Christian Democrats and orthodox Protestant parties could be explained
only slightly worse. Evaluations of GreenLeft and D66, however, could not be ex-
plained well. In later years the evaluations of the Labour Party, Liberal Party, and
Christian Democrats could not be explained as well as in 1986, but policy preferences
still mattered.16 With respect to GreenLeft and D66, the explanatory power of the
model increased. In fact, none of the party evaluations could be explained as well as
those of GreenLeft in 2002 (explained variance equalled 25 per cent). Evaluations of
the orthodox Protestant parties could also be explained fairly well in 2002, and so
could those of List Pim Fortuyn.
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TABLE 9.6  The impact of policy preferences on party evaluations
(b values in multiple regression analysis, constant, adjusted R2)
Labour Party Liberal Party
1986 1994 1998 2002 1986 1994 1998 2002
euthanasia 6.3 n.s. 2.7 4.7 n.s. 2.3 1.9 2.3
income inequality 16.2 7.9 4.5 6.1 - 15.3 - 10.8 - 11.9 - 9.2
nuclear plants 8.5 n.s. 2.7 3.8 - 8.8 - 5.1 - 3.9 - 5.3
European integration n.a. n.a. 4.8 4.0 n.a. n.a. 2.6 1.9
crime n.a. 2.7 n.a. 5.2 n.a. - 1.9 n.a. - 2.6
asylum seekers n.a. 6.5 3.7 7.0 n.a. - 5.1 - 8.8 - 6.3
constant 50.6 58.8 61.1 55.9 53.3 51.4 55.4 53.5
explained variance 0.20 0.10 0.07 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.14
Christian Democrats D66
1986 1994 1998 2002 1986 1994 1998 2002
euthanasia - 9.5 - 7.5 - 8.6 - 8.0 4.5 4.8 6.1 9.7
income inequality - 10.3 - 4.4 n.s. - 2.4 n.s. n.s. n.s. 3.2
nuclear plants - 6.1 - 4.0 n.s. - 3.5 2.2 1.6 2.5 1.6
European integration n.a. n.a. 4.5 n.s. n.a. n.a. 4.8 5.0
crime n.a. n.s. n.a. - 7.0 n.a. n.s. n.a. 6.1
asylum seekers n.a. n.s. - 2.8 n.s. n.a. 5.0 5.4 4.4
constant 62.3 57.5 58.0 57.8 51.2 56.9 50.7 51.2
explained variance 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.16
GreenLeft Socialist Party
1986 1994 1998 2002 1998 2002
euthanasia n.s. 5.0 5.5 5.4 5.0 4.4
income inequality 8.5 5.4 6.3 9.4 5.8 8.7
nuclear plants 5.7 6.0 5.1 4.2 3.1 4.0
European integration n.a. n.a. n.s. 5.2 n.s. n.s.
crime n.a. 4.5 n.a. 6.3 n.a. 4.6
asylum seekers n.a. 12.3 13.0 11.1 10.9 7.9
constant 38.8 48.1 50.6 54.9 39.9 46.9
explained variance 0.07 0.20 0.17 0.25 0.10 0.12
Notes: The constant indicates the evaluation score expected for voters who positioned themselves at
the mid-point of each scale. The 1994 figures concern the issue of ethnic minorities (instead of asy-
lum seekers).
n.s. indicates an effect is not significant; n.a. indicates policy preference scores are not available
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THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY IN TERMS OF LEFT-RIGHT
Another explanation of vote choice that has been suggested after the decline of mod-
els based on voters’ social identity, is that of ideology in terms of left-right. Downs
(1957) argued that if voters want to vote for a party whose policy proposals they pre-
fer, they do not need to know the positions of political parties on all kinds of issues.
They may rely on ideological agreement as a short cut, for example in terms of a left-
right continuum. Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983) argued that in the Netherlands
both voters and parties can indeed be characterised by a particular position on an
ideological continuum of left-right, and that voters’ choices at the polls can be ex-
plained well in those terms. The model states that voters perceive the left-right posi-
tions of the various parties, compare these to their own left-right position, and vote
for the party that is closest to them.
This view implies that party evaluations can be explained on the basis of ideo-
logical agreement in terms of left-right. This can be tested on the basis of the follow-
ing question, which has been asked in both the pre-election and the post-election in-
terview of the DPES.17
Political opinions are often described in terms of left or right. When you think
of your own political opinions, where would you place yourself on this line?
Please mention the number that applies to you.
Respondents were shown a card with a horizontal line with either ten positions
(numbered 1 through 10) or eleven positions (numbered 0 through 10).18 The first
position was labelled ‘left’ and the last position was labelled ‘right’. Additionally,
each card showed a position labelled ‘don’t know’. In the post-election interview vot-
ers were additionally asked to rate the various parties on the basis of the same scale.19
TABLE 9.6  (continued)
(b values in multiple regression analysis, constant, adjusted R2)
Orthodox Protestant List Pim Fortuyn
1986 1994 1998 2002 2002
euthanasia - 14.2 - 11.6 - 14.8 - 18.0 n.s.
income inequality - 6.0 n.s. n.s. n.s. - 6.5
nuclear plants n.s. - 3.3 - 2.0 - 1.7 - 3.3
European integration n.a. n.a. - 2.2 n.s. - 2.5
crime n.a. n.s. n.a. n.s. - 7.5
asylum seekers n.a. n.s. n.s. n.s. - 22.3
constant 37.1 41.4 47.7 49.2 28.9
explained variance 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.22 0.24
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It is also said of political parties that they are left or right. Would you please
indicate the degree to which you think that a party is left or right. The Labour
Party? And the Liberal Party? …
Measures that indicate how much agreement voters perceived between their
own position and those of the various parties, have been constructed by subtracting
the score voters assigned to a particular party from the score they said applied to
themselves; the absolute values of the resulting figures have been taken.20 Hence, a
value of 0 means that voters perceived no difference between their own left-right po-
sition and that of the party in question. As the ideological difference increases, so
does the measure. The maximum score on this scale equals 9; this score results if re-
spondents position themselves at one end of the scale, and the party at the other end.
To analyse how well party evaluations can be explained on the basis of left-right
ideology, multiple regression analyses have again been performed. The dependent
variables are the evaluation scores awarded to the various parties. The independent
variables are the measures that indicate the perceived agreement between voters and
parties in terms of the left-right continuum. The constant in the regression analyses
corresponds with the evaluation that the model predicts for voters who put them-
selves and the party at the same left-right position. The b-values indicate how much
the evaluation score would change if the perceived ideological disagreement would
increase with one point (on the ten-point scale of left-right).21
The impact of perceived ideological agreement in terms of left-right on party
evaluations was relatively stable across the years, as well as across parties (Table 9.7).
In most cases, the size of the effect was about four to five points. This means that
voters who saw a minor difference between the ideological position of a particular
party and their own ideological position (equal to one point on the ten-point scale of
left right), awarded that party an evaluation score that was about 5 points lower than
the score awarded by voters who perceived full ideological agreement. Although the
size of the effects was fairly similar across the parties, some differences can be ob-
served. These concern the Labour Party in particular. The strongest effect found con-
cerns the Labour Party in 1986 (7 points), and the weakest effect concerns that same
party in 1998 (3 points).
Although the size of the effects was fairly similar, the explanatory power of the
left-right agreement model varied considerably across parties and across years. This
means that other factors than perceived agreement in terms of left-right were more
important for some parties than for others. In 1986 the model performed best with
respect to evaluations of the Labour Party (the explained variance was 40 per cent).
In that year the model also performed fairly well with respect to the Liberal Party
and the Christian Democrats (explained variance was about 30 per cent). Regarding
the other parties the corresponding figures varied between 10 and 20 per cent. On
the whole, between 1994 and 2002 the explanatory power of the model was some-
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TABLE 9.7  The impact of left-right agreement on party evaluations
(b values in multiple regression analysis, constant, adjusted R2)
Labour Party Liberal Party
1986 1994 1998 2002 1986 1994 1998 2002
effect of disagreement - 7.2 - 4.6 - 3.2 - 4.5 - 5.7 - 5.4 - 5.1 - 4.9
constant 81.1 68.2 70.8 66.0 65.7 65.7 64.7 64.3
explained variance 0.40 0.17 0.08 0.16 0.30 0.25 0.23 0.20
Christian Democrats D66
1986 1994 1998 2002 1986 1994 1998 2002
effect of disagreement - 6.0 - 5.1 - 3.8 - 4.8 - 3.5 - 4.0 - 3.5 - 4.2
constant 73.4 63.3 62.6 65.8 62.4 66.7 60.1 59.6
explained variance 0.29 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.10
GreenLeft Socialist Party
1986 1994 1998 2002 1998 2002
effect of disagreement - 4.5 - 5.6 - 4.4 - 5.2 - 4.5 - 4.3
constant 53.5 67.6 68.5 69.6 59.4 61.5
explained variance 0.14 0.22 0.15 0.22 0.14 0.12
Orthodox Protestant List Pim Fortuyn
1986 1994 1998 2002 2002
effect of disagreement - 4.4 - 4.1 - 4.1 - 4.3 - 5.8
constant 48.5 48.0 52.5 53.4 50.7
explained variance 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.18
Note: Entries indicate effects of one point distance at the ten-point scale; constants indicate the evalu-
ation score expected for voters who put themselves and a party at the same position.
what weaker, but ideological agreement in terms of left-right still mattered. In 2002
the explained variance was about 20 per cent with respect to GreenLeft, Liberal Party,
and List Pim Fortuyn, about 15 per cent with respect to Labour Party and Christian
Democrats, and about 10 per cent with respect to Socialist Party, orthodox Protestant
parties, and D66. The most striking differences across the years concern the Labour
Party. While in 1986 the explanatory power was 40 per cent, by 1998 it had decreased
to only 8 per cent. In 2002 the figure was again higher, but still far behind that of
1986.
Another striking finding is that the evaluation that is predicted by the model for
voters who perceive full agreement with a party in terms of left-right, differs mark-
edly across the parties. In 1986, for example, voters who placed the Labour Party at
the same position as themselves awarded them a score of about 80, while voters who
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placed the Liberal Party at the same position as themselves awarded them a score of
about 65. The values also varied across time. While with respect to the Labour Party
in 1986 the evaluation predicted for those voters was about 80, in 1994 and 1998 it
was about 70, and in 2002 it was about 65. This suggests that other factors that play a
role favour some parties more than others; the degree to which they do may vary
across time.
THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT SATISFACTION
Among the other factors that may influence how voters evaluate parties are their
feelings about the performance of the latest government. According to the notion of
retrospective voting, voters’ choices are based primarily on judgements about the
past. The notion of government satisfaction is closely related to this. Government
parties may be expected to benefit from satisfaction with the government, whereas
opposition parties may benefit from dissatisfaction with the government.
Government satisfaction has been operationalised on the basis of the following
question.
With the help of this card, could you indicate how satisfied you are in general
with what the government has done during the past four years?
A card listed five alternative answers: very satisfied, satisfied, neither satisfied nor
dissatisfied, dissatisfied, and very dissatisfied.
Virtually all voters could say whether or not they were satisfied: only 2 per cent
said they did not know how satisfied they were (see Table 8.8 in Chapter 8). Multiple
regression analyses have again been performed to examine the impact of govern-
ment satisfaction on party evaluations. Because few voters indicated they were very
satisfied or very dissatisfied, these are joined with those who said they were satisfied
or dissatisfied, respectively. The dependent variables are the evaluation scores
awarded to the individual parties. The independent variables are two dummy vari-
ables that indicate whether or not voters were satisfied, and whether or not voters
were dissatisfied (each coded 1 if they were, coded 0 if they were not). This means
that the constant in the regression analyses indicates the evaluation score expected
from voters who were neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied with the government; these
individuals will be referred to as ‘neutral voters’. The b-values indicate the effects of
satisfaction and dissatisfaction.
Various effects are possible. One possibility is that we will see a positive effect
of satisfaction for the government parties and a negative effect for opposition parties.
With respect to dissatisfaction a reversed pattern may be expected. These expecta-
tions are based on the idea that government parties benefit from satisfaction with the
government, and opposition parties from dissatisfaction. Another possibility is that
Explaining Party Evaluations 187
government satisfaction affects only voters’ evaluations of the government parties,
and that evaluations of the opposition parties are thus based solely on other factors.
A third possibility is that some government parties benefit from satisfaction with the
government, whereas others do not. Likewise, some opposition parties may benefit
from dissatisfaction with the government, while others do not.
The results of the analyses provide some support for each expectation (Ta-
ble 9.8). First, voters who were satisfied with the incumbent government evaluated
the parties that had participated in the government more positively than neutral vot-
ers, and voters who were dissatisfied with the government evaluated those same
parties more negatively. For example, in 1986 voters who were satisfied with the
Lubbers-I government awarded the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party
evaluation scores that were about 15 points higher than those awarded by neutral
voters. If voters were dissatisfied with the government, they awarded those parties
scores that were about 20 points lower. In later years government parties were
awarded evaluation scores that were about 5 to 10 points higher among satisfied vot-
ers than among neutral voters, while dissatisfied voters awarded the government
parties scores that were about 8 to 15 points lower. The only exception concerns the
Liberal Party in relation to the two purple coalitions, which showed some weaker
effects.
Without exception, in each year the largest effects found – positive as well as
negative – involved the party of the incumbent prime minister (Lubbers’ Christian
Democrats in 1986 and 1994, Kok’s Labour Party in 1998 and 2002). Apparently, the
prime minister’s party got the credits as well as the debits of the performance of the
government more strongly than other coalition partners. The differences are limited,
however, and other coalition parties usually benefited or suffered only slightly less.
On the whole, dissatisfaction had a stronger effect on evaluations of the govern-
ment parties than satisfaction. In each election, the mean negative effect of dissatis-
faction was about 4 points larger than the positive effect of satisfaction; across parties
and years the mean effect was 8.5 for satisfaction and 12.5 for dissatisfaction.
Evaluation scores awarded to opposition parties were affected by government
satisfaction too, but in different ways. In some cases voters who were satisfied with
the government awarded particular opposition parties lower scores than neutral vot-
ers did, while dissatisfied voters awarded them higher scores. For example, in 1986
with respect to the Labour Party the effects were as large as with respect to the gov-
ernments parties (between 15 and 20 points), but in the opposite direction. A similar
pattern can be observed that same year with respect to the predecessors of
GreenLeft, and in 2002 with respect to List Pim Fortuyn (most effects were about 10
points). In other cases, however, the patterns were reversed and evaluation scores of
opposition parties were affected similarly as those of the government parties. For ex-
ample, in 1986 and 1994 voters who were satisfied with the government awarded the
orthodox Protestant parties higher scores than neutral voters, while dissatisfied vot-
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ers awarded them lower scores. The effects were not as large as those regarding the
government parties, but they were still of a considerable magnitude (between 4 and
14 points). In 1998 and 2002, on the other hand, voters who were satisfied with the
government awarded the orthodox Protestant parties similar or slightly lower scores,
and dissatisfied voters awarded them slightly higher scores. These differences can be
understood if one realises that the first two cabinets included the Christian Demo-
crats, whereas the latter two did not.22 Finally, in some cases government satisfaction
had virtually no effect on how voters evaluated a particular party. For example, ef-
fects did not exceed 5 points with respect to the evaluations of D66 in 1986, the Lib-
TABLE 9.8  The impact of government satisfaction on party evaluations
(b values in multiple regression analysis, constant, adjusted R2)
Labour Party Liberal Party
1986 1994 1998 2002 1986 1994 1998 2002
effect of satisfaction - 20.3 5.1 6.9 7.3 15.2 n.s. 3.3 2.2
effect of dissatisfaction 15.8 - 8.1 - 8.7 - 14.8 - 17.4 n.s. - 8.2 - 3.3
constant 62.2 58.6 62.4 56.6 45.2 51.1 51.6 52.8
explained variance 0.27 0.05 008 0.15 0.27 0.00 0.03 0.01
Christian Democrats D66
1986 1994 1998 2002 1986 1994 1998 2002
effect of satisfaction 16.9 10.9 n.s. - 2.3 - 4.4 n.s. 6.9 5.6
effect of dissatisfaction - 22.6 - 14.3 - 5.1 n.s. - 3.1 - 4.2 - 8.3 - 12.5
constant 55.5 54.3 55.8 58.2 55.5 59.6 51.6 52.2
explained variance 0.35 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.10
GreenLeft Socialist Party
1986 1994 1998 2002 1998 2002
effect of satisfaction - 11.0 n.s. n.s. 3.2 n.s. n.s.
effect of dissatisfaction 9.1 - 2.9 - 4.7 - 10.0 4.4 - 3.7
constant 44.8 49.2 55.9 55.8 43.2 48.8
explained variance 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00
Orthodox Protestant List Pim Fortuyn
1986 1994 1998 2002 2002
effect of satisfaction 7.2 8.1 n.s. - 3.3 - 6.3
effect of dissatisfaction - 14.3 - 3.6 5.3 6.5 11.3
constant 34.4 34.7 40.6 42.4 34.4
explained variance 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05
n.s. indicates an effect is not significant
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eral Party in 1994, GreenLeft in 1994 and 1998, and the Christian Democrats and So-
cialist Party in 1998 and 2002.
The explanatory power of the model based on government satisfaction largely
reflects the size of the effects just discussed. In 1986 evaluations of the Labour Party,
Liberal Party, and Christian Democrats could be explained particularly well. The ex-
plained variance was 25 per cent with respect to the former two parties, and even 35
per cent with respect to the latter. Evaluations of the predecessors of GreenLeft and
orthodox Protestant parties could be explained to some extent too (explained vari-
ance equalled 11 per cent). In subsequent years with respect to the government par-
ties the explained variance was at most as high as 15 per cent (Christian Democrats in
1994 and Labour Party in 2002), but sometimes as low as 1 per cent (Liberal Party in
2002). After 1986, the only two opposition parties for whom the model resulted in an
explained variance of 5 per cent were GreenLeft and List Pim Fortuyn in 2002. In all
other cases the explanatory power of the model was very limited. Hence, the model
based on government satisfaction cannot be applied successfully with respect to all
parties and all years. However, in some instances government satisfaction appeared
to play an important role, in particular in relation to government parties.
THE IMPACT OF PARTY LEADER EVALUATIONS
AND MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES
Another reason why voters may like or dislike parties, is because of their leaders.
Leadership effects may be analysed in several ways. Anthony King (2002) distin-
guished three strategies researchers may employ. One of these, the so-called im-
proved-prediction strategy, links up well with the approach adopted here.23 In this
strategy the question asked is: suppose we already know a lot about voters in terms
of their social characteristics, ideological position, policy preferences, partisan loyal-
ties, and the like; what does knowing judgements of party leaders then add to our
ability to predict vote choice? The main reason for employing such a strategy is that
it prevents researchers to falsely attribute effects of the listed factors to the impact of
party leaders (King 2002; cf. Miller and Shanks 1996). Although in this chapter the
aim is different, namely to predict party evaluations, the same strategy may be em-
ployed for the same reasons. The impact of party leader evaluations will thus be as-
sessed in terms of the additional explanatory power they provide. Therefore, the ex-
planatory power of a model that includes all factors discussed so far will first be
examined. This is useful for the analysis of the impact of party leader evaluations,
but may also be considered interesting in its own right. Such multivariate analyses
indicate how much each factor attributes to the explanation of party evaluations
once the others are taken into account.
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To determine the joint impact of religious identity, social class identity, policy
preferences, perceived ideological agreement, and government satisfaction, regres-
sion analyses have again been performed. The dependent variables are the evalua-
tion scores awarded to the various parties. The independent variables are all meas-
ures discussed previously in this chapter. To facilitate comparisons across the
various variables, standardised coefficients (beta weights) are presented.24
All factors influenced party evaluations to some extent (Table 9.9). Since the re-
sults of the analyses indicate the effect of each factor while the effects of the other
factors are controlled for, this implies that the effect of none of the factors was medi-
ated – at least not fully – by other factors.25 So the effects of religious and social class
identity were not mediated fully by policy preferences, and the effects of policy pref-
erences were not mediated fully by perceived left-right agreement either (nor the
other way round). Second, the size of the impact of the various factors varied clearly
across parties, and within parties sometimes across time. Third, earlier conclusions
concerning the size of the impact of the various factors are supported by the
multivariate analyses. Let us focus on these in some more detail.
The size of the impact of social identity varied strongly across parties, and
within parties to a limited extent across time. Voters’ religious identity had a strong
impact on their evaluations of the Christian Democrats (beta varied roughly between
0.15 and 0.25) and, especially among voters with a strong Protestant identity, on their
evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties (beta varied between 0.25 and 0.30).
Evaluations of D66, GreenLeft, and Socialist Party were sometimes also affected by
voters’ religious identity (four beta’s varied between 0.10 to 0.20), while evaluations
of the Labour Party, Liberal Party, and List Pim Fortuyn were virtually unaffected.
The impact of social class identity was limited with respect to all parties. If effects
were at all significant, their size was limited (beta’s mostly varied between 0.05 and
0.10).
The impact of policy preferences also differed across parties. With respect to the
Labour Party and Liberal Party the issue of income inequality mattered most (beta’s
varied between 0.12 and 0.18), while the influence of the asylum seekers issue was
only slightly weaker (beta’s varied between 0.09 and 0.14). Evaluations of the Chris-
tian Democrats and D66 were not affected that strongly by opinions on any issue,
although various issues mattered somewhat. The position of GreenLeft, and to a
more limited extent also that of the Socialist Party, was different. Their evaluations
were affected fairly strongly by various issues, in particular those of asylum seekers
and income inequality. The orthodox Protestant parties and List Pim Fortuyn took a
different position: only one issue mattered, and it did so strongly. In the case of the
orthodox Protestant parties this concerned the euthanasia issue (beta’s varied be-
tween 0.14 and 0.27), while voters’ evaluations of List Pim Fortuyn were affected
very strongly by their opinions about asylum seekers (beta equalled 0.32). No issue
had such a strong impact in any year.
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The only factor that had a relatively similar impact across parties, was left-right
agreement. In general, evaluations of the various parties were affected fairly strongly
by perceived ideological disagreement (most beta’s were close to 0.25). The most no-
table exceptions are that evaluations of the Labour Party in 1986 and of the Liberal
Party in 1994, 1998, and 2002 were affected by left-right disagreement more strongly
(beta’s varied between 0.35 and 0.41), while in 2002 evaluations of D66 were affected
by left-right ideology less strongly (beta equalled 0.17).
Finally, the impact of government satisfaction varied across parties in a particu-
lar way. Among government parties satisfaction and dissatisfaction usually had a
fairly strong impact, while evaluations of the opposition parties were not affected
much. An exception concerns the evaluations of the Labour Party in 1986, which
were affected in the opposite way. With respect to the evaluations of government
parties it is noteworthy that the effect of satisfaction was slightly weaker than that of
dissatisfaction (the mean values of beta equalled 0.12 and 0.16, respectively). Note
also that evaluations of the Christian Democrats in 1986 were affected relatively
strongly by satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the Lubbers-I government, while
evaluations of the Liberal Party in 1998 and 2002 were not affected much by voters’
evaluations of the two purple coalitions led by Kok. Another thing to note is that if
voters were satisfied with the Lubbers-III government of the Christian Democrats
and Labour in 1994, this did not affect their evaluations of the Labour Party. Hence,
the degree to which satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the government affected
evaluations of government parties, varied somewhat across them. In each election,
the strongest effects found involved the prime minister’s party.
Given the differences across parties in the size of the effect of various factors, it
is no surprise that a similar observation can be made regarding the explanatory
power of the multivariate model. In particular, evaluations of the Labour Party, Lib-
eral Party, and Christian Democrats could be explained well in 1986 (explained vari-
ance was about 50 per cent), while in later years the model performed less well. Nev-
ertheless, evaluations of these three parties could also be explained to a considerable
extent in later years (explained variance varied between 20 and 35 per cent). Figures
regarding the evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties and GreenLeft did not
deviate much. The same applies to evaluations of List Pim Fortuyn in 2002, which
could be explained as well as those of most other parties. The model performed rela-
tively poorly, on the other hand, with respect to evaluations of the Socialist Party (ex-
plained variance equalled 20 per cent) and with respect to D66 when they were in
opposition (explained variance equalled 13 per cent).
Another thing to note concerns the constants in the regression analyses, which
varied across parties and time as well. These values refer to a rather peculiar class of
voters: secular middle class voters who had no pronounced views on the various is-
sues, perceived full agreement in terms of left-right, and were neither satisfied nor
dissatisfied with the government. Nevertheless, these values do tell us something
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TABLE 9.9  The multivariate model and party evaluations
(beta coefficients, constant, and adjusted R2 in multiple regression analysis)
Labour Party Liberal Party
1986 1994 1998 2002 1986 1994 1998 2002
weak Christian identity n.s. 0.05 n.s. - 0.04 - 0.05 0.06 n.s. n.s.
strong Christian identity n.s. n.s. - 0.08 n.s. - 0.07 n.s. - 0.08 - 0.05
working class identity 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.06 - 0.05 - 0.08 - 0.10 - 0.05
upper middle class identity n.s. - 0.06 - 0.05 n.s. 0.09 n.s. n.s. 0.07
euthanasia 0.05 n.s. n.s. 0.08 0.06 0.08 n.s. 0.07
income inequality 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.14 - 0.15 - 0.18 - 0.18 - 0.12
nuclear plants 0.08 n.s. 0.06 0.09 - 0.12 - 0.11 - 0.04 - 0.09
European integration n.a. n.a. 0.08 0.07 n.a. n.a. n.s. n.s.
crime n.a. 0.06 n.a. 0.06 n.a. n.s. n.a. n.s.
asylum seekers n.a. 0.13 0.09 0.10 n.a. - 0.09 - 0.14 - 0.12
left-right disagreement - 0.41 - 0.31 - 0.21 - 0.22 - 0.27 - 0.39 - 0.35 - 0.37
satisfied with government - 0.13 n.s. 0.17 0.14 0.17 n.s. 0.06 0.07
dissatisfied with government 0.10 - 0.17 - 0.16 -0.20 - 0.18 n.s. - 0.08 -0.09
constant 67.5 68.3 65.6 60.7 60.7 62.2 65.0 63.3
explained variance 0.52 0.25 0.21 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.32 0.28
Christian Democrats D66
1986 1994 1998 2002 1986 1994 1998 2002
weak Christian identity 0.13 0.23 0.26 0.24 - 0.06 n.s. - 0.07 - 0.05
strong Christian identity 0.16 0.26 0.24 0.22 - 0.09 - 0.08 - 0.19 - 0.18
working class identity n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. - 0.06 n.s. n.s.
upper middle class identity - 0.04 - 0.07 - 0.05 n.s. 0.10 n.s. 0.07 0.07
euthanasia - 0.11 n.s. - 0.10 - 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.14
income inequality n.s. - 0.09 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.08 0.10
nuclear plants - 0.05 - 0.06 n.s. n.s. 0.07 n.s. 0.07 0.05
European integration n.a. n.a. 0.08 0.05 n.a. n.a. 0.08 0.10
crime n.a. n.s. n.a. - 0.08 n.a. n.s. n.a. 0.07
asylum seekers n.a. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.a. 0.13 0.11 0.06
left-right disagreement - 0.24 - 0.23 - 0.22 - 0.29 - 0.29 - 0.25 - 0.20 - 0.17
satisfied with government 0.20 0.12 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.14 0.08
dissatisfied with government - 0.26 - 0.21 - 0.08 n.s. - 0.08 - 0.08 - 0.09 - 0.16
constant 62.2 56.8 56.8 57.8 61.7 67.3 56.0 57.0
explained variance 0.50 0.36 0.23 0.25 0.13 0.13 0.21 0.28
n.s. indicates an effect is not significant; n.a. indicates scores are not available
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TABLE 9.9  (continued)
(beta coefficients, constant, and adjusted R2 in multiple regression analysis)
GreenLeft Socialist Party
1986 1994 1998 2002 1998 2002
weak Christian identity n.s. - 0.06 n.s. n.s. - 0.08 n.s.
strong Christian identity n.s. - 0.11 n.s. n.s. - 0.12 n.s.
working class identity - 0.09 n.s. n.s. - 0.06 n.s. n.s.
upper middle class identity n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.07 n.s. 0.11
euthanasia n.s. n.s. 0.12 0.10 n.s. 0.07
income inequality 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.10 0.13
nuclear plants 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 n.s. 0.08
European integration n.a. n.a. n.s. 0.09 n.s. n.s.
crime n.a. 0.08 n.a. 0.08 n.a. n.s.
asylum seekers n.a. 0.20 0.24 0.17 0.20 0.14
left-right disagreement - 0.27 - 0.29 - 0.25 - 0.26 - 0.26 - 0.25
satisfied with government - 0.15 n.s. n.s. n.s. - 0.07 n.s.
dissatisfied with government n.s. n.s. - 0.06 - 0.07 n.s. n.s.
constant 51.4 64.2 60.2 62.0 58.4 52.8
explained variance 0.22 0.30 0.25 0.34 0.21 0.19
Orthodox Protestant List Pim Fortuyn
1986 1994 1998 2002 2002
weak Christian identity 0.06 0.16 0.09 0.13 n.s.
strong Christian identity 0.25 0.29 0.28 0.26 n.s.
working class identity n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
upper middle class identity n.s. n.s. - 0.06 n.s. n.s.
euthanasia - 0.22 - 0.14 - 0.25 - 0.27 0.06
income inequality n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.07 - 0.06
nuclear plants n.s. - 0.08 n.s. n.s. n.s.
European integration n.a. n.a. - 0.05 n.s. n.s.
crime n.a. n.s. n.a. n.s. n.s.
asylum seekers n.a. n.s. n.s. 0.08 - 0.32
left-right disagreement - 0.24 - 0.23 - 0.22 - 0.23 - 0.26
satisfied with government n.s. 0.06 n.s. n.s. - 0.08
dissatisfied with government - 0.14 n.s. n.s. 0.07 0.09
constant 43.5 42.5 49.4 49.3 41.9
explained variance 0.34 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.31
Note: With respect to the orthodox Protestant parties the model includes dummy variables for a
weak or strong Protestant identity instead of a weak or strong Christian identity.
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about how voters evaluated the various parties, irrespective of the factors included
in the model. The most noteworthy changes across time were that the evaluations of
GreenLeft were considerably more positive than those of their predecessors, and that
the rather positive evaluations of D66 in 1994 had ceased to exist four years later. The
findings furthermore indicate that the orthodox Protestant parties and List Pim
Fortuyn were evaluated relatively negatively. With respect to the former this can be
understood if one realises that the reference group to which the constant refers con-
cerns secular voters.26 This may also explain why the constant regarding the Chris-
tian Democrats was usually slightly lower than that of most other parties. For the
negative evaluations of List Pim Fortuyn such a straightforward explanation is not
available.27
The explanatory power of the model that combines the various concepts pro-
vides a baseline against which the impact of party leader evaluations can be as-
sessed. In Chapter 8 it was already shown that party evaluations and party leader
evaluations strongly correlated. This seems to suggest a large impact of leader evalu-
ations. This impact will be examined by adding party leader evaluations to the
multivariate model discussed above.
The DPES asked voters to indicate how much they liked various party leaders.
I would also like to know how sympathetic you find the following politicians.
If you don’t know a politician, please feel free to say so. First Wim Kok. Which
score would you give him? And Jaap de Hoop Scheffer? …
Voters made use of the same card they used to indicate their feelings about the politi-
cal parties, which had a line printed with values ranging from 0 to 100, while both
end-points and the mid-point were labelled.
Incorporating party leader evaluations in the model improved the explanatory
power substantially (Table 9.10). The extent to which it did, varied between 15 per
cent with respect to evaluations of D66 in 1998 and 46 per cent with respect to evalu-
ations of List Pim Fortuyn in 2002. Consequently, the multivariate model that in-
cluded party leader evaluations resulted in explained variance figures that were con-
siderably higher than those of the multivariate model presented previously. For
example, while in 1998 the model that did not take into account party leader evalua-
tions on average explained about 25 per cent of the variance in party evaluations, the
model that did include party leader evaluations had an explanatory power of around
50 per cent. Hence, the inclusion of party leader evaluations resulted in as much ex-
tra explanation of variance in party evaluations as all the other concepts had ac-
counted for together.
One might be tempted to conclude that party leader evaluations were thus the
single most important determinant of voters’ feelings towards political parties. How-
ever, a warning of caution must be given. The major problem of an analysis of the
impact of party leader evaluations on party evaluations, is that the relationship is
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reciprocal. If party evaluations are regarded as the dependent variables and party
leader evaluations as the independent variables, effects of party leader evaluations
on party evaluations would be found. However, these effects may result from an op-
posite causal direction, namely from party evaluations to party leader evaluations.28
This problem may also occur with respect to other factors, but appears to be most
severe with respect to party leader evaluations.29
One finding in particular suggests that the impact of party leader evaluations
might be overestimated. Consider the findings regarding party evaluations in 1994.
These suggest that evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties were, like those of
the other parties, affected fairly strongly by voters’ feelings towards their leaders.
Similar findings are obtained if one focuses on those parties individually. At the
same time, however, evaluations of the three orthodox Protestant parties were
strongly correlated to each other. In fact, in a model that explains evaluations of one
orthodox Protestant party (GPV) on the basis of voters’ evaluations of the other two
orthodox Protestant parties (RPF and SGP), the explained variance equals 84 per
cent. If voters’ evaluations of the leader of the GPV (Schutte) are additionally in-
cluded, the explanatory power increases with only 2 per cent. This suggests that
evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties have similar causes, and that party
leader evaluations play a minor role. Analyses like those performed in this chapter,
however, result in a different conclusion. This means that such analyses presumably
overestimate the impact of party leader evaluations substantially. This is not to say
that party leader evaluations play no role, but on the basis of the available data we
cannot estimate accurately how large a role they play. As long as the problem of the
reciprocal relationship has not been solved, findings as those presented above
should therefore be interpreted with much care.
TABLE 9.10  Explanatory power of a multivariate model that includes party leader evaluations
(explained variance [adjusted R2] in multiple regression analysis)
additional explained variance overall explained variance
1986 1994 1998 2002 1986 1994 1998 2002
Labour Party 0.21 0.29 0.27 0.20 0.73 0.54 0.48 0.51
Liberal Party 0.19 0.27 0.28 0.16 0.65 0.59 0.60 0.44
Christian Democrats 0.12 0.20 0.26 0.29 0.62 0.56 0.49 0.54
D66 0.32 0.40 0.15 0.30 0.45 0.53 0.36 0.58
GreenLeft n.a. 0.28 0.27 0.28 n.a. 0.58 0.52 0.62
Socialist Party - - 0.38 0.40 - - 0.59 0.59
Orthodox Protestant n.a. 0.33 0.31 0.28 n.a. 0.63 0.64 0.61
List Pim Fortuyn - - - 0.46 - - - 0.77
mean 0.21 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.61 0.57 0.53 0.58
n.a. indicates party leader evaluation scores are not available
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Previous electoral research has made use of various factors to explain vote choice in
the Netherlands. These include social identity, left-right ideology, policy preferences,
and government satisfaction. In this chapter their impact on the evaluations of indi-
vidual parties has been examined. The analyses have shown that virtually all factors
contribute to our understanding of why voters evaluate parties as they do. Perhaps
the most striking observation is that the explanatory power of the models varied con-
siderably across parties, and within parties across time. Evaluations of the Labour
Party could be explained best in 1986 and 1994 on the basis of left-right agreement,
while in 1998 and 2002 models including left-right agreement, policy preferences,
and government satisfaction performed about equally well. Evaluations of the Lib-
eral Party could also be explained best on the basis of left-right agreement, while the
model that included policy preferences clearly outperformed the other two models.
The only exception was 1986, when evaluations of the Liberal Party could also be
explained well on the basis of government satisfaction. With respect to the evalua-
tions of the Christian Democrats in 1986 government satisfaction and left-right
agreement resulted in the best explanations, in 1994 and 2002 left-right agreement
and social identity did, while in 1998 the model based on social identity performed
best. With respect to the evaluations of D66 the most notable observation is that each
model had only limited explanatory power. Evaluations of GreenLeft, on the other
hand, could usually be explained rather well on the basis of voters’ policy prefer-
ences as well as in terms of perceived left-right agreement. With respect to the Social-
ist Party models including these factors had less explanatory power, but more than
the other two. With respect to the orthodox Protestant parties social identity and
policy preferences both explained evaluations rather well, and more so than left-
right agreement. Finally, evaluations of List Pim Fortuyn could be explained best on
the basis of policy preferences, while the model based on left-right agreement out-
performed the other two.
These findings illustrate that each model tells a part of the story. This in a sense
justifies the application of a model that combines the various concepts. In such a
multivariate model perceived left-right agreement played a major role, irrespective
of which party was focused on. Apparently, voters perception regarding the extent to
which parties’ political views correspond with their own opinions in terms of this
general ideological dimension always matter. With respect to government parties
voters’ satisfaction with the incumbent government more often than not played an
important role too, in particular if the party of the prime minister was involved. Ad-
ditionally, voters’ Christian identity was highly relevant regarding the Christian
Democrats and the orthodox Protestant parties, and to a more limited extent with
respect to D66. Social class identity, on the other hand, played only a minor role. Fi-
nally, in some instances particular issues had an impact that could not be accounted
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for by the notions of left and right, nor by any of the other factors. The most notewor-
thy case concerns List Pim Fortuyn. Evaluations of this newcomer were affected very
strongly by voters’ opinions regarding the issue of asylum seekers. The same issue
played a role, although less strongly and with effects in the opposite direction, with
respect to evaluations of GreenLeft and Socialist Party. Another case where opinions
on a particular issue had a large impact, concerns the issue of euthanasia in relation
to the orthodox Protestant parties.
Additional analyses indicated that party evaluations could be predicted more
accurately if party leader evaluations were also included in the model. The effects of
party leaders that were then found, were as large as those of all other factors jointly.
This seems to suggest that voters’ feelings about the parties’ leaders play a major role
with respect to their evaluations of those parties. However, a warning of caution was
given: the causal direction of the effect may well be in the other direction, which
means that voters’ feelings about the party leaders are determined by their feelings
about the parties they represent.
The findings provide support for the view that electoral research should in-
clude party evaluations in its models and analyses, rather than merely focus on vote
choice in terms of a single categorical variable, which indicates what party people
voted for. Evaluations of different parties appear to be affected by different factors.
Only by focusing on evaluations of each party separately, can this be properly ana-
lysed. The fundamental implication of these findings is that the assumption of ho-
mogeneity in bases of evaluation, which underlies many voting models, should be
considered false. Voters do not like or dislike different parties for the same reasons.
Voters like or dislike different parties for different reasons.

PA R T  I V
Conclusions
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C H A P T E R  1 0
A PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
OF VOTING
Similar psychological processes underlie all kinds of behaviour. According to the
view adopted in this research, to understand people’s behaviour we must under-
stand those psychological processes. This implies that to explain why people vote as
they do, psephologists may use insights from psychology. In the preceding chapters
some of those insights were used to formulate a number of models with respect to
voting. These have been tested in the context of four Dutch parliamentary elections.
The following discussion may be seen as an attempt to integrate the ideas presented
into a single psychological theory of voting. Furthermore, the main findings will be
summarised and some of the implications will be discussed. (Implications for psy-
chology are discussed separately in Appendix G.)
A TWO-STAGE MODEL OF VOTING
The picture that emerges from this research is that of voting behaviour as the result
of a two-stage process. The first stage consists of the formation and change of images
of parties, candidates, and governments, as well as the formation and change of
evaluations of those same objects. The second stage is one of decision-making in rela-
tion to a specific upcoming election. According to the view proposed, voters decide
on the basis of the evaluations created in the first stage, in particular the evaluations
of the parties.
Voters’ images as well as their evaluations of parties, candidates, and govern-
ments are based on information that voters receive about them. The two major
sources from which voters obtain information are media messages and personal
communication. Whenever voters process information about political actors this
may have a lasting impact, because it may affect the representation of those objects
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in their long-term memory. This may happen in two ways. First, it is possible that
voters store the information as such. For example, if they hear that a particular party
has proposed to limit the legal possibility of abortion, they may store this fact as such
in their memory. Second, it is possible that voters adjust their image of the party in-
volved. For example, the same information may lead voters to believe that the politi-
cal views of that party correspond closely to principles advocated in the Bible. These
two ways in which memory may be affected correspond closely to the distinction
commonly made between episodic memory and semantic memory (Tulving 1972).
The former concerns personal ‘experiences with’ and the latter concerns ‘facts about’.
So voters’ long-term memory contains memories of their experiences with parties,
candidates, and governments, as well as images about what they are like.
Information is not only processed cognitively, but also affectively; information
is evaluated automatically (cf. Zajonc 1980, 1984). In the example discussed above,
this means that voters will automatically evaluate the proposal by the party to
change abortion laws. They will like or dislike it to a certain degree. Such ‘evaluative
responses’ will mostly be rather weak. When they are strong, this may lead to spe-
cific emotions like disgust, anger, or enthusiasm (cf. Russell 2003).
Evaluative responses and emotions may affect long-term memory. First, voters
may become aware of their response and store the knowledge of the response as
such in their long-term memory. This means that they remember that they liked or
disliked the policy proposal regarding abortion, or whether it made them feel dis-
gusted, angry, enthusiastic, or whatsoever. A second possibility is that the evaluative
response or emotion affects another kind of phenomenon, namely that which Frijda
(1994) referred to as ‘sentiments’ and which Russell (2003) referred to by the notion
of ‘perception of affective quality’. These concern the degree to which particular
things are liked or disliked by a person. They may be conceived of as individuals’
enduring dispositions with respect to a particular object in terms of a like-dislike
continuum. In the example discussed, hearing about the policy proposal may make
voters like the corresponding party, depending on whether a positive or negative re-
sponse was evoked, more or less. If these ‘sentiments’ concern political parties or
candidates, they have been referred to by the notions of party evaluations and candi-
date evaluations. With respect to governments they have been referred to by the no-
tion of government evaluation or incumbent approval. Such evaluations are acti-
vated automatically whenever information about the objects involved is processed
(cf. Fazio et al. 1986; Bargh et al. 1992).
Information processed may also be used by voters to form another kind of im-
age, namely one concerning an upcoming election. These images, which can be con-
ceived of as imagined future scenarios, may be referred to by the notion of prospects.
Prospects concern what might happen in and after the election. Hence, they tell vot-
ers what is at stake. Voters do not only perceive prospects, they evaluate them as
well. If voters think about the possibility that a particular person might become
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prime minister, for example, they will like or dislike this idea and it may make them
anxious or hopeful. Such responses are integrated in a similar way as responses to-
wards parties and candidates into what may be referred to as ‘prospect evaluations’.
These indicate how much voters like or dislike a foreseen or imagined scenario.
An important point to be added is that information stored in long-term
memory may be recalled; it is then processed in a similar way as information from
media messages or personal communication (cf. Damasio 2000). This means that if
voters recall the proposal by the party with respect to abortion, they may again expe-
rience feelings of anger or enthusiasm. Furthermore, these feelings may again affect
their evaluation of the party involved. The representation of parties in long-term
memory is thus relevant for how voters evaluate them, for if this information is re-
trieved, it is evaluated and may consequently affect voters’ evaluation of the party.
So voters who think a lot about the policy proposal concerning abortion – in other
words, voters who strongly associate the party with that policy – will presumably
have an evaluation of that party that is strongly affected by their feelings about that
policy.
The second stage consists of decision-making in relation to a particular
upcoming election. According to the model proposed, voters do not use all informa-
tion stored in memory in relation to the competing parties or candidates, or the in-
cumbent government. Instead, they rely on simple decision rules or short cuts. These
are referred to by the notion of heuristics. The model assumes that in these heuristics
the evaluations formed in the information-processing stage play a key role. Voters
make their decision on the basis of these evaluations.
Six heuristics can be identified. One is the so-called party preference heuristic. It
implies that the only information voters need concerns the degree to which they like
or dislike the competing parties, which are referred to as party evaluations. These tell
voters how to vote, namely for the party they evaluate most positively. This party is
referred to as the party preference. Voters may also base their decision on their
evaluations of the competing candidates, rather than the parties. According to the
corresponding candidate preference heuristic, voters simply vote for the candidate
they like best. Another alternative for voters is to base their choice on the evaluation
of the incumbent government: if voters like the incumbent government, they vote for
them; if they dislike the incumbent government, they vote for the opposition. If the
government involves a coalition of two or more parties this heuristic does not auto-
matically result in a choice for one particular party, but voters may solve this prob-
lem; for example, if voters feel positively about the incumbent government, they
may support the party of the prime minister. Because evaluations of incumbents are
often conceived of in terms of approval, the corresponding heuristic may be referred
to as the incumbent approval heuristic.
If voters employ one of these three heuristics, they do not take into account
what the election is about. Yet voters may do so. In that case, they decide on the basis
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of the election outcome preference heuristic. This means that they cast their vote in a
way associated with bringing about a desired scenario, and base their choice on so-
called ‘prospect evaluations’. For example, if voters prefer a Labour candidate to be-
come prime minister and therefore vote Labour, they make use of this heuristic. This
heuristic is related to the notion of strategic voting, but has to be distinguished from
it. Although strategic voting by definition involves the use of the election outcome
preference heuristic, the use of this heuristic need not result in strategic voting. Vot-
ers who use this heuristic may well vote for the party they like best.
In the other two heuristics that voters may employ, evaluations are not so cen-
tral. First, voters may have the habit of voting for a particular party. When they face
another election they may decide, without much elaboration, to support the same
party again. Voters may also base their choice on the endorsement of a particular
party or candidate by other persons. Although choices made on the basis of these
heuristics are not directly based on evaluations, these may play a role. For example,
it may be hypothesised that voting habits are used by voters only if the various
evaluations are not very intense and thus do not point towards a vote for a particular
party (cf. Marcus et al. 2000).
Figure 10.1 shows a model that combines these ideas. It is referred to as a two-
stage model of voting. In the first stage, which may be referred as the pre-choice
stage, voters process information and this leads to the formation and change of im-
ages of the government, parties, and candidates; voters also form an image of what
upcoming elections are about and who endorse a particular party or candidate. Fur-
thermore, in this stage voters form and change evaluations of the government, par-
ties, candidates, and prospects. In the second stage, which may be referred to as the
choice stage, voters make a decision about for whom to vote on the basis of their
party evaluations, candidate evaluations, government evaluation, prospect evalua-
tions, perceived endorsements, and voting habit. They do so on the basis of simple
decision rules or heuristics.1
How do concepts traditionally used to explain vote choice, such as voters’ social
characteristics, ideological positions, or policy preferences, fit the two-stage model?
In the model such concepts are referred to as exogenous variables.2 These have an
impact on voting if they influence the concepts specified in the model, in particular
the information-processing. For example, orthodox Christian voters pay attention to
other media and have different personal conversations than secular voters, and con-
sequently both groups may process different information. Furthermore, orthodox
Christian voters may respond differently towards the same information as secular
voters. If both groups hear that a particular party has proposed to limit the legal pos-
sibility of abortion, orthodox Christian voters may become enthusiastic, whereas
secular voters may become angry. In a similar way voters with different ideological
positions or different policy preferences can be expected to attend different media
and have different conversations (and hence process different information) and re-
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FIGURE 10.1  A two-stage model of voting
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spond differently to the same information. Such differences in information proc-
essed and evaluative responses or emotions carry over to evaluations of parties, can-
didates, and governments. Voters with different social characteristics, ideological po-
sitions, and policy preferences differ in how they evaluate parties, candidates, and
governments. Consequently, voters who differ in terms of such characteristics will
also differ in terms of how they vote.
The view presented implies that explaining vote choice may also be conceived of
as a two-stage process. The primary task of psephologists is to identify the heuristics
that voters employ to make their choice and explain why they use a particular heu-
ristic. In this stage researchers have to take voting habits, government evaluations,
party evaluations, candidate evaluations, prospect evaluations, and perceived en-
dorsements as a given. After all, voters also take them as a given when they decide
for whom to vote. However, as long as we do not also understand why voters evalu-
ate governments, parties, candidates, and prospects in a particular way, our under-
standing of their voting behaviour will remain limited. It is therefore essential to ad-
ditionally explain why voters like or dislike governments, parties, candidates, and
prospects. This may be considered the second task of electoral researchers.
THE SINCERE VOTE MODEL
In this study the impact of voting habits, endorsements, and evaluations of parties,
governments, candidates, and prospects has been focused on in terms of simple deci-
sion rules, or heuristics. This approach differs from how the relationship between
independent variables and vote choice is often analysed. Many studies of voting pre-
dict vote choice on the basis of a model in which various independent variables are
combined in a mathematical way – as if voters assign different weights to each vari-
able and reach their vote decision by thus combining all variables.
This study also differs from other studies of voting in another way: it has not
considered party choice the sole dependent variable. Instead, voting has been ana-
lysed on the basis of the question whether it could be defined as ‘sincere’. It has been
argued that to understand why people vote as they do the various concepts included
in the two-stage model are not equally important. The single most important concept
is that of party evaluations. In most democratic countries of the world elections can
be seen as primarily a competition between political parties and consequently noth-
ing matters more than how voters feel about those parties. To what degree voters like
or dislike parties is presumably the key to their choice. These feelings have been con-
ceptualised in this study in terms of the social-psychological concept of attitudes.
With respect to political parties voters’ attitudes have been referred to by the notion
of party evaluations. If people vote for the party they evaluate most positively, their
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vote is classified as sincere; if they vote for another party, their vote is classified as
non-sincere.
The influence of party evaluations on voting behaviour has been modelled in
terms of the sincere vote model. This model is based on the idea that it is essential to
distinguish between four concepts: party evaluations, party preferences, voting in-
tentions, and voting behaviour. According to the model, party evaluations jointly
form a party preference. Party preferences indicate which parties voters evaluate
most positively. A party preference may consist of one party (single party prefer-
ence), as well as two or more parties (multiple party preference). According to the
model voters form a voting intention in accordance with their party preference, and
in the polling booth they transform their voting intention into voting behaviour. This
means that three expectations can be formulated: (1) voters intend to vote for the
party they evaluate most positively (the party preference); (2) voters vote in line with
their voting intentions; and consequently (3) voters vote in line with their party pref-
erences. The latter expectation may be referred to as the sincere vote hypothesis.
The sincere vote model has been tested by applying it to the Dutch parliamen-
tary elections in 1986, 1994, 1998 and 2002 on the basis of data from the respective
Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES). The results of the analysis can be sum-
marised by distinguishing five groups of voters: (1) voters who met the expectations
and who had a single party preference, (2) voters who met the expectations and who
had a multiple party preference, (3) voters whose voting intention did not match
their party preference, (4) voters whose voting behaviour did not match their voting
intention, and (5) voters who were undecided (when interviewed before the election)
and whose voting behaviour did not match their party preference.3
What number of voters belonged to each of the five groups is shown in Ta-
ble 10.1. The number of voters who met the expectations and whose choices could be
predicted accurately on the basis of the model decreased from 67 per cent in 1986 to
45 per cent in 2002. In each election a substantial minority of the voters (between 16
and 26 per cent) met the expectations, but their choice could not be predicted accu-
rately because they had a multiple party preference, that is, they evaluated at least
two parties equally positively. Furthermore, in each election all types of discrepan-
cies occurred and caused voters not to meet the expectations. If the figures of the
various categories are combined, then it becomes clear that the number of voters
who did not meet the expectations increased from 17 per cent in 1986 to 30 per cent
in 2002.
Whether the numbers of voters who met the expectations are regarded as high
or low, depends on the perspective taken. If we compare the results to the begin situ-
ation, one in which we knew nothing about voters, the sincere vote model certainly
resulted in a large fit. However, if we think about the fact that most models of voting
assume that voters vote for the party they like best, then the figures of fit are remark-
ably low. From that perspective, we should be surprised about the large number of
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voters who do not fulfil the expectations. In the four elections on average no less than
about one in every four voters violated the assumption that underlies virtually all
models of voting, namely that they vote for the party they like best.
Another important conclusion concerns the concepts distinguished in the sin-
cere vote model. Although strong relationships were found, a substantial minority of
voters intended to vote for another party than one they evaluated most positively,
and another substantial minority voted for another party than the one they initially
intended to vote for. The discrepancies found provide support for the idea that the
three corresponding concepts can and should be distinguished. One reason to do so
is that the discrepancies between the concepts may be useful for particular addi-
tional analyses.
The analysis of the sincere vote model showed that there is more to voting than
simply expressing which party one likes best. What more there is, was discussed in
terms of the alternative heuristics that voters may employ to reach a vote decision.
What is particularly interesting about the heuristics identified, is that they may ex-
plain why voters sometimes prefer to vote for another party than one they evaluate
most positively. Discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions may
TABLE 10.1  Percentage of voters who met the expectations based on the sincere vote model
and why others did not
1986 1994 1998 2002
  1. voters who met the expectations
67 57 48 45
(voters with single party preferences)
  2. voters who met the expectations
16 22 26 25
(voters with multiple party preferences)
  3. voters with a discrepancy between
5 5 9 11
party preference and voting intention
  4. voters with a discrepancy between
9 8 10 12
voting intention and voting behaviour
  5. voters with a discrepancy between
party preference and voting behaviour 5 10 10 11
(voters who were initially undecided)
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1192) (1282) (1596) (1505)
Note: The figures add up to more than 100 per cent, because some voters fit the third as well as the
fourth group (between 1.4 and 2.9 per cent; see Table 7.32 in Chapter 7, categories 10 to 13).
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be attributed to the use of alternative decision rules. To what extent the heuristics
could provide an explanation of so-called non-sincere voting was analysed. Three
factors had the hypothesised impact. First, voters’ preferences regarding the partisan
composition of the future government played a role. If voters preferred a coalition
that did not include their favourite party, they were relatively likely to vote for an-
other party than one evaluated most positively. Second, although party leader evalu-
ations were far less important than party evaluations, they did play a role. Voters
who did not like the leader of their favourite party well, as well as voters who liked
the leader of another party well, were relatively likely to support another party than
their favourite. Third, the findings provide support for the idea that voting habits
play a role. Some voters stuck to the party they already voted for in the previous
election, even though they liked another party somewhat better.
The findings indicate that the impact of strategic voting and candidate prefer-
ences cannot be ignored. These factors may explain the amount of non-sincere voting
found. The findings furthermore indicate that a considerable minority of the voters
changed their mind about for whom to vote in the last weeks of the campaign and
consequently the possibility of changes in party evaluations in the period shortly be-
fore the election cannot be ignored either. This also implies that campaigns matter:
not only may they be used by voters who do not know for whom to vote shortly
before the election, even voters who already know how to vote weeks in advance
may change opinion and vote differently. By distinguishing party preferences, vot-
ing intentions, and voting behaviour, the sincere vote model provides a framework
to study these phenomena. Hence, the sincere vote model reaches further than
merely explaining vote choice on the basis of party evaluations. The model also pro-
vides a basis for additional analyses.
EXPLAINING PARTY EVALUATIONS
A strategy that psephologists might adopt if they wish to study the impact of the
conceptions used traditionally in electoral research, is to examine how they affect
evaluations of parties, candidates, and governments. This approach was adopted in
this research in order to explain party evaluations in the context of four Dutch parlia-
mentary elections. Four models were formulated to explain voters’ party evalua-
tions. For the sake of convenience, they may be referred to as the social identity
model, the policy preferences model, the left-right agreement model, and the incum-
bent approval model. Furthermore, the additional explanatory power of party leader
evaluations was examined. The analyses showed that the various factors indeed af-
fected party evaluations; the extent to which they did varied considerably across par-
ties (see Table 10.2).
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Two social characteristics were examined, namely religious identity and social
class identity. The latter had virtually no impact on how voters evaluated the various
parties. Voters’ religious identity had a considerable effect, but only with respect to
some of the parties. Voters with a (strong) Christian identity evaluated the Christian
Democrats and orthodox Protestant parties much more positively than secular vot-
ers did, while they evaluated Labour much more negatively in 1986, and D66 in 1998
and 2002. The effects were observed even if voters’ ideological positions and policy
preferences were taken into account. Effects on evaluations of the other parties were
either limited or absent. Consequently, whereas evaluations of the Christian parties
could be explained relatively well on the basis of the social identity model (explained
variance varied between 15 and 20 per cent), evaluations of the other parties mostly
could not (explained variance was usually below 5 per cent).
Regarding the impact of policy preferences on party evaluations, variation was
also observed across parties. Variation was found not only in terms of the degree to
which policy preferences could explain party evaluations, but also in terms of which
policy preferences mattered. Evaluations of the Labour Party and Liberal Party were
affected most strongly by voters’ positions regarding the issue of income inequality.
Evaluations of the Christian Democrats were affected most strongly by the issue of
euthanasia. Evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties were affected even more
strongly by voters’ position regarding euthanasia, while a modest effect in the oppo-
site direction was observed for D66. Voters’ feelings about GreenLeft depended most
TABLE 10.2  Explanatory power of various models to explain party evaluations (I)
(explained variance in multiple regression analysis - mean adjusted R2 across four years)
Labour Liberal Christian D66
Party Party Democrats
social identity model 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.07
policy preferences model 0.13 0.17 0.10 0.08
left-right agreement model 0.20 0.25 0.18 0.09
government satisfaction model 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.05
multivariate model 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.19
party leader model (additional power) 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.29
Green Socialist Orthodox List Pim
Left Party Protestant Fortuyn
social identity model 0.04 0.03 0.18 0.00
policy preferences model 0.17 0.11 0.16 0.24
left-right agreement model 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.18
government satisfaction model 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.05
multivariate model 0.28 0.20 0.33 0.31
party leader model (additional power) 0.28 0.39 0.31 0.46
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strongly on their positions regarding the issue of asylum seekers. A similar effect of
more limited magnitude was observed in relation to the Socialist Party. The strongest
effect of policy preferences in any year also concerned the issue of asylum seekers,
but the direction of the effect was reversed. Voters who took a right-wing position on
this issue evaluated List Pim Fortuyn much more positively than other voters.
Multivariate analyses indicated that the asylum seekers issue mattered more
strongly than anything else with respect to how voters felt about this newcomer.
These findings indicate that voters’ policy preferences affect their evaluations of po-
litical parties in varying ways. Whereas some parties are liked or disliked for their
positions on one issue, other parties are for their positions on another issue.
There is one exception to the finding that the impact of the factors varied con-
siderably across parties. Perceived agreement in terms of the left-right continuum
had a similar effect: if voters perceived a particular party to be further removed from
their own position in terms of a left-right continuum, they evaluated that party more
negatively. Across parties as well as across time the effects were of a similar magni-
tude. The left-right agreement model performed relatively well in 1986, in particular
with respect to the three major parties (explained variance varied between 30 and 40
per cent). Political conflict could well be understood in these ideological terms, and
this was apparently an important basis for voters’ evaluations of the major parties.4
Another factor that has been examined in relation to party evaluations is voters’
satisfaction with the incumbent government. Again, effects varied considerably
across parties and time. In some instances, voters’ evaluations of government parties
depended strongly on their satisfaction with the latest government. This was the case
with respect to the Christian Democrats and Liberal Party in 1986, Christian Demo-
crats in 1994, and the Labour Party and D66 in 2002. Evaluations of the Labour Party
in 1994 and of the Liberal Party in 1998 and 2002, on the other hand, were virtually
unaffected by voters’ feelings towards the governments in which these parties par-
ticipated. How much voters liked or disliked opposition parties usually was affected
less strongly by government satisfaction, except for the Labour Party in 1986. Voters
who were satisfied with the government liked them worse, and dissatisfied voters
liked them better. So the overall pattern is that incumbent approval affects evalua-
tions of government parties, most strongly those of the prime minister’s party,
whereas evaluations of opposition parties are usually not affected much. Across par-
ties the explanatory power of the government satisfaction model was rather poor,
except for the three major parties in 1986 (explained variance varied between 25 and
35 per cent).
The impact of a final factor, party leader evaluations, has been examined on the
basis of the so-called ‘improved-prediction strategy’ (cf. King 2002). First, it was ex-
amined how well voters’ party evaluations could be explained on the basis of a
multivariate model that included all concepts discussed above. Self-evidently, the ex-
planatory power of the multivariate model exceeded that of the other models. Next,
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it was shown that adding voters’ evaluations of party leaders to the multivariate
model improved the explanatory power considerably. The degree to which party
evaluations could be explained better if party leader evaluations were included var-
ied across parties, and within parties across time. On average, the additional ex-
planatory power of party leader evaluations was as strong as that of all four other
factors combined. This may seem to suggest that party leader evaluations are of
paramount importance for how voters evaluate parties, but a warning of caution was
given. The strong correlation between party leader evaluations and party evalua-
tions may well be the result of an effect of the latter on the former, rather than the
other way round.
If the models are compared in terms of how well they perform across parties, a
number of observations can be made (see Table 10.3). First, in 1986 and 1994 the left-
right agreement model resulted in larger explained variance figures than any other
model. In 1998 and 2002 the policy preferences model and the left-right agreement
model had fairly similar explanatory power, which was considerably larger than
those of the two other models. The explanatory power of the social identity model on
the whole was rather limited, while the government satisfaction model performed
well only in 1986. If the various concepts are combined in one multivariate model,
the explanatory power exceeds that of the other individual models. Given the previ-
ously discussed findings, it will be no surprise that such a model performed some-
what better in 1986 than in later years. Adding party leader evaluations to the model
strongly improved the explanatory power.
These findings are not at odds with previous electoral research, which mostly
focused on the choice set as a whole rather than evaluations of individual parties.
What has become clear, however, is that behind the overall figures a considerable
amount of variation across parties may be hidden. Although voters’ social identity
overall did not matter much, it did in terms of how some parties were evaluated.
And although government satisfaction could not explain how voters felt towards all
parties, in most instances it did affect rather strongly their evaluations of at least one
TABLE 10.3  Explanatory power of various models to explain party evaluations (II)
(explained variance in multiple regression analysis - mean adjusted R2 across parties)
1986 1994 1998 2002
social identity model 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.07
policy preferences model 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.17
left-right agreement model 0.24 0.17 0.13 0.16
government satisfaction model 0.19 0.04 0.03 0.05
multivariate model 0.36 0.28 0.25 0.29
party leader model (additional power) 0.21 0.30 0.27 0.30
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party. Furthermore, voters’ preferences regarding a particular issue often affected
their evaluations of one party, while having no impact on their evaluations of the
others. By analysing evaluations for each party separately, it has been shown that
some parties are liked or disliked for one reason, and other parties for another.
THE PSEPHOLOGICAL PARADIGM
Most electoral studies share a set of related assumptions with respect to how the
minds of voters work. Jointly, they may be referred to as the psephological para-
digm. Various studies have shown that those assumptions are in fact false. The mind
works differently than electoral researchers have explicitly or implicitly assumed. In
order to increase our understanding of voting, in particular the psychological proc-
esses involved, we therefore need to abandon those assumptions. It is time to assess
to what extent this research has contributed to that task.
In this study the psephological paradigm has not been abandoned fully. Some
of the assumptions commonly made also underlie this study. First, voting has been
regarded as a two-decision process in which voters first decide whether or not they
will vote, and second for whom they will vote. The fact that both decisions need not
be made independently of each other, has been neglected. Second, votes have been
focused on in terms of the party for which they were cast, even though voters may
have considered their votes as being cast for a particular candidate. And third, politi-
cal parties have been regarded as unitary actors. The possibility that voters distin-
guish between different aspects of parties, has not been taken into account. The latter
fact is reflected in the central position of the notion of party evaluations in this re-
search. The use of this concept implies that voters’ likes and dislikes concern parties
as a whole. According to an alternative view, voters may like a particular party better
at the national level than at the local level, or they may like a party better in terms of
its program than in terms of its government performance.
Other assumptions that make up the psephological paradigm, however, have
not been taken for granted. Some of the assumptions challenged have not been ex-
amined empirically. For example, it has been argued that voting studies have falsely
assumed that parties are represented in voters’ memory only in terms of so-called
semantic memory. However, voters not only have images of parties, but also memo-
ries. Voters may remember, for example, specific things that parties have done in the
past. This aspect has traditionally been ignored in many election surveys. The same
applies to the impact of emotions, which have not (yet) gained central stage in elec-
toral research. To what extent this has hindered our understanding of why voters
like or dislike parties remains to be seen, however. The election surveys upon which
this study is based did not contain data necessary for the required analyses.
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Some other assumptions have been challenged and this has been supported by
empirical evidence. Most importantly, the assumption of a sincere vote, according to
which all voters simply vote for the party they like best (irrespective of the electoral
context), has been examined rigorously. This has been done by testing the sincere
vote model. The findings show that this assumption is false. A considerable amount
of voters preferred to vote for another party than one they evaluated most positively.
To some extent the discrepancies found between voters’ party preferences and voting
behaviour might be seen as a methodological artefact, which results from the design
of election surveys like the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies. Because party
evaluations were assessed some time before the actual election, changes in those
evaluations in the latest phase of the campaign may have accounted for discrepan-
cies observed between party preferences and actual voting behaviour. However,
even in the pre-election interviews a considerable minority of voters indicated that
they intended to vote for a party that they did not like best at that moment. This
means that the assumption of a sincere vote has to be considered false. Moreover,
large minorities of voters were found to like at least two parties equally well. For
them, too, there is more to voting than simply expressing which party they liked
best. If they were to vote for the party they evaluated most positively, they would not
be able to reach a decision.
Another assumption that has been challenged is the assumption of causal ho-
mogeneity, according to which all voters decide in the same way. It has been argued
that voters may decide on the basis of different choice mechanisms. This view has
been combined with the idea that voters make use of heuristics. When faced with an
election, voters do not weigh all information related to the judgement or contestants.
Instead, they rely on decision short cuts. The most important heuristics have been
identified on the basis of a combination of existing voting studies, in particular the
study by Downs (1957), and attitude-behaviour models. According to the resulting
view, voters may decide for whom to vote on the basis of a voting habit, by relying
on their evaluations of one of three key political actors – incumbent government,
competing parties, or their candidates –, on the basis of their preferences regarding
the outcome of the election, or on the basis of endorsements by other people. The
analyses show that vote choices cannot all be understood from the perspective of a
single heuristic, not even the heuristic that underlies virtually all models of voting
(party preference heuristic). However, virtually all vote choices can be understood
from the perspective of at least one heuristic.
An assumption that shows similarity with the previous one, is the assumption
of homogeneity in bases of evaluation. Most models of voting build on the idea that
the degree to which voters like or dislike parties depends on their image of those
parties, that the image of each party consists of the same set of elements, and that the
evaluations of those elements jointly determine the overall evaluation of a party. Par-
ties are assumed to be liked and disliked for the same reasons. According to the
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model of party evaluations presented in this research, however, how voters evaluate
parties depends on their evaluations of information they process about each party.
The model states that information that voters process in working memory automati-
cally evokes emotional responses, and that these are integrated by forming and up-
dating party evaluations – hence the model is referred to as the emotion-integration
model. This implies that evaluations of different parties may be based on different
kinds of information. After all, the media reports and personal conversations about
one party may involve different subjects than those concerning another party. The
analyses support this view: the extent to which voters’ social identity, policy prefer-
ences, perceived ideological agreement with parties, and satisfaction with the incum-
bent government affected their party evaluations, clearly differed across those par-
ties. Contrary to what models of voting often assume, the bases of evaluation are not
the same across parties.
FUTURE RESEARCH
There are various ways in which future research might build on this study and fur-
ther improve our insight in why people vote as they do. Some possibilities seem par-
ticularly worth mentioning.
One strategy is related to the simplifications that have been made in this study.
Self-evidently, the real world is not as simple as the models presented suggest. For
example, it may be doubted whether voters’ feelings with respect to parties are in-
deed one-dimensional, as suggested by the central notion of party evaluations, and
can be conceived of as a single score in terms of a like-dislike continuum. The possi-
bility that voters’ attitudes towards parties may be ambiguous, for example, has not
been taken into account. Perhaps conceptualising those feelings in terms of two or
more dimensions – for example, one for positive and one for negative feelings (cf.
Cacioppo et al. 1997) – and examining their relationships with vote choice, would
result in more accurate explanations of voting. Or one might conceptualise voters’
feelings towards parties in terms of a number of discrete emotions, like anger, dis-
gust, and enthusiasm (cf. Abelson et al. 1982; Marcus et al. 2000). Similarly, feelings
about incumbent governments and feelings about prospects need not be one-dimen-
sional; they may also be conceptualised, for example, in terms of discrete emotions
like anger and gratitude (incumbents), or hope and fear (prospects). Furthermore,
the implicit assumption of the sincere vote model that voters either have an intention
to vote in a particular way or have no intention at all, may be challenged. Perhaps it
would be more accurate to conceive of the formation of voting intentions as the re-
sult of a process that consists of various stages. Voters who are hesitating between
two parties, for example, could be considered as occupying some kind of intermedi-
ate position.
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With respect to the heuristics that voters may use to decide for whom to vote,
one question in particular still needs to be answered. This study has identified the
heuristics that voters may use, but it has not clarified in what circumstances voters
will adopt which heuristic. There are at least two ways in which this matter might be
dealt with. First, the heuristics identified might be ordered in terms of a hierarchy.
One could hypothesise, for example, that if the election outcome preference heuristic
points to a particular party, voters will use that heuristic. If it does not, they will turn
to the incumbent approval heuristic. If this heuristic does not provide a choice either,
voters will turn to the party preference heuristic, next to the candidate preference
heuristic, otherwise to the voting habit heuristic, and in the last instance to the en-
dorsement heuristic. Self-evidently, another ordering is also conceivable. This matter
might also be dealt with in another way. One could conceive of the concepts that un-
derlie the use of the various heuristics as making up a number of parallel forces, that
may each point towards (or away from) a particular party. Which of the forces deter-
mines for whom people vote, may be hypothesised to depend on their strength. This
means that if voters have particularly strong feelings about the competing candi-
dates, for example, they might be hypothesised to use the candidate preference heu-
ristic. Future studies might examine whether such explanations can add to our un-
derstanding of voters’ use of heuristics.
With respect to the finding that evaluations of different parties may have differ-
ent origins, there is a similar problem. The question arises why certain characteristics
are important with respect to some parties, but not with respect to others. On the
basis of this study, it may hypothesised that this has to do with the information that
voters process about parties, which in turn depends on the way parties are discussed
in the media, which in turn presumably depends – at least partly – on the behaviour
of the parties themselves. To what extent this explanation holds, has not been exam-
ined in this study. By combining studies of voting behaviour with studies of political
communication and media studies of election campaigns this may be analysed. Fur-
thermore, to what extent the emotion-integration model of party evaluations pro-
vides a more accurate description of the psychological processes that underlie the
formation and change of party evaluations than other models, remains to be seen.
On the basis of the kind of data upon which this study is based (traditional election
surveys) this cannot be assessed. Hence, future studies might address this matter by
employing different methods, such as experimentation.
Another matter that has not been addressed, is the impact of the political sys-
tem. It has been assumed that the psychological processes that underlie voting do
not differ across countries with different political systems. Nevertheless, the system
may matter. For example, the extent to which individuals meet the expectations of
the sincere vote model may differ across political systems. One might hypothesise
that the expectations are met less often in political systems in which candidates play
a more central role. The political system may also influence the degree to which
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other heuristics are employed by voters. One might hypothesise, for example, that
political systems that typically lead to coalition governments inhibit the use of the
incumbent approval heuristic and the election outcome preference heuristic.
Examining such an impact of political systems may increase our understanding of
voting.
A final way to build on this research, would be to apply the sincere vote model
more broadly. In this study the model has only been applied to explain voting behav-
iour at the individual level at a single point in time. Both in terms of the time frame,
as well as in terms of the level of analysis, the analysis can be extended. First, one
might use the sincere vote model to analyse electoral change at the individual level.
The model suggests that if voters change their vote, this can be attributed primarily
to changes in evaluations of the competing parties; additionally, changes in the im-
pact of factors that lead to non-sincere voting and changes in the composition of the
set of competing parties may play a role. Second, one might use the sincere vote
model to analyse electoral change at the aggregate level. The model suggests that
such changes can be attributed to changes in evaluations of the competing parties at
the individual level (in combination with changes at the individual level in the im-
pact of factors that lead to non-sincere voting and changes in the composition of the
electorate). On the basis of the sincere vote model a nexus between the analysis of
voting behaviour (individual level) and election outcomes (aggregate level) may be
established.
ON PARTISANSHIP
Arguably, one of the most important implications of this research concerns the
conceptualisation of partisanship. The Michigan scholars initially saw partisanship
as one of the factors that influenced the vote directly (Campbell et al. 1954). In The
American Voter (1960), however, they argued that partisanship had to be seen as an
indirect determinant of vote choice. This was specified in terms of the ‘funnel of cau-
sality’. Social characteristics determined which party voters identified with, party
identification influenced voters’ perceptions and evaluations of the competing candi-
dates and the issues central in the election, and these perceptions and evaluations
influenced their vote choice. European electoral research has traditionally treated
voters’ feelings towards the political parties in the same way: in terms of identifica-
tion.
According to the view presented in this research, partisanship should be con-
sidered a direct determinant of vote choice. Most democratic countries of the world
have a parliamentary system in which political parties play a key role. Elections can
then be conceived of as primarily a choice between parties. Consequently, when vot-
ers decide for whom to vote, their feelings towards the competing parties may be
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expected to be of paramount importance and influence their vote choice directly.
Furthermore, this study proposes to conceptualise partisanship not in terms of iden-
tification, but in terms of evaluation. This means that in Europe voters’ feelings about
parties should be treated in the same way as feelings about candidates have been in
the United States: as direct determinants of vote choice that are conceptualised and
operationalised in terms of a like-dislike continuum. This implies that partisanship is
not regarded a stable disposition, acquired in early life and maintained during adult-
hood. Instead, the view presented fits better the conception of partisanship as a run-
ning tally (cf. Fiorina 1981).5
The analyses presented in this research show that if partisanship is treated in
the way proposed, various problems associated with the party identification concept
may be overcome. Thomassen (1976b) pointed out that party identification, at least
in the way the concept was operationalised in Dutch election studies, could not be
distinguished meaningfully from vote choice: voters simply identified with the par-
ties they voted for (or intended to vote for) and reverse. The findings in this research
show that this problem does not apply if partisanship is conceptualised and
operationalised in terms of party evaluations. Although most voters intended to vote
for a party they evaluated most positively (their party preference), a substantial
number of voters were found to intend to vote for another party. The party prefer-
ence concept can be distinguished empirically from vote choice. Additional analyses
indicated this distinction is meaningful. Discrepancies between which party voters
liked best and which party they intended to vote for could (in part) be explained on
the basis of party leader evaluations and preferences regarding the partisan compo-
sition of the future government.
Another problem with the party identification concept, Van der Eijk and
Niemöller (1983, ch. 8) argued, is that in the Netherlands many voters identified with
more than one party. This problem of multiple identifications does not apply to the
party preference concept, or to its measure. Instead, the possibility of multiple pref-
erences is incorporated. Whether a party preference is single or multiple depends on
whether one party is evaluated most positively, or whether more than one party is.
Theoretically, there is no reason why voters may not like more than one party
equally well. The empirical analysis has shown that many voters indeed do. So the
second major problem of the party identification concept also does not apply to
party evaluations and party preferences.6 Furthermore, focusing on voters’ feelings
with respect to parties in terms of party evaluations fits Richardson’s (1991) plea for
measurements that tap negative feelings. Whereas negative feelings towards parties
cannot be analysed well on the basis of the party identification concept, they can be
analysed in terms of party evaluations.
Another matter is whether partisanship needs to be included in a model of vot-
ing. The finding that the concept of party identification cannot be applied to the
Netherlands, has led several scholars to conclude that we should focus on identifica-
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tion in terms of social groups or in terms of ideology. It should be questioned
whether this is the best strategy. Political parties are such central objects in the elec-
toral process, that how voters feel about them cannot be ignored if one wants to un-
derstand their behaviour. The only question is how the influence of those feelings on
voting behaviour has to be analysed. This study has provided an answer to that
question.
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A P P E N D I X  A
THE CONCEPT OF A SINCERE VOTE
The introduction of the concept of a sincere vote is generally credited to Robin
Farquharson. In Theory of Voting (1969) he sought to fill a gap in social choice litera-
ture, namely its neglect of strategies that voters may employ in order to obtain a de-
sired outcome. In order to be able to analyse such strategies, he used the notion of
‘sincere voting’ as a point of departure.
In the mathematical models Farquharson presented three concepts are central:
voters, outcomes, and preferences (pp. 5-6). Voters are defined as individuals (or
other units, such as nations), which constitute an electorate (or an assembly or com-
mittee) and whose choices have consequences. Outcomes are defined as the possible
results of the decision process in which voters participate. Preferences are defined as
voters’ evaluations of the outcomes in terms of a rank order. Hence, voters are as-
sumed to be able to list all possible outcomes of a voting procedure in order of their
preference. Farquharson argued that in his book the results “have been set out only
for the case of three voters and three outcomes, but can readily be extended to cover
any desired number of either” (pp. xi-xii). Furthermore, he argued that outcomes
may involve single candidates as well as combinations of candidates (p. 6). This
means that the models can also be applied to parliamentary elections in which politi-
cal parties compete for a large number of seats.
Following K. J. Arrow (1951), Farquharson noted that “the simplest assumption
which can be made about the behaviour of voters is that their votes are directly in
accordance with their preference scales” (p. 17). Such behaviour he referred to as
‘sincere voting’. In some cases this kind of behaviour is not advantageous to a voter,
since voting another way would have resulted in a more preferable outcome (prefer-
able from the perspective of the voter). Voters may then adopt a strategy other than
voting sincerely. This is commonly known as ‘strategic voting’. Note that in order to
be able to vote strategically, voters need to have an idea about the preferences of
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other voters. If few other voters share their preferences, it may be advantageous to
adopt a strategy and vote ‘non-sincerely’.
Farquharson’s notion of sincere voting can be applied relatively easily to a con-
text in which three candidates (A, B, and C) compete for a single seat on the basis of
plurality rule. In that case, there are three possible outcomes: (1) candidate A wins
the seat, (2) candidate B wins the seat, and (3) candidate C wins the seat. Voters are
assumed to rank order these three outcomes and sincere voting corresponds with
voting for the candidate one prefers to win the seat. For example, for voters with the
preference rank order ‘ABC’ sincere voting corresponds with voting for candidate A.
It becomes slightly more complicated if three candidates compete for two seats,
even though in that case there are also only three possible outcomes: (1) candidates A
and B win the seats, (2) candidates A and C win the seats, and (3) candidates B and C
win the seats. What complicates the situation is that if voters prefer a particular out-
come, this does not lead to a unique vote choice. For example, for voters who prefer
the outcome in which candidates A and B win the seats, the question remains
whether to vote for candidate A or B. This problem can be solved by focusing on the
whole rank order: a ‘second preference’ for candidates A and C to win the seats leads
to a sincere vote for candidate A, whereas a ‘second preference’ for candidates B and
C to win the seats leads to a sincere vote for candidate B. This example nicely illus-
trates the necessity of the assumption that voters rank order all possible outcomes.
Another situation is that in which three parties compete for two seats. In that
case there are six possible outcomes: (1) party A wins both seats, (2) party B wins
both seats, (3) party C wins both seats, (4) party A and B both win one seat, (5) party
A and C both win one seat, and (6) party B and C both win one seat. This means that
in such an election voters need to rank order six alternative outcomes. If they vote
according to these preferences, their vote may be called sincere.
As Farquharson rightly pointed out, the principles he set out can be applied to
elections with any number of candidates (or parties) and any number of seats. If one
wants to apply the ideas empirically, however, one runs into trouble. The reason lies
in the fact that voters need to rank order all possible outcomes. In the context of
Dutch parliamentary elections, for example, usually around twenty parties compete
for 150 seats. If one would exclude parties that fail to win any seat, this still leaves
about ten parties and 150 seats. This means that in Farquharson’s terms there are
about 140 billion possible outcomes, which voters are presumed to rank order. This
may be possible theoretically, but in practice voters cannot be expected to be capable
of rank ordering such a large number of possible outcomes, nor can any such rank
order be assessed in empirical research.
This study therefore proposes to define a sincere vote not in terms of the out-
come of an election (as alternative distributions of the seats), but in terms of those
who compete in an election. As in this research political parties are put central, sin-
cere voting is defined in terms of voters’ preferences regarding the competing par-
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ties. Furthermore, this study proposes to determine these preferences not on the ba-
sis of a rank order of parties provided by voters, but on the basis of voters’ evalua-
tions of each individual party; evaluations indicate to what extent a voter likes or
dislikes a particular party. By comparing at the individual level the evaluations of the
competing parties, voters party preferences can be determined. A vote is defined as
sincere if it is cast in favour of the party that a voter prefers, that is, evaluates more
positively than any other party.1
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A P P E N D I X  B
ILLUSTRATIONS OF
THE USE OF HEURISTICS
Support for the view that voters may use different decision rules, or heuristics, can
be found in analyses of answers that voters themselves provide to open-ended ques-
tions about why they voted for a particular party. Tables below list examples of such
answers, taken from the 1998 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (Aarts et al. 1999).
First, various voters motivated their choice by referring to an election outcome
they preferred (Table B.1). For example, some said that the ‘purple coalition’ had to
return, that Labour should become large enough, or that Wim Kok should become
prime minister again. Some others mentioned their aversions with respect to possi-
ble election outcomes; for example, by stating that they wanted to prevent a second
purple coalition, to prevent the Liberals to become the largest party, or to prevent
that Bolkestein would become prime minister. Various other voters motivated their
choice by referring to retrospective judgements, which mostly involved approval of
the incumbent government or its leader (Table B.2). For example, some voters said
they were very satisfied about the past four years or that Kok was doing well.
Other voters made statements that point to the use of the party preference heu-
ristic (Table B.3). They said they voted for a particular party simply because it was
the most attractive party, because it appealed to them most, or because there was no
better alternative. Some other voters motivated their choice by referring to the appeal
of a particular politician, mostly the leader of the party they supported (Table B.4).
Voting habits were also mentioned by various voters, who sometimes said they
voted for a particular party because they had done so all their life, for years, or the
last times (Table B.5). The notions of tradition and being brought up that way point
to a similar mechanism of automatic choice. Finally, some voters indicated that they
based their choice on the endorsement of that party by someone else (Table B.6).
They indicated that others said they had to vote that way, that they did so on the
advice of a colleague, or because their husband voted for them.
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TABLE B.1  Vote choice motivations related to the election outcome preference heuristic
Somewhat leftist government needed; Labour should be large enough PvdA-voter
I found that Wim Kok should become prime minister again PvdA-voter
I was afraid that otherwise we would get Bolkestein as prime minister PvdA-voter
To prevent that the Liberals would become the largest party PvdA-voter
Because ‘purple’ had to return D66-voter
I was afraid that they would become too small to maintain ‘purple’ D66-voter
Must remain in ‘purple’ cabinet D66-voter
There should be no ‘purple-II’ CDA-voter
Hoped that CDA would win; to get representatives of CDA in government CDA-voter
TABLE B.2   Vote choice motivations related to the incumbent approval heuristic
Very satisfied about past four years PvdA-voter
‘Purple-I’ did well PvdA-voter
Because Kok is doing well PvdA-voter
Kok was good as prime minister PvdA-voter
Because of the good economy thanks to this cabinet PvdA-voter
Ministers did good work last four years VVD-voter
I found that they were doing well D66-voter
They had an important role the last four years D66-voter
Was not so satisfied with the ‘purple’ cabinet CDA-voter
TABLE B.3  Vote choice motivations related to the party preference heuristic
Most attractive party PvdA-voter
A good party PvdA-voter
In other parties less trust PvdA-voter
The best party CDA-voter
Is my party CDA-voter
Appeals to me most VVD-voter
There was no better alternative VVD-voter
Better than D66 GL-voter
Made the best impression on me SP-voter
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TABLE B.4  Vote choice motivations related to the candidate preference heuristic
I like Kok PvdA-voter
Because of Kok PvdA-voter
More confidence in Kok than Rosenmöller PvdA-voter
Pronk is an honest politician PvdA-voter
Convincing impression of De Hoop Scheffer CDA-voter
Bolkestein is clear VVD-voter
Els Borst appealed to me D66-voter
Borst made a good impression in the debate D66-voter
Kok is not my man SP-voter
TABLE B.5  Vote choice motivations related to the voting habit heuristic
That has always been my party PvdA-voter
Tradition PvdA-voter
Brought up with PvdA-voter
Out of habit CDA-voter
Have voted for them all my life CDA-voter
Always voted for a confessional party CDA-voter
Tradition, for years my party VVD-voter
I did that last times VVD-voter
Always voted D66 D66-voter
TABLE B.6  Vote choice motivations related to the endorsement heuristic
I always vote the same as my husband PvdA-voter
Because others said I had to do so PvdA-voter
People say that it is a good party PvdA-voter
Because father voted for that party as well CDA-voter
I think I have to because I am a Catholic CDA-voter
On the advice of a colleague VVD-voter
Because my parents vote for them VVD-voter
Husband voted for me D66-voter
My girlfriend did it for me D66-voter
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A P P E N D I X  C
THE CONCEPTUALISATION
OF MEMORY
To understand how parties are represented in memory, and how this may affect vot-
ers’ evaluations of these parties, it may be useful to provide a classification of
memory based on three distinctions: long-term versus short-term memory, primary
versus secondary memory, and episodic versus semantic memory (see Figure C.1).
In The Principles of Psychology (1890) William James distinguished between pri-
mary and secondary memory. Information that is perceived through the senses, and
which individuals become consciously aware of, concerns primary memory.
An object of primary memory is not thus brought back; it was never lost; its
date was never cut off consciousness from that of the immediately present mo-
ment. In fact it comes to us as belonging to the reaward portion of the present
space of time, and not to the genuine past. (James 1890a/1950: 646-647)
Secondary memory concerns the recollection of that same information after it has
dropped from consciousness.
Secondary memory […] is the knowledge of a former state of mind after it has
already once dropped from consciousness; or rather it is the knowledge of an
event, or fact, of which meantime we have not been thinking, with the additional
consciousness that we have thought or experienced it before. (James 1890a/1950: 648)
The fact that information can be recalled implies that it has been stored. This
points to the distinction between short-term and long-term memory. Primary and
secondary memory both concern what today is commonly referred to as short-term
or working memory (Squire 1987, ch. 10). Information that is present in conscious
awareness concerns short-term memory. Information that is stored, which can be re-
trieved and thus become secondary memory, concerns long-term memory.
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Larry Squire (1987, ch. 11) proposed to categorise long-term memory in turn on
the basis of two divisions, which reflect the fact that different systems in the brain are
involved.2 The first division is that between declarative and procedural memory. The
former concerns memory for facts and experiences that can be expressed verbally,
whereas the latter includes skills and abilities (which cannot be expressed verbally).
Since the latter are not of interest in this context, procedural memory will be ignored
here. With respect to declarative memory, Squire further distinguished between epi-
sodic and semantic memory (cf. Tulving 1972). The former is associated closely with
personal experiences, the latter with knowledge of facts.
Episodic memory refers to memory for past events in an individual’s life. This
system represents information concerning temporally dated episodes that can
later be recollected. Episodic memory stores the cumulated events of one’s life,
an individual’s autobiography. Semantic memory refers to knowledge of the
world. This system represents organized information such as facts, concepts,
and vocabulary. The content of semantic memory is explicitly known and
available for recall. Unlike episodic memory, however, semantic memory has
no necessary temporal landmarks. It does not refer to particular events in a
person’s past. (Squire 1987: 169-170)
Although the distinction between episodic and semantic memory has proven contro-
versial, in particular regarding the question whether different brain systems are in-
volved, in social psychology the distinction has been considered useful (Carlston and
Smith 1996: 185).3
Both the orthodox model and the on-line model (see Chapter 6) consider the
way that parties and candidates are represented in voters’ memory relevant for how
they evaluate them. However, they differ in terms of the kind of memory focused on.
Traditional theories of voting focus primarily on long-term memory, in particular se-
mantic memory. Research on the on-line model has emphasised the role of short-
term memory, in particular primary memory. To understand well why voters evalu-
ate parties or candidates as they do, however, all four aspects have to be focused on.
FIGURE C.1  Taxonomy of memory (based on Squire 1987 and James 1890a)
MEMORY
short-term long-term
primary secondary episodic semantic
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A P P E N D I X  D
THE CONCEPTUALISATION
OF EMOTIONS
Various authors have stressed that how individuals evaluate parties or candidates
cannot be understood properly if one does not take into account the role of emotions
(see Chapter 6). The aim of this appendix is to discuss the conceptual issues related
to this literature in some more detail, and thereby provide the basis for a model of
party evaluations in which the role of emotions is incorporated. This model itself,
which is referred to as the emotion-integration model of party evaluations, is dis-
cussed in Chapter 6.
EMOTIONAL RESPONSE AND FEELING THERMOMETERS
According to George Marcus, Russell Neuman and Michael MacKuen (2000) emo-
tions result from two different systems in the brain: the disposition system and the
surveillance system (see Chapter 6). If we assume that these systems exist, an impor-
tant question is whether the emotional output of the systems is unipolar or bipolar.
This has implications for how the impact of emotion should be conceptualised, as
well as for how they can best be measured. Marcus and his colleagues argued that
the emotional outcomes of the two systems can be conceptualised best as two unipo-
lar dimensions. This means that depression is nothing but the absence of enthusiasm,
and calmness is nothing but the absence of anxiety. They furthermore argued that
this implies that conceptualising emotional response along a bipolar valence dimen-
sion is misleading. Consequently, the use of the feeling thermometer scale is inap-
propriate, they argued. Their arguments link up to those provided by John
Cacioppo, Wendi Gardner and Gary Berntson (1997), who argued that attitudes,
which are usually conceived of as a single bipolar dimension (see Chapter 3), can be
234 THE  SINCERE  VOTE
represented better in terms of two unipolar dimensions (one for positive and one for
negative evaluative processes).
Although Marcus and his colleagues may be right that emotion cannot be con-
ceptualised best as one bipolar valence dimension, this does neither imply that the
emotional output of the two systems is unipolar, nor that feeling thermometer scales
have to be abandoned. For the conceptualisation of emotional response there are a
number of alternatives to the two unipolar dimensions. One possibility is to view
both dimensions as bipolar. With respect to the emotional output of the disposition
system, which scans successes and failures of ongoing activities, Marcus and his col-
leagues focused primarily on enthusiasm resulting from detected success. They re-
garded depression as the typical outcome of absence of enthusiasm. Another possi-
bility would be to focus explicitly on the frustration of people’s goals as an opposite
of success. A prime candidate for the corresponding emotional outcome appears to
be anger. Anger may be hypothesised to result from a detected frustration in the dis-
position system. Clearly, anger does not point to the absence of enthusiasm, but has
to be seen as an emotion in its own right. Consequently, anger and enthusiasm could
be seen as the opposites of a bipolar dimension.4 In a similar way one could argue
about the possible opposite of anxiety and fear. Aristotle (335 B.C./1991) already ar-
gued that two important emotions that are each other’s opposites are phobos and
tharsos, which have been translated as fear and confidence. Hence, we may conceive
of emotions – if the term emotion is appropriate – as trust and confidence as the op-
posite of emotions like anxiety and fear.
Another possibility is to regard emotional response as four unipolar dimen-
sions, by separating the aforementioned positive emotions from their negative oppo-
sites. Yet another possibility is that some emotions concern a bipolar dimension,
whereas others concern a unipolar dimension.5 Finally, emotions may be conceived
of as more varied, in line with the distinctions that have been made between differ-
ent so-called discrete emotions. This links up to the idea that there are only a limited
number of ‘basic emotions’, such as fear, anger, disgust, joy, and sadness. Other emo-
tions, such as shame or guilt, have been conceived of as specific mixtures of basic
emotions, and correspondingly distinctions have been made between ‘primary’ and
‘secondary’ emotions (see, for example, Plutchik 1980, ch. 9–11). To analyse their im-
pact, different emotions may thus also be conceptualised and analysed as distinct
phenomena, rather then transforming them into scores for positive and negative
emotions, or for enthusiasm and anxiety.6
What this discussion shows, is that emotional response can be conceptualised in
several ways. A lesson to be learned from the work by Marcus and his colleagues is
that emotion is not conceptualised best as one bipolar valence dimension. However,
their framework seems problematic as well. It may be doubted whether feeling un-
enthusiastic, safe, or comfortable indeed can be conceived of best as absence of emo-
tional response, and it can be questioned whether the disposition and surveillance
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system have only unipolar emotions as their outputs. Furthermore, it remains un-
clear how emotions that are not included in the framework have to be dealt with.
Can these emotions be ignored? If not, how must they be treated?
Another matter is whether feeling thermometer scales are appropriate measure-
ments for emotional response. If one thinks that emotional response can be
operationalised by a single bipolar measure, the objections by Marcus and his col-
leagues appear to be valid. The results of various studies confirm that emotional re-
sponse cannot be conceived of that way (see Marcus et al. 2000). However, this does
not imply that feeling thermometer ratings are not valuable. To come to that conclu-
sion, it would above all be necessary to show that there exists no such thing as liking
or disliking candidates (or other objects), the notions that underlie the measure-
ments. This is not what the studies on the impact of emotions showed. Emotional
responses in terms of anxiety, fear, enthusiasm, disgust, and anger may well exist
next to positive and negative affect as tapped by feeling thermometer scales. If such
discrete emotions, or the dimensions they jointly make up, exist independently of
each other, this does not imply that liking and disliking as such, or related emotions
like love and hate, do not exist. Consequently, it may be useful to study the latter
additionally. Furthermore, even if positive and negative affect exist largely inde-
pendently of one another, they may still be studied in terms of ratings along a single
bipolar evaluative dimension (Cacioppo et al. 1997).7 So although feeling thermom-
eter ratings do not reflect the variety of emotional responses that voters may show,
the measure may still be useful for assessing an overall evaluation, like that referred
to as an on-line tally (Lodge et al. 1989).
TAXONOMY OF EMOTION
If liking and disliking exist next to emotional responses as anxiety, fear, hope, enthu-
siasm, pride, disgust, and anger, the question arises how these phenomena relate to
each other. In this context an important distinction is that between emotional re-
sponse as an acute or temporary state and emotional response as a more enduring or
permanent state, which is often referred to by the notion of a trait. According to Rich-
ard Lazarus (1994: 79), of the many distinctions that have been made between differ-
ent kinds of emotion phenomena, that between stable and unstable, or between state
and trait, is the least controversial. Another distinction that can be used to classify
emotions is whether or not the emotion is related to a specific object or event (inten-
tionality). Emotions that lack an object are often distinguished and referred to by the
notion of moods. Nico Frijda’s (1994) classification of emotional or affective phenom-
ena into four categories is based on these two distinctions. With respect to emotions
that involve a specific object or event, Frijda distinguished between emotion epi-
sodes (temporary states) and sentiments (enduring states). The notions of love and
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hate, and likes and dislikes, he regarded as typical examples of this latter category
(although these words may be used also to refer to temporary states). Emotional re-
sponses that do not involve a particular object may be referred to as moods (tempo-
rary states) and personality or temperament (enduring states).
A classification of emotion based on these two distinctions is provided in
Figure D.1. Emotional phenomena are divided first on the basis of the temporal di-
mension into states and traits.8 Emotion states and traits are both in turn divided on
the basis of the question whether they are directed at a particular object. Emotion
states that lack an object are referred to as moods, while those directed at a particular
object are referred to as emotion episodes. Emotion traits that lack an object are
called temperament, while those concerning a particular object are called sentiments.
The taxonomy is illuminating with respect to the study of emotions in relation
to candidate evaluations. The measures used by Abelson and his colleagues (1982)
and Marcus (1988) concern emotion episodes (has the candidate ever made you feel
angry?), while the measures used by Marcus and MacKuen (1993) presumably con-
cern sentiments (do you feel enthusiastic about the candidate?). Hence, in studies
that examined the impact of emotion different phenomena were focused on. Some
analyses concerned the impact of temporary emotional states, whereas others con-
cerned more permanent emotional traits.
Another thing to note is that it was not emotions as such that the reported stud-
ies examined, but memories of emotions. The questions of the American National Elec-
tion Studies indicated whether voters recalled having experienced certain emotional
responses. It is well known that memories are constructions that are influenced by
current thoughts and feelings (Schacter 1996). This also applies to memories of emo-
tions (Robinson and Clore 2002a). In the electoral context Linda Levine (1997) con-
firmed this. She found that recalled emotional reactions to the withdrawal by Ross
Perot in the 1992 U.S. presidential election changed across time. Systematic distor-
tions occurred in relation to later appraisals and subsequent feelings with respect to
Perot’s withdrawal. For example, voters who remained loyal to Perot after the elec-
tion underestimated how sad and angry they initially had been (according to their
FIGURE D.1  Taxonomy of emotion (based on Frijda 1994 and Lazarus 1994)
EMOTION
state trait
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own earlier reports). This implies that memories of emotions may be distorted com-
pared to the actual, original response. Consequently, self-report may be considered
problematic for assessing past emotional experiences. As the initial emotional re-
sponse is usually not available to researchers, however, they have to rely on voters’
memories. Although these may be distorted, Levine’s findings are encouraging at the
same time. The recalled emotions were biased, but nevertheless considerable stabil-
ity was observed. This means that the reports may still be reasonably accurate.
FROM EMOTION EPISODES TO SENTIMENTS
A final question is how the emotional phenomena distinguished relate to each other.
From the perspective of this research, the relationship between emotion episodes
and sentiments is particularly interesting, as voters’ feelings towards political parties
fit those categories. Moreover, party evaluations may be considered an example of
the emotion phenomenon that is referred to as sentiments; both concern a degree of
liking or disliking.
The most important way in which emotion episodes and sentiments are related,
is that the former may become integrated into the latter (Frijda 1994: 65). In this con-
text, the framework provided by James Russell (2003) may be useful. According to
Russell, at the heart of what we call emotion is what he calls core affect. This refers to a
person’s state that is characterised by a particular level of arousal and a particular
level of pleasure. It concerns the extent to which a person feels good or bad, ener-
gised or enervated. Core affect may be viewed as a position in a two-dimensional
space that combines the dimensions of pleasure–displeasure and activation–deacti-
vation (see also Russell 1980; Watson and Tellegen 1985). Russell argued that when-
ever individuals notice a change in their core affect, they attribute this change to a
particular event or object. In the case of a lost friend, for example, individuals will
attribute their sadness to that loss. Russell used the notion of attributed affect to refer
to the linking of a change in core affect to its perceived cause. Furthermore, he ar-
gued, on the basis of these processes individuals make inferences about the capacity
of particular events or objects to change their core affect. In other words, people
know whether certain things can make them feel good or bad. This knowledge he
referred to as perception of affective quality. People supposedly classify objects in those
terms, or at least in terms of the pleasure dimension (p. 157).9
Russell’s framework links up well to the taxonomy of emotion discussed. His
distinction between core affect and attributed affect is related to that between moods
and emotion episodes, while his distinction between attributed affect and affective
quality is related to that between emotion episodes and sentiments.10 Russell as-
sumed that emotion episodes are all built on core affect. Each emotion episode is as-
sociated with particular levels of arousal and pleasure. Moreover, his framework im-
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plies that sentiments can be viewed as perceptions of affective quality that are based
primarily on the core affect attributed to the objects involved. This means that past
emotional experiences with an object explain people’s evaluations of that object. So
what matters is to what extent objects make people feel good or bad, energised or
enervated. These are integrated into sentiments. This research refers to these by the
notion of evaluations.
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A P P E N D I X  E
THE IMPACT OF PARTY SIZE
Various electoral researchers have argued that one of the factors that determine
whether voters will vote for a particular party is its size. The idea is that large parties
are better able to realise their policy preferences, since they have a better chance of
getting into government (Maas et al. 1991: 76; Oppenhuis 1995: 133; Tillie 1995: 123-
124). Consequently, if voters are attracted by more than one party, they are more
strongly inclined to vote for a large party. Various research findings support the idea
that party size plays such a role. A. E. Bronner and R. de Hoog (1978) found that in
their judgements about how similar or different parties were, powerfulness (poten-
tial government parties versus not potential government parties) was one dimension
that voters made use of. They found that powerfulness played a role with respect to
voters’ preferences for parties (see esp. ch. 8). Obviously, powerfulness is related to
size. Another example of the presumed impact of party size is found in reactions to
Van der Eijk and Niemöller’s (1983, ch. 7) test of the smallest distance hypothesis.
They found that a substantial minority of the Dutch voters did not vote for the party
that in ideological terms was closest to them. Of the voters who did, many had two
or more parties at equal distance. In reaction to these findings it was suggested that
the size of parties could play an additional role (Maas et al. 1991; Van Holsteyn 1989).
Empirical analyses showed that voters supported the closest party more often if it
was a large party than if it was a small party (87 versus 32 per cent) (Maas et al. 1991:
76). And if more than one party was at closest distance, voters more often voted for a
large party than for a small party (about 90 versus 10 per cent) (Van Holsteyn 1989:
145). Jean Tillie (1995, ch. 6) found that ideology and party size were the two most
important determinants of voters’ tendency to vote for parties (with the impact of
both seeming to be of about equal size). Erik Oppenhuis (1995, ch. 6-7) found that in
other countries of the European Union parties’ size also strongly influenced voters’
tendency to vote for them.
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TABLE E.1  Size of parties (number of seats in the Second Chamber after each election)
1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002
Labour Party PvdA 47 52 49 37 45 23
Liberal Party VVD 36 27 22 31 38 24
Christian Democrats CDA 45 54 54 34 29 43
Democrats 66 D66 6 9 12 24 14 7
Political Party Radicals PPR 2 2 - - - -
Communist Party CPN 3 - - - - -
Evangelist Party EVP 1 - - - - -
Pacifist Party PSP 3 1 - - - -
GreenLeft GL - - 6 5 11 10
Political Reformed Party SGP 3 3 3 2 3 2
Reformed Political League GPV 1 1 2 2 2 -
Reformed Political Federation RPF 2 1 1 3 3 -
ChristianUnion CU - - - - - 4
Centre Party CP 1 - - - - -
Centre Democrats CD - - 1 3 - -
Elderly Alliance AOV - - - 6 - -
Union 55+ U55+ - - - 1 - -
Socialist Party SP - - - 2 5 9
List Pim Fortuyn LPF - - - - - 26
Liveable Netherlands LN - - - - - 2
––– ––– ––– ––– ––– –––
total 150 150 150 150 150 150
Note: In 1989 the four small left-wing parties (PPR, CPN, EVP, and PSP) had merged into GreenLeft;
in 2002 two orthodox Protestant parties (GPV and RPF) had merged into the ChristianUnion.
Source: www.parlement.com
On the basis of the framework of the sincere vote model it may be tested to
what extent party size has the hypothesised impact. If it has, then we expect to see
that discrepancies in the relationship between party preferences and voting inten-
tions occur more frequently among voters whose party preference consists of a small
party than among voters whose party preference consists of a large party. Addition-
ally, we expect to see that such voters relatively often evaluate a small party best, but
intend to vote for a large party.
Before the impact of party size can be analysed, the question how party size
should be operationalised has to be settled. The elections that are focused on in this
research are Dutch parliamentary elections. The elections determine the distribution
of the 150 seats of the Second Chamber of parliament. Therefore, it seems appropri-
ate to operationalise the size of parties as the number of seats they occupy in the Sec-
ond Chamber (see also Tillie 1995: 101). The only remaining question, then, is which
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moment should be focused on. Because the distribution of seats in a specific election
is in a sense the phenomenon to be explained, this would not be an appropriate
measure to operationalise party size. Therefore, in the analyses below the parties’
number of seats in the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament after the previous
election is taken as a measure of party size. In the analysis of the 1998 election, for
example, the measures of party size correspond with the number of seats parties ob-
tained in the election in 1994. Table E.1 shows the number of seats each party held in
the Second Chamber after the various elections.
If voters who prefer small parties have non-sincere voting intentions relatively
often, we expect to see a relationship between which party voters preferred and what
kind of voting intention they had (sincere or non-sincere). Table E.2 shows the pro-
portion of non-sincere voting intentions in relation to voters’ party preferences (sin-
gle and multiple party preferences are both included).11 Across the parties some clear
differences can be observed. Among voters who evaluated the Labour Party, Liberal
Party, or Christian Democrats most positively, few voters intended to vote for an-
other party than their party preference (between 2 and 10 per cent). Among voters
whose party preference included D66, the proportion that had a non-sincere voting
intention was fairly similar to the figures concerning the electorate as a whole. Voters
whose party preference included one of the other, smaller parties relatively often in-
tended to vote for a party they did not like best. For example, for voters who pre-
ferred GreenLeft (or their predecessors) this proportion varied between 16 and 30
TABLE E.2  Party preferences and the party preference–voting intention relationship
(percentage of voters with a non-sincere voting intention)
party preference: 1986 1994 1998 2002
Labour Party 2 3 10 7
Liberal Party 3 4 3 10
Christian Democrats 6 6 5 6
D66 12 7 11 17
GreenLeft 30 16 20 18
Socialist Party - - 16 21
Orthodox Protestant 23 16 20 18
Centre Democrats 29 15 40 -
Elderly Alliance - - 30 -
List Pim Fortuyn - - - 15
Liveable Netherlands - - - 20
all voters 7 8 13 14
Note: The GreenLeft figure of 1986 concerns their predecessors.
Reading example: Of all voters whose party preference included the Labour Party, in 1986 2 per cent
had a non-sincere voting intention; of all voters in 1986 7 per cent had a non-sincere voting inten-
tion.
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TABLE E.3  Voting intentions of voters with a non-sincere voting intention (%)
party preference: 1986 1994 1998 2002
Labour Party 35 22 24 19
Liberal Party 22 24 27 15
Christian Democrats 24 16 30 30
D66 10 18 5 3
GreenLeft 2 2 4 4
Socialist Party - - 2 5
Orthodox Protestant 5 1 6 7
Centre Democrats 1 16 1 -
Elderly Alliance - - 1 -
List Pim Fortuyn - - - 15
Liveable Netherlands - - - 2
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (82) (87) (186) (204)
Note: The GreenLeft figure of 1986 concerns their predecessors.
per cent, and for voters who preferred the orthodox Protestant parties it varied be-
tween 16 and 23 per cent.12 Overall, these figures provide support for the hypothesis
that the size of parties influenced voters’ tendency to prefer to vote for them.
Another expectation that follows from the hypothesised impact of party size, is
that voters with non-sincere voting intentions turned to large parties relatively often.
Table E.3 therefore shows the voting intentions of voters with a non-sincere voting
intention. Note that the number of voters is low, so the figures have to be interpreted
with care. Nevertheless, the overall pattern is consistent with the hypothesis. Voters
with non-sincere voting intentions relatively often intended to vote for a large party.
So far, the impact of party size has been examined by inspecting the tables with
in mind the size of the various parties of the party preferences. The impact of party
size can be also analysed without any reference to the specific parties that were in-
volved. In order to do so logistic regression analyses have been performed. The de-
pendent variable in these analyses is a so-called dummy variable that indicates
whether or not voters intended to vote in line with their party preference (the vari-
able was coded ‘0’ for voters with a sincere voting intention and ‘1’ for voters with a
non-sincere voting intention). The independent variable is the size of the preferred
party (number of seats in the Second Chamber). In the case of multiple party prefer-
ences, the measure is based on the largest party included in the party preference.
The results of the logistic regression analyses are shown in Figure E.1.13 As ex-
pected, in each year the chance of a non-sincere voting intention decreased as the
size of the preferred party increased. Consequently, voters who preferred a large
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party were relatively unlikely to have a non-sincere voting intention, whereas voters
who preferred a small party were considerably more likely to have a non-sincere vot-
ing intention. Note, however, that even for the smallest parties the figure predicts a
voting intention in line with the party preference, since the chance of a non-sincere
voting intention remains below 50 per cent. Although the overall pattern is fairly
similar in all four years, some differences can be observed. In 1994 the effect of party
size appeared to be not as large as in the other years, whereas 1986 stands out as the
year in which party size mattered most. These differences are reflected in the ex-
planatory power of the models (see note 3). In 1986 non-sincere voting intentions
could be explained fairly well on the basis of party size (Nagelkerke R2 equalled
0.24), whereas in the other years the explanatory power of the models was much
more limited (Nagelkerke R2 varied between 0.06 and 0.12).
Although these findings support the idea that discrepancies between party
preferences and voting intentions have to do with the size of the parties involved,
they do not provide evidence for the hypothesised impact. The figures only show
that specific voters more often intended to vote for other parties, not that they in-
tended to vote for larger parties. Therefore, additional analyses are needed to find
out whether the party that voters with non-sincere voting intentions intended to vote
for was indeed larger than their party preference. Table E.4 provides the relevant
data. As expected, in each year a majority of the voters with non-sincere preferences
intended to vote for a party that was larger than that of their party preference (be-
FIGURE E.1  Size of the preferred party and the chance of a non-sincere voting intention
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tween 60 and 70 per cent). Some voters, however, intended to vote for parties that
were actually smaller than their party preference. These were largely outnumbered,
however, by voters who turned to larger parties.
The findings provide support for the hypothesis that the size of parties is rel-
evant with respect to the question what party voters prefer to vote for. Voters whose
party preferences consisted of smaller parties were more likely to intend to vote for
another party than their party preference than voters whose party preference con-
sisted of larger parties. Moreover, a majority of the voters with non-sincere voting
intentions turned to a larger party than their party preference.
A final question to be answered is how the logistic regression models based on
party size relate to those based on coalition preferences (see Chapter 8). After all, the
underlying idea is that party size matters because large parties are more attractive
because they are more likely to participate in the government.
The model based on party size explained non-sincere voting intentions worse
than similar models based on coalition preferences: in 1994 and 2002 the amount of
explained variance of models based on party size was considerably smaller, whereas
in 1986 and 1998 the amount of explained variance of both kinds of models was vir-
tually the same.14 Moreover, models that included measures for coalition preferences
as well as party size hardly explained non-sincere voting intentions better than mod-
els that based on coalition preferences: the model improvement was very limited.15 In
other words, if the impact of voters’ coalition preferences is taken into account, party
size contributes to a very limited extent to the explanation of discrepancies between
party preferences and voting intentions. Apparently, the impact of party size indeed
resulted from the fact that coalition preferences included large parties more often.16
TABLE E.4  Relationship between size of preferred party and size of party intended to vote for
(voters with non-sincere voting intentions only) (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
voting intention for larger party 70 63 65 60
voting intention for similar-sized party 4 7 8 10
voting intention for smaller party 27 30 28 30
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (82) (87) (186) (204)
Note: Voters with multiple party preferences who intended to vote for a party that had a size be-
tween that of the largest and the smallest party included in the party preference, are included in the
second category.
Reading example: In 1986 of all 82 voters with a non-sincere voting intention 70 per cent intended to
vote for a party that was larger than their party preference, 4 per cent intended to vote for a party of
similar size, and 27 per cent intended to vote for a party that was smaller than their party preference.
245
A P P E N D I X  F
PARTY LEADER EVALUATIONS
AND VOTE CHOICE
This appendix shows how voters evaluated party leaders, which party leaders they
preferred, and to what extent their voting intentions and voting behaviour were in
line with their party leader preferences. The findings support the view that in Dutch
parliamentary elections political parties are more central than their candidates, be-
cause voting intentions and voting behaviour can be predicted more accurately on
the basis of party evaluations (see Chapter 7) than on the basis of party leader evalu-
ations (see this appendix; see also Chapter 8). How voters evaluated the various
party leaders is shown in Table F.1 to Table F.4.
By comparing at the individual level the evaluation scores awarded to each
party leader, party leader preference measures have been created. A party leader is
said to be preferred if a voter evaluates that leader more positively than all other
party leaders. Across the years for at least 98 per cent of the voters a party leader
preference measure could be created; for up to 2 per cent it could not, because they
did not evaluate any of the party leaders. Table F.5 shows what evaluation scores vot-
ers awarded to the party leader they preferred, while Table F.6 shows how many
party leaders voters preferred. Analogous with the distinction between a single and
a multiple party preference, a distinction can be made between a single and a multi-
ple party leader preference. The proportion of voters who evaluated one party leader
more positively than any other varied between 59 per cent in 2002 and 78 per cent in
1986. Consequently, between 1986 and 2002 the proportion of voters with a multiple
party leader preference increased from 22 per cent to 41 per cent (differences in the
number of leaders evaluated account for some, but not all, of the variation observed
in the table).
How often voters preferred the various party leaders is shown in Table F.7 to
Table F.9. Table F.7 shows the party leader preferences of voters with a single party
leader preference, while Table F.8 concerns voters with multiple party leader prefer-
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TABLE F.1  Evaluation scores awarded to party leaders in 1986 (% and mean)  (N=1630)
Den Uyl Nijpels Lubbers Van Mierlo
(PvdA) (VVD) (CDA) (D66)
100 6 1 11 1
90 8 2 18 3
80 14 7 19 10
70 12 10 11 13
60 12 12 10 18
50 13 16 12 19
40 9 13 3 10
30 6 10 3 6
20 5 9 3 4
10 6 10 4 3
0 6 7 3 3
––– ––– ––– –––
subtotal 98 97 98 90
don’t know 2 3 2 10
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
mean 55 43 67 53
ences. The findings are combined in Table F.9, which shows voters’ party leader pref-
erences irrespective of whether they involved a single of multiple preference. In 1986
Ruud Lubbers of the Christian Democrats was preferred most often by far. Of all vot-
ers 42 per cent liked him better than any other party leader. Other voters with a sin-
gle party leader preference mostly preferred Joop den Uyl of the Labour Party: 27
per cent liked him best. Few voters preferred Ed Nijpels (Liberal Party) or Hans van
Mierlo (D66). In 1994 the party leader who was preferred most often was Wim Kok
of the Labour Party. Van Mierlo (D66) was preferred relatively often as well (by 17
per cent), while relatively few voters preferred Elco Brinkman (Christian Demo-
crats), Frits Bolkestein (Liberal Party), or a leader of the smaller parties. Four years
later, Kok stood out as the most-often preferred leader even more strongly. Among
all voters 35 per cent liked him best, while none of the other leaders was preferred by
more than 10 per cent. In 2002, on the other hand, there was little agreement concern-
ing party leader preferences. The two best-liked leaders, Jan Peter Balkenende of the
Christian Democrats and Paul Rosenmöller of GreenLeft, were each preferred by
only 12 per cent of the voters. Unlike his predecessors Den Uyl and Kok, Ad Melkert
was preferred by very few voters (4 per cent).
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TABLE F.2  Evaluation scores awarded to party leaders in 1994 (% and mean)  (N=1812)
Kok Bolkestein Brinkman Van Mierlo Brouwer
(PvdA) (VVD) (CDA) (D66) (GL)
100 5 0 1 2 1
90 10 2 3 7 2
80 20 6 8 14 5
70 20 12 13 21 10
60 16 15 13 17 12
50 12 17 16 17 15
40 6 11 13 7 10
30 4 9 10 4 7
20 2 6 7 3 5
10 3 6 7 2 4
0 1 4 7 1 3
––– ––– ––– ––– –––
subtotal 98 89 98 96 73
don’t know 2 11 2 4 27
––– ––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100 100
mean 64 48 46 60 48
TABLE F.2  (continued)
Rabbae Schutte Van Dijke Van der Vlies Janmaat
(GL) (GPV) (RPF) (SGP) (CD)
100 0 1 0 0 0
90 1 1 0 0 0
80 3 3 0 1 0
70 6 4 1 1 0
60 7 6 1 2 1
50 12 8 2 4 2
40 5 4 1 2 2
30 5 6 1 2 2
20 3 4 1 2 3
10 4 4 1 1 8
0 6 3 1 2 77
––– ––– ––– ––– –––
subtotal 52 44 11 17 95
don’t know 48 56 89 83 5
––– ––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100 100
mean 44 43 38 39 5
248 THE  SINCERE  VOTE
TABLE F.3  Evaluation scores awarded to party leaders in 1998 (% and mean)  (N=2101)
Kok Bolkestein De Hoop Scheffer Borst Rosenmöller
(PvdA) (VVD) (CDA) (D66) (GL)
100 7 1 1 1 2
90 16 3 2 3 6
80 26 10 6 9 16
70 22 13 11 16 17
60 11 14 15 18 12
50 9 16 19 18 11
40 3 13 10 10 7
30 2 9 7 8 3
20 1 6 4 4 2
10 1 6 3 2 2
0 1 4 1 2 1
––– ––– ––– ––– –––
subtotal 98 96 79 91 80
don’t know 2 4 21 9 20
––– ––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100 100
mean 72 50 52 54 62
TABLE F.3  (continued)
Marijnissen Schutte Janmaat
(SP) (GPV) (CD)
100 1 1 0
90 3 1 0
80 6 4 0
70 9 6 1
60 9 6 0
50 11 10 1
40 6 6 1
30 5 5 2
20 3 4 4
10 2 3 10
0 1 2 72
––– ––– –––
subtotal 57 48 93
don’t know 43 52 7
––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100
mean 55 47 5
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TABLE F.4  Evaluation scores awarded to party leaders in 2002 (% and mean)  (N=1908)
Melkert Dijkstal Balkenende De Graaf Rosenmöller
(PvdA) (VVD) (CDA) (D66) (GL)
100 1 1 2 1 2
90 2 4 7 3 7
80 6 13 17 13 18
70 14 22 19 20 23
60 17 20 16 19 16
50 18 17 14 14 10
40 15 10 8 9 8
30 11 5 5 6 5
20 7 3 3 3 3
10 8 2 3 4 3
0 2 0 0 1 1
––– ––– ––– ––– –––
subtotal 99 97 96 93 98
don’t know 1 3 4 7 2
––– ––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100 100
mean 47 59 61 57 61
TABLE F.4  (continued)
Marijnissen Veling Van der Vlies Fortuyn Teeven
(SP) (CU) (SGP) (LPF) (LN)
100 1 0 1 2 0
90 7 1 1 5 0
80 14 3 2 9 2
70 17 4 3 11 4
60 17 6 5 8 8
50 12 8 7 10 14
40 7 5 4 8 10
30 6 4 4 8 9
20 3 4 3 7 8
10 4 3 4 15 8
0 1 1 2 16 3
––– ––– ––– ––– –––
subtotal 89 39 35 98 67
don’t know 11 61 65 2 33
––– ––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100 100
mean 59 48 44 40 38
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TABLE F.5  Evaluation scores awarded to preferred party leader (% and mean)
1986 1994 1998 2002
100 17 8 12 10
90 25 19 23 24
80 27 29 33 37
70 14 22 19 20
60 8 10 7 6
50 5 6 3 2
0-40 2 5 2 1
none evaluated 2 1 2 0
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1630) (1812) (2101) (1908)
mean score 80 75 79 80
TABLE F.6  Number of leaders preferred (% and mean)
1986 1994 1998 2002
1 78 67 65 59
2 18 24 24 23
3 4 7 8 11
4 or more 1 2 3 6
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1595) (1797) (2066) (1900)
mean score 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.7
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TABLE F.7  Distribution of single party leader preferences (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
leader Labour Party 27 29 35 4
leader Liberal Party 2 7 7 6
leader Christian Democrats 42 6 4 12
leader D66 7 17 3 5
leader GreenLeft - 4 8 12
leader Socialist Party - - 4 8
leaders Orthodox Protestant - 2 3 3
leader Centre Democrats - 1 1 -
leader List Pim Fortuyn - - - 9
leader Liveable Netherlands - - - 0
––– ––– ––– –––
total 78 67 65 59
(N) (1595) (1797) (2066) (1900)
TABLE F.8  Distribution of multiple party leader preferences (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
leader Labour Party 14 23 27 7
leader Liberal Party 7 10 12 15
leader Christian Democrats 18 11 7 19
leader D66 10 21 11 14
leader GreenLeft - 9 16 21
leader Socialist Party - - 7 15
leaders Orthodox Protestant - 4 4 4
leader Centre Democrats - 1 1 -
leader List Pim Fortuyn - - - 11
leader Liveable Netherlands - - - 2
––– ––– ––– –––
total 22 33 35 41
(N) (1595) (1797) (2066) (1900)
Note: Because voters with multiple party leader preferences are represented in more than one row,
the figures add up to more than the total that had a multiple party leader preference.
252 THE  SINCERE  VOTE
TABLE F.9  Distribution of party leader preferences (single or multiple) (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
leader Labour Party 41 52 63 11
leader Liberal Party 10 17 19 22
leader Christian Democrats 60 17 11 30
leader D66 17 38 14 19
leader GreenLeft - 13 25 33
leader Socialist Party - - 11 23
leaders Orthodox Protestant - 7 6 7
leader Centre Democrats - 2 2 -
 leader List Pim Fortuyn - - - 20
leader Liveable Netherlands - - - 2
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1595) (1797) (2066) (1900)
Note: Because voters with multiple party leader preferences are represented in more than one row,
the figures add up to more than 100 per cent.
TABLE F.10  Relationship between party leader preferences and voting intentions (%)
1986 1994 1998 2002
voting intention for party of leader preference 76 68 68 71
voting intention for another party 24 32 32 29
––– ––– ––– –––
total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1061) (1062) (1277) (1392)
To what extent voters intended to vote for the party of the leader they liked
best, is shown in Table F.10. Across the years between 68 and 76 per cent intended to
vote for the party of their favourite party leader, while between 24 and 32 per cent
intended to vote for another party. These findings indicate that voting intentions
were related to party leader preferences fairly strongly, but less strongly than to
party preferences – recall from Chapter 7 that the corresponding figures for party
preferences showed much stronger relationships.
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A P P E N D I X  G
IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHOLOGY
The aim of this research has not been to evaluate attitude-behaviour models or emo-
tion research, or whatever other psychological theory. However, the findings pre-
sented do have some implications for those fields.
One of the insights from attitude-behaviour research that has been central in
this study, is that a distinction can and should be made between attitudes towards
objects (like a particular political party) and attitudes towards behaviour involving
those objects (like voting for a particular party in a specific election) (see Ajzen and
Fishbein 1980; Eagly and Chaiken 1993). This research suggests that it may be useful
to distinguish a third category of attitudes, namely those towards prospects (like the
prospect that a particular party will become largest in a specific election). This builds
on the insight from neuroscience that decision-making is guided by individuals’
evaluations of, or emotional responses to, imagined future scenario’s (see Damasio
1994); it also links up to the idea presented in the context of emotion research that
three kinds of evaluations should be distinguished: those of objects, events, and ac-
tions (Ortony et al. 1988). The three kinds of attitudes are related to each other. If
voters strongly like a particular party, they will presumably like the prospect of that
party becoming largest, and they will presumably also like the idea of voting for that
same party. The attitudes are related not only in terms of empirical correlations, but
also in terms of causal relationships: attitudes towards objects underlie attitudes to-
wards prospects, which in turn underlie attitudes towards behaviour; however, atti-
tudes towards objects may also influence attitudes towards behaviour directly (see
Figure G.1).17
This study furthermore suggests that if individuals decide to behave in a par-
ticular way, the underlying psychological process may include the formation of pro-
spective attitudes, but these need not be formed. This means that behavioural deci-
sions may be based on individuals’ evaluations of particular prospects associated
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with that behaviour, but individuals may also base their decision on their evalua-
tions of the objects involved without taking into consideration any prospect. For ex-
ample, in the electoral context voters may decide to support a particular party be-
cause they would like that party to become largest or because they would like that
party to participate in the next government. In that case prospective attitudes play a
role. However, voters may also decide to support a particular party simply because
they like that party well. In that case they do not elaborate upon possible future sce-
narios associated with the outcome of the election, but simply rely on their attitudes
towards the objects involved. This view is in line with that presented by Eagly and
Chaiken (1993) about how attitudes as focused on by Fazio (1986) and attitudes as
focused on by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) may be fit into a single model.
Another matter concerns the question which objects are relevant in relation to
behaviour. In the electoral context there are at least three different kinds of actors
that play an important role: political parties, candidates, and governments. Hence,
voters’ attitudes towards each of those actors matter. Attitude-behaviour models
have often merely assumed that in a behavioural context it is clear what the objects
are that should be focused on, namely those which could be considered the target of
the behaviour. However, in elections it is not always clear whether the targets are
parties, candidates, or governments. Moreover, in the same election different voters
may base their decision on their attitudes towards different targets or objects. Pre-
sumably, in other contexts similar problems play a role. One of the key questions,
then, is which objects are of paramount importance, and which factors determine
how relevant various objects are for different individuals.
A final lesson for attitude-behaviour research concerns the role of preferences.
Various attitude-behaviour studies have shown that what matters in a choice situa-
tion are not attitudes towards single choice options as such, but attitudes towards the
various choice options in comparison to one another. In this study this idea has led to
the use of the notion of preferences. A preference concerns that object or prospect of
a particular choice set, towards which an individual’s attitude is most positive, that
is, more positive than that toward any of the alternative choice options. In the elec-
FIGURE G.1  Three categories of attitudes and their relationships
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toral context this means that attitudes towards political parties can be focused on in
terms of party preferences, which indicate towards which party individuals held the
most favourable attitude. In other domains a similar procedure may be used.
Regarding another subfield of psychology, that of emotion research, the most
important message from this study appears to be that we need further insight in the
relationship between what Frijda (1994) referred to as emotion episodes (temporary
states) and sentiments (enduring states or dispositions). According to the view pre-
sented in this research, emotion episodes are integrated into sentiments. Further-
more, a general response in terms of a like-dislike dimension is regarded as the sin-
gle most important sentiment. Emotion research has often focused on emotion
episodes and neglected sentiments. According to Frijda (2000: 64), however, both
concepts are not that different and consequently emotion researchers should per-
haps include sentiments in their analyses. The framework provided by Russell (2003)
may be considered useful in this context, since it shows how emotion episodes and
sentiments may be related.
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NOTES
CHAPTER 1  –  INTRODUCTION
1  Joseph Schumpeter (1942/1996: 269) defined the democratic method on the basis of
precisely this criterion. However, free and fair elections are clearly not the only thing that
matters. To speak about a democracy, many other requirements must be fulfilled, such as
universal suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative informa-
tion, and associational autonomy (see Dahl 1989, who speaks about polyarchy instead of
democracy, which he regards an ideal that will never be fully reached). Nevertheless,
elections may be considered democracy’s key element.
2  How elections serve as ‘instruments of democracy’ has been discussed by, among
others, Bingham Powell (2000). In his view, two key functions of elections are holding
past governments accountable and providing future governments with a mandate. Addi-
tionally, he points to their role in selecting representatives, and holding these accountable.
3  Psephos is Greek for a vote and logos for a word.
4  The Michigan scholars (Campbell et al. 1954, 1960) presented a fairly similar view.
Sociological variables were thought to influence voting behaviour only through media-
tion of psychological variables, such as party identification and attitudes. Even the Co-
lumbia scholars (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944, Berelson et al. 1954) adopted such a view. This will
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
5  Note that the view presented implies that it is possible to distinguish between psy-
chological and non-psychological concepts. A philosophical discussion about this distinc-
tion is not provided here. Suffice it to say that psychological concepts are those that con-
cern an individual’s mind. Non-psychological concepts are all concepts that do not in any
sense refer to, and exist independently of, the individual’s mind. With respect to variables
(the concrete measurements of concepts) a similar distinction can be made between psy-
chological and non-psychological variables.
6  This idea also applies to non-psychological variables: some can be regarded as the
causes (or consequences) of others. For example, individuals’ income may depend on
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their level of education.
7  Universal suffrage was introduced for men (aged 25) in 1917, and for women in
1919. The required age was lowered to 23 in 1946, to 21 in 1967, and to 18 in 1972 (Daalder
1991: 57).
CHAPTER 2  –  PSYCHOLOGY IN VOTING THEORY
1  In this context issues and ideology need not be very different. When issues are
used to position voters in a political space, frequently the issues are assumed to represent
a more general dimension of political conflict. An issue can then be regarded as an indica-
tor of an ideological dimension (see, for example, Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1989b: 113).
2  This can be deduced from the figures presented by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and
Gaudet (1944: 26).
3  The three principles were referred to, and summarised, as “differentiation is a con-
dition for disagreement (...) transmission is a condition for persistence [and] contact is a
condition for consensus” (Berelson et al. 1954/1966: 74).
4  Research in which this line of thought is still strongly present is that of ‘contextual
theories of politics’ (see Huckfeldt and Sprague 1993).
5  The data had been published before by Lipset in Political Man (1960) and were
based on a survey conducted in May 1956 by the Netherlands Institute of Public Opinion
(Lipset 1960/1969: 245).
6  This figure can be computed on the basis of the data presented by Lipset and
Rokkan (1967: 17).
7  In some studies social class is operationalised on the basis of individuals’ occupa-
tion (see, for example, Nieuwbeerta 1995; Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1999). Such measure-
ments do not concern an identity. However, alternative measurements are based on vot-
ers’ self-classification in terms of social class, which does refer to an identity (see, for
example, Van der Kolk 2000).
8  Asch (1952) has been selected as an example of this criticism, because in Voting his
criticism is referred to and replied to explicitly (Berelson et al. 1954/1966: 290 ff.).
9  These words were related only to the local level of Elmira, but the point of view
can be generalised to any level.
10  Many psychological phenomena that have been elaborated upon later by other
scholars were already discussed in Voting. Examples are effects of framing (p. 200 ff.,
p. 270), bandwagon effect (p. 289), wishful thinking (discussed as ‘projection’, p. 289), and
perception biases resulting from assimilation and contrast effects (discussed as ‘distortion
effect’, p. 220 ff.).
11  Sociological characteristics not only influence psychological characteristics, but
the reverse occurs also. Although characteristics such as religion, social class, and urban
versus rural place of residence may be ‘inherited’ to a large extent or ‘just happen’ to peo-
ple, they also result from individuals’ deliberate choices (Catt 1996: 92-93). The political
values people have may influence their choices and determine what their social character-
istics are. For example, because individuals regard doing certain voluntary work highly
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important, they may have a part-time paid job and consequently have a lower income
than they would have had otherwise. In that case income depends on political values,
rather than the other way round.
12  The question wordings are taken from the questionnaire printed in The Voter De-
cides (Campbell et al. 1954/1971: 217-218).
13  Other ordering dimensions, however, could be used as well, Campbell and his
colleagues (1960) argued. They listed three additional possibilities: (1) exogenous factors
versus relevant conditions, (2) personal versus external conditions, and (3) political ver-
sus non-political conditions.
14  The fact that Thomassen (1976b: 77) labelled his conclusion as ‘tentative’ and ‘in-
conclusive’, has not prevented many from concluding that the party identification con-
cept is of no use in some countries, or at least in the Netherlands; or that the party identi-
fication in those countries “does not exist” (Miller and Shanks 1996: 117).
15  In the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies, from which these questions have
been taken, distinctions have been made additionally between respondents who consid-
ered themselves a convinced adherent, and those who did not. Voters who mentioned
more than one party sometimes were asked additional questions. For these details refer to
the documentation of those studies (Van der Eijk et al. 1986; Anker and Oppenhuis 1994;
Aarts et al. 1999).
16  The question wordings used by Thomassen (1976b) differ somewhat from the
DPES format just discussed.
17  Later research showed that with respect to the stability in party identification
(compared to vote choice) the Dutch case was unique in comparison to the United States,
Canada, Britain, and Sweden: only in the Netherlands did fewer voters change their vote
than the direction of their party identification (LeDuc 1981; Holmberg 1994a). Other re-
search, however, indicated that also in Germany vote preference was more stable than
party identification (Richardson 1991). Berglund (2000) pointed out that the finding that
party identification is instable in the Netherlands, may be largely a result of the exclusion
of independents from analyses. If those are included, he argued, the original findings by
Thomassen (1976b) are not replicated.
18  According to the model, voters apply two future-orienting modifiers to their
judgement. First, a so-called trend factor may be taken into account. This implies that less
weight is given to performances in the beginning of the election period, and more weight
to more recent performances. Second, if both parties have different platforms or policies
but provide an equal utility income, vote choices are based on comparisons of performance
ratings. These are based on the comparison between an actual government and a voter’s
ideal government, that is, between what a government has done and what a voter thinks
they should have done. Hence, performance ratings are the ratio between the received
utility income and the highest possible utility income. These ratings enable voters to com-
pare government performances in different situations (different times and different areas)
(Downs 1957, ch. 3).
19  Downs (1957: 47) argued that the model assumes all information voters have is
factually correct, although it may be incomplete. Another assumption made is that citi-
zens’ political tastes are fixed. Downs (1957: 37-38) furthermore noted that voters may be
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unaware of benefits they receive, and that only the benefits voters are conscious of can
influence their vote choice.
20  Downs (1957: 48) argued that for each voter the meaning of ‘reasonable’ depends
on the voter’s personal temperament.
21  These included voters with more than one party ‘at a closest distance’ for whom
no unique prediction could be made on the basis of left-right positions alone.
22  The framework of the heartland model was used before by Anthony Heath, Roger
Jowell and John Curtice (1985, ch. 8) to analyse the role of ideology in voting in Britain. Its
application to the Netherlands was discussed first by Irwin and his colleagues (1987).
23  One of the criticisms of Downs’ theory was that political disagreement is not
structured by a single dimension (Stokes 1963: 370-371). The research by Van der Eijk and
Niemöller (1983) nevertheless defined ideology in Dutch politics on the basis of one di-
mension only, that of left-right. Others have also concluded that Dutch politics is struc-
tured by one dimension (Tillie 1995). According to other researchers, however, (voting in)
Dutch politics can be understood best on the basis of two ideological dimensions
(Middendorp 1991; Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1989b, 1997; Van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003),
or on the basis of three (Van Wijnen 2001).
24  Note that this conceptualisation is in line with one in which religious values are
regarded as the primary dimension of conflict, and left-right values are regarded as a sec-
ondary dimension. Note that this framework more or less implies that whereas the La-
bour Party and the Liberals are evaluated on the basis of two dimensions, the Christian
Democrats are on the basis of one.
25  Irwin and Van Holsteyn’s (1989b) heartland model also differs from Van der Eijk
and Niemöller’s (1983) left-right model in another way. The impact of left-right was stud-
ied on the basis of each voter’s own perception of parties’ positions. As a consequence each
voter had its own configuration of parties in the space. In the heartland model parties’
heartlands are regarded as fixed and consequently they do not vary across voters.
26  In the 1977-1986 period the proportion of voters who were situated in the heart-
land of one of the three parties who voted for the corresponding party varied between 51
and 58 per cent. These figures can be computed on the basis of the data provided by Irwin
and Van Holsteyn (1989b: 116, Table 1). Figures concerning 1989 and 1994 are not fully
comparable with those concerning the earlier elections, because in 1989 question
wordings had changed and the abortion issue was replaced by that of euthanasia (Irwin
and Van Holsteyn 1997: 105). The 1989 and 1994 data, however, indicate that in 1994 fewer
voters fit the heartland model than in 1989. The figures concerning the performance of the
three major parties in their own heartland varied between 45 and 59 per cent in 1989, and
between 42 and 54 per cent in 1994.
27  In 1998 the Christian Democrats obtained only about 30 per cent of the vote in
their heartland, while in 2002 the figures for the Labour Party and Liberal Party were only
about 25 and 30 per cent, respectively.
28  In some analyses Middendorp (1989; 1991) found structures that consisted of
more than two dimensions. These are not elaborated upon here.
29  The same applies to other spatial models of voting: they may be used to analyse
voting behaviour, even if they do not accurately describe how voters perceive electoral
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politics.
30  This view is related to the work of, among others, David Sears (2001; Sears et al.
1980), who emphasised that voters are not rational beings who reason about their self-
interest, but react emotionally to ‘symbols’.
31  A neutral position implies no direction and no intensity.
32   Mathematically, they operationalised the effect of an issue with the following for-
mula: issue effect = (candidate location – neutral point) x (voter location – neutral point).
By adding up the effects of different issues an overall issue effect results, which is referred
to as ‘scalar product’.
They operationalised a candidate’s position as the mean perceived position of the
candidate by the voters (p. 101). Hence, the model assumes that candidate positions are
fixed across individuals.
33   The saliency theory has implications for voting only in as far as voters also per-
ceive parties in terms of valence issues. Whether they do arguably depends to a consider-
able extent on how the media report about parties. In the context of the 1994 Dutch parlia-
mentary elections Sander Flight and Juan Felix (1995: 101) found that parties campaigned
mainly in terms of valence issues, as Budge and Farlie (1979) argued, but that the media
reported the campaign mainly in terms of position issues. Consequently, it may well be
that political parties behave according to the theory of issue ownership, but that voters do
not.
34  Catt’s (1996) research focused on British election studies, but the arguments are
valid more in general. She distinguished two aspects of the orthodoxy: the theoretical and
the methodological. The methodological aspects of the orthodoxy concern standardised
methods of collecting and analysing data. In this section the methodological aspects are
not discussed; only the theoretical aspects are focused on.
35  U.S. presidential elections illustrate that other objects are possible: in these elec-
tions voters select a ticket that comprises two candidates, one for president and one for
vice-president.
36  In relation to parties’ positions in an ideological space or an issue space, it has
been suggested that consequently ideological positions of parties can be conceived of bet-
ter as an area than as a position (see, for example, Granberg and Gilljam 1997: 45-46).
37  This idea is to a large extent at odds with the notion of second-order national elec-
tions (Reif and Schmitt 1980; see also Van der Eijk, Franklin, et al. 1996).
38  One might argue that knowledge of a certain speech need not concern episodic
memory; it may also concern semantic memory. It is possible that a certain speech is rep-
resented in memory as a fact, rather than as a recollection of having heard the speech. In
such cases it would perhaps be more appropriate to speak of ‘episodic information’ than
‘episodic memory’.
CHAPTER 3  –  ATTITUDE-BEHAVIOUR MODELS AND VOTING
1  The early conceptualisations of an attitude as a readiness to respond in a favour-
able or unfavourable way towards an object, seems to refer most strongly to the behav-
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ioural component.
2  Another view on attitudes has been employed by Fishbein and Ajzen with respect
to attitudes towards behaviour (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). In
this alternative view an attitude is regarded as a resultant of evaluations of a set of beliefs,
which implies that attitudes are not ‘independent’ phenomena, but a resultant of evalu-
ated beliefs.
3  Eagly and Chaiken (1993: 155) additionally stated, “attitudes, tendencies to evalu-
ate an entity with some degree of favor or disfavor, are ordinarily expressed in cognitive,
affective and behavioural responses”. This view largely reflects the so-called three-com-
ponent view on attitudes.
4  In recent years the idea that attitudes concern a single evaluation of an object has
been challenged. It has been argued that the evaluation of an object may consist of more
than one dimension, for example dependent on the context in which it is evaluated. Con-
sequently, one could speak about multiple attitudes (Wood 2000: 548-551), which may re-
sult in attitudinal ambivalence (Ajzen 2001: 39-40). According to the view adopted in this
research, however, attitudes concern a single dimension.
5  In some research the position of a party is fixed among respondents, since it is
operationalised as the average scale position given to the party by respondents. In other
research the party position is allowed to differ across respondents, since individual per-
ceptions of party positions are used. Only the latter method corresponds closely to the
notion of beliefs.
6  Quality of decision making is defined in relation to the likelihood that one would
later arrive at another decision (Fazio et al. 1992: 395).
7  Two theories that explain the underlying psychological processes are cognitive
dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) and self-perception theory (Bem 1972).
8  In some area’s, such as health psychology, Icek Ajzen’s (1985, 1991) Theory of
Planned Behaviour, a modified version of the Theory of Reasoned Action, has frequently
been applied (Ajzen 2001).
9  For theoretical criticism on the Theory of Reasoned Action see Jonas and Doll 1996;
Liska 1984; Sarver 1983; and Swanborn 1996.
10  The principle of correspondence has also been referred to as the principle of com-
patibility (Ajzen 1988; Eagly and Chaiken 1993: 162-166, 217).
11  Contrary to Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) and Eagly and Chaiken (1993, ch. 4), in this
research a distinction between ‘object’ and ‘target’ is not made. When attitudes towards
objects are discussed, these correspond with what Eagly and Chaiken referred to as atti-
tudes towards targets. Hence, in this research attitudes towards objects do not include
attitudes towards behaviours.
12  In some instances certain ‘steps’ in the model may be skipped; for example, some-
times intentions are not formed and attitudes result more directly into behaviour.
13  One might argue that attitude-behaviour research overestimates the strength of
the relationship between attitudes and voting behaviour, because voting behaviour is
usually measured on the basis of self-report and such measures tend to be biased towards
current attitudes. However, these problems apply to other behaviour as well, so this can-
not explain the relatively strong relationship observed in the domain of voting.
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14  The increase in explained variance using regression analysis mostly varied be-
tween five and ten per cent. The differences may to a considerable extent be a methodo-
logical artefact, because differences in measurement may have occurred.
15  This may have been a methodological artefact. The authors argued that this find-
ing may have been due to the fact that the intention was operationalised as the likelihood
of voting for one specific candidate, not party (Singh et al. 1995).
16  A. Echebarria Echabe, D. Paez Rovira and J. F. Valencia Garate (1988: 187) also
concluded that subjective norms had more effect than attitudes, which was replicated in a
later study (Echebarria Echabe and Valencia Garate 1994). Their research, however, did
not measure attitudes directly, but made use of expectancy-value measures. This may ex-
plain their deviating results.
17  Echebarria Echabe and his colleagues (1988; 1994) made use of expectancy-value
measures of attitudes and it remains to be seen whether similar effects would have been
obtained if attitudes had been measured directly. Moreover, with respect to the 1994
study their findings may be due to the fact that intentions were operationalised for each
party separately at a seven-point scale, rather than as categorical variable.
18  To judge whether concepts are useful additions or not, two criteria may be used:
prediction and explanation (Sutton 1998). In some circumstances merely predicting
whether an individual will perform certain behaviour may be useful, but in this research
explanation is the aim.
CHAPTER 4  –  THE SINCERE VOTE MODEL
1  Concepts that political scientists refer to as attitudes do not necessarily involve an
evaluative (like-dislike) dimension. Political knowledge, for example, is regarded by po-
litical scientists as an example of (political) attitudes (see, for example, Robinson et al.
1999). However, political knowledge does not concern a positive or negative evaluation of
a particular object. Consequently, from a social psychological perspective political knowl-
edge does not fit the notion of an attitude.
What distinguishes this study from various other studies on attitudes, is that a one-
dimensional view of attitudes is adopted. This is drawn attention to by speaking about
evaluations instead of attitudes.
The emphasis put in this research on the notion of evaluations may also be linked to
the work of Sears (2001; Sears et al. 1980), who speaks about ‘symbolic politics’. Accord-
ing to Sears, citizens’ emotional responses to a wide variety of ‘symbols’ are of paramount
importance to understand how they behave in politics.
2  Distinguishing between behavioural preferences and intentions is important if
discrepancies between both concepts can be expected, resulting from the additional im-
pact of skills or cooperation (see Eagly and Chaiken 1993). Voting is presumably not one
of the domains where this is relevant. If voters like the idea of voting for a particular
party, lack of skills or cooperation will presumably not prevent them from forming an
intention accordingly. Therefore, in the context of voting distinguishing the two concepts
is not necessary.
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3  At the aggregate level this means that if a certain party is evaluated more posi-
tively than another party, this does not imply that the party also was preferred more often
than the other party.
4  It may well be that parties and candidates are represented in memory not inde-
pendent of each other, but in relation to one another, especially in two-party systems
(Rahn 1995; Rahn et al. 1990; see also Sniderman et al. 1990; 1991, ch. 9). This could imply
that party preferences are more or less as such stored in memory. What is important,
however, is that also in this view there is ‘a balance’ between party evaluations and party
preferences. Consequently, party preferences can be determined by merely comparing
party evaluations.
5  The model implies that voters will choose from the parties they know: a party can
only be evaluated, and thus preferred, if voters know the party.
6  Although the idea that voting behaviour is determined by a voting intention may
seem obvious (or tautological and useless), distinguishing both concepts is important. It
involves the distinction, and linkage, between a behavioural concept (voting behaviour)
and a mental concept (voting intention). The explanation of voting behaviour by voting
intentions therefore fits the psychological approach, according to which behaviour can be
explained on the basis of mental or psychological concepts. Moreover, including voting
intentions in the analysis enables researchers to study party preferences and voting inten-
tions at the same time. The importance of this will become clear later in this study.
7  There are other ways in which the strength component may be defined. One op-
tion is to regard the evaluation as a measure of strength. A preference for a party that is
evaluated very positively would then be considered stronger than a preference for a party
that is evaluated fairly positively. A disadvantage of this procedure is that the comparison
between evaluation scores, which according to the sincere vote model is highly impor-
tant, would be lost. Another possibility is to define the strength of a preference as the
degree to which a party is on average liked more, or less, than the other parties. A disad-
vantage of this procedure is that the strength measure could be positive even though a
party is not preferred, which would be awkward from the perspective of the sincere vote
model.
8  One may be tempted to conclude that the sincere vote model can best be applied
to a single moment in time, namely that corresponding with the actual voting behaviour.
Although this would presumably result in the strongest relationships between voting be-
haviour and the other concepts, this is not by definition an approach to be preferred. Our
understanding does not depend solely on the strength of statistical relationships. We
could well increase our understanding by taking into account a longer time period ‘at the
cost’ of the strength of the relationships.
9  An example of a ‘true discrepancy’ between voting intention and voting behaviour
would be voters who accidentally ticked another party and consequently voted for an-
other party than the one they preferred to vote for. This appears to have happened with
respect to the butterfly ballot paper used in Palm Beach County in Florida in the 2000 U.S.
presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore: due to the design of the ballot
paper, some voters, while intending to vote Gore (and thinking they did), in fact voted for
Pat Buchanan, a candidate not really similar to Gore.
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10  Another possibility is that the impact of other factors (exogenous variables)
changed. The sincere vote model may also be used to analyse the size of such change,
even though the factors from which they originate cannot be identified. This links up to
the third way in which the model may be used.
11  A matter related to this is the impact of party size on vote choice (see Van der Eijk,
Franklin, et al. 1996; Tillie 1995; Oppenhuis 1995). If party size has the hypothesised im-
pact, we expect to see discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions that
are related to the size of the parties involved.
12  The underlying idea of normal vote analysis is that voters have a long-term pref-
erence to vote for a particular party. Party identification, viewed as a stable long-term
characteristic, could then be seen as the individual level equivalent of the normal vote.
However, Converse (1966) did not explicitly make such a link to the individual level in his
analysis. Moreover, he argued that voters may have a long-term preference to vote for
another party than the one they identify with.
Although the sincere vote model does not require party preferences or vote prefer-
ences to be stable, it shows some similarities with the normal vote analysis outlined by
Converse.
13  Changes in the composition of the electorate are another factor that such an ag-
gregate level analysis would have to take into account.
CHAPTER 5  –  VOTE CHOICE HEURISTICS
1  As a result, if individuals make judgements, these may have biases and not be
fully accurate. For example, Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (1982)
showed that when individuals make judgements the principles of representativeness,
availability, and anchoring and adjustment result in certain biases.
2  Identifying what heuristics voters may use to reach a vote decision may be consid-
ered the first task of electoral research in relation to choice mechanisms. A second task is
to explain why the use of a certain heuristic results in the choice for a particular party. A
final task is to explain in what circumstances voters will make use of each heuristic. In
this chapter the emphasis is mainly on the first task: identifying the different heuristics
voters may employ.
3  If voters rely on retrospective judgements in order to get the favoured policies in the
future, their behaviour may still be considered instrumental.
4  Damasio (1994) referred to this idea as the ‘somatic marker hypothesis’ .
5  D66 were doing badly in the opinion polls. If the actual results would be that bad
(or worse), the coalition of the Labour Party, Liberal Party, and D66 would supposedly not
continue.
6  Similar processes may operate in elections that concern other positions, such as
those of mayor, governor, or senator. In such elections voters imagine that the various
candidates become mayor, governor, or senator, and their evaluations of these prospects
are the key to their vote choice.
7  This terminology links up with Ivor Crewe and Anthony King (1994: 191), who
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spoke about the “presidentialization of British elections”.
8  If statements of vote selectors do not concern future policies, their use does not fit
the notion of prospective voting. Moreover, even if they do, one may doubt whether all
voters that make use of vote selectors view them in terms of future policies. If not, classify-
ing its use as an example of prospective voting would be inaccurate.
9  The party size preference heuristic is described in the figure as “vote for the party
you want to increase in size”. The point of reference may be an actual situation (for exam-
ple, the current number of seats in parliament) as well as a hypothetical situation (for ex-
ample, the vote share in opinion polls).
10  Note that the term ‘incumbent’ is used here more broadly than mere incumbency
in a district or as President
11  In this research ‘incumbent approval’ will mean ‘the degree to which voters ap-
prove or disapprove of the performance of the incumbent (president or government)’.
Hence, ‘approval’ includes ‘disapproval’.
12  Key’s (1966: 76) argument that “the only really effective weapon of popular con-
trol in a democratic regime is the capacity of the electorate to throw a party from power”
points to voting as an instrumental act. However, Key (1966: 61) put more emphasis on
the retrospective character of voting, as he argued that the electorate “commands pro-
spectively only insofar as it expresses either approval or disapproval of that which has
happened before”.
13  Although an attitude-behaviour model in which only the attitude towards the in-
cumbent is included matches well with the notion of retrospective voting, a difference
between such an attitude-behaviour model and the discussed heuristic may be observed.
The attitude towards the incumbent need not be (influenced by) a retrospective judge-
ment. For example, the attitude can be based on an appraisal of that candidate’s future
policy proposals.
14  In some studies so-called differential measures have been used. These can be re-
garded as a mixture between an across-subjects design and a within-subjects design (see,
for example, Fishbein, Ajzen and Hinkle 1980).
15  Protest may involve disapproval of government actions, but it may also concern
other actors. Moreover, if voters feel they protest against something, the object of the pro-
test may be ill-defined. Only if a protest is clearly directed at government actions, it fits
the incumbent approval heuristic.
16  In relation to the 1998 Dutch parliamentary elections some voters of GreenLeft
mentioned this: they said that the party had done a good job as an opposition party (vot-
ers no. 12756, 14174, and 19090; 54-year-old woman, 39-year-old woman, and 46-year-old
woman).
17  Drees is usually credited for the introduction of these benefits (AOW), but they
were in fact introduced in 1956 by Suurhoff. Earlier initiatives by Drees in the late 1940s,
however, in a sense laid the foundation for them (Daalder 2000: 37-39).
18  Downs (1957) mentioned this heuristic as an alternative possibility for voters in
multi-party systems with coalition governments. Because in such a context taking into
account possible election outcomes was difficult, voters could simply vote for their fa-
vourite party. Although it is usually not identified as a choice mechanism, the party pref-
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erence heuristic may be regarded as an assumption that underlies most theories of voting.
19  Note that consequently the notion of a sincere vote may be considered an analyti-
cal construct, just as the notion of a strategic vote.
20  Voters may also develop other kinds of voting habits. An example that fits few
models of voting is that of a Dutch voter who reported that she always voted for the first
party on the ballot. Because the first party on the ballot varies across elections (it corre-
sponds with the party that received most votes in the previous election), this voter sup-
ported different parties, even though the choice mechanism concerned a habit.
21  Downs (1957) argued further that habitual voters come in two kinds: those who
always vote for the same party (loyalists) and those who always abstain (apathetics). As in
this research only those who actually vote are focused on, only the former kind are of
interest here.
22  The concept of a normal vote, however, concerned the aggregate level.
23  In The Voter Decides (1954) Campbell and his colleagues took this position, but in
The American Voter (1960) they viewed party identification as an indirect determinant.
Some later models again included party identification as a direct determinant of vote
choice (see, for example, Markus and Converse 1979).
24  The party preference heuristic might also be described as “vote for (the candidate
of) the party that you like best”, while the candidate preference heuristic might also be
described as “vote for (the party of) the candidate you like best”.
25  Note that the model speaks about ‘prospect evaluations’, not ‘prospective evalua-
tions’. One reason for this is a matter consistency in terminology: what precedes the no-
tion of evaluation in each instance is the object of that evaluation: party, candidate, gov-
ernment, or prospect. An additional reason is that the notion of ‘prospective evaluations’
has been used in electoral research in a somewhat different way. Miller and Shanks (1996,
ch. 14), for example, define prospective evaluations as expectations regarding the future
governmental performance of parties or candidates (p. 391). An example would be voters’
judgement regarding whether a particular presidential candidate would solve the prob-
lem of poverty. Such judgements are not like-dislike ratings of a hypothetical situation,
and therefore do not fit the conceptualisation of prospect evaluations adopted in this re-
search.
CHAPTER 6  –  THREE MODELS TO EXPLAIN PARTY EVALUATIONS
1  The notion of a funnel of causality as employed by the Michigan scholars deviates
from this idea (Campbell et al. 1960). However, in their analyses vote choice was also pre-
sented as the sole dependent variable, while a set of independent variables was used to
explain vote choice.
2  The argument can even be taken one step further. The concepts used traditionally
to explain vote choice not only can be linked to party evaluations instead of vote choice,
arguably they should be linked to party evaluations rather than to vote choice.
3  The main question with respect to the rule of combining various evaluations is
probably how important each single characteristic is. In a simple model each single evalu-
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ation may be given equal weight. This requires that the evaluations of the characteristics
are all measured on the same scale. An alternative would be to assign different weights to
different characteristics. This corresponds to the notion of ‘saliency’: some aspects may be
more important or salient than others. The weights may also be determined empirically,
for example by the use of a statistical analysis in which the single evaluations are used as
independent variables and overall party evaluations as dependent variables. Note that
such a procedure assumes that the weight assigned to each characteristic is equal among
all voters; for an alternative approach, refer to Rivers (1988).
4  In relation to the orthodox model three conclusions concerning how we may go
beyond the existing theories may be formulated. First, it is important to include all con-
cepts simultaneously, rather than focus on some only. Second, it is important not to define
the concepts too narrowly. For example, party characteristics should include not only is-
sues, but also other kinds of characteristics; and in as far as issues are focused on, they
should not be limited to the few that the researcher regards important. Third, individual
differences, as well as differences across parties, should be allowed for.
5  The model is also central in later work by Kelley (1983).
6  Updating is not necessary if the positive or negative valence of the processed infor-
mation fits the existing evaluation. For example, if a candidate proposes a policy that cer-
tain voters disagree with, these voters need not adjust their evaluation if they already
strongly dislike the candidate.
7  The designs of the various experiments varied in terms of the experimental condi-
tions, tasks performed, question order, measurements used, and so on. The outline of the
experiments discussed corresponds most closely to the 1989 study by Lodge and his col-
leagues, whereas their 1995 study deviates most strongly from the discussed design.
8  A small effect was found of policy positions that were falsely attributed to the can-
didates. This was explained as projection or rationalisation bias: individuals are more
likely to think that candidates they like take policy positions they like (Lodge et al. 1989:
415; McGraw et al. 1990: 49).
Kathleen McGraw and her colleagues (1990) found that issue saliency mattered: is-
sues that individuals had rated as very important had a stronger impact than other issues.
9  Using a somewhat different experimental design David Redlawsk (2001) found
that candidate evaluations could be predicted better on the basis of recalled information
than on the basis of processed information. A problem of this study, however, is that the
evaluation of recalled information was determined directly by asking subjects for each
memory whether it made them feel good, bad, or neutral about the candidate, whereas
the evaluation of information processed was determined indirectly by comparing that in-
formation to the subjects’ ideal points. Because of these differences the comparison is
problematic.
10  The correlations between the positive and negative emotion factors ranged be-
tween – 0.04 and – 0.54. The correlations between the two corresponding indices ranged
between – 0.05 and – 0.42 (Abelson et al. 1998: 622–623, table 1–2).
The factor loadings typically varied between 0.60 and 0.80 (of the forty-two values
none exceeded this range, and eleven were lower). If we assume that the variables that
made up a factor measured one and the same concept, these values are fairly low. One
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should keep in mind, however, that the variables were dichotomous; this may have influ-
enced the results. Nevertheless, the factor loadings do not permit the conclusion that the
various variables that made up a factor measured a single concept. In that case the values
had to be higher. So, the conclusion must be that the various variables apparently shared
some common element, but may still be independent phenomena.
11  The values of Cronbach alpha of these indices ranged between 0.62 and 0.80
(Abelson et al. 1998: 627, table 7).
12  The index of positive emotions contained three different emotions and the index
of negative emotions four. Hence, the overall effect of negative emotions could be as large
as that of positive emotions.
13  Victor Ottati, Marco Steenbergen and Ellen Riggle (1992) found that if episodic
memories of emotions were operationalised as a four-point ordinal scale (always-never)
instead of the dichotomous yes-no, positive and negative emotions were more strongly
correlated to each other, and were not more weakly correlated than positive and negative
trait measures. Hence, the low correlations between positive and negative emotions
found by Abelson and his colleagues (1982) may have been a methodological artefact.
14  Alternative explanations for the low correlations that have been suggested are
methodological in nature (see Abelson et al. 1982; Ottati et al. 1992).
15  Initially Marcus (1988) referred to both systems as the behavioral activation and
behavioral inhibition system; Marcus and MacKuen (1993) referred to them as behavioral
inhibition and behavioral approach system. In order to prevent confusion in the follow-
ing discussion both systems are referred to by the names that were employed more re-
cently: disposition and surveillance system (Marcus et al. 2000).
16  The notion of interest had been used to operationalise enthusiasm, so the fact that
enthusiasm was found to increase interest is not much of a surprise.
17  The role of emotion in relation to cognition has been discussed in various other
studies as well (see, for example, Ragsdale 1991; Goren 1997; Glaser and Salovey 1998;
and Lavine et al. 1999).
18  Emotion episodes may also be integrated into other kinds of sentiments – for ex-
ample, disgust or enthusiasm about a certain party. These are the type of emotions that
Marcus and MacKuen (1993) focused on. Such sentiments are presumably stored in long-
term memory just as party evaluations. This study regards the latter of paramount impor-
tance and only focuses on those.
19  The distinction that is made between the emotional response as such and its con-
scious representation corresponds with that made in emotion research between emotions
and feelings (Damasio 1994, 2000; LeDoux 1998). According to the corresponding view,
emotions are the total set of changes or responses in the brain and the body, whereas feel-
ings are the conscious representations of those responses.
20  This means that voters may have insight in why they like or dislike a particular
party to a certain degree. If voters have accurate beliefs about what emotional responses
affected their evaluation of a particular party, voters’ accounts of those experiences pro-
vide an explanation for their party evaluations. However, voters may also hold inaccurate
beliefs about the relationship between their emotional response to particular information
about a party and their evaluation of that party.
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More specific, voters may be mistaken with respect to the causal direction. A rather
negative evaluation of a particular party, for example, might lead voters to also evaluate
negatively a particular characteristic of that party. Voters might then – falsely – assume
that their negative overall evaluation was driven by their negative evaluation of this char-
acteristic. In that case one could speak about rationalisation. Note that the model pre-
sented does not include such processes, because it is directed solely at the causes of party
evaluations, not their effects.
21  The fact that information upon which party evaluations are based, as well as in-
formation concerning the resulting emotional responses, are soon forgotten, implies that
the processes described by the emotion-integration model of party evaluations cannot be
studied well on the basis of self-report. The reason is that self-report appears to result in
valid measures of emotional responses only for a limited period of time.
Why this is the case has been illuminated by Michael Robinson and Gerald Clore
(2002). According to their theory, individuals can recall emotion episodes only for a short
period of time. Next, individuals can only ‘estimate’ their emotional responses on the ba-
sis of related information in episodic memory. After a few weeks this information is also
lost and individuals can only estimate their emotional responses on the basis of general
beliefs about the emotion-evoking ability of particular situations or beliefs about the typi-
cal emotional response of the individuals themselves (both kinds of beliefs are stored in
semantic memory).
Because estimates of past emotions based on beliefs stored in semantic memory may
well be biased, the formation and change of party evaluations can only be studied for the
period immediately preceding that of a self-report. Changes in party evaluations across
long periods of time – for example, that between two consecutive parliamentary elections
– require many repeated surveys.
CHAPTER 7  –  EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE SINCERE VOTE MODEL
1  Documentation on these studies can be found in Van der Eijk, Irwin and Niemöller
(1986); Anker and Oppenhuis (1989); and Aarts, Van der Kolk and Kamp (1999). The
documentation on the 2002 survey should become available soon too. The corresponding
data files have been (or will be) deposited at the Steinmetz Archive in Amsterdam; they
can also be obtained from several other social science data archives.
2  The fact that party evaluation measures were included in the pre-election inter-
view is highly important, because this safeguards somewhat against the possibility that
party evaluations or party preferences are deduced from actual voting behaviour (see the
discussion about the causal direction of the relationship between attitudes and behaviour
in Chapter 3). It must be noted, however, that in the pre-election interview voters were
also asked about their voting intentions. We cannot exclude the possibility that answers to
that question influenced answers to subsequent questions later in the interview about
party evaluations.
3  The question wordings are from the 1998 survey. The English translations have
been taken from the DPES documentation (Aarts et al. 1999). For details about the ques-
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tion wording in the other surveys, question order (including the order in which parties
were evaluated), and showcard format, refer to the official DPES documentation (see note
1).
4  It should be noted that the connotation of the Dutch word “sympathiek” is some-
what different from the English translation “sympathetic”. The Dutch word does not in-
volve feelings of sympathy; its meaning comes closer to “likeable” or “nice”.
5  There are three reasons to recode the 101-point measure into an eleven-point for-
mat. The first is that research findings suggest that people are unable to distinguish that
many intensities and consequently not much can be gained by including many answer
categories (Miller 1956; Cox 1980). This implies, one could argue, that minor differences
on the 101-point scale do not represent true attitudinal differences.
A second reason is that minor differences in evaluations of parties might result from
differences in (intended) voting behaviour, rather than the other way round. People
sometimes infer what their attitudes are from their behaviour (cf. Bem 1972; Eagly and
Chaiken 1993: 538-552). Although it would not be realistic to assume that party evalua-
tions are merely inferred from (intended) voting behaviour, to some extent such a process
may operate. Minor differences on the 101-point scale, in particular at the upper side of
the scale, would then be the result. Although the problems of reversed causal direction
can never be fully overcome in analyses based on cross-sectional data, we might safe-
guard somewhat against them by not regarding minor differences on the evaluation scale
too seriously (and rounding off the scores).
A final reason to recode the scores is that this makes the party preference measure
(to be discussed later) more comparable across the years. This has to do with the fact that
the showcard on which the evaluation scale was presented differed across the various
DPES studies. For example, in 1986 each single unit between 0 and 100 was marked by a
small line, while in 1998 only multiples of ten were marked. Presumably due to such dif-
ferences, the proportion of evaluations that consisted of other values than multiples of ten
varied considerably across the surveys. For example, the proportion of evaluations of the
Labour Party that consisted of another value than a multiple of ten was 13.9 per cent in
1986, 5.2 per cent in 1994, 1.6 per cent in 1998, and 23.9 per cent in 2002. If the scores
would not be recoded, differences in the number of voters with a multiple party prefer-
ence could be a methodological artefact resulting from differences in question format (or
better: showcard format). This would in turn affect the predictive power of the sincere
vote model. This is not to say that by applying the recoding procedure all figures are fully
comparable, but the problems are arguably less severe.
6  In 1986 by accident one of the small left-wing parties (PSP) was not included.
In 1998 the order in which the parties were presented was randomised.
7  The official DPES data files do not distinguish between voters who did not know
the party and voters who did not know what evaluation score to award. Initially such
distinctions were made, however. In the interview a separate code was used if voters said
they did not know the party. In an unofficial file of the 1998 DPES that was distributed
within a small circle of electoral researchers (a file with the name NKO98B.sav) this dis-
tinction was still present. Data from that file show that on average (across the eleven par-
ties) 77 per cent of the voters who are classified as ‘don’t know’ indicated they did not
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know the party, whereas 23 per cent did not know what evaluation score to award. For
the four largest parties (Labour, Liberal Party, Christian Democrats, and D66) both pro-
portions were of about equal size, while for the other parties clearly more voters said they
did not know the party than that they did not know what score to award. Therefore, in
the analyses and discussion in this research voters in the ‘don’t know’ category will be
treated as if they did not know the party.
The few voters for whom no scores were available have been included in the ‘don’t
know’ category.
8  The 1986 figures concern the Centre Party, the figures of later years concern the
Centre Democrats. Since the former can be regarded a predecessor of the latter, both par-
ties will sometimes be referred to jointly as Centre Democrats.
9  The figure for the ChristianUnion was 8 per cent, and that for the SGP 4 per cent.
The fact that both figures add up to 12 per cent (instead of 10 per cent, which the table
lists), indicates that two per cent of the voters had a multiple party preference that in-
cluded both the ChristianUnion and the SGP.
10  Voters who did not evaluate any party have been excluded from subsequent
analyses if these involve party preferences.
11  The proportion of voters with a single party preference can be also determined by
combining the figures that indicate that a particular party was strongly, moderately, or
weakly preferred.
12  The recoding of the evaluation scores into an eleven-point format affected these
figures. For example, without this recoding in 2002 the proportion of voters with a single
party preference would be 74 per cent rather than 64 per cent.
13  Parties have been classified as left-wing or right-wing on the basis of the mean
left-right score respondents awarded them. Labour Party, GreenLeft (and their predeces-
sors), Socialist Party, and D66 have thus been classified as left-wing; the other parties as
right-wing.
14  The few voters who evaluated only one party, are included in the strong party
preference category.
15  The original Dutch questions do not contain an equivalent of the English ‘to in-
tend’, as the translation of the question suggests. In Dutch the question wording was “Op
welke partij gaat u stemmen op 6 mei?”. This could have been translated as “Which party
are you going to vote for on May 6?” or as “Which party will you vote for on May 6?”.
16  Voters who did not know yet whether they would vote, and voters who did not
know for whom to vote, were asked whether there were any parties they considered vot-
ing for; and if so, which parties. Voters who intended not to vote were asked what party
they would vote for, if they were obligated to vote by law. The operationalisation of vot-
ing intentions does not make use of answers to these questions, but is based solely on the
preceding question about voting intentions.
17  Because self-reports of past behaviour tend to be biased towards current prefer-
ences, such a bias will presumably only weaken the support found for the sincere vote
model. The problem would be more severe if party evaluations would have been meas-
ured in the same interview as that in which the behaviour is reported. That, however, is
not the case: party evaluations are measured before the election.
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18  The proportion of voters in the DPES who reported having cast a vote is consider-
ably larger than the actual turnout in that election. This may be an effect of a sample bias
(non-voters are underrepresented in the DPES) or misreporting (voters who did not vote
nevertheless report a vote), but it may also result from a so-called Hawthorne-effect: par-
ticipation in the research stimulates voters to vote in the election.
19  In each survey, for about one per cent of the voters who claimed to have voted no
party choice was reported. The reasons for this were that the voters refused to answer,
had cast a blank vote, did not know for whom they had voted, or data concerning their
vote choice were uncodable or missing. These voters will not be included in analyses that
concern voting behaviour.
20  The figures concerning voting intentions and voting behaviour concern the aggre-
gate level and therefore cannot be used to draw inferences about what happened at the
individual level.
21  According to the sincere vote model, voters with multiple party preferences may
vote for any of the parties they evaluate most positively. Which of the preferred parties
those voters are expected to (intend to) vote for, is not indicated by the model. Conse-
quently, the model can explain voting behaviour fully only for voters with single party
preferences.
22  Due to panel attrition the number of voters included in this table is smaller than
in the previous one.
23  Another reason why voters with a single party preference may be more likely to
vote in line with their voting intention has to do with changes in party evaluation scores
that may occur over time. For the sake of argument, let us assume that voters indeed pre-
fer to vote for a best-liked party. As a result of changes in party evaluations a non-pre-
ferred party may then be evaluated more positively than the party of the initial voting
intention. This would result in a change in voting intention and the ultimate vote would
differ from the initial preference. As the difference between the evaluations of the party
intended to vote for and the best liked other party is larger, the chance that the difference
will be overcome due to changes in the party evaluations is smaller. By definition such a
difference is larger for voters with a single party preference (this difference is ten points
or more) than for voters with a single party preference (this difference is zero). Conse-
quently, the second-best evaluated party is more likely to become the best-liked party due
to changes in party evaluations among voters with a multiple party preference than
among voters with a single party preference. This means that voters with multiple party
preferences are more likely to change their voting intention and consequently vote for
another party than their initial voting intention indicated.
24  Support for the presumed role of voting intentions is also obtained if the party
preference–voting behaviour relationship is focused on: this relationship is less strong
than that between voting intentions and voting behaviour. Findings from which this can
be deduced will be presented later in this chapter (Table 7.32).
25  The figures were 23 per cent in 1986, 29 per cent in 1994, 24 per cent in 1998, and
22 per cent in 2002.
26  If voters would choose at random, the chance that voters with a multiple party
preference would vote sincerely is larger due to the simple fact that their party preference
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included more parties.
27  The findings about the party preference–voting intention and voting intention–
voting behaviour relationships suggest that the voting behaviour of voters who had for-
mulated a voting intention did not match party evaluations fully either, but to validate
such a conclusion the relationship between party preferences and voting behaviour itself
must be examined. It is possible that both types of discrepancies counterbalance each
other. A voter may evaluate party A most positively, prefer to vote for party B before an
election, but ultimately vote for party A. In that case there would be a discrepancy be-
tween party preference and voting intention, as well as between voting intention and vot-
ing behaviour, but there would be no discrepancy between party preference and voting
behaviour.
28  Note that the number of patterns is not sixteen (two times two times two times
two), as one might suppose. The main reason for this is that some combinations are logi-
cally impossible. For example, a discrepancy in the party preference–voting intention re-
lationship and a match in the voting intention–voting behaviour relationship cannot go
together with a match in the party preference–voting behaviour relationship. On the
other hand, some additional patterns are distinguished due to the fact that some voters
had not yet formed a voting intention when they were interviewed before the election.
29  The figures are discussed as if a change took place between 1986 and 1994. An-
other interpretation is that the 1986 election was an odd one out.
30  An exception with respect to party evaluations is the 2002 DPES, which asked vot-
ers to evaluate the various parties before as well as after the election. The three other sur-
veys included party evaluations measures only in the pre-election interview.
CHAPTER 8  –  THE NON-SINCERE VOTE
1  How problematic the exclusion of the endorsement heuristic from the analyses is,
depends on the number of voters who employed it. Research by Joop van Holsteyn (1994,
2000) suggests that in relation to Dutch parliamentary elections the problem is not severe.
In their answers to open-ended questions about why they voted for a particular party, few
voters referred to other people (indicated by Van Holsteyn by the notion of imitation).
2  In the DPES voters were asked how much difference it makes to them which par-
ties become part of the government (much, a little, or no difference). Because inclusion of
the corresponding variable hardly affected the outcomes of the analyses, this question is
not made use of.
Two other kinds of election outcome preferences that may play a role are those con-
cerning which party becomes the largest in the new (Second Chamber of) parliament, and
who becomes the prime minister of the new government. Since the DPES did not contain
questions about voters’ preferences regarding which party becomes largest, this aspect is
not studied here.
With respect to voters’ preferences regarding the future prime minister, voters were
asked how much faith they had in various persons as a prime minister. The leaders of the
major parties were awarded scores in terms of a seven-point rating scale with end-points
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labelled ‘no faith at all’ and ‘very much faith’. What is problematic, however, is that these
questions were asked in the post-election interview. Therefore, it is not appropriate to use
them to explain voting intentions before the election. Consequently, the analysis of the im-
pact of election outcome preferences in this chapter is limited to the role of voters’ govern-
ment preferences.
3  This classification is based on the idea that the Labour Party, GreenLeft, and So-
cialist Party can be considered left-wing parties, the Liberal Party, List Pim Fortuyn, Cen-
tre Democrats, and orthodox Protestant parties can be considered right-wing parties, and
other parties can be considered centre parties.
This classification differs from that with respect to multiple party preferences,
which did not include the notion of centre parties (see Chapter 7, Table 7.14 and note 13),
because few voters included solely left-wing or right-wing parties in their coalition pref-
erence.
4  In part these figures result from missing data, since those voters have been in-
cluded in this category.
5  In 1986 and 1994 respondents were asked to choose between the four major par-
ties. Consequently, those who liked one of the smaller parties best could not include these
parties in their coalition preferences.
6  Because there were very few voters who did not express a coalition preference but
did express a vote preference, these are not included as a separate category in the table.
7  Before this question was asked, respondents were asked about their perception of
the effects of government policy on the economic situation, on employment, and on their
personal financial situation. This may have influenced the subsequent judgement by a
process known as priming.
8  Voters who did not provide an answer are also included in the don’t know cat-
egory.
9  Because few voters were very satisfied or very dissatisfied, these categories are not
distinguished in the subsequent analyses.
10  The various proportions do not include voters with a multiple party preference
that included both a government and an opposition party.
11  What matters is not the government satisfaction and party preference as such, but
whether or not both matched with each other. By combining the categories this is empha-
sised.
Moreover, in only one of the eight cases there was a significant difference in the pro-
portion with a non-sincere voting intention between the groups joined (p-value of Chi-
square test < 0.05). (In 1998 dissatisfied voters who preferred an opposition party had a
non-sincere voting intention more often than satisfied voters who preferred a government
party. Chi-square = 17.9; d.f. = 1; p = 0.00)
12  The party leaders of the Labour Party, Liberal Party, Christian Democrats, D66,
Centre Democrats, and List Pim Fortuyn were about equally well-known as their parties
(except for Bolkestein in 1994 and De Hoop Scheffer in 1998). The party leaders of
GreenLeft, Socialist Party, orthodox Protestant parties, and Liveable Netherlands were
less well-known than their parties, except for Rosenmöller and Marijnissen in 2002.
13  In 1994 GreenLeft had two leaders, Brouwer and Rabbae. The evaluation scores
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used in the analyses are based on the leader that a voter liked best.
14  The relatively large figures in 1986 and 1998 result from the fact that in 1986 only
the leaders of the four major parties were included in the survey, while in 1998 no evalua-
tion scores were asked for the leaders of two orthodox Protestant parties and the Elderly
Alliance.
15  Because coefficients of logistic regression analyses are not always easy to inter-
pret, results are presented in terms of figures. The models are shown in Table N.1. In
these analyses (and in the next), the dependent variable was coded ‘0’ for voters with a
sincere voting intention and ‘1’ for voters with a non-sincere voting intention. The
chances in the figure can all be computed on the basis of these data. The formula upon
which the models are based is as follows:
log (prob [event]/prob [no event]) = C + BX.
This formula can be written in terms of odds as follows:
prob (event)/prob (no event) = ec * ebx.
Hence, in 1986 the odds of the probability of a non-sincere vote versus a sincere vote for
voters who awarded the leader of the preferred party an evaluation score of, say, 80, was
0.044 (namely, e–1.84 * e–0.016*80). This means that for these voters the chance of a non-sincere
voting intention was 4 per cent (0.044/[1+0.044]).
In addition to the constant and the b-value, standard errors (S.E.) are presented.
These indicate whether or not the effects as indicated by the b-values are statistically sig-
nificant. Finally, Nagelkerke R2 is a measure that indicates to what extent the variance in
the dependent variable can be explained on the basis of the independent variable(s) in the
model. Its value can vary between 0 and 1. The larger the value, the better the model ex-
plains the dependent variable.
16  Because the predictions that the models make for voters who awarded low evalu-
ation scores are based on few observations, these should be interpreted with care. There-
fore, dashed lines are used for evaluation scores below 50.
17  The slightly weaker impact in 1986 may be a methodological artefact resulting
from the fact that this year only the leaders of the four major parties were evaluated.
18  Table N.2 presents the results of these logistic regression analyses.
19  Because differences below – 20 and above 30 occurred seldom, dashed lines are
used in those areas.
In order not to exclude respondents from the analyses, for voters who did not evalu-
ate the leader of their party preference as well as for voters who only evaluated the leader
of their party preference difference scores of 0 have been used. A score of 0 can be re-
garded as a neutral position, since it implies that party leaders brought their parties nei-
ther an advantage, nor a disadvantage.
The results of the logistic regression analyses are shown in Table N.3. The amount of
explained variance of the model based on difference-scores was larger than the sum of
explained variance of the two previous models. This means that party leader evaluations
can best be focused on in terms of the party leader preferences that they constitute, like
argued in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
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20  Party leader evaluations may also influence party evaluations, and thereby influ-
ence vote preferences more indirectly. In that way the impact of party leader preferences
may still have changed. Chapter 9 will discuss this possibility.
21  The table includes voters who did not evaluate any of the parties, but who did
evaluate one or more party leaders. The reason is that for these voters a voting intention
can be predicted, namely on the basis of the party leader evaluations.
22  Note that the 1986 figure is underestimated as a result of the panel attrition.
23  If we focus solely on voters who could recall a vote for a specific party in the pre-
vious election, the proportion of voters who preferred another party increased from 20 to
33 per cent.
24  The analyses do not include the very few voters who did not evaluate any of the
TABLE N.1  Evaluation of the leader of the preferred party and the chance of a non-sincere
voting intention (results of logistic regression)
1986 1994 1998 2002
constant - 1.84 - 1.08 - 0.77 - 0.78
B-value - 0.016 - 0.020 - 0.017 - 0.014
(S.E.) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Nagelkerke R2 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
(N) (1041) (1062) (1286) (1398)
TABLE N.2  Evaluation of the best-liked leader of non-preferred parties and the chance of a
non-sincere voting intention (results of logistic regression)
1986 1994 1998 2002
constant - 3.53 - 4.31 -3.51 - 4.23
B-value 0.015 0.026 0.022 0.033
(S.E.) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Nagelkerke R2 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04
(N) (1114) (1086) (1380) (1423)
TABLE N.3  Difference between evaluations of the leaders of preferred and non-preferred par-
ties and the chance of a non-sincere voting intention (results of logistic regression)
1986 1994 1998 2002
constant - 2.40 - 2.44 - 1.79 - 1.72
B-value - 0.017 - 0.040 - 0.028 - 0.030
(S.E.) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Nagelkerke R2 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.06
(N) (1127) (1091) (1396) (1426)
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parties, but nevertheless had a vote preference.
25  The two variables are added to control for possible effects of party evaluations
and party preference strength. If the control variables were not added, the outcomes
might result from differences in those factors. First, voters who like their party preference
well may be less likely to have a non-sincere voting intention than voters who do not like
their party preference well. In other words, we may expect that as the party evaluation
becomes more positive, the chance of a non-sincere voting intention becomes smaller. Sec-
ond, voters who have a strong party preference, which means that they like all other par-
ties much less than their party preference, may be less likely to have a non-sincere voting
intention than voters who like one or more other parties only a little less. In other words,
we may expect that as the difference between the evaluations of preferred and non-pre-
ferred parties becomes larger, the chance of a non-sincere voting intention becomes
smaller. These possible effects have been controlled for by adding two variables: one that
indicates the evaluation score awarded to the party preference, and another that indicates
the preference strength. Note that the preference strength measure was discussed in
Chapter 7, and is comparable to that discussed earlier in this chapter in relation to party
leader preferences. It indicates the difference between the evaluation score awarded to
the preferred party and the score awarded to the best-liked non-preferred party.
26  Merely predicting a sincere vote for all voters would already lead to proportions
of correct predictions between 86 and 93 per cent. If a distribution is skewed so much, it is
hard to improve the proportion of correct predictions.
27  The R statistic is a measure that indicates the partial contribution of each variable
to the model. Its values may vary between – 1 and + 1. The larger the absolute value of R,
the stronger this variable contributed to the explanation of the dependent variable.
Hence, in these models a positive value means that the chance of a non-sincere voting
intention increased. A negative value, on the other hand, means that this chance de-
creased. (The other coefficients have been discussed earlier in this chapter; see note 15).
28  This contrasts with the bivariate relationship found above, which emphasises the
importance of focusing on the various concepts simultaneously in a single, multivariate
analysis.
29  Party leader preferences are operationalised on the basis of a continuous variable,
whereas other heuristics are operationalised on the basis of categorical variables. One
may wonder whether this affected the results. Additional analyses indicated this was not
the case. Very similar results were obtained on the basis of logistic regression models that
included a categorical variable to operationalise party leader preferences (one with three
categories: (1) leader of preferred party liked best, (2) leader of a non-preferred party
liked best, or (3) leader of preferred and non-preferred parties liked equally well).
30  The size of the impact of the two control variables was limited, and the direction
as expected. If voters evaluated their party preference more positively (as indicated by the
evaluation score awarded), they were somewhat less likely to have a non-sincere voting
intention. Additionally, if the preference for this party was stronger (as indicated by the
difference with the evaluation score awarded to the best-liked non-preferred party), they
were somewhat less likely to have a non-sincere voting intention.
31  The Ns upon which the figures are based can be determined on the basis of Ta-
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ble 7.21.
32   For some voters (between 3 and 10 per cent) the reason was that their coalition
preference included none of the parties they evaluated most positively.
CHAPTER 9  –  EXPLAINING PARTY EVALUATIONS
1  Three other parties that have been represented in Dutch parliament – the Centre
Democrats, Elderly Alliance, and Liveable Netherlands – are not included. First, these
parties received few seats – with only one exception at most three – and might therefore
be considered less interesting. Second, in 1994, when the Elderly Alliance received six
seats, respondents were not asked to evaluate them.
2  Another thing to note is that the analyses are based on the assumption that the
various concepts influence party evaluations, rather than the other way round. As will be
discussed later in this chapter in more detail with respect to party leader evaluations, this
assumption is problematic. Voters may, for example, be satisfied about a particular gov-
ernment simply because they like the parties that participate in it. Or voters may base
their policy preferences on the degree to which they like the parties who advocate them.
Even in the case of social characteristics the causal direction may not be as often assumed
(see Catt 1996: 92-93). To overcome these problems longitudinal data, which assess the
same concepts at different points in time, are necessary. Because the surveys upon which
this research is based are cross-sectional studies, the findings to be presented should be
interpreted with care. (The Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies consist of a pre-election
and post-election interview, but questions concerning the various concepts are usually
asked in only one of these interviews.)
3  The problem of the causal direction discussed above applies equally to each party
evaluation. Hence, the most interesting aspect of the analysis of party evaluations is not
affected by this problem.
4  Like in earlier chapters, question wordings are from the 1998 survey. Differences
in question wordings will not be discussed. For details, refer to the official documentation
of the DPES.
5  In 1986 and 1994 the question about attendance of religious services was asked
only to church members. In 1998 and 2002 the question was also asked to respondents
who did not consider themselves member of a church. In order to make the figures com-
parable across the years, and because in the following analyses this question will be used
to operationalise the strength of a Christian identity, the figures in the table concern re-
spondents who considered themselves a member of a Christian church.
In 1986 four categories of church attendance were used (see Table 9.2), while since
1994 an additional category was included for attending church two or three times a
month. In order to make the figures comparable across years, these voters have been clas-
sified as ‘at least once a month’ (and were combined with voters in that category). The
differences in question format may be a reason why in 1986 some more voters were classi-
fied as attending church weekly than in later years.
6  In order to exclude effects that are not statistically significant (p < 0.05) a backward
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procedure has been used.
Dummy variables were created that were coded ‘1’ if voters belonged to a particular
category, and ‘0’ if they did not.
7  Because few voters classified themselves as upper class or upper working class,
these categories have been combined with upper middle class and ordinary working
class, respectively.
8  The few voters who had a non-Christian religious identity, as well as voters who
did not know which social class they belonged to, are not classified separately. Conse-
quently, these voters are in a sense represented, like secular middle class voters, by the
reference category to which the constant in the regression analysis applies.
9  Evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties (in 1986, 1994, and 1998: SGP, GPV,
and RPF; in 2002: SGP and Christian Union) are analysed in terms of the highest evalua-
tion score awarded to any of these parties. Similarly, the evaluations of the predecessors
of GreenLeft (CPN, PPR, and EVP – recall that respondents were not asked to evaluate the
PSP) are analysed in terms of the highest evaluation score awarded to any of them.
10  This conclusion is supported by the findings shown in Table 9.4. Formal statistical
evidence for this conclusion, however, is to be found in partial R figures (which are not
shown).
11  The labels are from the 1998 DPES, except those of the issue of crime, which are
from the 2002 survey. The labels of the ethnic minorities issue have been adjusted slightly,
in order to reflect the original question wording more accurately. Question wordings and
labels sometimes differed across years. Refer to the official documentation of the DPES
for details.
12  Three additional remarks need to be made. First, in 1986 the issues of asylum
seekers, integration of ethnic minorities, crime, and European integration were not yet
included in the survey, in 1994 the issues of asylum seekers and European integration
were not yet included, and in 1998 the issue of crime was not included. Second, in 1986
the questions were all asked in the post-election interview. Since 1994 they have all been
asked in the pre-election interview, except that since 1998 the question on nuclear plants
has been asked in the post-election interview, and in 2002 so were the questions on inte-
gration of ethnic minorities and European integration. Third, with respect to some issues
position one at the seven-point scale corresponded with the ‘right-wing’ position, and po-
sition seven with the ‘left-wing’ position (euthanasia, income inequality, nuclear plants).
With respect to other issues this was reversed (ethnic minorities, asylum seekers, crime,
European unification).
13  Because some of the questions were asked in the post-election survey, in which up
to 18 per cent of the respondents did not participate, for some issues the opinions of a
substantial minority of voters remain unknown. If this panel attrition is accounted for, the
don’t know figures in some cases were slightly higher, but none exceeded 10 per cent.
14  Testing the impact of policy preferences on the basis of the proximity model or the
directional theory would require the inclusion of data concerning voters’ perceptions of
parties’ positions with respect to the various issues. As such data are mostly not available
in the DPES, the analyses presented only include voters’ own policy preferences.
15  Tables N.4 to N.7 show the correlations between voters’ positions with respect to
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TABLE N.4  Relationship between voters’ policy preferences in 1986
(Spearman’s correlation coefficient)
eutha- income
nasia inequality
income inequality 0.17 -
nuclear plants 0.11 0.45
TABLE N.5  Relationship between voters’ policy preferences in 1994
(Spearman’s correlation coefficient)
eutha- income nuclear ethnic
nasia inequality plants minorities
income inequality 0.11 -
nuclear plants 0.10 0.33 -
ethnic minorities - 0.11 n.s. n.s. -
crime n.s. 0.14 0.10 0.32
TABLE N.6  Relationship between voters’ policy preferences in 1998
(Spearman’s correlation coefficient)
eutha- income  nuclear ethnic asylum
nasia inequality plants minorities seekers
income inequality 0.18 -
nuclear plants n.s. 0.22 -
ethnic minorities n.s. 0.08 0.10 -
asylum seekers - 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.51 -
European   integration n.s. - 0.09 n.s. 0.21 0.19
TABLE N.7  Relationship between voters’ policy preferences in 2002
(Spearman’s correlation coefficient)
eutha- income nuclear ethnic asylum crime
nasia inequality plants minorities seekers
income inequality 0.10 -
nuclear plants n.s. 0.21 -
ethnic minorities n.s. 0.13 0.13 -
asylum seekers - 0.06 0.21 0.18 0.48 -
crime - 0.10 n.s. 0.09 0.38 0.44 -
European    integration n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.25 0.19 0.16
n.s. indicates a correlation is not significant (p > 0.05)
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the various issues.
The analyses concerning comparisons between various multiple regression models
based on different sets of issues are not shown here.
16  The fact that with respect to the major parties the model based on policy prefer-
ences had more explanatory power in 1986 than in later years, can be understood if one
realises that this election year was characterised by a high level of polarisation (see
Thomassen et al. 2000).
17  In 1986 the question was asked only in the post-election interview, not in the pre-
election interview.
18  In the 1994 pre-election survey, as well as the 1986, 1994, and 1998 post-election
surveys, the ten-point format was used. In the 1998 and 2002 pre-election surveys, as well
as the 2002 post-election survey, the eleven-point format was used.
19  Because the questions concerning the parties’ positions have only been asked in
the post-election interview, the following analyses make use of measures from that inter-
view. In order to assess the impact of left-right ideology properly, respondents who par-
ticipated only in the pre-election interview have therefore been excluded from the analy-
ses.
20  In order to make findings comparable, the 2002 scale has been transformed into a
similar format as those used in previous surveys (a scale with values ranging between 1
and 10).
21  The procedure followed with respect to left-right ideology differs from that with
respect to policy preferences, since those analyses did not include voters’ perceptions of
party positions (see note 14). There are several reasons to opt for a different design here,
even though this arguably decreases the ability to compare the outcomes with those con-
cerning the impact of policy preferences. First, the models that were formulated by
Downs (1957) and applied to the Netherlands by Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983) con-
cern perceived agreement in terms of left right, not merely voters’ positions. Hence, ap-
plying those explanations of vote choice in order to explain party evaluations requires the
inclusion of measures that indicate perceived agreement. Second, the objections made by
Stokes (1963) and Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) in relation to the proximity model of
issue voting, which were discussed in Chapter 2, do not apply to the left-right continuum:
left-right scales can be conceived of as a set of ordered alternatives. Third, the meaning of
‘left and right’ (in particular that of ‘right’) is somewhat ambiguous. Because voters may
attribute a different meaning to such ideological labels, the effect of ideology on party
evaluations might be underestimated if all voters would be analysed at once in terms of
how they positioned themselves on a left-right continuum. By making use of scores that
indicate perceived agreement, such effects may in a sense be controlled for.
22  It seems plausible that voters who were pleased with a government in which the
Christian Democrats were the largest party, liked the other smaller Christian parties bet-
ter, while voters who were pleased with a government without the Christian Democrats
liked the other Christian parties worse.
23  One alternative strategy, the experimental strategy, is impossible to execute in
practice and cannot be employed on the basis of survey data. The other alternative, the
counterfactual strategy, is discarded because it links up less well with the kind of analyses
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performed in this chapter.
24  To eliminate variables that were not significant (p>0.05) a backward procedure
has been used.
25  This could have been expected on the basis of the idea that such factors can be
ordered in terms of a ‘funnel of causality’ (see Campbell et al. 1960, ch. 2; Miller and
Shanks 1996, ch. 8; Thomassen et al. 2000: 25-26).
26  In the analysis of evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties, the voters con-
cerned are not secular voters, but non-Protestant voters. These include not only secular
voters, but also Catholics and few others.
27  A possible explanation for the low evaluation scores awarded to List Pim Fortuyn
is that voters did not like Pim Fortuyn as a person. This expectation can be deduced from
the fact that voters evaluated Pim Fortuyn himself rather negatively (see Appendix F) and
that evaluations of Pim Fortuyn strongly correlated with those of List Pim Fortuyn (see
Chapter 8). The following analyses provide a test for this explanation.
28  Relationships between party evaluations and party leader evaluations can also be
spurious, especially from an information-processing perspective. If political parties are in
the news, this often involves their leaders. The resulting information-processing may lead
voters to update two ‘running tallies’: one concerning their evaluation of the party and
another concerning their evaluation of the party leader. In that case both evaluations are
caused by the same information processed.
29  Another reason why the relative impact of party leader evaluations on party
evaluations might be somewhat overestimated is methodological in nature. Party evalua-
tions and party leader evaluations have been measured in a similar way: on the basis of a
rating scale with values ranging between 0 and 100. The other independent variables, on
the other hand, have been operationalised in different ways.
CHAPTER 10  –  A PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF VOTING
1  The distinction between images, evaluations, and vote choice links up to the dis-
tinction commonly made in psychology between cognition, affect, and motivation (or co-
nation).
2  The exogenous variables may concern characteristics of voters themselves, as well
as characteristics of their environment (cf. Lewin 1951). These may also include phenom-
ena not discussed elaborately in this study, such as voters’ personality and self-image or
their social environment.
3  The third and fourth group are not mutually exclusive: voters may have a voting
intention that does not match their party preference, while their voting behaviour does
not match their voting intention. Because this applied to few voters (between 1 and 3 per
cent, see Table 7.32 in Chapter 7), voters with a discrepancy in both relationships are not
distinguished as a separate group.
4  Behind a stable impact of perceived agreement in terms of left-right, a shift in
terms of what kind of issues matter may be hidden. To some extent this was the case in
the Netherlands. More specifically, while between 1986 and 1998 voters position on the
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left-right scale were associated most strongly with their positions on the issue of income
inequality, in 2002 left-right positions were associated most strongly with positions on the
issues of ethnic minorities and asylum seekers. Apparently, the meaning of rather abstract
notions like left and right may change. This need not be a surprise: such notions are used
to make sense of politics, and since the issues that are central in political debates change,
so may the meaning of more abstract notions.
5  Fiorina (1981) regarded party identification as a summary measure of various ret-
rospective evaluations. The party preference concept as employed in this research lacks
that explicit reference to judgements about the past. The fact that experiences in the past
have an impact of how voters evaluate parties, does not mean that those evaluations
themselves are retrospective in nature.
6  The fact that the party preference measure does not have the problems of party
identification as operationalised in Dutch voting studies, does not mean that the party
preference measure is a better operationalisation of party identification. Party preferences
and party identification are two different concepts.
APPENDICES
1  The concept of a sincere vote as defined in this study differs from
Farquharson’s  (1969) conception in a number of ways. Two differences have already been
discussed. First, preferences are defined in terms of objects (parties) rather than outcomes
(distributions of seats). Second, preferences are assessed on the basis of voters’ evalua-
tions of individual parties rather than a rank ordering of these. As a result of this latter
fact, in this study ties in a rank ordering are allowed, whereas in Farquharson’s work they
are not. Furthermore, the procedure proposed enables one to assess the intensity of a
preference, which cannot be deduced from a rank order. Despite these differences, the
essence of the original definition of sincere voting remains intact. After all, a preference
rank order can be deduced from the evaluations and sincere voting remains defined as
“voting directly in accordance with one’s preference scales”.
A final thing to note is that in social choice theory any vote is either sincere or strate-
gic. This follows from the fact that its formal system allows voters to deviate form their
sincere vote only on the basis of a strategy that may help establish a particular outcome at
the aggregate level. This study takes into account a wider range of ways in which voters
may reach a vote choice. Consequently, voters may also vote ‘non-sincerely’ for other rea-
sons than strategic ones. This is discussed in Chapter 5.
2  The first division, which corresponds closely to what Daniel Schacter (1996) refers
to as implicit and explicit memory, has a firmer base in neuroscientific research than the
second division (Squire 1987, ch. 11).
3  The episodic-semantic distinction may be used to draw attention to the fact that
political parties and candidates may be represented in voters’ (semantic) memory not
only in terms of images of what they are like, but also in terms of what they have said and
done. In that case, however, the temporal landmarks do not concern the experiences of
the voter, but the actions of the parties or candidates. We may distinguish between both
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aspects by referring to them as semantic and episodic information.
4  Marcus and his colleagues acknowledged that in some instances the disposition
may result in negative emotions, but they conceived of it is terms of aversion.
5  For example, one may conceive of enthusiasm and anger as unipolar dimensions
(of which depression and calmness indicate the absence), whereas fear and anxiety on the
one hand and confidence and trust on the other may concern the opposite sides of a single
bipolar dimension.
6  Whether the various emotions can be conceived of in terms of one, two, or three
dimensions – and if so, which ones – has been a major question of emotion research. The
purpose here obviously is only to illustrate that different such conceptualisations exist.
7  According to Cacioppo and his colleagues (1997) attitudes build on positive and
negative evaluative processes, which exist independently of each other. However, they
argued, people’s conceptual organisation of affective states may tend towards a single bi-
polar evaluative dimension (p. 22). Consequently, especially in studies that rely on self-
report, conceptualising and operationalising attitudes or emotional responses in terms of
a single bipolar dimension may be considered appropriate.
8  This distinction parallels that made earlier in this chapter between short-term and
long-term memory.
9  Note that Russell’s (2003) framework differs from the theory of Marcus and his
colleagues (2000) in terms of which dimensions underlie emotion (pleasure and arousal
or enthusiasm and anxiety) as well in terms of whether the dimensions are bipolar (pleas-
ure and arousal in Russell’s framework) or unipolar (enthusiasm and anxiety in Marcus et
al.’s theory).
10  The notion of temperament is less central in Russell’s (2003) framework, but the
genetically based individual differences with respect to core affect that he mentioned
(p. 154) may be linked to it (see also Diener and Lucas 2000). The most important differ-
ence between the concepts in the taxonomy of emotion and the concepts central in Rus-
sell’s framework, is that the latter refer to states of activation and pleasure. Emotion is
commonly conceived to be more than that, and is related more closely to the pleasure
dimension than to the arousal dimension.
11  The number of observations upon which the figures are based varied as follows:
Labour Party between 310 and 520, Liberal Party between 207 and 341, Christian Demo-
crats between 277 and 396, D66 between 109 and 276, GreenLeft between 80 and 294, So-
cialist Party between 159 and 210, Orthodox Protestant parties between 71 and 157, Cen-
tre Democrats between 7 and 20; Elderly Alliance 81, List Pim Fortuyn 198, and Liveable
Netherlands 54; figures concerning all voters are based on Ns between 1091 and 1426.
12  With respect to the orthodox Protestant parties these figures include some voters
(7 per cent) who evaluated one orthodox Protestant party most positively, but intended to
vote for another orthodox Protestant party.
13  The results of the logistic regression analyses are shown in Table N.8.
The range of the number of seats of the party preference in the figure has deliber-
ately been set from 0 to 55. These numbers of seats are about the range of the observa-
tions: the size of the parties on which the data are based ranged from 1 to 54 (see Table E.1
in Appendix E). The model also makes predictions for party sizes that are larger, but be-
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cause these predictions are not based on observations in that range those predictions
should not be given too much weight.
14  The differences in terms of Nagelkerke R2 were 1 per cent in 1986, 6 per cent in
1994, 1 per cent in 1998, and 10 per cent in 2002 – all in favour of models based on coali-
tion preferences.
15  In the four years the differences in Nagelkerke R2 were 0.02, 0.00, 0.04, and 0.01.
16  Whereas in 1986 and 1994 these results could at least in part be a methodological
artefact resulting from the fact that coalition preferences could only include the four ma-
jor parties, this cannot account for the same findings in the other years.
17  Those familiar with attitude-behaviour research will notice the similarity between
prospective attitudes and the evaluations of behavioural beliefs that Fishbein and Ajzen
(1975) focused on, which concerned the belief that behaviour will lead to certain conse-
quences. Despite the similarity, there are some differences. A first difference is that
Fishbein and Ajzen did not conceive of the evaluations of beliefs as attitudes in the same
way as attitudes towards objects and attitudes towards behaviour. Secondly, they did not
conceive the consequences of the behaviour in terms of prospects. Arguably, a more im-
portant difference is that Fishbein and Ajzen’s conception more or less implies that indi-
viduals first consider behaviour, and then reason what the consequences of that behav-
iour would be. The thought of the behaviour then precedes the thought of the prospect.
According to the ideas presented in this study the process is reversed. In the electoral
context this means that according to Fishbein and Ajzen’s view voters think about the
possibility of voting for a particular party, realise that this might help that party become
largest, feel that they would like that to happen, and therefore like the idea of voting for
that party. According to the view presented in this study voters think about the possibility
that a particular party becomes largest, feel that they would like this to happen, realise
that voting for that party might help it become largest, and therefore like the idea of vot-
ing for that party.
TABLE N.8  Relationship between the size of the preferred party and the chance of a non-sin-
cere voting intention (results of logistic regression)
1986 1994 1998 2002
constant - 0.41 - 1.59 - 0.63 - 0.96
B-value - 0.066 - 0.031 - 0.053 - 0.038
(S.E.) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Nagelkerke R2 0.24 0.06 0.12 0.08
(N) (1127) (1091) (1396) (1426)
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N E D E R L A N D S E
S A M E N VA T T I N G
DE STANDAARDSTEM
Een psychologische studie
naar stemgedrag bij verkiezingen
DEEL I – INLEIDING EN ACHTERGROND
HOOFDSTUK  1:  INLEIDING
Waarom stemmen mensen zoals ze dat doen? Dat is de centrale vraag van dit
onderzoek. Waarom steunen kiezers een bepaalde kandidaat of partij, en niet een
andere? Deze vraag is niet nieuw en er zijn al veel antwoorden gegeven. Toch is ons
inzicht in stemgedrag nog beperkt. In zekere zin schijnt het vandaag de dag nog
beperkter dan enkele decennia geleden. De verklarende kracht van modellen die
gebaseerd zijn op sociaal-demografische factoren, zoals religie en sociale klasse, is
sterk afgenomen. Hetzelfde geldt voor modellen die gebaseerd zijn op ideologie en
beleidsvoorkeuren. We zullen ons daarom moeten wenden tot andere benaderingen.
Eén mogelijkheid is om te kiezen voor een psychologische benadering. De
kerngedachte hierin is dat om te begrijpen waarom mensen op een bepaalde manier
stemmen, we moeten begrijpen wat er in hun hoofd omgaat.
Stemmen wordt vaak opgevat als een combinatie van twee beslissingen of
vragen: wel of niet gaan stemmen, en op wie gaan stemmen? Alhoewel beide
beslissingen met elkaar verband kunnen houden, worden ze in
verkiezingsonderzoek (een vakgebied dat in het Engels wel psephology wordt
genoemd) als onafhankelijke beslissingen behandeld. Dit onderzoek hanteert
dezelfde benadering en is alleen gericht op de vraag op wie kiezers stemmen. In
deze studie is de vraag dus waarom mensen stemmen zoals ze dat doen, gegeven het
feit dat ze stemmen. Daarbij wordt stemgedrag in dit onderzoek gedefinieerd in
termen van partijen, aangezien in de meeste democratieën partijen een centrale rol
spelen. Dit betekent dat de onderzoeksvraag in de praktijk overeenkomt met
waarom kiezers op (een kandidaat van) een bepaalde partij stemmen.
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Omdat alle kiezers gebruikmaken van eenzelfde soort hersenen, zullen de
psychologische processen die aan hun stemgedrag ten grondslag liggen niet
wezenlijk verschillen tussen kiezers, verkiezingen, landen, of tijdstippen. Toch is
vanuit het perspectief van verkiezingsonderzoek Nederland bijzonder interessant.
Eén reden daarvoor is dat in termen van psychologische modellen ter verklaring van
stemgedrag Nederland een geval apart is gebleken: bestaande modellen konden er
niet goed worden toegepast. Bij Nederlandse kiezers kon geen zinvol onderscheid
gemaakt worden tussen partij-identificatie (een centraal concept in psychologische
modellen) en stemkeus, en daarom werd het belangrijkste psychologische model
niet bruikbaar geacht. Nederland is ook interessant omdat recente verkiezingen
opvallende veranderingen teweegbrachten. Het meest in het oog springend is het feit
dat in 2002 de lijst van Pim Fortuyn, die zelf negen dagen voor de verkiezingen werd
vermoord, de Tweede Kamer binnenkwam met 26 zetels. Daarmee werd de LPF
ineens de tweede partij van het land. Een laatste reden waarom Nederland geschikt
is voor deze studie, is dat de benodigde onderzoeksgegevens beschikbaar zijn. De
enquêtes van het Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek (NKO) in 1986, 1994, 1998 en 2002
bevatten vragen op basis waarvan centrale ideeën van dit onderzoek kunnen worden
getoetst.
HOOFDSTUK  2 :  DE  PSYCHOLOGIE  VAN  DE  THEORIE  TER  VERKLARING  VAN
STEMGEDRAG
Het werk van commerciële onderzoeksbureaus, die in de jaren dertig van de
twintigste eeuw voor het eerst op grote schaal gegevens verzamelden over
stemgedrag, legde de basis voor belangrijke studies naar stemgedrag in de
Verenigde Staten. De eerste was The People’s Choice (1944) van Paul Lazarsfeld en zijn
collega’s van Columbia University. Het doel van hun onderzoek was om het
psychologische proces van meningsvorming te onderzoeken, maar de auteurs
kwamen uiteindelijk tot de conclusie dat stemgedrag goed kon worden verklaard op
basis van sociaal-demografische kenmerken, waaronder sociaal-economische status,
godsdienst, en woonplaats (stad versus platteland). De mechanismen die sociaal-
demografische kenmerken verbinden aan stemgedrag werden meer uitvoerig
behandeld in hun tweede studie, Voting (Berelson et al. 1954). In Europa zijn de
verwante ideeën die Seymour Martin Lipset en Stein Rokkan uiteenzetten in Party
Systems and Voter Alignments (1967) vooral van belang. Zij toonden onder meer dat in
Nederland in de jaren vijftig de invloed op stemgedrag van sociaal-demografische
kenmerken, in het bijzonder godsdienst en kerkgang, zeer sterk was. Deze studies
sluiten aan bij de sociologische benadering, die wordt gekenmerkt door aandacht
voor sociaal-demografische kenmerken en groepslidmaatschap als verklarende
factoren. Vanuit psychologisch perspectief is de vraag hoe sociaal-demografische
kenmerken worden omgezet in stemkeuzes. In methodologische termen: welke
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psychologische variabelen worden beïnvloed door sociaal-demografische
kenmerken, die daardoor indirect van invloed zijn op de stemkeus?
In reactie op de studies van de onderzoekers van Columbia University,
publiceerden Angus Campbell en zijn collega’s van de University of Michigan The
Voter Decides (1954) en The American Voter (1960). De sociologische benadering kan
stemgedrag niet goed verklaren, zo stelden de onderzoekers uit Michigan, en de
aandacht dient te worden verschoven van sociale naar psychologische kenmerken.
De kern van Michigan-theorie, die als belangrijkste representant van de
psychologische benadering wordt gezien, is het idee dat kiezers beelden in hun
hoofd hebben, en dat deze beelden bepalen op wie ze stemmen. De schakel tussen de
beelden en de stemkeus bestaat uit het idee van psychologische krachten, die
optreden omdat de beelden worden geëvalueerd. De beelden worden als positief of
negatief ervaren. In The American Voter was dit vervat in zes “partij-attitudes”
(partisan attitudes – evaluaties met betrekking tot kandidaten, beleid, en
groepsbelangen), die beïnvloed werden door de partij-identificatie van kiezers, die
op haar beurt werd bepaald door sociaal-demografische kenmerken. In de analyses
werden partij-attitudes geconstrueerd op grond van beleidsvoorkeuren van kiezers
en hun opmerkingen over de kandidaten. Partij-identificatie werd gemeten door
kiezers te vragen of zij zichzelf doorgaans beschouwen als Republikein, Democraat,
of onafhankelijk.
Vanuit psychologisch perspectief is het van belang om op te merken dat partij-
attitudes niet beschouwd moeten worden als indicatoren voor hoe de psyche werkt.
Het aangebrachte onderscheid werd slechts gemaakt voor analytische doeleinden.
De studies uit Michigan zijn dus psychologisch in de zin dat de verklaring voor
stemgedrag is gebaseerd op informatie in het hoofd van kiezers. Maar ze zijn niet
psychologisch in de zin dat mentale processen die ten grondslag liggen aan
stemgedrag beschreven worden, of dat de gehanteerde concepten psychologische
entiteiten zijn. Een andere constatering is dat in de sociale psychologie attitudes
doorgaans geconceptualiseerd worden als posities op een dimensie die uiteenloopt
van zeer positief tot zeer negatief, terwijl partij-attitudes posities zijn op een
dimensie die uiteenloopt van sterk pro-Republikeins tot sterk pro-Democratisch.
Daarnaast is het waard om te vermelden dat Jacques Thomassen (1976) heeft laten
zien dat in Nederland partij-identificatie, dat hier werd gemeten door kiezers te
vragen of zij zichzelf beschouwen als aanhanger van een bepaalde politieke partij,
niet zinvol kon worden onderscheiden van stemkeus, zoals in de Verenigde Staten.
Verder wezen Cees van der Eijk en Kees Niemöller (1983) op een ander probleem: in
Nederland identificeerden kiezers zich met meer dan één partij, wat volgens hen niet
in overeenstemming is met het concept van partij-identificatie.
Een economische benadering wordt meestal onderscheiden als derde
benadering. An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) van Anthony Downs wordt
gezien als de belangrijkste vertegenwoordiger. Volgens zijn theorie proberen kiezers
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nut, dat zijn ontlenen aan het beleid van de regering, te maximaliseren. Rationele
kiezers evalueren elk beleidsvoorstel van een partij, zetten deze afzonderlijke
evaluaties om in een totale evaluatie voor elke partij, en vergelijken ten slotte de
evaluaties van de deelnemende partijen om hun stemkeus te bepalen. Echter, omdat
kiezers nooit volledig geïnformeerd kunnen raken over alle beleidsvoorstellen,
kunnen ze ideologie als richtsnoer gebruiken. Downs veronderstelde dat partijen ten
aanzien van alle issues standpunten innemen, die kunnen worden gepositioneerd
(en dus gemiddeld) op een links-rechts dimensie. Kiezers stemmen dan op de partij
die het dichtst bij hen staat. Downs memoreerde ook dat kiezers uit gewoonte steeds
op dezelfde partij kunnen stemmen, of kunnen afgaan op het oordeel van iemand
anders. Alhoewel Downs stelde dat zijn theorie geen psychologische theorie is, maar
slechts verklaart hoe kiezers zich zouden gedragen als zij rationeel zouden handelen,
is in termen van drie methoden die zijn onderscheiden om stemgedrag te
onderzoeken (externe gebeurtenissen bestuderen, de sociale omgeving bestuderen,
en psychologische variabelen bestuderen) zijn theorie toch duidelijk een voorbeeld
van de psychologische benadering.
Alhoewel de onderscheiden benaderingen verschillende sferen oproepen,
vullen ze elkaar eerder aan dan dat ze tegenstrijdig zijn. Tegelijkertijd delen
theorieën ter verklaring van stemgedrag een reeks assumpties of
vooronderstellingen over hoe de psyche van kiezers werkt. Samen vormen deze wat
het paradigma van verkiezingsonderzoek kan worden genoemd. Eén van deze
assumpties is het idee dat alle kiezers hun gedachten op dezelfde manier opmaken
en daardoor in één causaal model passen (assumptie van causale homogeniteit).
Daarnaast wordt meestal uitgegaan van het idee dat kiezers hun keuze bepalen door
de meest positief geëvalueerde partij of kandidaat te steunen (assumptie van een
standaardstem). Aanvullend wordt doorgaans verondersteld dat hoezeer men
partijen of kandidaten positief of negatief evalueert afhankelijk is van het beeld dan
men van hen heeft en van een waardering voor dat beeld. Weer een andere
assumptie is dat de reeks kenmerken die evaluaties van partijen of kandidaten
bepalen voor alle partijen en kandidaten hetzelfde is (assumptie van homogeniteit in
de basis voor evaluatie). De laatste overeenkomst heeft niet betrekking op wat
modellen ter verklaring van stemgedrag zeggen, maar wat ze niet zeggen. Wat
vooral ontbreekt is een visie op de beslismechanismen die aan het werk zijn.
HOOFDSTUK  3 :  ATTITUDE-GEDRAGMODELLEN  EN  STEMGEDRAG
Attitudes worden al lang beschouwd als één van de belangrijkste concepten in de
sociale psychologie. De twee belangrijkste redenen daarvoor zijn dat attitudes
percepties beïnvloeden en gedrag sturen. Daarom kan bij het bestuderen van
stemgedrag vanuit een psychologisch perspectief het attitudeconcept van belang
worden geacht.
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De vraag hoe een attitude kan worden gedefinieerd is niet eenvoudig te
beantwoorden. Ondanks vele decennia van onderzoek naar attitudes – of misschien
wel juist daardoor – is er geen overeenstemming over een conceptuele definitie. Toen
het concept werd geïntroduceerd, werden attitudes vooral gezien als “ten opzichte
van iets”, en niet als “een toestand van iemand”. Latere definities verschillen van de
oorspronkelijke opvatting en attitudes werden beschouwd als de neiging van
individuen om op een bepaalde manier te reageren. Milton Rosenberg en Carl
Hovland (1960) leverden een invloedrijke bijdrage door in te gaan op het soort
reacties dat attitudes oproepen. Zij stelden dat attitudes niet direct kunnen worden
waargenomen en gemeten, maar alleen de reacties die ze oproepen. Deze reacties, zo
stelden zij, vallen in drie categorieën uiteen: een cognitieve, een affectieve, en een
gedragscomponent. Zij concludeerden dat voor de meeste onderzoekers de
affectieve component centraal staat. Sindsdien hebben verschillende
toonaangevende onderzoekers dezelfde conclusie getrokken, namelijk dat affect
centraal is. De term evaluatie wordt daarbij vaak als synoniem gebruikt. De definitie
van Alice Eagly en Shelly Chaiken (1993: 1), die tegenwoordig vaak wordt
gehanteerd, omschrijft een attitude als “een psychologische neiging die wordt
uitgedrukt door een bepaalde entiteit in zekere mate gunstig of ongunstig te
evalueren”. Evaluaties die gunstig of ongunstig zijn is het centrale element
geworden in de definitie van een attitude.
Gedrag kan worden verklaard op grond van attitudes ten aanzien van objecten
waar het gedrag betrekking op heeft. De algemene bevinding is dat als een attitude
ten aanzien van een object meer positief is, gedrag ten gunste van dat object meer
waarschijnlijk is. Veel onderzoek naar de relatie tussen attitudes en gedrag is gedaan
binnen het kader van bepaalde attitude-gedragmodellen. De “theorie van
beredeneerd gedrag” (Theory of Reasoned Action) van Martin Fishbein en Icek Ajzen
(1975) wordt in het algemeen beschouwd als het belangrijkste model. In de kern stelt
deze theorie dat individuen hun besluit om bepaald gedrag te vertonen baseren op
hun inschatting van de gevolgen van het vertonen van het gedrag. In de theorie van
beredeneerd gedrag hebben attitudes betrekking op het vertonen van bepaald
gedrag (ten aanzien van een object). Russell Fazio (1986) benadrukte in zijn model
dat gedrag vaak niet het gevolg is van zulke bewuste afwegingen inzake de gevolgen
van gedrag. In plaats daarvan worden veel soorten gedrag min of meer automatisch
opgeroepen door positieve attitudes ten aanzien van het object van het gedrag. Alice
Eagly en Shelly Chaiken (1993) benadrukten dat deze twee modellen elkaar niet
uitsluiten. Hun eigen model suggereert, wanneer toegepast in de electorale context,
dat kiezers op een bepaalde partij kunnen stemmen simpelweg omdat ze die partij
graag mogen, maar ook omdat ze uit gewoonte op die partij stemmen, omdat ze zich
identificeren met stemmen op die partij, omdat ze menen dat dit van ze wordt
verwacht (of zich daartoe verplicht voelen), of omdat ze de gevolgen van stemmen
op die partij positief evalueren.
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Attitude-gedragonderzoek naar stemgedrag leidt tot een aantal conclusies. De
belangrijkste is dat men met attitudes ten aanzien van partijen en kandidaten een
eind komt als het gaat om het verklaren van stemgedrag. Hoe mensen stemmen
blijkt sterk te worden bepaald door de mate waarin men de deelnemende partijen of
kandidaten positief of negatief evalueert. Een tweede reeks samenhangende
conclusies heeft betrekking op het onderzoeksontwerp en de statistische methode
om de invloed van attitudes te analyseren. Als gedrag betrekking heeft op een keuze
uit een reeks alternatieven, zoals bij stemmen, dan is het van belang om niet naar de
afzonderlijke attitudes te kijken, maar naar hun onderlinge samenhang. De centrale
hypothese is dat kiezers stemmen op de partij (of kandidaat) ten aanzien waarvan
hun attitude het meest gunstig is. Het betreffende attitude-object kan de voorkeur
genoemd worden. Een andere conclusie is dat er een verschil is tussen de vraag of
kiezers een voorkeur hebben voor een bepaalde partij en of zij van plan zijn er op te
stemmen. Attitudes ten aanzien van partijen en kandidaten kunnen dus betekenisvol
worden onderscheiden van stemintenties, die een schakel vormen bij de invloed van
attitudes op stemgedrag. Een laatste conclusie is dat stemgedrag, evenals ander
gedrag, het gevolg kan zijn van verschillende psychologische processen. Kiezers
kunnen afgaan op hun attitudes ten aanzien van de deelnemende partijen en
kandidaten en stemmen op de meest gunstig geëvalueerde, maar kiezers kunnen
ook afwegen wat de gevolgen zijn van hun gedrag, bijvoorbeeld in termen van de
uitkomst van de verkiezingen. Andere manieren waarop kiezers een keuze kunnen
maken zijn door terug te vallen op een gewoonte of het advies van anderen te
volgen.
DEEL II – EEN SYNTHESE VAN PSYCHOLOGIE
EN VERKIEZINGSONDERZOEK
HOOFDSTUK  4:  HET  STANDAARDSTEM-MODEL
De vraag waarom mensen stemmen zoals ze dat doen wordt in dit hoofdstuk
beantwoord door het standaardstem-model (sincere vote model) te presenteren. De
introductie van het begrip van een “standaardstem” wordt doorgaans toegeschreven
aan Robin Farquharson. In Theory of Voting (1969) poogde hij om een lacune in de
literatuur van de sociale-keuzetheorie op te vullen, namelijk het ontbreken van
aandacht voor strategieën die kiezers kunnen hanteren om een door hen gewenste
uitkomst te bewerkstelligen. Om zulke strategieën te kunnen analyseren gebruikte
hij het idee van “sincere voting” als uitgangspunt of standaard. Dit zou men letterlijk
kunnen vertalen als “oprecht stemmen”, maar wat vrijer vertaald zou men kunnen
spreken van het uitbrengen van een “standaardstem”. Farquharson merkte op dat
“de eenvoudigste assumptie die men kan maken over het gedrag van kiezers is dat
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hun stemgedrag in overeenstemming is met hun voorkeursrangorde” (p. 17). Zulk
gedrag betitelde hij als “oprecht stemmen”. In sommige gevallen is zulk gedrag niet
voordelig voor een kiezer, omdat een andere stem zou resulteren in een meer
wenselijke uitkomst (meer wenselijk vanuit het perspectief van de kiezer). Kiezers
kunnen dan als strategie hanteren om op een andere manier te stemmen dan
standaard. Dit staat bekend als strategisch stemmen. Deze studie stelt voor om een
standaardstem niet te definiëren in termen van voorkeuren ten aanzien van de
uitkomst van een verkiezingsproces (als alternatieve zetelverdelingen, zoals
Farquharson deed), maar in termen van voorkeuren ten aanzien van de
deelnemende partijen. Een stem wordt gekwalificeerd als standaardstem als deze
wordt uitgebracht ten gunste van de partij waar de voorkeur van een kiezer naar uit
gaat, dat wil zeggen een partij die positiever wordt geëvalueerd dan welke andere
partij dan ook.
Het standaardstem-model is gericht op het verklaren waarom bij een bepaalde
verkiezing individuen stemmen op (een kandidaat van) een bepaalde partij. Volgens
het model is het belangrijkste concept om stemgedrag te verklaren dat van attitudes
ten aanzien van partijen. Op welke partij mensen stemmen hangt af van hoezeer zij
de individuele deelnemende partijen wel of niet mogen. In overeenstemming met
het idee dat evaluatie een centraal aspect is van attitudes, kunnen we in plaats van
“attitudes ten aanzien van partijen” ook spreken van “partijevaluaties”. Om aan te
geven hoe partijevaluaties stemgedrag bepalen bevat het model aanvullend twee
andere concepten: partijvoorkeur en stemintentie. Wat van belang is, is niet hoezeer
men een bepaalde partij wel of niet mag, maar of men deze meer mag dan de andere
partijen. Partijevaluaties moeten dus worden bekeken in termen van hoe zij in hun
onderlinge samenhang partijvoorkeuren vormen. De partijvoorkeur bestaat uit die
partij (of partijen) die een kiezer het meest positief evalueert. Als kiezers met een
verkiezing worden geconfronteerd, vormen zij een stemintentie in overeenstemming
met hun partijvoorkeur. Stemintenties behelzen het plan om te gaan stemmen op
(een kandidaat van) een bepaalde partij bij een bepaalde aanstaande verkiezing. Op
welk moment kiezers besluiten op wie ze gaan stemmen, en zo dus een stemintentie
vormen, kan van persoon tot persoon verschillen. Het model veronderstelt dat als
kiezers in het stemhokje staan, het enige wat zij doen is hun bestaande stemintentie
omzetten in stemgedrag. Alles tezamen betekent dit dat kiezers zullen stemmen op
de partij die zij het meest positief evalueren. Hiernaar kan worden verwezen als “de
standaardstem-hypothese” (sincere vote hypothesis). Variabelen die niet in het model
zijn opgenomen (exogene variabelen) worden verondersteld stemgedrag primair te
beïnvloeden door hun invloed op partijevaluaties. Vanzelfsprekend rijst de vraag
waarom kiezers partijen in bepaalde mate gunstig of ongunstig evalueren. Deze
vraag wordt behandeld in hoofdstuk 6. In het standaardstem-model worden
partijevaluaties als gegeven beschouwd.
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Enkele aanvullende opmerkingen over de concepten uit het model en hun
onderlinge relaties zijn op hun plaats. Om te beginnen kan met betrekking tot
partijvoorkeur onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen een enkelvoudige
partijvoorkeur en een meervoudige partijvoorkeur. Als kiezers één partij positiever
evalueren dan alle andere, dan spreken we van een enkelvoudige partijvoorkeur.
Kiezers kunnen ook meer dan één partij het meest positief evalueren; in dat geval
spreken we van een meervoudige partijvoorkeur. Ten tweede kan met betrekking tot
partijvoorkeur onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen richting en sterkte. Welke partij
men de voorkeur geeft kan de richting van de partijvoorkeur worden genoemd.
Hoezeer deze partij positiever wordt geëvalueerd dan welke andere partij dan ook
kan de sterkte van de partijvoorkeur worden genoemd. Ten derde kunnen
partijevaluaties, partijvoorkeuren, en stemintenties veranderen als de tijd vordert.
Daardoor is het mogelijk dat wanneer stemintenties enige tijd voor de verkiezingen
worden gemeten, er een discrepantie bestaat tussen stemintentie en stemgedrag. Een
laatste kwestie betreft het concept van een standaardstem. Een stem wordt een
standaardstem genoemd als deze uitgebracht wordt op de partij die een kiezer het
meest positief evalueert, ofwel wanneer partijvoorkeur en stemgedrag met elkaar in
overeenstemming zijn. Omdat kiezers andere redenen kunnen hebben om op een
partij te stemmen die niet hun partijvoorkeur is dan strategische, wordt voor het
tegenovergestelde van een standaardstem de term niet-standaardstem gehanteerd.
HOOFDSTUK  5 :  BESLISREGELS  VOOR  HET  STEMMEN
Volgens het standaardstem-model kan de stemkeus van kiezers worden verklaard
op basis van hun evaluaties van de deelnemende partijen. Maar stemmen behelst
meer dan het vergelijken van partijevaluaties. Het doel van dit hoofdstuk is om daar
meer licht op te werpen door te kijken naar verschillende beslisregels die kiezers
kunnen hanteren. De gepresenteerde visie is gebaseerd op twee assumpties. Ten
eerste wordt verondersteld dat kiezers niet alle voor- en nadelen van hun keuze
afwegen, maar gebruikmaken van eenvoudige beslisregels (in het Engels heuristics
genoemd). De tweede veronderstelling is dat er verschillende beslisregels zijn waar
kiezers gebruik van kunnen maken (assumptie van causale heterogeniteit).
De essentie van menselijk gedrag is volgens veel auteurs dat het doelgericht is.
Van kiezers kan dan verwacht worden dat ze de toekomst overdenken en hun keuze
baseren op evaluaties van mogelijke verkiezingsuitkomsten. Zulke uitkomsten
kunnen we toekomstscenario’s of perspectieven noemen en de evaluaties ervan
perspectief-evaluaties. Het overeenkomstige keuzemechanisme kan de beslisregel
van de verkiezingsuitkomst-voorkeur worden genoemd. Dit kan betrekking hebben
op de partijsamenstelling van de regering (coalitievoorkeur), wie minister-president
wordt, de grootte van partijen, of het gevoerde beleid. Ten tweede kunnen kiezers
hun stem baseren op hun oordeel over de prestaties van de zittende regering
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(regeringsevaluaties). De overeenkomstige beslisregel is eenvoudig: als individuen
tevreden zijn met de prestaties van de regering, dan stemmen ze op een
regeringspartij; zijn ze ontevreden, dan stemmen ze op de oppositie. Dit
keuzemechanisme kan de beslisregel van goedkeuring van de zittende macht
worden genoemd. Ten derde kunnen kiezers hun stem bepalen op grond van
evaluaties van de deelnemende partijen. Volgens de overeenkomstige beslisregel
stemmen kiezers op de partij die ze het meest positief evalueren. Omdat in dit
onderzoek die partij wordt aangeduid als de partijvoorkeur, kan dit de beslisregel
van de partijvoorkeur worden genoemd. Bij sommige verkiezingen, zoals
presidentsverkiezingen, draait het vooral om kandidaten. In dat geval kan verwacht
worden dat kiezers afgaan op hun evaluaties van die kandidaten. Volgens de
overeenkomstige beslisregel van de kandidaatvoorkeur stemmen kiezers op de
kandidaat die ze het meest positief evalueren. Deze beslisregel kan overigens ook
worden toegepast bij verkiezingen waarin partijen een centrale rol spelen. In plaats
van bij elke verkiezing een afzonderlijke afweging te maken, kunnen kiezers ook de
gewoonte ontwikkelen om steeds op (een kandidaat van) dezelfde partij te stemmen.
Als zij worden geconfronteerd met een verkiezing, dan zetten deze kiezers hun
gewoonte om in opnieuw eenzelfde stem. Dit keuzemechanisme kan de beslisregel
van de stemgewoonte worden genoemd. Ten slotte kunnen kiezers hun stem baseren
op steunbetuigingen voor een bepaalde partij of kandidaat door iemand anders –
bepaalde personen, groepen, of organisaties. Als kiezers hun keuze daarop baseren,
dan kunnen we spreken van de beslisregel van de steunbetuiging.
Hoe perspectief-evaluaties, regeringsevaluaties (goedkeuring van de zittende
macht), partijvoorkeur, kandidaatvoorkeur, stemgewoonte, en waargenomen
steunbetuigingen met elkaar verband houden, en hoe deze in één model kunnen
worden samengevoegd, is aangegeven in het beslisregel-model van stemgedrag
(heuristic model of voting). Het model stelt dat een stemintentie zijn oorsprong kan
vinden in elk van de zes onderscheiden concepten. Dit past bij het principe van
causale heterogeniteit. Aanvullend stelt het model dat regeringsevaluaties,
partijevaluaties, en kandidaatevaluaties stemintenties indirect kunnen beïnvloeden,
namelijk via hun invloed op perspectief-evaluaties. Er zijn verscheidene andere
factoren die vaak gebruikt worden om stemgedrag te verklaren, zoals sociaal-
demografische kenmerken, beleidsvoorkeuren, en ideologische posities. Volgens het
model hebben deze factoren geen directe invloed op stemintenties. Daarom zijn ze
niet opgenomen in het model en worden ze exogene variabelen genoemd. Dit
betekent dat de invloed van zulke factoren op stemintenties verondersteld wordt te
verlopen via de concepten uit het model.
Het beslisregel-model van stemgedrag staat op drie manieren in verband met
het standaardstem-model. Ten eerste geeft het beslisregel-model aan dat
partijevaluaties stemintenties kunnen beïnvloeden op zowel een directe manier (via
het gebruik van de beslisregel van de partijvoorkeur) als een indirecte manier (via
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hun invloed op perspectief-evaluaties en het gebruik van de beslisregel van de
verkiezingsuitkomst-voorkeur). Ten tweede maakt het beslisregel-model duidelijk
hoe kiezers met een meervoudige partijvoorkeur kunnen kiezen uit de partijen die
zij even positief evalueren. Ten derde geeft het beslisregel-model aan dat het bij
stemmen om meer gaat, en wat er meer is, dan het tot uitdrukking brengen van een
partijvoorkeur.
HOOFDSTUK  6 :  DRIE  MODELLEN  OM  PARTIJEVALUATIES  TE  VERKLAREN
Als stemgedrag sterk beïnvloed wordt door evaluaties van de deelnemende partijen,
zoals de modellen uit de voorgaande hoofdstukken veronderstellen, dan is de vraag
waarom kiezers partijen positief of negatief evalueren. Dit hoofdstuk bespreekt drie
modellen die gebruikt kunnen worden om partijevaluaties te verklaren.
Eén manier om partijevaluaties te verklaren is een model te ontwikkelen op
basis van het paradigma van verkiezingsonderzoek, dat werd besproken in
hoofdstuk 2. Zo’n model wordt hier het traditionele model (orthodox model)
genoemd. Het model is gericht op het verklaren van stemgedrag, maar kan ook
worden gebruikt om partijevaluaties te verklaren; deze evaluaties zijn namelijk
expliciet in het model opgenomen. Het te verklaren feit in dit model is het
stemgedrag van een individu. In overeenstemming met de assumptie dat kiezers de
partij steunen die zij het meest positief evalueren (assumptie van een
standaardstem), wordt stemgedrag bepaald door algemene evaluaties van de
partijen. Hiermee verschuift de vraag naar waarom kiezers partijen positief of
negatief evalueren. Volgens het model is dit afhankelijk van zowel de gepercipieerde
eigenschappen van de betreffende partij als de eigenschappen van de betreffende
kiezer. Partij-eigenschappen worden niet alleen waargenomen door kiezers, maar
ook geëvalueerd. Hoe kiezers partij-eigenschappen evalueren is afhankelijk van hun
persoonlijke eigenschappen.
Milton Lodge en zijn collega’s (1989) hebben een alternatieve visie
geformuleerd in het indruk-gerichte model (impression-driven model) van kandidaat-
evaluaties, ook wel bekend als het on-line model. Volgens dit model zullen kiezers
telkens wanneer zijn informatie met betrekking tot een kandidaat tot zich nemen,
een algemene evaluatie van die kandidaat bijstellen, een zogenaamde “running
tally”. De kerngedachte is dat de informatie op basis waarvan evaluaties worden
bijgesteld goed kan worden vergeten, terwijl de invloed op de evaluatie blijft
voortbestaan. Hierdoor hoeft de informatie met betrekking tot een kandidaat die
kiezers in hun geheugen hebben opgeslagen niet in overeenstemming te zijn met de
manier waarop de kandidaat wordt geëvalueerd. Ten aanzien van partijen kunnen
we een alternatief model ter verklaring van stemgedrag formuleren door het on-line
model te combineren met het idee dat kiezers stemmen op de partij die ze het meest
positief evalueren. Het verschil met het traditionele model betreft wat geëvalueerd
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wordt: percepties die in het geheugen liggen opgeslagen, of informatie die ooit
verwerkt is maar niet langer opgeslagen hoeft te liggen in het geheugen.
Een derde model komt tegemoet aan verscheidene tekortkomingen van het
traditionele model en het on-line model en houdt tegelijkertijd rekening met de rol die
emoties spelen. Volgens dit model worden partijevaluaties gevormd en bijgesteld op
basis van tijdelijke emotionele reacties die het gevolg zijn van het verwerken van
informatie in het korte-termijn geheugen. Wanneer individuen informatie
verwerken, dan zullen ze deze automatisch evalueren. Voor zover zulke tijdelijke
emotionele reacties worden toegeschreven aan politieke partijen, kan dit leiden tot
bijstelling van de evaluatie van de betreffende partij en zo een blijvende invloed
hebben. Het model geeft aan dat informatie die leidt tot een emotionele reactie
waargenomen informatie kan zijn (bijvoorbeeld door het lezen van een krant of
praten met vrienden), maar ook informatie die wordt opgeroepen uit het lange-
termijn geheugen. De laatste wordt ook automatisch geëvalueerd. Het model wordt
het emotie-integratie model van partijevaluaties (emotion-integration model of party
evaluations) genoemd, omdat partijevaluaties beschouwd worden als een gevolg van
emoties die worden ervaren met betrekking tot partijen; deze emoties worden
geïntegreerd in algemene evaluaties van de partijen.
DEEL III  – EEN ANALYSE VAN VIER
TWEEDE-KAMERVERKIEZINGEN
HOOFDSTUK  7:  EMPIRISCHE  TOETSING  VAN  HET  STANDAARDSTEM-MODEL
In dit hoofdstuk wordt het standaardstem-model empirisch getoetst door het toe te
passen op de Tweede-Kamerverkiezingen van 1986, 1994, 1998, en 2002 op grond van
gegevens van het betreffende Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek (NKO). De kern van het
NKO bestond uit twee interviews met een grote steekproef kiezers. De eerste serie
interviews werd gehouden in de weken voorafgaand aan de verkiezingen, terwijl de
tweede serie werd gehouden kort na de verkiezingen. Vragen met betrekking tot
partijevaluaties en stemintenties werden in het eerste interview gesteld, vragen met
betrekking tot stemgedrag in het tweede.
Om partijevaluaties te meten werd respondenten een kaart getoond met daarop
een lijn met op gelijke afstand cijfers van 0 tot 100 (alle tientallen). Een score van 0
werd voorzien van het label “zeer onsympathiek”, een score van 50 van het label
“niet sympathiek, maar ook niet onsympathiek”, en een score van 100 van het label
“zeer sympathiek”. In dit onderzoek zijn alle scores afgerond op tientallen. De
metingen voor afzonderlijke partijen kunnen worden gecombineerd om zowel de
richting als de sterkte van de partijvoorkeur te bepalen, alsmede om te bepalen of
kiezers een enkelvoudige of meervoudige partijvoorkeur hadden. Het interview
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bevatte ook vragen naar de stemintenties van respondenten. Om te beginnen werd
gevraagd of men zou gaan stemmen bij de aanstaande Tweede-Kamerverkiezingen.
Indien men bevestigend antwoordde, werd vervolgens gevraagd op welke partij
men zou gaan stemmen. Die laatste vraag wordt in dit onderzoek gehanteerd als
maat voor stemintentie. Hoe kiezers daadwerkelijk stemden, het stemgedrag, werd
bepaald door kiezers hiernaar te vragen in het interview na de verkiezingen.
Het standaardstem-model doet voorspellingen over twee relaties: van kiezers
wordt verwacht dat ze een stemintentie vormen ten gunste van de partij die ze het
meest positief evalueren, en dat ze stemmen conform hun stemintentie.
Dientengevolge wordt van kiezers ook verwacht dat ze stemmen op de partij die ze
het meest positief evalueren. Van de kiezers met een enkelvoudige partijvoorkeur
was 85 tot 92 procent van plan te stemmen op de meest positief geëvalueerde partij.
Van de kiezers met en meervoudige partijvoorkeur waren de percentages ongeveer
hetzelfde (rond 90 procent). Verder bracht bij elke verkiezing ongeveer 85 procent
van de kiezers zijn stem uit op de partij waarop men van plan was te stemmen toen
men voor de verkiezingen werd ondervraagd, terwijl ongeveer 15 procent
uiteindelijk op een andere partij stemde. Van kiezers die nog niet wisten op mie men
zou gaan stemmen toen men voor de verkiezingen werd ondervraagd (zwevende
kiezers), kan worden verwacht dat zij uiteindelijk stemden in overeenstemming met
hun partijvoorkeur. Het aantal zwevende kiezers dat zich gedroeg zoals verwacht
was echter tamelijk laag vergelijken met de cijfers ten aanzien van de kiezers die al
een beslissing hadden genomen: tot 46 procent van de zwevende kiezers stemde
niet-standaard.
Hoe sterk is de steun voor het standaardstem-model als het gaat om het
verklaren van stemgedrag, direct op basis van partijvoorkeur, voor het electoraat als
geheel? Bij elke verkiezing stemde een ruime meerderheid op de partij die men het
meest positief evalueerde. Dit percentage nam echter af van 85 procent tot 72
procent. Bovendien, terwijl in 1986 het stemgedrag van 68 procent van de kiezers
correct kon worden voorspeld op basis van de toegekende sympathiescores, nam dit
percentage af tot 46 procent in 2002. De overige kiezers brachten ofwel een
standaardstem uit maar hadden een meervoudige partijvoorkeur, waardoor hun
keuze niet kon worden voorspeld, ofwel ze stemden niet-standaard. Meest
opvallend is de toename van het aantal kiezers dat niet-standaard stemde: van 15
procent in 1986 tot 26 procent in 2002. Daarnaast nam het percentage kiezers met een
meervoudige partijvoorkeur in deze periode toe van 20 procent tot 36 procent.
Kortom, alhoewel de steun voor de standaardstem-hypothese sterk is, is de kracht
van die steun door de jaren heen wel afgenomen.
Aanvullende analyses laten zien dat kiezers met een sterke partijvoorkeur
minder geneigd waren om niet-standaard stemintenties te vormen dan kiezers met
gemiddeld sterke stemvoorkeuren, die daar op hun beurt weer minder toe geneigd
waren dan kiezers met een zwakke partijvoorkeur. Kiezers met een meervoudige
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partijvoorkeur namen een middenpositie in. Ten aanzien van de relatie tussen
stemintentie en stemgedrag laten de analyses zien dat kiezers met een sterke
partijvoorkeur het sterkst geneigd waren om aan hun stemintentie vast te houden,
gevolgd door kiezers met een gemiddeld sterke, die met een zwakke, en die met een
meervoudige stemvoorkeur. De rol van de sterkte van de partijvoorkeur is daarmee
zoals verwacht. De toename van het aantal kiezers met een niet-standaard
stemintentie blijkt overigens niet slechts het gevolg van veranderingen in de sterkte
van partijvoorkeuren (de gemiddelde sterkte van de partijvoorkeur nam gedurende
de onderzochte periode aanzienlijk af). In alle vier categorieën kwamen niet-
standaard stemintenties door de jaren heen wat vaker voor.
HOOFDSTUK  8 :  DE  NIET-STANDAARDSTEM
De centrale vraag in dit hoofdstuk is waarom kiezers er de voorkeur aan geven om
op een andere partij te stemmen dan de partij die ze het meest positief evalueren. In
dit verband zijn de beslisregels voor het stemmen die in hoofdstuk 5 zijn besproken
bijzonder bruikbaar. Met uitzondering van de beslisregel van de steunbetuiging,
kunnen al deze beslisregels worden onderzocht op basis van vragen die waren
opgenomen in de enquêtes waarop dit onderzoek is gebaseerd. De resultaten van de
analyses laten zien dat als kiezers van plan waren te stemmen op een partij die ze
niet het meest positief evalueerden, zij vaak de voorkeur gaven aan een regering met
deze partij, tevreden waren over hoe de regering waarin deze partij had
deelgenomen het had gedaan, de lijsttrekker van de partij sympathiek vonden, of
ook al bij de vorige kamerverkiezingen op de partij hadden gestemd.
Het relatieve belang van elke beslisregel, alsmede de mate waarin zij
gezamenlijk niet-standaard stemintenties kunnen verklaren, is onderzocht met
behulp van logistische regressie-analyse. Elk jaar was de coalitievoorkeur significant
van invloed: als de coalitievoorkeur van kiezers niet de partijvoorkeur bevatte, dan
was de kans op een niet-standaard stemintentie aanzienlijk groter. Het effect was het
sterkst in 1986 en 2002. Tevredenheid met het regeringsbeleid in de afgelopen jaren
was niet significant van invloed: zodra met de andere factoren rekening werd
gehouden, konden niet-standaard stemintenties niet beter worden verklaard door
tevredenheid met het regeringsbeleid in de modellen op te nemen. Evaluaties van
lijsttrekkers waren in drie van de vier jaren van invloed op niet-standaard
stemintenties (het uitblijven van een effect in 1986 kan een methodologisch artefact
zijn, omdat verschillende lijsttrekkers niet in de enquête waren opgenomen). In het
algemeen was de invloed van evaluaties van de lijsttrekkers wat zwakker dan van de
coalitievoorkeur. De stemkeus bij de vorige kamerverkiezingen was ook van invloed.
Bij elke verkiezing waren kiezers die bij de vorige verkiezingen gestemd hadden op
hun huidige partijvoorkeur minder sterk geneigd om een niet-standaard
stemintentie te vormen; kiezers die de vorige keer op een andere partij hadden
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gestemd, hadden wat vaker een niet-standaard stemintentie. De analyses geven aan
dat de vorige stemvoorkeur een grotere bijdrage leverde aan de verklarende kracht
van het model dan welke andere factor dan ook. Maar ten aanzien van dit feit is een
waarschuwing op zijn plaats: het geheugen van kiezers kan vertekend zijn,
waardoor de invloed van vroeger stemgedrag wordt overschat. Een laatste
constatering is dat de sterkte van de partijvoorkeur de verwachte rol speelde. Als de
partijvoorkeur sterker werd, nam de kans op een niet-standaard stemintentie af.
Een tweede vraag waarop in dit hoofdstuk is ingegaan, betreft hoe kiezers met
een meervoudige stemvoorkeur een keuze maken uit de betreffende partijen.
Misschien doen ze dat op basis van hun coalitievoorkeur, tevredenheid met het
gevoerde regeringsbeleid, voorkeur voor een lijsttrekker, of stemgewoonte. Om te
beginnen is onderzocht of het voor kiezers in principe mogelijk was om de knoop
door te hakken op basis van de betreffende beslisregel. De coalitievoorkeur bood
vaak geen oplossing, omdat kiezers een coalitie wilden waarin twee of meer partijen
van hun partijvoorkeur zitting zouden nemen. Tevredenheid met het gevoerde
regeringsbeleid bood meestal ook geen soelaas, ofwel omdat kiezers noch tevreden
noch ontevreden waren over het regeringsbeleid, ofwel omdat er twee of meer
regerings- dan wel oppositiepartijen in hun partijvoorkeur waren opgenomen. De
beslisregel van de kandidaatvoorkeur en de beslisregel van de stemgewoonte
daarentegen boden beide een meerderheid van de kiezers de mogelijkheid om bij
een meervoudige partijvoorkeur de knoop door te hakken. De volgende vraag is of
in die situaties waarin een beslisregel gebruikt kon worden, kiezers ook
daadwerkelijk een stemintentie vormden zoals op basis van die beslisregel verwacht
zou worden. Met betrekking tot twee beslisregels zijn de betreffende percentages
maar liefst 80 procent: de beslisregel van de coalitievoorkeur en de beslisregel van de
stemgewoonte. Alhoewel de steun voor het idee dat de beslisregel van de
goedkeuring van de zittende macht en de beslisregel van de kandidaatvoorkeur
minder sterk is, was de stemintentie van de kiezers die deze beslisregels zouden
kunnen gebruiken in meerderheid zoals op basis daarvan verwacht zou worden. Dat
impliceert dat sommige kiezers deze beslisregels gebruikt kunnen hebben om hun
uiteindelijke keuze te maken.
HOOFDSTUK  9 :  HET  VERKLAREN  VAN  PARTIJEVALUATIES :  EEN  TRADITIONELE
BENADERING
Bij elk van de onderzochte verkiezingen was het stemgedrag van de meeste kiezers
in overeenstemming met hun partijevaluaties. Als partijevaluaties stemgedrag zo
sterk beïnvloeden, dan rijst de vraag waarom kiezers partijen in een bepaalde mate
gunstig of ongunstig evalueren. De ideeën die in hoofdstuk 6 uiteengezet zijn
kunnen helaas niet worden getoetst op basis van de enquêtes waarop dit onderzoek
is gebaseerd. Dat betekent echter niet dat partijevaluaties helemaal niet verklaard
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kunnen worden. Het minste wat gedaan kan worden, is pogen partijevaluaties te
verklaren op basis van factoren die traditioneel gebruikt zijn om stemgedrag te
verklaren en die wel in de interviews aan de orde zijn gesteld: sociaal-demografische
kenmerken, beleidsvoorkeuren, ideologische posities, tevredenheid met het
regeringsbeleid, en evaluaties van de lijsttrekkers.
De religieuze identiteit van kiezers was sterk van invloed op evaluaties van het
CDA en, vooral bij kiezers met een sterke protestantse identiteit, op evaluaties van de
kleine christelijke partijen: SGP, GPV, RPF en ChristenUnie. Evaluaties van D66,
GroenLinks, en SP werden af en toe ook beïnvloed door de religieuze identiteit van
kiezers, terwijl evaluaties van de PvdA, VVD en LPF hierdoor nauwelijks werden
beïnvloed. De invloed van identiteit in termen van sociale klasse was bij alle partijen
beperkt. Het effect van beleidsvoorkeuren verschilde van partij tot partij. Met
betrekking tot de PvdA en VVD waren de vraagstukken van inkomensverschillen
vooral van belang, terwijl het effect van het asielzoekersvraagstuk bijna net zo sterk
was. Evaluaties van het CDA en D66 werden niet sterk beïnvloed door opvattingen
ten aanzien van issues, maar bij verschillende issues trad wel een zwak effect op.
Evaluaties van GroenLinks en SP werden tamelijk sterk beïnvloed door verschillende
issues, met name die van asielzoekers en inkomensverschillen. Met betrekking tot de
kleine christelijke partijen deed het euthanasievraagstuk er sterk toe, en bij de LPF
het vraagstuk van asielzoekers. Het effect van standpunten ten aanzien hiervan op
evaluaties van de LPF was sterker dan welk ander effect van issues dan ook. De
enige factor die ongeveer even sterk van invloed was bij alle partijen, was
ideologische afstand in termen van links en rechts. In het algemeen werden
partijevaluaties tamelijk sterk beïnvloed door de gepercipieerde ideologische
afstand. Het effect van tevredenheid met regeringsbeleid liet een specifiek patroon
zien: bij regeringspartijen hadden tevredenheid en ontevredenheid een tamelijk
sterke invloed, terwijl evaluaties van oppositiepartijen niet sterk beïnvloed werden
(met uitzondering van de PvdA in 1986). Bij elke verkiezing had het sterkste effect
betrekking op de partij van de minister-president.
Evenals de sterkte van de effecten van de verschillende factoren, wisselde ook
de verklarende kracht van het multivariate model waarin de genoemde factoren
worden gecombineerd. Evaluaties van PvdA, VVD en CDA konden in 1986 goed
worden verklaard (verklaarde variantie was ongeveer 50 procent), terwijl in
daaropvolgende jaren het model minder verklarende kracht had (verklaarde
variantie varieerde tussen 20 en 35 procent). De cijfers ten aanzien van de andere
partijen wijken daar niet sterk van af, behalve dat evaluaties van D66 slecht konden
worden verklaard in de jaren dat de partij in de oppositie zat (verklaarde variantie
was 13 procent).
De verklarende kracht van het model waarin de genoemde factoren worden
gecombineerd kan als referentiepunt worden gebruikt om het mogelijke belang van
lijsttrekkers te analyseren. Als evaluaties van lijsttrekkers aan het model worden
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toegevoegd, neemt de verklarende kracht aanzienlijk toe. De mate waarin dit het
geval was varieerde van 15 procent met betrekking tot D66 in 1998 tot 46 procent met
betrekking tot de LPF in 2002. De verleiding is groot om te concluderen dat
evaluaties van lijsttrekkers dus de belangrijkste verklarende factor zijn als het gaat
om evaluaties van politieke partijen. Opnieuw moet echter een waarschuwing
worden afgegeven: de gevonden effecten kunnen het gevolg zijn van een invloed in
omgekeerde richting, namelijk invloed van partijevaluaties op evaluaties van
lijsttrekkers. Met name één resultaat doet vermoeden dat de invloed van lijsttrekkers
wordt overschat in de gepresenteerde analyses. Volgens de uitkomsten zijn
evaluaties van lijsttrekkers ook sterk van invloed op evaluaties van de kleine
Christelijke partijen, terwijl evaluaties van die partijen zeer sterk met elkaar
samenhangen, wat suggereert dat ze eenzelfde basis moeten hebben. Op grond van
de beschikbare gegevens is het niet mogelijk om goed in te schatten hoe belangrijk
evaluaties van lijsttrekkers daadwerkelijk zijn.
DEEL IV – CONCLUSIES
HOOFDSTUK  10: EEN  PSYCHOLOGISCHE  THEORIE  TER  VERKLARING  VAN
STEMGEDRAG
Het beeld dat uit dit onderzoek naar voren komt is dat van stemgedrag als het
resultaat van een twee-fasen proces. In de eerste fase verwerken kiezers informatie
en dit leidt tot de vorming en bijstelling van beelden van de regering, partijen, en
kandidaten; kiezers vormen ook een beeld van waar het bij aanstaande verkiezingen
om draait en wie steun betuigt aan een bepaalde partij of kandidaat. Daarnaast
worden in deze fase evaluaties gevormd en bijgesteld met betrekking tot de regering,
partijen, kandidaten, en mogelijke verkiezingsuitkomsten (perspectieven). In de
tweede fase besluiten kiezers op wie zij gaan stemmen op grond van hun
partijevaluaties, kandidaatevaluaties, regeringsevaluaties, perspectief-evaluaties,
waargenomen steunbetuigingen, en stemgewoonte. Ze doen dit op basis van
eenvoudige beslisregels. Concepten die traditioneel gebruikt worden om
stemgedrag te verklaren, zoals sociaal-demografische kenmerken, ideologische
posities, of beleidsvoorkeuren, hebben invloed op de stemkeus als ze invloed hebben
op de concepten die in het twee-fasen model zijn opgenomen.
De uitkomsten van de analyses die aan het twee-fasen model ten grondslag
liggen staan op gespannen voet met de assumpties die samen het paradigma van
verkiezingsonderzoek vormen. Ten eerste is de assumptie van een standaardstem,
die stelt dat alle kiezers stemmen op de partij die ze het meest positief evalueren,
uitvoerig onderzocht door het standaardstem-model te toetsen. De resultaten laten
zien dat deze assumptie onjuist is. Een flink aantal kiezers gaf er de voorkeur aan te
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stemmen op een andere partij dan die zij het meest positief evalueerden. Ten tweede
is de juistheid van de assumptie van causale homogeniteit, die stelt dat alle kiezers
op dezelfde wijze hun keuze bepalen, in twijfel getrokken. De stelling is geponeerd
dat kiezers op basis van verschillende eenvoudige beslisregels hun stem kunnen
bepalen. De analyses laten zien dat niet alle stemkeuzes kunnen worden begrepen
vanuit het perspectief van één beslisregel, niet eens dat van de beslisregel die ten
grondslag ligt aan vrijwel alle modellen ter verklaring van stemgedrag (beslisregel
van de partijvoorkeur). Echter, vrijwel alle stemkeuzes kunnen worden begrepen
vanuit het perspectief van ten minste één beslisregel. Ten derde is de juistheid van de
assumptie van homogeniteit in de basis voor evaluatie in twijfel getrokken. Ten
aanzien van politieke partijen wordt doorgaans verondersteld dat kiezers
verschillende partijen wel of niet mogen om dezelfde redenen. De analyses laten zien
dat de mate waarin de sociale identiteit, beleidsvoorkeuren, gepercipieerde
ideologische afstand, en tevredenheid met het regeringsbeleid van invloed is op
partijevaluaties verschilt per partij. In tegenstelling tot wat modellen ter verklaring
van stemgedrag veelal veronderstellen, is voor verschillende partijen de basis voor
evaluatie niet dezelfde.
Eén van de belangrijkste implicaties van dit onderzoek betreft misschien wel de
conceptualisering van gevoelens van kiezers ten aanzien van politieke partijen. De
onderzoekers uit Michigan zagen deze aanvankelijk als één van de factoren die
direct van invloed zijn op de stemkeus, maar in The American Voter (1960) stelden ze
dat gevoelens ten aanzien van partijen als een indirecte verklarende factor moest
worden beschouwd. Ze conceptualiseerden deze gevoelens in termen van
identificatie. In Europees verkiezingsonderzoek zijn gevoelens van kiezers ten
aanzien van partijen traditioneel op dezelfde manier behandeld. Volgens de visie die
in dit onderzoek is gepresenteerd, dienen gevoelens ten aanzien van partijen
beschouwd te worden als factoren die direct van invloed zijn op de stemkeus.
Bovendien wordt in dit onderzoek voorgesteld die gevoelens te conceptualiseren in
termen van evaluaties. De gepresenteerde analyses laten zien dat als gevoelens ten
aanzien van partijen op de voorgestelde manier wordt geanalyseerd, diverse
problemen die verbonden zijn aan het concept van partij-identificatie vermeden
kunnen worden. Het probleem dat Thomassen (1976) identificeerde, namelijk dat
partij-identificatie en stemkeus niet zinvol onderscheiden kunnen worden, is niet
van toepassing op partijevaluaties. Bovendien is het probleem van meervoudige
identificatie, waar Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983) op wezen, niet van toepassing
op het concept of de metingen van partijvoorkeur. Een andere vraag is of gevoelens
ten aanzien van partijen in een model ter verklaring van stemgedrag opgenomen
moeten worden. De bevinding dat het concept van partij-identificatie niet kon
worden toegepast in Nederland, heeft verscheidene onderzoekers doen concluderen
dat we ons moeten richten op identificatie in termen van sociale groepen of
ideologie. Het valt te betwijfelen of dat de beste strategie is. Politieke partijen zijn
328 THE  SINCERE  VOTE
zulke centrale objecten in het electorale proces, dat gevoelens van kiezers ten aanzien
van die partijen niet kunnen worden genegeerd als men hun stemgedrag wil
begrijpen. De enige vraag is hoe de invloed van zulke gevoelens op stemgedrag moet
worden geanalyseerd. Deze studie heeft een antwoord gegeven op die vraag.
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Stellingen 
 
behorende bij het proefschrift The Sincere Vote: A Psychological Study of Voting 
van Martin Rosema 
 
 
1.  De gangbare theorieën ter verklaring van stemgedrag bij verkiezingen 
bieden slechts beperkt inzicht in de psychologische processen die aan dat 
gedrag ten grondslag liggen. 
 
2.  In verkiezingsonderzoek dient conceptueel onderscheid gemaakt te 
worden tussen partij-evaluaties, partijvoorkeur, stemvoorkeur/stemintentie, 
en stemgedrag. 
 
3.  Kiezers kunnen voor het bepalen van hun stem gebruikmaken van 
verschillende eenvoudige beslisregels. 
 
4.  In tegenstelling tot wat in verkiezingsonderzoek veelal wordt 
verondersteld, vinden kiezers verschillende partijen niet in bepaalde mate 
sympathiek of onsympathiek om dezelfde redenen. 
 
5.  Politieke partijen zouden hun leiders beter kunnen afrekenen op 
partij-evaluaties (sympathie van kiezers voor de partij) dan op resultaten van 
verkiezingen of traditionele opiniepeilingen. 
 
6.  Panelonderzoek (zoals het Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek) krijgt pas 
meerwaarde als dezelfde vragen op verschillende momenten aan dezelfde 
personen worden gesteld. 
 
7.  Voor longitudinaal onderzoek naar de mate van politieke interesse, is de 
gebruikelijke vraag “bent u zeer, tamelijk, of niet geïnteresseerd in politiek?” 
ongeschikt. 
 
8.  “Stemwijzers” miskennen een belangrijke functie van verkiezingen, 
namelijk het laten afleggen van verantwoording over prestaties in een 
afgelopen periode, doordat zij primair zijn gebaseerd op plannen voor een 
toekomstige periode. 
 
9.  De democratie zou erbij zijn gebaat als actief stemrecht niet langer aan een 
leeftijdsgrens wordt gebonden, maar als de uitoefening ervan tot een 
bepaalde leeftijd wordt overgelaten aan ouders. 
 
10.  Voor politicologen die als zodanig aan een universiteit zijn verbonden, 
leidt het vervullen van een functie binnen een politieke partij tot onwenselijke 
partijdigheid, of op zijn minst de schijn daarvan. 
 
11.  Het toevoegen van stellingen aan een proefschrift wekt ten onrechte 
de indruk dat het geven van antwoorden belangrijker is dan het stellen van 
vragen. 
